Japanese Military Cleared For Role In Anti-Terror War

By Patrick Goodenough
CNSNews.com Pacific Rim Bureau Chief
October 29, 2001

Pacific Rim (CNSNews.com) - The United States and Britain Monday welcomed the passage of anti-terrorism legislation in Japan, which will enable its military to participate in conflict situations abroad for the first time since World War II.

The law, passed earlier Monday, expands the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) for use in a non-combatant capacity in the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism. They will thus be able to provide logistic support, surveillance, search and rescue and medical services to the combat forces.

Two separate bills passed enable the SDF to provide additional security around U.S. military bases in Japan, and allows Japan's Coast Guard to open fire on unidentified vessels suspected of criminal activity.

White House spokesman Ari Fleisher said the Japanese move "demonstrates the enduring strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance," words echoed by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.

Boucher said the U.S. also appreciated Japan's humanitarian and refugee assistance to affected countries in the western Asia region.

U.S.-led airstrikes against the Taliban and the al-Qaida terrorist network in Afghanistan in retaliation for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks have seen large numbers of Afghan refugees pour into neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

Japan's parliament approved the main bill by 140 votes to 100, the vote driven by the ruling three-party coalition. It was rushed through the parliamentary process in a faster-than-usual 25 days, after Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi - a popular conservative - voiced strong backing for the anti-terror campaign.

A British foreign office official also noted and welcomed the "speed and strength of the Japanese response."

The legislation has been highly controversial. Following Japan's expansionist aggression before and during World War II, its post-war constitution strictly prohibited the SDF from participating in military operations on foreign soil. During the 1991 Gulf War, however, Tokyo came under fire from allies for offering financial help but not tangible military assets to join the coalition against Iraq.

Despite strong political opposition - opposition Democratic Party leader Yukio Hatoyama called the decision not to require prior parliamentary approval "suicidal" - many ordinary Japanese appear to have been won over.

A weekend Kyodo News opinion poll published Monday showed 57 percent of voters supported the anti-terrorism bill, while almost 39 percent said they were opposed.

Sixty-three percent of respondents said they backed the U.S. military action in Afghanistan.

Shift in outlook

Just months ago, feelings were running high in Japan after a series of criminal incidents involving U.S. servicemen stationed in the country. A collision last February of an U.S. Navy submarine and a Japanese fisheries training vessel off Hawaii, in which nine Japanese died, added to the negative sentiment.

The events of Sept. 11 shook the nation, however. Koizumi later that month visited the scene of devastation where the World Trade Center had stood, and then in a meeting with President Bush pledged Japan's support to fight terrorism "with determination and patience."

Japan also offered $10 million in New York City rescue assistance, provided refugee relief funds to Pakistan, and lifted economic sanctions against both Pakistan and India in a move aimed at helping Pakistan's government withstand domestic opposition to backing the U.S.

The reality of terrorism has moved closer for many Japanese. Twenty-three Japanese remain missing, believed dead, in the Sept. 11 attacks. In the Kyodo survey, 78.1 percent of respondents voiced fears of possible terrorist attacks in Japan.

In a worldwide caution on Oct. 23, the State Department said there had been unconfirmed information that terrorists may target U.S. military facilities or places frequented by U.S. servicemen in Japan and Korea.

"These individuals do not distinguish between official and civilian targets," the caution said.

"The focus of the legislation was on whether we think of the U.S. terrorist incidents in New York and Washington on Sept. 11 as other people's business or as our own affair," Koizumi said after Monday's vote. "What was being questioned was our basic stance - whether or not we can share the sorrow and anger of the American people."

The legislation having been passed, the government will now draw up plans to send a naval contingent to the Indian Ocean for transport and shipment missions. Ships, possibly including one of Japan's four hi-tech Aegis guided-missile destroyers, are expected to leave by the end of November.

Their likeliest task will be to transport supplies from U.S. bases in Japan and Guam to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, where some of the U.S. bombers used in raids over Afghanistan are based.

"The passage of the anti-terrorism legislation will enable Japan's very modern and capable navy to perform logistics and intelligence operations in direct support of the U.S. Navy," noted Japan expert William Breer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

"This function will relieve American forces of these responsibilities so that they may be used elsewhere, and contribute significantly to the prosecution of the effort against terrorism," Breer said. "This is a major step forward in U.S.-Japan cooperation for both regional and global security."

ASIA: Public Pressure to Shape U.S. Military Presence in Region

By Tim Shorrock

WASHINGTON, Oct 4 — A combination of public opposition and financial instability is creating pressures on the United States and its Asian allies to scale down the number of U.S. bases and military personnel in North-east Asia, analysts of Asian politics and U.S. foreign policy say.

But populist concerns about the heavy U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan are growing at a time when the U.S. military is adding to its forward-bases posture in Asia and the Japanese government is contemplating a deeper military alliance with the United States in the wake of the Sep. 11 attacks in New York and Washington.

"A definite policy challenge is looming for the governments of the region and the United States," said Kent Calder, director of a programme on U.S.-Japan relations at Princeton University and the special adviser to two recent U.S. ambassadors to Japan, Walter Mondale and Tom Foley.

"Political competition is leading to pressure against U.S. bases across a whole range of countries," he pointed out.

"There sure is a major rise of populism which demands reduction of the U.S. forward deployment in Japan," added Yoichi Kato, a staff writer for the 'Asahi Shimbun' newspaper and a visiting research fellow at the National Defense University and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

"The role of the (U.S.-Japan) alliance in terms of defending Japan is being questioned seriously," he added.

Calder and Kato spoke here at a forum on Asian populism and U.S. bases sponsored by Japan's Sasakawa Peace Foundation.

The forum took place two days after the Department of Defense issued its Quadrennial Defense Review, a blueprint for U.S. military policy and strategy. This year's report, issued in the wake of the Sep. 11 attacks, emphasises "homeland defense" of the U.S. mainland and the need to maintain a "forward deterrent posture" in critical areas around the world, including East Asia.

Without specifically naming China, the report makes it clear the U.S. military intends to maintain enough forces in Asia to keep the Chinese military in check. "Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-scale military competition," the report stated.

"The possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable resource base will emerge in the region. The East Asian littoral — from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan — represents a particularly challenging area," the report explained.

To prepare for this challenge, the review calls for the U.S. Navy to increase its aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific and study "options for homeporting an additional three to four surface combatants and guided cruise missile submarines".

That will add to the already formidable firepower at the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka, Japan, which is home to the Kitty Hawk, the only aircraft carrier based outside the United States.

The United States, the review stated, "will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and North-east Asia, which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world".

In Asia, those forward bases include Kadena in Okinawa, the largest U.S. Air Force base outside the U.S. mainland, and, on Okinawa, one of the U.S. Marine's three rapid deployment forces. Key U.S. bases in South Korea include U.S. Army installations.

In Europe, U.S. forces dropped from 250,000 during the Cold War to less than 85,000 today. But in Asia, the U.S. military structure is "largely unchanged", noted Calder, and in the last five years, "they've become even more forward-deployed".

But during that time, changes in the politics of host countries and economic shifts in Asia have altered the strategic landscape, creating the pressures that Calder and Kato now see as threatening to the U.S. military position in Asia.

In Korea, the relaxation of tensions between North and South as well as negotiations between the North and the U.S. government have substantially "reduced the (South) Korean sense of threat," Calder said.

That, combined with much greater political freedoms in a country once dominated by authoritarian military governments, is likely to make Koreans "less inhibited" and "more confrontational" about the impact of U.S. bases, he said.

That can already be seen in local movements opposed to a U.S. bombing range and the recent renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States.

Similarly, political discourse in Japan has widened as the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has lost political status with the public, culminating with the election by the party's rank-and-file of reformist Junichiro Koizumi over party elder Ryutaro Hashimoto.

Japan's faltering economy and corruption have also eroded the reputation of the once-powerful Ministry of Finance. On a local level, that has opened political space for NGOs in cities outside of Okinawa to criticise the presence of bases near their cities, Calder said.

In Okinawa itself, where nearly 75 percent of U.S. bases in Japan are located, anti-base sentiment remains high despite the attention paid by U.S. policymakers to the problems on the island. In 1995, the rape of a Okinawan girl by a U.S. marine triggered a crisis in U.S.-Japan relations. Six years later, the situation remains so volatile that another rape "would drive the alliance to almost collapse", said Kato.

In addition, Japan's deep financial problems and its decade-long recession are raising serious doubts among the Japanese public about the five billion U.S. dollars Japan spends every year to support the U.S. bases.

As the Japanese government embarks on a structural reform programme that is shifting economic policy from one of distribution of wealth to one of distribution of burdens, Kato said, "it's only natural that people ask 'are we getting a fair deal or being taken advantage of?' "

The LDP, which includes factions that are anti- and pro- American, is in a serious dilemma, Kato said, because of a "lack of plausible rationale for the alliance".

During the Cold War, a close military alliance could be justified by threats posed by the Soviet Union or North Korea. But with the Soviet Union long gone and dangers in Korea fading, the new threat has been explained as transnational terrorism. "But against (terrorism), the existing alliance is of little use," he said.

In Kato's view, Tokyo "should come out and say China is the reason for the alliance. If they talk of China as a potential target, people would really support it."

On the other hand, recent newspaper polls about the Koizumi government's decision to deploy Japanese Self-Defense Forces in support of U.S. military action in response to the Sep. 11 attacks show a deep ambivalence about Japan becoming a military power.

An 'Asahi' poll shows that 42 percent support the new mission, while 46 percent are opposed. Said Kato: "This shows the people are not yet sure Japan should take on a military role." (IPS/2001)

Security alliance redefined after end of Cold War

Friday, Aug. 24, 2001
By TAKUYA ASAKURA
Second of six parts

Changing security ties spur Japan to stand more on its own

Staff writer In August 1990, when then Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu telephoned U.S. President George Bush to offer a $ 1 billion contribution to the U.S.-led multinational forces in the Persian Gulf, Bush offered a disappointed-sounding "Thank you" before hanging up.

"We had thought we were offering a pretty good amount," said Nobuo Ishihara, then deputy chief Cabinet secretary, who was listening in on the telephone conversation. "There might have been a gap in the sense of crisis (between Tokyo and Washington) toward what was happening in the Persian Gulf."

The decade following the Gulf War saw tremendous changes in Japan's now 50-year-old security alliance with the U.S.

Japan's Constitution, which prohibits the nation from using military force in international disputes, left the nation to concentrate on economic reconstruction and development after the security treaty with the U.S. was signed in 1951.

However, as Japan's economic power surged and the Cold War came to an end, regional conflicts erupted worldwide, and the nation could no longer shy away from taking on an international security role.

The Gulf War became the first event to push Japan to take concrete action, Ishihara said.

The bilateral alliance did not obligate Japan to support U.S. forces outside the Far East. But the nation's heavy reliance on oil from the Middle East meant Japan had a vital interest in the region's stability.

While pressure mounted at home and abroad for Japan to do something more than throw money at the problem, strong domestic opposition prevented the government from dispatching Self-Defense Forces troops to the Gulf for logistic support.

The feeling in the U.S. about Japan's financial contribution, which totaled $ 13 billion, was that it was too little, too late.

When Kuwait ran an advertisement in major U.S. newspapers to express its gratitude to the countries that came to its aid, Japan was not mentioned.

The Gulf War came during a period of anti-Japan sentiment in the U.S., as exemplified by a 1989 issue of Newsweek, which blared "Japan Invades Hollywood" on its cover after Sony Corp.'s purchase of Columbia Pictures. It was a time when Japanese firms were on a bubble economy roll, snapping up prominent U.S. properties.

This experience led to major changes in Japan's security policy. For example, Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers were sent to the Gulf after the ceasefire, marking the first SDF overseas activity since the establishment of postwar defense forces in 1950.

Brushing aside strong resistance from the opposition camp, the Liberal Democratic Party passed a package of bills in the Diet in 1992 to enable the SDF to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

'Redefined' security treaty

U.S. frustration at Japan's passive stance in security matters resurfaced in 1993, when tensions mounted over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons development.

U.S. forces in Japan, through discussions with Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency officials, reportedly presented a detailed list of logistic support they needed from Japan, including permission to use civilian ports and airports in emergencies.

According to the original 1978 guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, Japan was supposed to prepare guidelines for the type of support to be provided to U.S. forces during emergencies in the Far East. Despite its obligation, however, Tokyo had not passed any legislation to enable such actions.

Makoto Sakuma, then chairman of the Joint Staff Council, recalled a warning by a top U.S. defense official that "the bilateral alliance could end" if the U.S. military should suffer casualties in possible Sea of Japan missions while Tokyo did nothing.

Takakazu Kuriyama, then Japanese ambassador to the U.S., said one reason that prompted Washington to seek a diplomatic solution with Pyongyang instead of a military one was "the U.S. realized they would not get any cooperation from Japan and would not be able to carry out effective operations if it took military action."

The crisis was a wakeup call to government officials in both Tokyo and Washington, who up to that point had tended to focus on economic relations, Kuriyama said.

In 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a joint declaration promoting a strengthened bilateral security alliance. The next year, the 1978 defense cooperation guidelines were updated.

This series of actions was termed a "redefining" of the security treaty, which appeared to have lost much of its raison d'etre when the Cold War ended.

Under the updated defense guidelines, Japan became obliged to support U.S. forces in future emergency situations in undefined "areas surrounding Japan."

In 1999, the Diet passed a package of bills to cover the new guidelines, paving the way for a system that enabled Japan to meet most of the demands presented by U.S. forces during the long-past North Korean crisis.

The new guidelines substantially changed the alliance, making Japan responsible for its own defense as well as regional security beyond its borders.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who took office in April, has indicated his readiness to reinterpret or amend the Constitution to allow Japan to engage in collective defense. The self-imposed ban on collective defense could pose an obstacle as Japan tries to expand the scope of its support of U.S. military actions under the updated guidelines.

While the alliance was formed as Cold War tensions mounted, it was, ironically, the end of the Cold War that pushed Japan into playing a greater security role.

"During the Cold War, the U.S. overlooked some flaws in the alliance," Sakuma said. But as concerns shifted from superpower confrontations to smaller regional conflicts, the U.S. came to believe that the party directly concerned should deal with such contingencies, leaving the U.S. to become involved only when its own interests are at stake, he said.

Shifting global alliances

Japan, which was not obliged to defend U.S. troops in international conflicts, has often been criticized for taking a "free ride" on the shoulders of the alliance.

However, developments during the 1990s illustrate the alliance's importance to the global strategy of the U.S., especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

In 1994, a panel launched under then Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa compiled a report on the nation's future security policy, in which the alliance with the U.S. was mentioned only after the need for multilateral security dialogue.

"The panel's report in fact gave the impression to Washington that Japan had begun to consider a multinational security system as its main goal and the alliance with the U.S. as supplementary," Kuriyama said.

Such moves by Japan, together with the North Korean nuclear situation, are believed to have prompted Washington to emphasize the crucial role of its bases in Japan.

"Given the great distances associated with the Pacific theater, assured access to bases in Japan plays a critical role in our ability to deter and defeat aggression," said the 1995 report on East Asia strategy compiled by Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of defense.

The Nye report also cited the "most generous" host nation support extended by Japan to U.S. forces based in the country. Such expenses amount to 450 billion yen annually, including the cost of the land lease, maintenance of facilities, utility charges and wages paid to Japanese base workers.

The report also referred to the large amounts of military equipment and services Japan buys from U.S. defense suppliers, saying such purchases have "also been beneficial to both countries."

Anxiety, skepticism grows

As the two countries explore closer defense cooperation, there remains skepticism within the Japanese government, including Defense Agency officials, about whether the U.S. would fulfill its obligation to defend Japan from enemy attack if Washington had no vital interest at stake.

The Senkaku islands, southwest of Okinawa's main island, which since 1970 have been claimed by China, are a good example. In 1996, then U.S. Ambassador Walter Mondale stirred up controversy by telling the New York Times that the treaty would not apply to the uninhabited islands.

Although several U.S. officials later denied such views, Washington has yet to take a clear-cut position on the matter. The islands, under U.S. control until 1972, were used as a shooting range.

While the security alliance appears to have widespread public support, distrust lingers among many Japanese toward their own government, which critics say has not sufficiently responded to concerns that its plans to expand the nation's security role contradict the war-renouncing Constitution.

Such doubts have led to anxieties that the updated guidelines could drag the nation into a U.S.-led war instead of serving as a deterrent force and ensuring the region's stability.

Frustration with the security alliance runs high among residents in Okinawa, which provides 75 percent of the land allocated by Tokyo for U.S. facilities, as well as other local communities where residents complain of such problems as noise pollution caused by jets from U.S. bases in their neighborhoods.

Their frustration is also vented at the government, which usually does little about their complaints in order to avoid damaging security ties with the U.S.

In April, the government spent 5.2 billion yen to buy out a dioxin-emitting private waste incineration facility near the U.S. Atsugi Naval Air Facility in Kanagawa Prefecture, after the U.S. military complained that pollution from the incinerator was threatening the health of its service members and their families.

While the solution to the pollution problem was also good news for Japanese residents living nearby, and the MSDF, which shares use of the base, the episode left some frustrated that the government only takes action when it is requested by the U.S. military.

"It symbolically showed the nature of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty," said Sagamihara Municipal Assembly member Tokio Kaneko, who has long campaigned against the noise pollution caused by U.S. jets. "The government of Japan always supports the U.S. position instead of representing its own people."

Japanese Journalist on Reports of Bad US Military Behavior in Okinawa

CNN NEWS SITE
Japanese Journalist on Reports of Bad US Military Behavior in Okinawa
Aired July 2, 2001 - 16:25 ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

JOIE CHEN, CNN ANCHOR: We have talked to you earlier in this hour about the situation in Okinawa in Japan -- that's one of the most southern-most islands in Japan -- where there's a situation, a number of service people, quite a few service people stationed at Okinawa. Now there has been a new accusation of a rape by a U.S. service personnel of a local woman, and this has raised a great deal of passion and concern in this area.

Joining us today is Yoichi Kato, who is from the Japanese newspaper known as the "Asahi Shimbum." And we appreciate your joining us, Mr. Kato, with a little bit more perspective about this story, because there's a lot -- it's a little bit difficult for people in the United States to understand the great deal of emotion about this story.

I mean, after all, tragically, violent crime does occur in this country with some regularity. Why has this case aroused so much concern in Okinawa?

YOICHI KATO, "ASAHI SHIMBUM": Well, first of all, I have to explain that the people in Okinawa think they are overly burdened for hosting U.S. forces on the island. Okinawa island itself has less than 1 percent of land area of Japan, but has 75 percent of all U.S. military installations in Japan. And there has been a number of accidents and crimes by U.S. servicemen.

And -- and in terms of rape, there -- there was a horrible case back in 1995 where a 12-year-old girl was raped by a servicemen, and which triggered strong protests among the people in Okinawa and also people in mainland Japan. So there has been a long history of the sense that the Okinawa people are disproportionately forced to take the burden. And so this -- this rape incident that recently happened just came on top of it.

CHEN: Mr. Kato, we've got questions for you from our live Web chat audience. Jorge Fernandez is asking: "What will happen to Japan and America relations if this is not taken into priority?"

KATO: Well, just as the prime minister, Koizumi, who visited Washington a couple of days ago and had a meeting with President Bush and agreed the importance or significance of alliance, it is now a focus of attention for both countries, whether we can really maintain this alliance, and the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan. And as I said, Okinawa is the biggest kind of -- the host within Japan, and if Okinawan people turn their back to U.S. forces, it's really hard to maintain the present framework.

CHEN: Yoichi Kato from "Asahi Shimbum" newspaper, Japanese newspaper. We appreciate your joining us from Washington today with a little more perspective today on this story, sir, thanks.

KATO: You're welcome.

Time for a strategic dialogue

Saturday, June 30, 2001

By RALPH COSSA

HONOLULU -- Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi will have a lot to talk about with U.S. President George W. Bush when the two meet for the first time at Camp David this weekend. High on the agenda should be the initiation of a strategic dialogue aimed at redefining the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

Koizumi appears ready to expand the U.S.-Japan relationship while also supporting a greater role for Japan in regional security affairs. While stating that he is not prepared at this time to put the difficult question of constitutional revision on the political agenda, the prime minister has stated that it is desirable for Japan to be allowed to participate in collective defense activities and to help defend its allies (read: the United States) in the event of regional crisis.

In a comment that appears aimed at stimulating debate on this once-taboo subject, Koizumi noted that "we should stop branding anyone speaking about revising Article 9 as hawkish or a rightist," correctly noting that this section of the Constitution -- which stipulates that Japan shall never maintain land, sea, or air forces -- "fails to reflect reality."

Koizumi's view seems to dovetail nicely with calls for a more equal relationship coming from Washington. Last fall, a special report, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership, produced by the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, stated that the 1997 revised Japanese Defense Guidelines outlining future cooperation with the U.S. should be viewed as a "floor" upon which to build further bilateral defense cooperation, and not as a "ceiling" preventing further, deeper cooperation.

The Armitage-Nye Report, by former U.S. assistant secretaries of defense Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, calls for an expanded Japanese role in the trans-Pacific alliance, while noting that the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning between Washington and Tokyo.

While this was an unofficial, bipartisan report, Armitage has since assumed the position of deputy secretary of state. His remarks during his early May visit to Tokyo that "the lack of consensus on collective self-defense is an obstacle" to expanding U.S.-Japan security cooperation suggests that much of the thinking in the Armitage-Nye Report will be carried over into the Bush administration's policy toward Japan.

While in Tokyo, Armitage noted that "the lack of an ability to participate in collective self-defense, although they are signatories to a defense treaty, is an obstacle. I think it is a healthy thing for the Japanese to look at some of these things and see what is reasonable and what is not." While Armitage appears supportive of an increased Japanese security role -- even if this requires constitutional reinterpretation or revision -- he was careful not to directly call for such a move, recognizing (as did the Armitage/Nye Report) that this is a domestic Japanese decision.

But, what exactly does the U.S. expect from Japan? How much is Japan willing or able to contribute beyond current levels, given both legal and political restrictions to greater Japanese participation in collective-defense activities? And how can any revitalization or reconfiguration of the alliance and respective roles and missions be accomplished in ways that are both generally acceptable to the publics of both nations and non-threatening to Japan's neighbors?

It was with questions such as these in mind that the Pacific Forum CSIS joined with the Tokyo-based Policy Study Group and the Okazaki Institute to examine the future of U.S.-Japan security cooperation. This research effort was driven by a belief that the U.S.-Japan governmental dialogue on security issues is overly preoccupied by short-term problems without adequate attention to where both countries are going in the long-term. Study group participants shared one common view and objective: all believed that the U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to long-term peace and security in the Asia Pacific region and must be sustained and revitalized because it is in the mutual national-security interests of both nations, and of the region in general, to do so.

The group's objective was not to achieve consensus on future paths as much as to stimulate thinking by laying out various policy options and by discussing topics that, at least until very recently, were often too sensitive or controversial to be placed on the official dialogue agenda. One consensus view did emerge, however: The U.S. should not been seen as pressuring Japan to change its Constitution . . . nor should Washington be seen as opposing such changes if this is the will of the Japanese people.

Washington has a responsibility to make it clear to Japan what it expects and desires from Tokyo in terms of greater security cooperation. It is then the Japanese government's responsibility to determine where it wants to go and where and how its desires overlap with Washington's. The two sides then need to reach some common understanding about revised roles and missions to ensure that their actions continue to be complementary -- this is what strategic dialogue is all about. Once Japan has determined what it is willing to do, it must further determine if reinterpretations or amendments to current laws or even the Constitution itself are required in order to travel down this chosen path.

It has long been the Japanese position that Japan, like all other members of the United Nations, has the right of collective self-defense. But Japan has elected not to exercise this right. The decision to change, or not to change, this self-imposed restriction is for the Japanese people and government alone to make.

Whether more active Japanese participation in peacekeeping, peacemaking or other such activities requires a reinterpretation or revision of the Constitution, or just more courageous political leadership and greater national consensus, is also for Japan to decide.

The study group took no position on this subject, even though many participants had strong opinions on this issue. Rather, its efforts were aimed at stimulating the dialogue and identifying the possible challenges and the future roles and missions breakdown that would best sustain the alliance relationship well into the 21st century.

This is not to imply that the U.S.-Japan alliance is seriously troubled today. Both the current state of the relationship and the opportunity for improvement are as good or better than at any time since the historic 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Declaration set the Defense Guidelines revision process in motion. But maintaining the status quo does not mean doing nothing. Considerable effort is required on both sides to sustain the momentum and take advantage of the opportunity to further expand and reinvigorate the alliance as new, forward-thinking leaders take command on both sides of the Pacific. Greater strategic dialogue is needed in order to ensure the alliance's future relevance. Hopefully, that dialogue will begin this weekend at Camp David.
Ralph A. Cossa is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Slyly, China extends its reach

Tuesday, May 29, 2001

By SHIGEO HIRAMATSU

Since early April, three Chinese vessels have been conducting marine research operations in the East China Sea, on the Japanese side of the midway line between Japan and China. These activities are based on a memorandum that the Japanese and Chinese governments exchanged in February. In accordance with the agreement, China gave advance notice of the operations to Japan and Japan approved the plan, the Japanese Foreign Ministry says. The Chinese vessels, however, are using pneumatic devices for acoustic exploration and conducting drilling tests, obviously outside the scope of the scientific research that Japan and China agreed to.

For the past several years, Chinese vessels have been conducting research activities in the same zone, defying Japanese protests. In 1999, a total of more than 30 vessels, sometimes accompanied by warships, conducted research operations in the waters. In 2000, a Chinese spy boat crossed the Tsushima Strait between Japan and South Korea and then the Tsugaru Strait in Japan, moving southward along the Pacific coast to waters off Cape Inubo in Chiba Prefecture. There the vessel reportedly conducted intelligence-gathering operations focused on metropolitan Tokyo before going back to China. These activities prompted Japan to exchange a memorandum with China about controlling research operations in the East China Sea.

The document requires Japan and China to give two months' notice through diplomatic channels on marine research activities in the East China Sea, which is known as Dong Hai in China. Japan must notify China about entering "waters near China," while China must notify Japan about entering "waters near Japan in which Japan has an interest." The latter wording appears to imply that Japan has no rights in the waters.

Under the framework, both nations must provide the names of the research organizations, vessels and ship officers involved, as well as the purpose, specific details and site of proposed research activities. The document says that exchanges under this framework should not influence either side's position regarding maritime-law issues.

Both China and Japan must observe the diplomatic agreement. The Japanese Foreign Ministry says the agreement should help control unchecked Chinese marine research activities in the East China Sea. The most serious problem with this agreement, however, is that it fails to define the two nations' "exclusive economic zones" and the continental shelf lines. In fact, the agreement became necessary because the demarcation lines had not been established.

By allowing China to conduct marine research activities without establishing demarcation lines, Japan effectively sanctioned such activities on the Japanese side of the midway line.

A Chinese research vessel is already active in a wide area between Amami-Oshima Island to Ishigaki Island. Underwater is a large continental shelf. The ship is reportedly using pneumatic devices for acoustic exploration in the waters, where it has repeatedly conducted illegal research operations in recent years. Meanwhile, 400 kilometers west of Yakushima Island, another Chinese vessel is reportedly conducting drilling tests.

With pneumatic devices for exploration and drilling equipment, the Chinese are obviously conducting geological surveys of the sea bottom, disregarding Japanese rights. The Japanese Foreign Ministry says the Chinese activities are for scientific research only and do not pose problems for Japan. Another Chinese research vessel now in the area does not appear to be engaged in abnormal activities, according to the ministry. Going by appearances, some research activities may not seem abnormal, however.

The Foreign Ministry says it has received information about four more Chinese research vessels in the waters. Thus, a total of seven Chinese research vessels are active on the Japanese side of the midway line. Japan is likely to receive further notifications notices from China about marine research activities in the zone.

Some 30 years ago, four Japanese oil companies established concessions and applied for exploration in the same waters, but never received approval for their plans from the Japanese government. Yet Chinese vessels are openly conducting exploration in the zone with blessings from the Japanese government. By failing to control Chinese activities, Japanese government officials are effectively betraying their own country.

Shigeo Hiramatsu is professor at Kyorin University. This article was translated from the Sanken Shimbun's Seiron column of May 19.

More Okinawans accept presence of U.S. military

Sunday, May 20, 2001

The percentage of Okinawans who accept the presence of U.S. military facilities in their prefecture exceeds the percentage of those opposed to the bases for the first time since 1975, according to the results of a government poll released Saturday.

According to the Cabinet Office, 45.7 percent of the residents responding to the survey said they accept the U.S. bases on their soil, saying they are "necessary" or "unavoidable."

But 44.4 percent of Okinawans said they are not happy at playing host to the U.S. military.

The poll questioned 2,000 adults, of whom 68.7 percent responded.

Among the male respondents, those who tolerate the U.S. military presence outnumber opponents by 54.7 percent to 39.4 percent, but the corresponding figures are reversed among female respondents, at 38.5 percent and 48.3 percent.

According to the poll, 20.6 percent said the U.S. bases are "unnecessary," down 4.3 points from the previous poll in 1994, while 23.8 percent said they pose a danger to Japan's security, down 5.6 points.

The poll also showed that 9.8 percent believe the U.S. military presence is "necessary" for Japan's security, up 2 points, while 35.9 percent said it is "unavoidable," up 4.9 points.

Okinawa accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's total land mass, but is home to about 75 percent of the land occupied by U.S. military facilities in Japan.

The findings of the poll come at a time when people in Okinawa are concerned about their jobs amid a prolonged economic slowdown. The jobless rate in Okinawa is roughly twice the national average.

Tetsumi Takara, a professor of law at the University of the Ryukyus, said the economic benefits of U.S. bases might have influenced the responses.

"I guess the economic benefit may have helped many people reply that 'the bases are unavoidable'," he said.

"But it is too early to conclude that the latest survey shows 'Okinawa approves of the bases' because public opinion can changes drastically in Okinawa, particularly after accidents and scandals involving the U.S. military," he said.

Okinawa 'not crucial'

WASHINGTON (Kyodo) A scholar on defense issues at a U.S. think tank told visiting Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine on Friday that the number of U.S. Marines stationed in the prefecture could be drastically cut from the current 15,000 level as the bases there have little military value.

Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow at the Department of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the United States, however, is concerned that if it agrees to reduce or integrate its military bases in Okinawa, it would eventually have to completely withdraw its military presence from the region.

But O'Hanlon told Inamine that the U.S. could agree to reduce the number of troops in Okinawa if the prefectural government allows the U.S. military to retain certain facilities such as ports and airports.

Inamine told O'Hanlon that any kind of "trade-off" concerning the base problem would be difficult and would be met with strong opposition from local residents.

The governor is in Washington on the first leg of a two-week tour of the U.S. to confer with senior U.S. government officials on issues concerning the planned relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa's Ginowan.

He is also hoping to convey to Americans the feelings of local residents, who view the U.S. military presence in the prefecture as a heavy burden.

Calls for a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Okinawa have become stronger in the wake of a series of crimes committed by U.S. Marines stationed there and their family members.

The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly and several town assemblies have adopted resolutions calling for withdrawal of the troops or a reduction in their number.

Okinawa Prefecture is home to about 75 percent of land occupied by U.S. military facilities in Japan.

An unwelcome visit from the uyoku

David McNeill

Published 26 February 2001

David McNeill, on radio in Japan, dared to mention the 1937 Nanking massacre. The consequences, he suggests, should concern us all

In a country teeming with exotica for the jaded westerner, there is little to beat Japan's extreme right wing for weirdness. Countless bemused foreigners have been entertained for years by the sight of semi-militarised black vans, emblazoned with love poems to Nippon, noisily ferrying their shaven-headed cargo of ultra-patriots through the streets of central Tokyo.

Talk to people, and nine out of ten will dismiss it as harmless posturing, a fringe pantomime that adds colour to the city's rich tapestry. But the uyoku, as they are known, take themselves seriously and, as I recently found out when they paid me a visit, we should take them seriously, too.

My wife and I host a weekly talk show on local radio in western Tokyo. My role is the exotic gaijin foil to her motormouth main personality, and the show tries to take a jaundiced, opinionated approach to the clash of east v west. In December, we talked briefly about a trip we had made a year earlier to Nanking in China, the site of a notorious massacre by the Japanese imperial army at the end of 1937. Walking through the museum in Nanking that commemorates the incident, reading the testimonies of hundreds of Chinese and non-Chinese survivors, looking at countless photographs of corpses - and indeed their bones, some of which lie beneath the museum site - it is impossible to deny what happened. And we said so.

Now, you might think this would pass as fair comment, part of the daily conversational hurly-burly of the media, the oxygen of democracy and all the rest of it. You would be wrong. Thirty minutes after the show was broadcast, three members of a local "political group" arrived at the studio and asked to see the management. One, clearly the leader, would not have looked out of place on a family shopping trip, with his khaki pants and neatly trimmed hair, but the other two were straight out of the yakuza textbook - designer tracksuits, punch perms and gimlet-eyed stares.

The station director, Oki-san, came rushing into the studio with a look of mild shock. After exchanging name cards, everyone sat down, and the leader, speaking softly and politely, explained his displeasure. The Nanking massacre had not been "officially announced" (koshiki happyo) by the government, so we shouldn't have mentioned it, he said. If we were going to use the radio to talk about communist countries, why didn't we tell our listeners that Japan had exported thousands of tonnes of rice to help famine-stricken North Korea, he asked. Was our radio station communist? Oki-san carefully noted these points on a writing pad before escorting the visitors to the elevator, bowing and thanking them for their visit. No voices had been raised; no names were called. The only thing they left behind was a faint air of menace.

Two days later, the senior station manager called a meeting. He apologised for taking our time and explained that, from now on, he would be very grateful if we would not discuss political issues on the radio. He apologised again. If someone sent in a fax or an e-mail giving their opinions, it was fine to read it out over the air but not to give our own opinions. He said we would need to apologise on air for the Nanking comment. If we didn't, the men and their friends would drive their gaisensha (trucks equipped with loudspeakers) outside our sponsors (two ramen restaurants, a bar and a couple of real-estate agents) and harass them until they withdrew their support. Violence was unlikely, but he couldn't rule it out. He apologised again for asking us to apologise. He handed us a statement that the station had prepared for us to read on the next show. It said that we humbly apologised for the "inappropriate comments" we had made the previous week.

We scooped up our jaws from the floor and headed home. The station's management had gone along with the uyoku's suggestions and upped the ante, outcensoring the censors by requesting an end to all political discussion. While we argued over the next couple of days about whether to call the station's bluff and commit broadcasting hara-kiri, about a dozen faxes arrived at the studio in response to our comments, all pleading with us to stick it out. We decided to read out some of the faxes - only one of which referred specifically to Nanking - and not to read the station's apology.

Our storm in a small Japanese teacup died down soon enough, but it illustrated the role of extreme rightists in policing and setting limits on public discussion in this country.

I am not the first person to discover this, nor to point it out. Honda Katsuichi, one of the first Japanese journalists to investigate Nanking - and who still rarely ventures out in public without some disguise, for fear of reprisals - Masayuki Takagi, Karel van Wolferen and others have all said the same thing. But I may be one of the few gaijin to experience it directly, and I wanted to know: who are these people, what do they want, and what kinds of things get a dedicated Japanese ultra-rightist reaching for the keys to his gaisensha? Here is what I found.

The best estimates are that there are more than 100,000 members of far-right groups in Japan, belonging to almost 1,000 groups throughout the country, 800 of which are affiliated through an organisation called the Zen Nihon Aikokusha Dantai Kaigi, or the All-Japan Conference of Patriotic Associations. The exact number is clouded in controversy because there is overlap with yakuza gangsters. From the 1960s onward, after the Political Fund Regulation Law prohibited extortion, many yakuza groups transformed themselves into right-wing political organisations; political groups were allowed to raise money and claim preferential tax treatment as long as they presented income and expenditure statements to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Ideologically, both uyoku and yakuza see themselves to some extent as patriots and defenders of traditional codes of honour.

Besides Nanking, the current list of ultra-right taboos includes the so-called comfort women, or sex slaves, forced into prostitution by the army during the Second World War, and Unit 731, the army laboratory in wartime Manchuria that experimented with chemical weapons on live Chinese prisoners. Yoshihisa Yoshida, a physics professor at Sagami Women's University and a national consultant on a Unit 731 exhibition held in 1998, was hounded for two weeks by a convoy of vans after his name was publicly linked to the issue. "They drove round and round my university screaming at me to come out," he says. "I thought it would never end." War veterans who come forward to tell their stories can also expect the attention of right-wingers. Shiro Azuma, who served for four years in China and kept a detailed diary that he subsequently published, tells stories of threats and intimidation. So does Yoshio Shinozuka, a member of Unit 731 who agreed to testify in the current lawsuit brought by 100 surviving Chinese victims.

The uyoku reserve their greatest firepower for any attempt to degrade the ultimate national symbol, the emperor, and, ultimately, they hope to restore his prewar authority. The mayor of Nagasaki, Hitoshi Motojima, a mild-mannered Christian, was threatened for months by right-wingers, egged on by academics and a handful of senior politicians, for suggesting that Emperor Hirohito bore some responsibility for the war. He was eventually shot in the back (he survived) in January 1990, but not before 3.8 million people had signed a petition supporting what he said.

Isolated cases of extreme political violence are a feature of life in many advanced countries, but the Japanese version has several distinct characteristics. First is the sheer number of attacks, thousands of them, from low-key intimidation of the type we experienced at the radio station to high-profile assassinations of political figures.

The second major difference is the relationship of the violence to people in power. The common view of the people who cause this mayhem, even among the "serious" nationalist right, is that they are low-life thugs, but the lowlifes can always take comfort from pronouncements by pillars of the establishment. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's recent slip, that Japan was a "divine nation centred on the emperor", is only the latest example of how apparently extreme-rightist posturing, such as calls for the restoration of the emperor's powers and denials of well-documented war crimes, finds echoes in the very furthest reaches of Japan's dim political corridors.

There are well-documented ties between ultra-right figures and Japan's most senior politicians, who have used them to harass and attack the left. The most famous of them all, Nobusuke Kishi, found time to be prime minister and mix with some of the most notorious right-wing and yakuza figures in Japan. Last year's resignation by the chief cabinet secretary, Hidenao Nakagawa, after he was accused of consorting with the boss of an ultra-right organisation, is part of a long and venerable political tradition here.

The most important result of years of dedicated service by right-wingers in the establishment and on the fringe alike may have been, in the words of Ivan P Hall, the author of Cartels of the Mind: Japan's intellectual closed shop, to have shifted the centre of debate, and of political consensus in this country, well to the right. One would have thought that as the uyoku survey the current Japanese political landscape, they would be quite happy with their lot. The Hinomaru, or rising-sun flag, once the dividing symbol of left and right, flutters across the nation's schoolyards; and the Kimigayo, the national anthem, is belted out by lungs too young to remember the battles fought over it, both having been officially recognised in August 1999. The uyoku's arch-enemy, the Communist Party (whose chairman, Kenji Miyamoto, they attempted to assassinate in 1973), has swung to the right since the collapse of the USSR.

Four weeks after the uyoku's fateful visit to our studio, I showed Oki-san my research. I thought about Al Pacino's line in the movie The Insider to his CBS boss who had crumbled under corporate pressure: "Are you a media man or a businessman?" But in the end, I simply asked him if his kids knew about Nanking. "They study it at school," he said, "so I'm sure they do." Later, at home, I had a look at a current Japanese history textbook: Nihonshi. The Nanking massacre is not mentioned. The Nanking "Incident" is, as a footnote on page 234 to a one-sentence report that the Japanese army captured Nanking after fierce resistance. The footnote reads: Konotoki, nihonhei wa hisentouin wo fukumu tasuu no chugokujin wo satsugai shi, haisengo, tokyosaibande ookiina mondai tonatta (Nanking Jiken). My translation of this: "During this time, the Japanese army killed many Chinese, including non- combatants, something that became an important issue at the Tokyo war crimes court after Japan's defeat (the Nanking Incident)."

Not a denial, I'm sure we can all agree. But it doesn't exactly brim over with tortured remorse either, does it?

Okinawa governor wants U.S. drills relocated to Guam

Japan Policy & Politics, March 5, 2001
NAHA, Japan, Feb. 26 Kyodo

Gov. Keiichi Inamine of Okinawa Prefecture said Monday he will pursue the possibility of having at least some of the U.S. military drills in Okinawa relocated to Guam.

In answer to a question at an Okinawa prefectural assembly session about the military exercises, Inamine said, ''I am considering asking through the Japanese government about the possibility of relocating them to Guam.''

It is the first time for Inamine, who took office in December 1998, to take up the issue of relocating U.S. military drills overseas, indicating a policy change of his administration.

Inamine had previously criticized the idea, which was originally proposed by his predecessor Masahide Ota, as ''unrealistic.''

Inamine's about turn will dismay the U.S. and Japanese governments, as he has been a strong advocate of their plans for relocating U.S. military bases within the prefecture, including the Futemma Air Station in central Okinawa.

Inamine said he is considering the possibility of relocating the drills ''because Gen. James Jones, commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, has said that he has ordered a study of relocation of some of its drills from Okinawa to Guam.''

Inamine also said, ''From the viewpoint of easing the burdens of the Okinawa people concerning the U.S. military bases, I would like to ask for relocation of the rotation exercises in which the U.S. Marines move between their bases on the U.S. mainland and Okinawa and other places.''

Many of the Marines who participate in the rotation exercises are young, often immediately after graduating from high school. It is said they tend to cause problems in the local community as a result of alienation because they are only exposed to the local culture for such a short period of time and cannot adapt themselves to it.

Inamine was answering a question from assembly member Tomonori Itosu of the New Komeito party.

On Thursday, Inamine told the assembly that he will ask the government to raise the issue of reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa.

It was the first time for Inamine to refer to reducing the size of U.S. forces in Okinawa.

On Sunday, Inamine told Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, who was visiting Naha on a one-day trip, that the people of Okinawa Prefecture ''can no longer bear'' the burden of hosting such a large segment of the U.S. military forces in Japan.

''In a way, we had been reserved about demanding a reduction of the Marines and other U.S. military forces. But we can no longer bear it,'' Inamine said, alluding to recent incidents in the prefecture involving U.S. officers and soldiers, including one suspected of arson in the town of Chatan.

In the meeting with Kono, Inamine reiterated Okinawa's demands that the United States reduce the size and scope of its military presence in the prefecture and asked for the central government's backing.

Okinawa Prefecture accounts for only 0.6% of Japan's territory but 75% of the land occupied by U.S. forces in Japan. About 25,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Okinawa, more than half the 47,000 such personnel in Japan.