Abe reaffirms troops alliance with US

By David Pilling in Tokyo
Published: Jan 29, 2007

Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, was on Monday forced to restate the country's "strong commitment " to its military alliance with the US after remarks by his defence minister apparently critical of Washington's military strategy.

The incident reinforced a growing impression of indiscipline in Mr Abe's cabinet that has contributed to a sharp fall in his approval rating ahead of local and upper house elections due over the next few months.

Mr Abe also told parliament that he had reprimanded Hakuo Yanagisawa, his health minister, for making "inappropriate remarks " alluding to women as "baby making machines ". The health minister apologised.

The prime minister was forced to reaffirm ties with the US after remarks by Fumio Kyuma, the head of the newly upgraded defence ministry, who described the US as being "cocky " in its attitude to Okinawa, the island that bears the biggest burden of US troops stationed in Japan.

Earlier, Mr Kyuma had said the US invasion of Iraq was a mistake, though he subsequently made clear that his remark had been made in a "personal capacity ". Japan supported the invasion and later dispatched 550 ground troops on a reconstruction mission.

The controversy over US-Japan relations could gather momentum when parliament discusses a bill next month to help fund the redeployment of 8,000 US marines from Okinawa to Guam. Tokyo is expected to foot about $6bn of the $10bn cost. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan is likely to question why the country should pay for US troops stationed outside Japan.

Washington has been frustrated at Tokyo's hesitation in implementing an agreement to change the location of US bases, particularly in Okinawa, a culturally distinct part of the country where many resent both the US and politicians from Japan's mainland.

Tokyo and Washington in October 2005 hammered out details of a comprehensive base realignment in line with US plans to build a more nimble global force. But parts of the plan have run into opposition from local politicians, some of whom use base issues to extract monetary compensation from Tokyo.

In a speech on Saturday, Mr Kyuma said: "The US says that [the 2005 agreement] should be implemented now that the two governments have made a decision between themselves, but we can't do it unless the Okinawa governor says yes. The US doesn't understand that. "

Mr Abe, pressed by the opposition in parliament on Monday, said Mr Kyuma stood behind the government's position and that any reservations he expressed were purely personal. However, one government official said he was puzzled by Mr Kyuma's loose talk, which he said compromised the government's position.

Yasuhisa Shiozaki, cabinet secretary, confirmed that the US had inquired "about exactly and in what manner " Japan's defence minister had spoken. "They were inappropriate remarks, but he immediately corrected them, " he said.

Last year, Mr Abe was forced to distance himself from comments by Taro Aso, his foreign minister, and other political allies suggesting Japan should lift its taboo on discussing an independent nuclear deterrent. Those remarks, too, had been made in a personal capacity, Mr Abe said.

Mr Shiozaki told reporters on Monday that cabinet discipline remained intact. "We are not a cabinet with its members saying whatever they like, " he said.

Abe dismisses concern over split in Cabinet opinion on Futemma plan

Jan 23 08:55 AM US/Eastern

TOKYO, Jan. 23 (AP) - (Kyodo)— Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on Tuesday brushed aside charges of inconsistency leveled against his Cabinet members over a government plan to relocate a U.S. base in Okinawa Prefecture, reiterating that the government will stick to its agreement with Washington.

Trying hard to put a lid on the controversy surrounding the U.S. Marine Corps' Futemma Air Station following a statement by Okinawa affairs minister Sanae Takaichi that local demands for the planned airfield to be moved further out to sea should be considered, Abe was visibly agitated when pressed to say whether his administration was split on the issue.

"We have not yet reached a conclusion and until we do it is rather natural to have various opinions. Otherwise, if everyone held the same view, there would be no need to have discussions," the premier told reporters at his office.

Asked if negotiations with the local authorities will be delayed as a result of a lack of consistency in his government, Abe shrugged it off by saying, "There is absolutely no such thing."

Ahead of the regular parliamentary session which will commence Thursday, Abe is desperately hoping to minimize further damage to his administration, which only four months into office has seen its popularity plummet following the resignation of a Cabinet minister, and money scandals and misconduct involving key players.

"I believe that if we proceed with the discussions (between the central and local governments), we will be able to gain (local) understanding and reach a conclusion," Abe said, stressing that he will listen to local opinion while also pushing to persuade locals to accept the plan agreed by Tokyo and Washington in May.

The municipal government of Nago, a city in Okinawa Prefecture where Futemma is scheduled to be relocated from the more densely populated city of Ginowan, has accepted the Japan-U.S. plan to build a coastal replacement airfield with two runways in a V-shape.

But Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro proposed on Friday that the airfield be built further offshore to the southwest and Takaichi suggested to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki on Monday that the central government give positive consideration to the idea.

Shiozaki, the top government spokesman, reiterated in a news conference Tuesday that there would be no change to the central government's basic stance.

"We are not kids, so I believe (Takaichi) understands" that negotiations are based in principle on the plan agreed between Japan and the United States, Shiozaki said.

Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma also expressed displeasure with Takaichi's actions, telling another news conference Tuesday morning, "I do not know what intent she had in her remarks."

Separately, Takaichi defended herself, saying, "We're at a stage where views are exchanged in order to achieve the best conclusion...I was only conveying my view that it is important to lend one's ear to the heartfelt opinions of local residents."

The Futemma relocation is a main pillar of the overall realignment plan for the U.S. military presence in Japan, which also includes moving thousands of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and dispersing flight drills from congested bases to other facilities across Japan.

In May, Japan and the United States agreed on a plan to build the new airfield in Nago's U.S. Camp Schwab by 2014 as a replacement for the Futemma base.

Any delay in obtaining local cooperation to proceed with the plan is likely to cause a headache for Abe, who is hoping to maintain as good a relationship with close ally the United States as that of his predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi.

Washington was already frustrated by Japan's failure to carry out an earlier Futemma offshore relocation plan, which has been stalled since 1996 due mainly to environmental concerns and opposition from protesters.

Abe's support ratings slipped to 45 percent in a recent Kyodo News poll, down from a high of 65 percent just after he took office in late September. The Asahi Shimbun, a major Japanese daily, reported that Abe's approval rating fell to 39 percent in its poll, below the 40 percent line for the first time.

America Lacks Foreign-Policy Savvy

January 21, 2007
By Richard Halloran

A columnist for The New York Times, Nicholas Kristof, posed an intriguing question last Sunday: "Why are we (Americans) so awful at foreign policy?"

Kristof pointed not only to Iraq but at foreign and security policy in general, contending the "shortsightedness is a bipartisan tradition in foreign policy. Historically, we are often our own worst enemy."

He gave two reasons: "Great powers always lumber about, stepping on toes, provoking resentments, and solving problems militarily simply because they have that capability." Secondly, he asserted: "We don't understand the world."

Kristof's gloomy condemnation may have been a tad too sweeping. In the six decades since the end of World War II, the U.S. was benevolent in the occupations of defeated Japan and Germany, and the Marshall Plan surely stimulated the recovery of Western Europe.

The U.S., led by Democratic President Harry S Truman at the beginning and Republican Ronald Reagan at the end, bested the Soviet Union in the Cold War. In the middle of that, President John F. Kennedy deftly prevented the Cuban missile crisis from triggering a nuclear war.

In Asia, America helped to end colonialism by granting the Philippines independence in 1946 and stopped the spread of communism in the Korean War of 1950-53. Republican President Richard Nixon began an opening to emerging China with his journey to Beijing in 1972. Democratic President Jimmy Carter completed that opening by establishing diplomatic relations with China in 1979.

In stark contrast, it has been in the administrations of Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican President George W. Bush that U.S. skills in foreign policy have withered. Clinton achieved little of note in that field during his eight years in office, and the legacy of Bush's two terms ending in January 2009 will most likely be branded by the blunder in Iraq.

In the last decade of the 20th century and the first of the 21st, the ineptitude of the United States in foreign affairs appears to have been caused by what might be called the "Five I's:"

* Isolationism: Deep in the American psyche is a core conviction that this nation was founded by people who had escaped the political, economic and social ills of Europe and Asia, and who believe that America would be better off if people elsewhere solved their own problems and left us alone.

* Idealism: Even though Americans are isolationists, they believe the U.S., as the Puritan John Winthrop said in 1630, is "a city upon a hill" that the rest of the world should emulate. In the focus on human rights, democracy and the pursuit of happiness, realism is shunted aside.

* Ignorance: Kristof was right in saying Americans don't understand the world. U.S. education, in high school and college, does not prepare citizens to deal with the world. And print and TV news sources often fail to tell Americans what they need to know about events beyond our shores.

* Inattention: The U.S. government, with its divisive politics and unending struggles for personal power, has become so fractured that it can focus on only one problem at a time. Right now it is Iraq -- while policies toward China, North Korea, Sudan and Darfur, and other places languish.

* Individuals: Personalities count more than bureaucracies or ideologies. Presidents Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower were personally unalike but shared a Midwestern common sense that steered them well. Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush are equally different but share a basic indifference to foreign affairs.

Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state who has been controversial for some of his policies and for his oft-displayed self-confidence -- some say arrogance -- also has been a keen analyst of American foreign affairs, especially of the nation's swings between idealism and realism.

In his 1994 book, "Diplomacy," he said America's "two approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, so contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith: that the United States possessed the world's best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy."

He concluded, and the reader could almost hear a sigh escape from this passage: "America's journey through international politics has been a triumph of faith over experience." He added, with another apparent sigh: "What is new about the emerging world order is that for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it."

Central, local gov'ts remain apart over Futemma relocation plan

Jan 18 11:05 PM US/Eastern

TOKYO, Jan. 19 (AP) - (Kyodo) — The central government and local authorities remained apart concerning a plan to relocate a U.S. military base in Okinawa as they held a third consultative meeting on the issue Friday in Tokyo.

Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro told reporters after the meeting at the prime minister's office he proposed during informal discussions with central government representatives that the new replacement airfield to be built off Nago be constructed further offshore than currently planned.

Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima reiterated his view that the government should bring the U.S. Marine Corps Futemma Air Station to a state of virtual closure in three years to eliminate the danger it poses to the densely populated area of Ginowan where it is located.

Under an agreement finalized last May, the Japanese and U.S. governments plan to build an airfield with two runways in a V-shaped formation on the coast and a new landfill in Nago in and around the U.S. Marines' Camp Schwab by 2014 to replace the airfield functions of Futemma.

The central government explained the background to the latest relocation plan and told the local government representatives that it wants to continue consultations with them over the matter, according to Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma.

The Futemma relocation is a main pillar of the overall plan for the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan, which also includes moving 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and dispersing flight drills from congested bases to other facilities across the country.

Central, local gov'ts remain apart over Futemma relocation plan

Jan 19 01:49 AM US/Eastern
TOKYO, Jan. 19 (AP) - (Kyodo) — The central government and local authorities remained apart concerning a plan to relocate a U.S. military base in Okinawa as they held a third consultative meeting on the issue Friday in Tokyo.

The parties agreed to meet again at an early time after neither side made concessions on their differences over the specifics of moving the airfield functions of the U.S. Marine Corps Futemma [Futenma] Air Station in Ginowan to an area in Nago around the Marines' Camp Schwab.

Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro told reporters after the meeting at the prime minister's office he proposed during informal discussions that the new replacement airfield in Nago be constructed further offshore than currently planned.

But central government officials indicated they do not consider it a proposal as the mayor did not mention it during formal consultative talks.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki told a press conference there was no such adjustment proposal made in the meeting.

The national government explained the background to the latest relocation scheme and the rough outline of plans for environmental assessment, reclamation work and construction, aimed for completion by officials said.

Under an agreement finalized last May, the Japanese and U.S. governments plan to build an airfield with two runways in a V-shaped formation on the coast and a new landfill in Nago in and around Camp Schwab by 2014 as a replacement for the Futemma [Futenma] base.

Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima, who opposes the current plan, reiterated his view that the government should bring the Futemma [Futenma] Air Station to a state of virtual closure within three years to eliminate the danger it poses to the densely populated area where it is now located.

Nakaima said in the consultative talks that he finds it difficult to agree with the current plan to build the V-shaped runways, but agreed on the need to continue discussions with the central government.

The Okinawa governor, however, suggested at a separate press conference that he may accept moving the facility to the Camp Schwab vicinity, saying, "The Nago area seems to be realistic in order to complete the relocation."

Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma said separately he told the local government representatives he wants to continue consultations with them over their wish to eliminate the dangers of Futemma [Futenma].

Following the consultations, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met with Nakaima and other local representatives and told them the national government intends to continue discussions with them.

"We must lend our ear to the heartfelt voices of the local people and explain the government's views carefully," Abe later told reporters.

The Nago municipal government earlier accepted the new airfield plan, but Shimabukuro said Friday he wants the V-shaped runways to be built further to the southwest to reduce noise in nearby residential areas.

Tokyo has yet to gain approval from the Okinawa prefectural government. Under current laws, landfills for airfield construction require authorization from the governor.

Nakaima, who took office in December, is seen as showing more flexibility on the Futemma [Futenma] issue than his predecessor, Keiichi Inamine, who strongly opposed the V-shaped runways and called for relocating the facility outside of Okinawa.

The Futemma [Futenma] relocation is a main pillar of the overall plan for the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan, which also includes moving 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and dispersing flight drills from congested bases to other facilities across the country.

Representatives of the central government and the Okinawa, Nago and other related local governments met in Tokyo for consultations on the Futemma [Futenma] relocation plan for the first time in August last year and held their second meeting in December.

The U.S.-japan Alliance: Sustaining the Transformation

The U.S.-japan Alliance:
Sustaining the Transformation

By Bruce A. Wright and Mark O. Hague
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 44, 1st quarter 2007 / JFQ

On October 29, 2005, the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs (collectively known as the Security Consultative Committee, SCC) capped nearly 3 years of intense discussions about the structure of the most important U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific. They signed the Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.1 Unofficially known as the ATARA Report, this document details the roles, missions, and capabilities that both countries have agreed must be improved to strengthen their partnership. Most significantly, it outlines the strategic foundations for the alliance and provides operational-level guidance to further the partnership in support of the National Security Strategy and the four priority areas outlined in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

Following the success of the report, the SCC presented a more detailed roadmap of alliance transformation on May 1, 2006, which reflected several months of consultations at the working level between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Forces, Japan, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), and U.S. Department of State and their Japanese counterparts. This roadmap contained detailed implementation plans to achieve the goals set out in the ATARA Report.

Forces of Regional Instability

Historically, the U.S.-Japan alliance has provided a bulwark against regional instability. Whether through containing communism or providing for free navigation of the seas so commercial shipping could thrive, the United States has always been considered the honest broker in the region and has been called on countless times to provide assistance for disasters, stem the spread of organized crime and illicit activities such as piracy, defend friends and allies from attack, or take action to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Throughout the postwar era, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable to supporting American operations across the theater.

Nevertheless, the threat of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region persists. Several factors have created strategic uncertainty: uneven economic development, unresolved territorial disputes, resource competition, environmental degradation, overpopulation, rising nationalism, great power rivalry, and a sense of history that has left many countries feeling victimized (either from colonialism or aggression in World War II).2

Furthermore, the diversity of cultures, languages, religions, and economic and political systems poses enormous challenges to devising a common value system on which to build any type of multilateral security structure. Past efforts at building these types of institutions, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, have foundered, and the incremental progress of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum underscores the continuing reluctance of area nations to commit to large-scale security cooperation. The result has been a security framework centered on bilateral ties and alliances with the United States.

The strategic geography of the Asia-Pacific region also shapes the security environment. The most economically successful countries, Japan and the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), lie on the coast or in the littoral. Their growth and survival are tied to the trade that passes over the sea lanes. With the exception of Japan, these nations were too small to develop navies that could protect trade routes and have relied on U.S. naval and air presence to underwrite their security.3 However, the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean imposes a tyranny of distance that precludes forces in the continental United States from rapidly deploying to the region in a crisis. To maintain an effective military presence in Asia and honor alliance commitments there, Washington must maintain a forward presence to reassure friends and allies of its ability to respond to crises and dissuade others from acting in ways that harm U.S. interests.

Importance of Japan

The enduring U.S. interest in the region is to maintain peace and stability so nations can flourish economically, socially, and politically. To this end, Japan is a committed ally and partner. It shares the American commitment to democratic values, free and fair trade, respect for human rights, and rule of law, standing as a counterpoint to those who claim that democracy is both destabilizing and incompatible with Asian values. This shared value system has helped shape Japan’s view of its national interests and provided the foundation for an alliance that has persisted for more than 50 years.

As the world’s second largest economy, Japan has the financial and technological potential to make great contributions to international security. Tokyo already pays $4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S. forces, over 2.5 times what the next closest country remits and half of the total direct and indirect cost-sharing assistance received from all U.S. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Pacific, and Gulf Cooperation Council allies combined in 2003.4 It also includes funding for an educated and dedicated workforce of Japanese nationals who not only provide labor but who also, as an added benefit, help bridge the linguistic and cultural barriers between the U.S. military and its hosts.

Vast wealth and technological advancement also hold the potential for greater interoperability with U.S. forces. Japan currently has $8 billion of foreign military sales cases open with the United States and spends nearly $1 billion a year on American equipment. As the third largest purchaser of U.S. made military gear (behind Egypt and Saudi Arabia),5 Japan purchases, produces, or codevelops at least 28 major weapons systems, such as the F–15 Eagle, Patriot PAC–2 and PAC–3, Apache helicopter, and the Aegis Shipboard Air Defense System. Japan was also the first ally to invest heavily in ballistic missile defense (BMD) and will codevelop the next generation of the SM–3 missile and associated radars and fire control systems—all key components of U.S. BMD architecture.

Most importantly, Japan provides bases for stationing and deploying over 50,000 uniformed personnel from all Service components. Its location in the Asian littoral places the U.S. Armed Forces in a position to project power over the ocean trade routes, which are the economic lifeline of the region, and also serves as an access point to South and Southeast Asia, critical regions in the war on terror. A strong American presence acts as a deterrent against those who would upset the status quo through aggression and reassures Japan and other nations who have come to view the U.S. presence in Asia as a stabilizing force.

Evolution of the Alliance

One of the greatest strengths of the U.S.-Japan alliance is its continued evolution to meet the challenges of a shifting strategic landscape. World War II left Japan without any military forces and no legal authority to establish a defense capability. This soon changed as events on the Korean Peninsula drove the United States into another war. In 1950, the occupation authorities in Japan recognized the threat to Japanese interests posed by the communist forces on the peninsula and established the National Police Reserve, which later evolved into the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF).

Since the inception of the SDF, Washington and Tokyo have reached a series of benchmarks, both bilaterally and unilaterally. The countries updated their security relationship in 1960 by signing the current security treaty, which includes the imperatives of defending Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Far East. The U.S. military relationship was further defined in 1978 when the Security Consultative Committee signed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. These principles focused the alliance on the defense of Japan and established a division of labor called the Shield and Spear concept, in which the SDF would defend the homeland (acting as the shield), while the United States would take the fight beyond Japanese territory (the spear). These guidelines opened the door for formal bilateral training and planning.

Japan dispatched its Maritime SDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf at the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. This was the first time the SDF was allowed to operate beyond territorial waters and paved the way for participation in support of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts in Cambodia the following year—and the first time since World War II that Japanese ground troops operated outside the country. Since then, the SDF has continued to contribute to UN efforts by dispatching soldiers to Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda, East Timor, Honduras, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Recognizing the end of the Cold War and the simmering tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and Japan updated previous agreements on role-sharing by signing the New Defense Guidelines in 1997. These rules marked a shift in focus from the Cold War imperative of defending Japan to a shared commitment to maintaining peace and security in the Far East. Tokyo agreed to provide logistic support and perform search and rescue and maritime inspection operations in rear areas to assist U.S. military operations around Japan.6 These guidelines also provided for a more robust bilateral coordination mechanism and more detailed bilateral planning.

In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Tokyo passed the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law in October of that year, permitting the SDF to deploy ships to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan.

Shaping the Alliance

As the United States and Japan entered the 21st century, the Asia-Pacific region faced strategic uncertainty. The attacks on the World Trade Center brought nontraditional threats to the forefront, yet traditional military rivalries and historic animosities persisted. North Korea, moreover, continued to defy the world in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions. These developments called for a renewed look at the alliance.

In December 2002, the SCC directed a review of both nations’ defense and security policies. Known as the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), this study included an analysis of the global security environment; discussion of bilateral roles, missions, capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperation in missile defense and efforts to confront regional challenges. The DPRI process allowed both countries to reaffirm the value of the alliance and reshape it to ensure its relevance for the foreseeable future.

On February 19, 2005, the allies agreed on a set of common strategic objectives, which encompassed a variety of security challenges that threatened regional and global peace and stability. Issues addressed at the SCC level included closer cooperation in missile defense, combating terrorism, and resolving the proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea. Both nations also called for the peaceful resolution of “issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue” and encouraged China to improve the transparency of its military affairs. The SCC committed to
holding regular consultations to coordinate policies and objectives.7

Following this meeting, U.S. and Japanese leaders began a comprehensive review of the roles, missions, and capabilities that each country should pursue in support of common strategic objectives. The results of this study were approved by the SCC on October 29, 2005, and published in the ATARA Report. This document reaffirmed the importance of the alliance to both countries and addressed two fundamental issues: force posture realignment and the roles, missions, and capabilities each side would need to respond to diverse challenges.

Force Posture Realignment

American military bases in Japan provide the USPACOM commander with enormous flexibility and strategic access to the Asia-Pacific region. Kadena Air Base in Okinawa is the largest American airbase outside of the continental United States, the Navy’s only forward deployed aircraft carrier calls Yokosuka Naval Base home, and one of the Marine Corps’ III Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) is located in Okinawa. Aside from these critical forces, there are more than 80 other military facilities of various sizes.

As important as these bases are, they reflect a force structure designed to address past threats, not future challenges. Additionally, some were originally in rural areas. Urban sprawl, especially near Tokyo and in Okinawa, eventually brought residential neighborhoods to the front gates. Routine training became an irritant to the alliance in some areas as residents complained of noise and other degradations in the quality of life.

Through the DPRI, the SCC embarked on an ambitious program to create an enduring presence for U.S. forces by relocating units to other areas, including Guam, reducing the burden on local communities while repositioning U.S. forces to respond better to regional crises. Certain measures were specified:

• The headquarters of III MEF will relocate to Guam. A Marine air-ground task force will remain in Okinawa. Additionally, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma will be replaced by a new facility at Camp Schwab, thus relocating the majority of tactical aircraft that support III MEF far from urban areas to reduce noise complaints and allay local fears of mishaps. These moves will also allow the Marines to consolidate their forces in northern Okinawa, away from the urbanized south.

• Carrier Air Wing 5, part of the USS Kitty Hawk battlegroup, will relocate to Iwakuni MCAS, moving its jet aircraft out of Tokyo’s crowded Kanto Plain. The Kitty Hawk battlegroup will remain forward deployed in Yokosuka, and the Navy will maintain some capability in Atsugi. The Kitty Hawk, theNavy’s sole remaining conventionally powered aircraft carrier, will be replaced by the nuclear powered USS George Washington in 2008.

• U.S. Army Japan at Camp Zama will be transformed into a joint task force–capable, deployable headquarters that is part of the U.S. Army I Corps, providing the USPACOM commander with another forward-deployed, crisis response option in the theater.

• The Air Self-Defense Force will collocate its air defense command headquarters with the headquarters of U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Tokyo, strengthening bilateral ballistic missile defense command and control and shared early warning systems.

• Japan agreed to provide land and facilities in northern Japan to support the deployment of an X-band radar, the first time since 1985 the country has provided space and infrastructure to the U.S. military for a new facility.8

Interoperability

Interoperability covers the spectrum of military conflict from the strategic, through the operational, to the tactical level. At the strategic level, it encompasses issues such as crisis management and decisionmaking, intelligence exchange, budgeting, capacities of the defense industrial base, and the legal and policy frameworks that provide a nation’s leaders the authority to mobilize assets in support of national security objectives.

At the operational level, interoperability focuses on cooperation between national military forces and includes such areas as combined or bilateral command and control, combined and interagency planning, basing and force posture, and organizing bilateral or multinational forces to leverage the capabilities that the militaries of each nation possess. At the tactical level, interoperability efforts primarily focus on bilateral and multilateral training, where military units practice operating together in a variety of contingencies.

To maintain regional peace and stability, U.S. and allied forces must be postured strategically and linked operationally to dissuade, deter, and, when necessary, defeat threats. Restructuring bases within Japan will better position forces there to respond to contingencies and crises in the region and increase interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces. In some cases, such as in Camp Zama and Yokota Air Base, American and SDF units will be collocated, providing unprecedented opportunities to train together and increase interoperability.

Alliance transformation, however, is not limited to real estate. The effectiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance will ultimately be measured by how the two militaries can achieve common objectives through a variety of regional and global activities, not by the location of U.S. bases within Japan. Defining the roles, missions, and capabilities each force should bring to a contingency, then developing those capabilities through bilateral training, is essential to a more capable alliance. Missile defense, countering WMD proliferation, bilateral training and exercises, and strengthening Tokyo’s role in regional and global affairs are among the most significant issues being addressed.

Missile Defense

Protecting the homeland from direct attack is a fundamental duty of the Armed Forces and the highest priority of the national defense strategy. U.S. and Japanese efforts at missile defense in Japan form the frontline protection against missiles directed at both countries from continental Asia.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) fired a Taepodong missile over Japan unannounced in 1998. This incident, described by North Korea as a failed satellite launch, was a stark reminder that Japan is well within the range of North Korean missiles yet has no protection. After that incident, the Japanese government began a series of studies on missile defense and in December 2003 decided to pursue a missile defense capability that included close cooperation with the United States on operational matters and research on BMD systems.

Both allies reaffirmed their commitment to BMD at the two-plus-two meetings in February and October of 2005. They also agreed to base an American X-band radar in Japan that will be able to search and track missiles directed at either country. Aegis warships and Patriot PAC–3 batteries, both Japanese and American, will provide area and point defenses to critical infrastructure and military bases within Japan.

This close bilateral coordination in missile defense paid dividends in July 2006, when Kim Jong Il again attempted to use his ballistic missiles to intimidate Japan and position his regime as a global military power. Unlike in 1998, however, the U.S.-Japan alliance was at a much improved level of readiness and detected the DPRK missile activity. The U.S. security establishment identified seven missile launches as they occurred. One of the tested missiles was a Taepodong, which failed soon after launch.

The close bilateral and interagency coordination between Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan; the Japan Defense Agency; Japan Joint Staff Office; and the American Embassy provided the senior leadership of both allies the opportunity to meet on the world stage with timely, reliable, and coordinated information, which ultimately defeated Pyongyang’s efforts to surprise the world. In fact, these ballistic missile launches by North Korea have substantially strengthened Japanese public support for the security alliance and paved the way for additional domestic spending on bilateral missile defense systems.

The July 2006 missile launches highlighted the importance of sharing missile defense data to ensure situational awareness. A vital element of this exchange will be an air and missile defense coordination center collocated with the U.S. Forces, Japan, headquarters at Yokota Air Base.9 This key command node will act as the nerve center for future joint and bilateral military activities in Japan, enabling U.S. and Japanese commanders to interact face to face, conduct coordination, and provide direction for all bilateral military activities.

At the heart of this center will be a robust multilink communications node that will fuse information on land, sea, air, and space operations into one all-encompassing operational picture. This facility will ensure rapid, bilateral decisionmaking, gaining Japanese and U.S. forces the time to react to a variety of crises, including a ballistic missile attack.10

Counterproliferation

Given its history as the only nation ever attacked with nuclear weapons, and having been victimized by domestic terrorists spreading Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system in 1995, Japan has positioned itself on the diplomatic moral high ground in its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and their delivery devices. Its proximity to North Korea, which withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and has a history of proliferating missiles, only intensifies the threat it feels and helps keep nonproliferation at the top of the national agenda.

A key area for U.S.-Japanese cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Japan was one of the first signatories. In October 2004, the SDF led Team Samurai ’04, an exercise that brought together 22 countries and provided a venue for practicing national crisis management, command and control, and maritime interdiction.11 Such operations are crucial in increasing the interoperability of nations involved in counterproliferation.

Bilateral Training and Exercises

To ensure the viability of the alliance, U.S. and Japanese forces in Japan must operationalize the strategies established at SCC meetings through a robust program that includes bilateral exercises in Japan, as well as SDF drills and training in the United States and Guam. Tokyo has committed to making changes in training infrastructure, enhancing the value of training, and dispersing training more broadly throughout Japan’s communities.

Each of the U.S. Service components has rigorous bilateral training programs with their Japanese counterparts that reflect their unique mission sets and capabilities. Both the Navy and Air Force require airspace to train tactical aircraft, and the Navy must also conduct field aircraft carrier landing practice. Under the new alliance structure, U.S. pilots may utilize airspace previously used only by Japanese pilots and have access to new Air SDF ground facilities. Airspace around the Kanto Plain and Iwakuni will be adjusted to accommodate the move of the carrier air wing, and Japan renewed its pledge to find a permanent base for Navy pilots to conduct field carrier and night landing practice, replacing the current site at Iwo Jima.

The Ground SDF will collocate its Central Readiness Force (CRF) headquarters with U.S. Army I Corps at Camp Zama. The CRF is a newly created major command in the Ground SDF that has administrative control over all special operations units and the mission of preparing Japanese forces for overseas peacekeeping duties. Positioning the CRF in Camp Zama will increase the training opportunities, liaison, and interoperability between this important headquarters and I Corps. Additionally, the U.S. Army will build a battle-command training center at the nearby Sagami Depot, which will have state-of-the-art computer simulations to enhance the bilateral training and readiness of both I Corps and its counterpart headquarters in the Ground SDF.

At the operational level, the key training that pulls all the elements of the various SCC reports together is the bilateral Exercise Keen Edge, conducted between U.S. Forces, Japan, and the Japan Joint Staff Office. Held every other year, Keen Edge tests the limits of the joint operating systems of U.S. Forces, Japan, in a bilateral, joint, and interagency environment. During the latest exercise in February 2005, 102 officers from the Joint Staff Office participated at Yokota Air Base, and 36 operated out of the Bilateral Coordination Center. Keen Edge both validated the roles, missions, and capabilities described in the ATARA Report and highlighted the work still needed to move the alliance forward. Another exercise is schedule for January 2007 to maintain the momentum and build on lessons learned in previous exercises.

Japan’s Leadership Role

In the postwar era, Japan has grown from a defeated and devastated nation to an economic powerhouse. The rise from the ashes of war was due to a variety of factors: a shared value system with the United States that prioritized democracy, rule of law, capitalism, and free trade; integration in the global marketplace; and a long era of peace and stability in Northeast Asia. As a beneficiary of the current international system, Japan has an obligation to help provide peace and stability not just in the region but also throughout the world. As its alliance with America matures and SDF capabilities increase, Japan will be able to assume a greater leadership role in the region and contribute more toward a stable international environment.

Tokyo faces tough challenges. A declining birthrate and aging society are predicted to put downward pressure on economic growth for at least the next 10 years, and an unresolved historical legacy undermines its military legitimacy with many, but not all, countries in the region. Myriad laws restricting Japan’s use of force, all stemming from interpretations of its constitution, effectively limit the Japanese to exercising soft power (that is, creating policies or programs that attract others due to appeal rather than threats). Within these constraints, however, there are activities that can help Tokyo to exercise regional and global leadership.

Participation in international peacekeeping operations is an example. Since it deployed its first UN peacekeeping mission in 1992, the SDF has proven to be a professional and effective force, albeit in a noncombat role, providing engineering expertise, logistic support, and disaster relief supplies throughout the world. Since then it has supported more peacekeeping and international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations and has over 500 SDF members supporting UN reconstruction in Iraq.

Each time the SDF deploys and brings relief supplies to people who are suffering or otherwise improves the area it deploys to, it gains the moral high ground by refuting arguments that Japan is a revanchist military power. In many ways, its actions in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations reflect national values, and any rational review of Japan’s postwar military activities would conclude that the country is a fully democratic nation-state in complete control of its forces and free from the urge of military domination.

The alliance transformation effort under way in Japan will change the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance in ways never thought possible just a decade ago. The momentum established through the Defense Policy Review Initiative process will strengthen what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has described as a “pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific region” as both nations move toward a more mature security partnership in which they field increasingly integrated and balanced alliance capabilities.

Postscript

On October 9, 2006, North Korea attempted to enter the ranks of the nuclear power states by announcing that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Described by Secretary Rice as “provocative” and condemned by nearly all of the world’s leaders, this act served to highlight the volatility of the region as it prompted many of North Korea’s neighbors to reassess their policies regarding the nation. It also underscored the importance of maintaining a strong forward presence in Northeast Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance serves a dual purpose of providing a credible deterrent that Kim Jong Il must consider if he continues to develop a nuclear capability further and reassuring our allies in the region of the continued U.S. commit- ment to their defense, including coverage under our extended nuclear deterrence. Interestingly, Kim’s provocation further trengthened Japan’s public support for the security alliance that their leaders have supported for more than 45 years. JFQ

Lieutenant General Bruce A. Wright, USAF, is Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan. Lieutenant Colonel Mark O. Hague, USA, is a staff officer in the Plans and Policy Directorate (J–5) at U.S. Forces, Japan.

NOTES
1
Security Consultative Committee Document, U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, October 29, 2005, available at
.
2
See, for example, Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006), 26–27.
3
See John R. Landry, “The Military Dimensions of Great-Power Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Strategic Traditions and Regional Realities, ed. Paul D. Taylor (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2001), 83–86.
4
In 2003, Japan’s host nation support covered nearly 75 percent of U.S. basing costs in Japan. See 2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions Support to the Common Defense, available at .
5
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency Facts Book (Washington, DC: DSCA Administration and Management Business Operations, September 30, 2004), 3–11, available at .
6
The area in which Japan can provide this support has not been geographically delineated and is conceptual in nature. See The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, available at . See also Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2005 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2005), 162–171, available at .
7
See “Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005, available at .
8
In 1985, the government provided 214 acres for the Haruo housing area near Sasebo Navy Base.
9
Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2005, Summary, available at .
10
For an overview of the operational and technical challenges of fielding a missile defense system, see M. Elaine Bunn, Deploying Missile Defense: Major Operational Challenges, Strategic Forum 209 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, August 2004), available at .
11
Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation Fact Sheet, “Japanese Regional Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise (Team Samurai ’04),” October 22, 2004,
available at . For a perspective from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see “The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise ‘Team Samurai 04’ (Overview and Evaluation),” October 28, 2004, available at .

U.S. military and Asia-Pacific snafus

japan today > japan > commentary
Henry Hilton
January 15, 2007

Judging by a recent multinational report, the U.S. military has more than got its hands full in our region. Incidents involving American personnel figure prominently in how local communities and their leaders are currently viewing the continuing presence of foreign troops on Asian soil.

After examining the situation in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, prominent academics, under the direction of Sheila Smith of the East-West Center in Honolulu, are discovering a wide range of similarities among three very different Asian nations. In a presentation last week at the International House of Japan, the research team's attention inevitably centered on the fraught scene in Okinawa. Recalling the November gubernatorial election results that gave a close victory to the Liberal Democratic Party's Hirokazu Nakaima, a packed Japanese audience was eager to hear what might be the next moves in the seemingly endless Okinawan saga.

The panel responsible for the publication "Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia" hoped that the traditional "top down" approach of the central government in Tokyo's dealings with the United States authorities might be reversed.

The suggestion that a more community-driven "bottom up" scheme might be on the cards was clearly welcomed. Yet others with a bureaucratic background cautioned that listening excessively to the view from Naha might risk impairing the wider geopolitical realities that to date have continued to link Japan and the United States in a close pan-Pacific strategic alliance structure for the past half century. There was some consolation, though, in learning that citizens' groups in both South Korea and the Philippines were following events in Okinawa and, in turn, Japanese activists were said to be learning from others in the region on how best to deal with the controversial issues of U.S. bases.

Despite the contrasts between the three societies and their post-1945 histories, the panel reckoned that a common "protest dynamic" was leading to a general awareness in Tokyo, Seoul and Manila that communities near American military bases have to be listened to with far greater sensitivity than in the recent past. It won't do any longer just to assume that each country in the last resort always needs Uncle Sam and to calculate that security considerations invariably have to take priority. Negotiators at the national level, according to the East-West specialists, now have little choice but to be aware constantly of how a wide range of doubtless conflicting local actors, such as landowners, environmentalists, women's groups and business interests, feel about the presence of U.S. military personnel and their installations.

One obvious and highly inflamatory issue remains, of course, the question of crimes committed by American personnel off base. The recent incident involving a U.S. serviceman in the Philippines, where there has been anger at the manner in which the two national governments have been handling the still unresolved issue, and the series of crimes committed both in Okinawa and Kanagawa Prefecture since the 1990s can only risk weakening long-established American ties with its Pacific allies.

Two changes are surely called for. The first is greater control by the host governments over the legal technicalities in all allegations of serious cases, such as murder, rape and robbery, in order that citizens in Asia can see that their systems of justice are determining the outcome. This will no doubt require further renegotiation of existing government-to-government status of forces agreements. The second reform centres on the U.S. military's behavior.

Earlier this month, it was announced that U.S. Navy personnel in Japan are to be subject to fresh restrictions on alcohol consumption but more needs to be done. Since any crime by a U.S. service member against a Japanese citizen is a potential threat to the long-term future of the security alliance, there will have to be tougher restrictions and punishments. The robbing of a taxi driver or a street brawl near base could easily have major political implications.

Henry Kissinger was certainly correct when he noted in an earlier era that U.S. bases in east Asia ultimately cannot function effectively without the support and goodwill of national governments and local communities. In the post-Cold War world this is even more so. A couple of nasty incidents in Okinawa or around camps north of Seoul easily might well trigger a wave of anti-Americanism. Local issues may increasingly become the tail that wags the dog.

Japan's Defense Change Symbolic

January 08, 2007
By Richard Halloran

On Tuesday, the Japan Defense Agency becomes the Japan Ministry of Defense in a change that seems small on the surface, but is substantial in its underlying reality.

In Japanese, the new name requires changing only one ideograph, from "cho" to "sho." In Romanized Japanese, it is but one letter. And in American English, most people would not see much difference between "agency" and "ministry."

In a nation often driven by symbols, however, this shift reflects a newly assertive Japan that some Japanese say seeks to be a "normal" country. Moreover, it responds to a perceived threat from North Korea and reflects Japanese anxiety over potential threats from China.

The Diet, Japan's legislature, authorized the revision last month with surprising little opposition, given the pacifist stance of left-wing parties in the past. The new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, asserted to the press that the transition to the Ministry of Defense "demonstrates both domestically and internationally the maturity of Japanese democracy."

He contended the change showed "our confidence in civilian control. It also sends a signal that Japan is prepared to contribute even more to the international community, and that it will take on its role responsibly."

In practical politics, the director general of the Defense Agency becomes the minister of defense and a member of the Cabinet that presides over the executive branch of Tokyo's government. That Cabinet of a dozen ministers drawn from the Diet is roughly the equivalent of the U.S. presidency, a fact often overlooked outside of Japan.

Until now, the head of the defense agency was something of a political nonentity. Sometime in the past, the only thing one director general of the agency was able to accomplish was to have a military band parade in his hometown.

On becoming a full-fledged member of the Cabinet, the defense minister will have more say about his ministry's budget than in the past, when it was fashioned largely by bureaucrats from the prime minister's office and the Finance Ministry. For decades, however, Japan has limited its military spending to 1 percent of gross national product and that seems unlikely to change any time soon.

Internationally, in dealing with the U.S. secretary of defense or top defense officials of other nations, the Japanese defense minister will be treated now "as an equal governmental chief in both name and reality," says Tokyo's 2006 white paper on defense. In prestige-conscious Japan, this counts.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces, however, will keep their names, both in Japanese and in translation. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force will not become the Japanese army and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force will not become the Japanese navy. At least not yet; some senior retired officers have been quietly lobbying for those names to be revised, too.

The birth of Japan's Defense Ministry is part of a plan to improve Japan's security. Prime Minister Abe says he wants to amend Article IX of the constitution, under which Japan has renounced force as an instrument of national power. It has been at the heart of Japanese pacifism for 60 years; a revision would constitutionally permit Japan to use military force to protect its interests.

The prime minister also has said Japan needs a national security council patterned on that in Washington and should form an agency to gather and analyze intelligence. Today, the Japanese prime minister has only a small research office to provide analyses of events and trends abroad.

The North Koreans and Chinese have criticized the elevation of the defense ministry. The (North) Korean Central News Agency, controlled by the government in Pyongyang, said that turning the defense agency into a ministry was intended to realize Japan's "militarist ambition for overseas expansion."

Similarly, an official Chinese newspaper, the People's Daily, contended that the shift reflected "a change in nature" for Japan's defense establishment as it "clears barriers for the Japanese armed forces on their way of going beyond self-defense."

What the North Koreans and Chinese fail to realize is that their belligerence toward Japan has accelerated a Japanese revision in their thinking on military power and caused Tokyo to strengthen its defense ties with the U.S. as the Americans realign their forces in Asia.

In the normal course of events, Japan would most likely have gradually shed its postwar pacifism in favor of a more assertive posture. The North Koreans and Chinese, however, have brought that day forward, which would not seem to be in their own best interests.

More Marines bound for O'ahu, Guam

Posted on: Monday, January 8, 2007
By William Cole
Advertiser Military Writer

The Marine presence on O'ahu could grow by about 1,000 as the service reshuffles its forces in the Pacific and moves forward with plans to relocate 8,300 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by about 2014, Lt. Gen. John Goodman said.

The top Marine commander in the Pacific offered a straightforward explanation for the move to Guam, which is precipitated by growing tensions and a shortage of space on Okinawa.

"Why Guam? The answer is because I can't go to the Philippines," Goodman said at a Chamber of Commerce of Hawai'i military partnership conference last week.

"If our alliance with the Philippines would allow us to go there, I would move 8,000 Marines right now to Manila Bay," Goodman said.

In 1991, the Philippine Senate voted to reject a treaty allowing U.S. bases in the country, but the government continues to welcome U.S. military aid and training.

Strategically, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan also would be preferable for the basing, but since such moves are not possible, Guam is as close as Goodman can get to potential hot spots.

"I can take off from Guam in my helicopters or Okinawa with Marines on board and I can be in the fight fast — within hours," the three-star general said.

Service commanders also emphasized the importance of Hawai'i as the Pacific increasingly becomes a center of gravity for economic production, potential terrorism, and military buildup by countries such as China.

At the same time, the United States is taking forces from Europe and South Korea and pulling them back to the Mainland.

Lt. Gen. John M. Brown III, who heads U.S. Army, Pacific, at Fort Shafter, said 85 percent of the Army will be based in the continental United States in the next few years. Forces that are forward-based, like those in Hawai'i, become critical to national military strategy, Brown said.

"Those forces have to be early and initial entry forces that can respond to the combatant commander's requirements immediately while that big portion in the Army back in the continental U.S. moves forward," Brown said.

The Army's Stryker brigade is a fast-strike unit that is designed to be deployed within days.

Hawai'i also remains a command and control nerve center.

O'AHU MARINES

Goodman said Hawai'i's contingent of about 6,500 Marines could grow by 800 to 1,000 as part of possible command and control changes at Kane'ohe Bay.

Adm. Gary Roughead, who commands U.S. Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor, noted that exercise Valiant Shield off Guam in June brought together three aircraft carriers, more than 300 aircraft and other forces in the biggest U.S. Navy and Air Force presence in the western Pacific since the Vietnam War.

The exercise was commanded from the Navy's Makalapa headquarters and Kenney Headquarters at Hickam Air Force Base.

"But Hawai'i really enables it all from the Navy perspective," Roughead said. "We do have the tyranny of distance, but with today's technology, we're now commanding our forces in ways that were unheard of 10 to 15 years ago."

The Navy presence in the region is only going to grow with defense planning expected to tip the balance of attack submarines from a 50/50 split in the Pacific and Atlantic to 60 percent in the Pacific, Roughead said.

IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN

Some 22,000 Marines from Marine Forces Pacific drawn from California, Hawai'i, Arizona, Okinawa and Mainland Japan are in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that number probably will go up by another 3,000 to 4,000 over the course of the year if anticipated orders are received, Goodman said.

Brown said excluding a troop level change expected to be made by the president, 25,000 U.S. Army, Pacific, soldiers are expected to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan this fiscal year, and in fiscal 2008 another 25,000 will be prepared to deploy if called upon.

Reach William Cole at wcole@honoluluadvertiser.com.

Base realignment still facing some hurdles

Jan. 8--TOKYO -- Tokyo and Washington have yet to clear a score of hurdles over the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture, despite a Japanese-U.S. accord last year.

The shifting of the air station's functions to the marines' Camp Schwab on the coast of Nago is a major pillar of the Japanese-U.S. agreement on the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan.

A third round of talks is scheduled for Jan. 17--although there may be a delay--between the central government, the Okinawa prefectural government and local municipal governments concerned.

The central government and the municipalities--the city of Nago and three towns and villages--favor a plan to build an airfield with two 1,800-meter runways arranged in a V-shaped pattern on the Nago coast and nearby landfill.

Okinawa Gov. Hirokazu Nakaima, however, is against the plan, insisting the airfield is too close to residential areas and could affect residents. He also has maintained that the plan should be in line with the U.S. commitment to have Futenma Air Station--which is in the densely populated city of Ginowan--closed down within three years.

Current laws require authorization by the Okinawa governor for landfill work necessary for the airfield construction plan.

"Thank you for coming all the way to the Cabinet Office the other day for our last consultation meeting [on the base relocation]," said Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiji Suzuki when he met with Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro at the Nago municipal government office Sunday.

The government's deputy chief spokesman added, "I'm truly glad to have an opportunity today to extend our thanks to you once more, as we're well aware that you, as head of Nago, have been tasked with the heaviest of duties" for bringing about the V-shape airfield.

Subsequently, Suzuki also was humble when he met the heads of the three municipalities of Higashison, Ginozason and Kincho.

Talking with each for about 30 minutes, Suzuki stressed, "The central government is strongly determined to do our best to ensure settlement [of the airfield issue] in a way satisfactory to all of you."

The visits by Suzuki, who will coordinate the upcoming joint consultation, were intended as a message that the Cabinet Office will act responsibly in addressing the relocation issue, sources close to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said.

The future process for finalizing the plan, however, is still up in the air.

In a meeting Sunday with Suzuki, Nakaima reiterated his two conditions for giving the go-ahead to the planned airfield: modification of the central government's V-shape design; and removal of possible hazards relating to Futenma Air Station, including its closure in three years.

Regarding possible changes to the government-drafted plan, Defense Agency Director General Fumio Kyuma made an unexpectedly flexible statement Wednesday.

"A plan that can secure the agreement of the three parties of Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City and the United States would be good, no matter what it may be," he said.

Kyuma also indicated he was considering an alternative plan with a single runway off Camp Schwab.

But Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki downplayed Kyuma's remarks.

At a press conference Friday, Shiozaki said the forthcoming consultation should focus on the central government's plan.

He said Kyuma's remarks "have apparently been made to stress the importance of an agreement among the Japanese and U.S. governments and localities for the implementation of this plan."

Foreign Minister Taro Aso appeared displeased with Kyuma's remarks and said the same day that the construction plan of a V-shaped airfield should go forward as is, citing that the agreement was signed by the senior foreign and defense officials of Japan and the United States last May in Washington.

Kyuma's remarks were tantamount to reversing the official accord between Tokyo and Washington, Aso added.

Other government sources said, there could be little room for a major modification to the V-shape plan, as time for discussing the issue with the United States is limited.

Some officials said a face-saving compromise for Nakaima could be made if minor changes are made to the current plan, such as shifting the airfield offshore a few dozen meters to reduce noise and preventing aircraft from flying over nearby communities.

To ensure the base relocation plan goes smoothly in line with the May 2006 accord, the central government has adopted an elaborately calculated carrot-and-stick policy for affected areas.

One example is a bill for creating a special law to promote the U.S. force realignment, which the government will present to an ordinary Diet session convening Jan. 25. The bill calls for creating a new tax grant system for local governments facing increased burdens in hosting U.S. military installations.

The government earmarked 5.1 billion yen in such grants in its 2007 national budget, which will be allocated to local entities in proportion to their pace of progress in accepting the government-planned realignment projects.

The more cooperative the local governments are with the plans, the more cash they will receive for improving infrastructure such as roads, harbors and other facilities.

In addition to the special grant system, the government will continue disbursing 100 billion yen a year for economic development in the northern part of Okinawa Island to benefit local entities ready to take part in the joint central government-Okinawa Prefecture-local government consultation.

Bitter measures have been taken under this policy on the municipal government of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, which has opposed plans for transferring U.S. carrier-based aircraft from the U.S. Naval Air Facility in Atsugi, Kanagawa Prefecture, to the marine corps' Iwakuni Air Station.

The Defense Facilities Administration Agency, which is in charge of managing facilities for Japan's defense forces and the U.S. military, has shelved budgetary appropriation plans for fiscal 2007 that were intended to help finance construction of a new building for the Iwakuni municipal government. The agency also has dropped a plan to help construct facilities relating to a planned civilian airport that Iwakuni citizens want to see built on the air station.

By Yoshifumi Sugita, Kiyoshi Miyamoto and Shinya Yamada

Defense chief calls for flexibility on U.S. base plan for Okinawa

Jan 3 09:00 AM US/Eastern

(AP) - BANGKOK, Jan. 3 (Kyodo) — Japanese Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma on Wednesday suggested he will not insist on the airfield construction plan Japan and the United States agreed for Nago, Okinawa Prefecture.

Speaking to reporters in Bangkok, where he met Thai officials the previous day, Kyuma said, "A plan that can secure the agreement of the three parties of Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City and the United States would be good, no matter what it may be."

The Japanese and U.S. governments have come up with a plan to build two 1,800-meter runways in a V-shape in Nago to allow for the relocation of the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps Futemma Air Station near the city center.

The Nago municipal government has accepted the plan provided that aircraft not fly over residential areas.

The Okinawa prefetural government has not consented to it. A prefectural official told the prefectural assembly last month that the V-shape airfield is too close to residential areas and could impact on the lives of local people.

Current laws require authorization by the Okinawa governor for landfill work that would be necessary for airfield construction.

Kyuma indicated that he is considering an alternative plan that calls for the construction of only a single-runway airfield off the U.S. Marines' Camp Schwab in Nago.

It remains to be seen if Kyuma's idea will be realized, given the twists and turns that have accompanied the base relocation plan. The initial Japan-U.S. accord called for relocating Futemma to an offshore airfield near Nago, but it stalled for a decade due in part to protesters blocking construction.

"It would be good if it has only one runway," Kyuma said. The V-shape plan requires a big budget and one runway should cost less, he said. Since the Japanese government is faced with the task of rehabilitating its debt-ridden finances, the lower the cost is, the better it would be, he said.

On the location, Kyuma said, "It must be pushed offshore to prevent (aircraft) from flying over neighboring communities, but it must not reach an island (that lies around 100 meters off the coast of Nago)," he said.

Kyuma also said the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will be abolished as of Sept. 1 and relevant legislation will be introduced in the Diet in February.

The agency, tasked to manage facilities for Japanese defense forces and the U.S. military, had been scheduled for abolition sometime in fiscal 2007, which begins April 1, under legislation passed in December to upgrade the Defense Agency to a full ministry that will also take over the facilities agency.

On the upgrading of the Defense Agency to a ministry, Kyuma said proposals are in the offing to set up a post of deputy minister in charge of coordinating the realignment of U.S. forces within the ministerial secretariat.

He also disclosed a proposal to establish a Japan-U.S. defense cooperation bureau that will handle coordination of missile defense plans and other bilateral defense issues.

Also in the works is a plan to set up a strategy planning office that would conduct mid- to long-term research on the situation in the Korean Peninsula, the emergence of China as a military power and the U.S. global strategy, Kyuma said.