SDF assistance to U.S. military triples

The Asahi Shimbun
December 20, 2005

The number of cases in which the Self-Defense Forces provided supplies or support for the U.S. military more than tripled in fiscal 2004 from the previous year, the Defense Agency said.

The increase stems from a 2004 revision to the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), enabling the SDF to provide such assistance to the U.S. military even during routine training drills.

The agreement was originally intended only for U.N. peacekeeping operations or joint training drills.

But Tokyo and Washington have become increasingly interdependent in terms of military cooperation. In addition, enhancing Japan's role in logistics support for U.S. troops is part of an interim report on U.S. military realignment.

According to the Defense Agency, the SDF provided goods and services to the U.S. military in response to requests 212 times between April and December 2004.

For all of fiscal 2003, the figure was 67.

Of the 212 cases, 150 involved assistance approved under the 2004 revision of the ACSA.

Conventional SDF assistance, including providing accommodation, fuel, transportation and other duties during Japan-U.S. joint exercises, remained at the same level as the previous year, which was 58.

Of the 212 cases, 148 involved U.S. aircraft being refueled at SDF air stations.

The Asahi Shimbun

U.S. used Japan's Gulf War isolation to push it onto world stage

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
December 16, 2005

(Kyodo) _ In the early 1990s, after Japan faced criticism for its passive checkbook diplomacy during the first Gulf War, the United States sought to take advantage of Tokyo's "defensiveness and fear of isolation" to prod it to play a greater role on the global stage, according to a recently declassified U.S. government document.

The document -- a cable dated March 14, 1991, by then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost -- is part of more than 1,750 declassified documents totaling over 8,000 pages that highlight how during 1977-1992 U.S. pressure spurred Japan to increase its international contributions and resolve trade friction.

The papers also clarify the process of how the two nations worked together to deepen their defense cooperation during these critical years, which saw the end of the Cold War and the launch of the Gulf War, even though their trade and economic ties were deteriorating.

Now, more than a decade later, Japan and the United States have recently agreed on the realignment of the U.S. military in Japan to strengthen defense ties by integrating the operations of the U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force and to transform their security relations into a global alliance.

The documents were obtained by the National Security Archive, a research center and library affiliated with George Washington University in the U.S. capital.

In the cable sent to the U.S. State Department shortly after the Gulf War, Armacost said the Japanese government took an "essentially passive approach" to the war and that the Diet debate failed to "educate the pubic on the fundamental interests and principles at stake."

"Much of the responsibility belongs to the rigid parliamentary practices built up over the 40 years of single party rule and to the bureaucratic mentality" with which the government, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition parties "have traditionally approached issues," he said.

But Armacost said, "In pursuing our interests here, we have the opportunity to take advantage of Japan's defensiveness and fear of isolation in the wake of the Gulf crisis to gain greater GOJ (government of Japan) cooperation."

"In sum, we have a real opportunity to influence the direction of Japanese foreign policy and to point Japan's financial and political influence in directions supportive of U.S. interests if we devote the time necessary for consultations and if we give the GOJ some room for maneuver within the context of different approaches to achieving shared objectives," he said.

Armacost warned against "the bashing" seen in the U.S. Congress and media over Tokyo's contributions, saying that it "has fueled resentment" in Japan.

"Of more importance is the growing theme here that America's welcome new self-confidence may turn to arrogance and that the United States, unconstrained by the need to maintain alliances to contain the Soviet Union in a 'uni-polar world' and frightened by Japan's economic challenge, will now 'turn its guns' toward Tokyo," he said.

"We need to avoid an overly confrontational approach that risks provoking a backlash," Armacost said.

In a memorandum dated April 20, 1981, for U.S. President Ronald Reagan ahead of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's visit to Washington, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stressed the importance of encouraging Japan to increase its defense capabilities.

"Japan is our only Asian ally with the potential significantly to increase its defense efforts," he said. "Therefore, your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki provides a fine opportunity to urge Japan to help provide for its own defense while the United States continues to provide the offensive capability in the region."

More specifically, Weinberger advised the president to propose that Japan "approximately double your maritime and air defense capabilities in the Northwest Pacific within this decade...to protect shipping lanes north of the Philippines and west of Guam plus the air defense of Japan."

As for trade disputes, a memorandum of talks between Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig on March 23, 1981, documents the proposal officially made by the United States for Japanese automakers to voluntarily restrain their exports to resolve the auto dispute amid escalating retaliatory pressure in the U.S. Congress and industry.

"Our concern is to preempt in both Europe and the United States the protectionist trends by some manifestation in the near-term of Japanese restraint in the areas of small car and small truck exports," Haig said.

But Ito told Haig that the Japanese government "was not yet prepared to respond in specific terms," according to the document.

Asked whether Washington wanted a government-to-government agreement, Haig said, "We were not seeking a formal agreement, but rather voluntary guidelines by the Japanese on which both sides had expressed their views and had the ability to assist in developing."

Haig and Ito agreed that some steps were needed to address the issue, although they shared the view that Japanese imports were not the cause of the U.S. auto industry's problems.

The two nations eventually struck a deal on voluntary plans and resolved the auto dispute.

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News

Value of US base land in Japan enough to buy all of New York City

Mainichi Daily News
December 15, 2005

If the value of all the Japanese land "occupied" by the U.S. military was combined, there would be enough money to buy all of New York City, including the Statue of Liberty, which is a symbol of how little liberty Japan actually has, according to Flash (12/27).

The men's weekly claims to be outraged by what it calls Japan's blind obedience to the United States even as it was supposed to be negotiating with its ally to reduce the burdens, fiscal and otherwise, local governments carry here to host the U.S. military.

Flash says its own independent study revealed that Japan is home to 88 U.S. military installations, which combined take up 312 million square meters with a total land value exceeding 14 trillion yen.

"Using the results of the global real estate market survey carried out in 1999 by the former National Land Agency and the Japanese Association of Real Estate Appraisal, 14 trillion yen would be a sum large enough to buy all the land in New York City, based on the standard value of residential land," an appraiser familiar with the residential market tells Flash.

Of course, the figure doesn't include New York's mercantile nature and commercial value, but that doesn't change the fact that over 14 trillion yen worth of Japanese territory is being "occupied," the weekly says.

Tokyo ranks third among Japan's 47 prefectures in terms of the amount of territory used by the U.S. military, following only Okinawa and Kanagawa prefectures. Tokyo Metropolitan Government officials are actively seeking the return of land in the capital that is currently under the control of the U.S. military.

"Bases in Tokyo should have their status reviewed, downgraded and ultimately be returned to the control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Yokota Air Field (U.S. Air Force Base) in particular is being strongly sought as the location of a third airport in Tokyo, where demand for flights increases yearly," a metropolitan government spokesman tells Flash. "As far as the metropolitan government is concerned, our policy for the time being is to continue to propose to the national government and U.S. military that the joint civilian-military use of facilities be permitted. We want the U.S. military to immediately return the Akasaka Press Center and Tama Service Annex should be opened up to as many Tokyo residents as possible."

The U.S. military presence in Tokyo also causes a decline in local land values, according to the veteran appraiser.

"Ground around Yokota Air Base is strong and able to withstand earthquakes, which makes it really good for housing. Other popular residential areas like Tokorozawa and Sagamihara are also homes to U.S. bases," the appraiser tells Flash. "Basically, what I'm trying to say is that there are these huge U.S. bases located in commutable areas within about an hour's train ride from central Tokyo and these prove to be considerable obstacles as far as things like land values and residential construction are concerned." (By Ryann Connell)

U.S. and Japan: When an Alliance is Not an Alliance

December 6, 2005
By Todd Crowell
Global Beat Syndicate
(KRT)

TOKYO—Virtually unnoticed, and without much fanfare, a historic and major shift is about to occur in Japan, where its post-war “peace constitution” may soon be revised in significant ways. This could affect the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security–the so-called “military alliance” between Japan and the United States.

But in fact, the treaty is not an alliance at all, and strictly speaking, Japan is not an ally. It is a close friend, a partner, a collaborator on the world stage. But “ally” is strictly a courtesy title.

The current treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan should it be attacked. But Japan does not have an equal obligation to help defend us if we are attacked. That is because Article 9, the war-renouncing clause written into Japan’s post-war constitution, has been interpreted as barring any kind of “collective defense.”

The newest update to the treaty are designed to promote better cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and to lessen the burden on host communities, especially on Okinawa. The new watchword is “interoperability.” One noteworthy change moves the Japanese air defense command center from Fuchu to the big American base at Yokota. The Ground Self-Defense Forces rapid reaction forces headquarters is also to move to the U.S. Army base at Camp Zama in the interests of closer coordination.

As a young Air Force officer stationed at Yokota in the late 1960s, it seemed to me the U.S. Forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force might as well have been on different planets. In nearly two years, I never met a JSDF officer. To my knowledge there was no liaison or sharing of classified information. No contact. Nothing.

When U.S. forces dealt with Japanese, it was usually with local civilian authorities over such mundane matters as off-base housing. When contingencies arose, such as capture of the U.S. Pueblo or the shooting down of an EC-121 over the Sea of Japan, Japanese forces were not a factor in any war plans.

That began to change in the 1990s. Japan had provided billions of dollars to support the Gulf War coalition, but, consistent with its anti-war principles, provided no troops. Afterwards, Tokyo was stunned at how ungrateful Washington and others were for their generous financial support.

That became the catalyst for a slow evolution in Japan’s use of its military. The Diet passed laws that allowed Japanese troops to participate in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and elsewhere. In 1996 Washington and Tokyo inked the Joint Security Declaration, in which Japan promised to provide logistical support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and which authorized joint research in missile defenses.

There is such a disconnect between reality and paperwork in Japan—and the gap has widened so much, that Japanese leaders are now seriously considering for the first time revising their constitution in a way that faces long-standing reality: for example, officially recognizing the Self-Defense forces, which have existed for nearly six decades. The draft revision is expected to allow Japan all the rights of self-defense, including forming alliances with other countries and deploying Self-Defense forces overseas.

Does this mean the existing security treaty will be turned into a real alliance? That is unlikely because, even though nearly 50 years have passed, memories remain of the riots surrounding the last revision of the treaty in 1960, riots that forced President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel his proposed state visit.

A lot has changed in Japan since then. The radical student movement that provided so many foot soldiers in 1960 hardly exists today. And it seems doubtful that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would have to ram any revisions through the Diet at midnight, like his predecessor Nobosuke Kishi.

Koizumi has a huge majority in the Diet, and the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan abandoned knee-jerk opposition to the security treaty in the interests of electability.

That leaves perhaps only the tiny Social Democratic Party to carry the flag of traditional Japanese pacificism. Seiji Mataichi, the party’s secretary general, said of the latest defense agreement, “It goes beyond the contents of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” Mr. Mataichi is almost certainly correct. But his party holds only six seats in the Diet.

ABOUT THE WRITER
Todd Crowell was a senior writer for Asiaweek in Hong Kong. He now comments on Asian affairs on his website Asia Cable.

Okinawa - Rising Magma

By Miyagi Yasuhiro (Councilor, Nago City, Okinawa)

Koizumi's Japan enjoys the warmest of relationships with Bush's US, for the very good reason that Koizumi has proved himself willing, even enthusiastic, to deliver what Washington requires – uncritical support in general, continuing provision of facilities for the US military in Japan, and Japanese boots on the ground to support the American mission in Iraq. On one significant issue, however, Koizumi has failed to deliver: the 1996 promise to replace the antiquated and inconvenient facilities of Futenma Marine Air Station, that now sits uncomfortably in the middle of the bustling township of Ginowan in the middle of Okinawa island, with a new facility in Northern Okinawa, to be built on the coral reef offshore from the fishing village of Henoko, in the township of Nago. It was a relatively remote and backward area, and Tokyo assumed it could rely on persuasion and financial inducements to overcome local opposition. It got rid of the Governor, the stubborn scholar and constitutionalist, Ota Masahide, in 2000, installing in his place a conservative figure expected to be more pliable, and poured in money to soften up the local opposition. Despite everything, however, it has not prevailed. In October 2005, the plan to construct the base on the reef had to be abandoned. Koizumi admitted the opposition had been too great. The Japanese state had, in effect, been defeated, by a coalition of fishermen, local residents, and citizens. One of the most remarkable events in recent Japanese history passed without notice by the media and the pundits.

While conceding that defeat, however, Tokyo decided to press for an alternative site a very short distance away from the one it abandoned, in the shallow waters offshore from Cape Henoko, in Oura Bay. Washington agreed. As in 1996, Tokyo plainly intends to use persuasion and inducement and hopes it will not be necessary to resort to force, This time, however, even the Governor installed in 2000 as the best man to advance the Tokyo agenda, Inamine Keiichi, has declared himself fundamentally opposed to the new plan, and surveys show Okinawan opposition running at over 70 per cent, higher than at any time in the 1990s. Governor Inamine has spoken often of the magma rising and Okinawa being on the brink of an eruption. Such a catastrophe is nearer now than ever before.

Miyagi Yasuhiro has been a key figure in the movement of opposition to militarization in Okinawa for the past decade. Here he issues a somber warning to Tokyo and Washington: the Okinawan people will not be overcome, the base will not be built.

Over the names of the Foreign and Defense Secretaries of Japan and the United States (2+2), a document with the provisional title “The Japan-US Alliance – Future Oriented Change and Reorganization,” dated 29 October 2005, sits on my desk. Asked to write my impression of it, I try again and again to read it, but my gloom is so deep that it is hard to bring myself to do so. This “Agreement” has been described as an “Interim Report,” as if there might be also a “Final Report,” but the words “Interim Report” are nowhere to be found in it. It was drawn up without any consultation whatever with the local governments affected by it and, by calling it “Interim Report,” the Japanese government wants public opinion to believe, mistakenly, that there might be changes in the “final version” still to come.

From its opening paragraphs the Agreement reaffirms “newly emerging threats” that might affect the security of the countries of the world and “issues giving rise to uncertainty and instability” in the Asia-Pacific. Yet it is the implementation of the Agreement itself that constitutes a threat and a problem.

On the question of the shift of Futenma Marine Air Station that is a major focus of attention, the major mainland newspapers carried editorials backing the Agreement. Nihon keizai shimbun (9 October) carried an editorial about “overcoming the confrontation on the Futenma issue by the exercise of political responsibility” and hinted at the introduction of police force against the opposition movement by residents in accord with that political resolve. Mainichi shimbun (27 October) wrote: “surely this time at last we will be able to see a resolution” and referred to the Schwab area as if it were unpopulated, describing it as a “step forward” for the base to be moved “from Futenma, where it sits amid a crowded residential area, to the Camp Schwab vicinity.”

The mass media tends not only not to learn from history but to shamelessly distort contemporary events. To us Okinawans, who have experienced the catastrophe of the last war and the subsequent US military occupation, this country, that is unable to comprehend the reaction by South Korea and China when the Prime Minister worships at Yasukuni where the leaders of the aggressive war are enshrined, seems to have lapsed into distorting narrowness of vision.

Prime Minister Koizumi may think that, so long as there is the Japan-US alliance, all will be well, but it would not be out of character for Bush’s America to provoke a “Tonkin Gulf Incident” (when fabricated attacks on a US naval vessel in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 were used as pretext for the US to begin bombing North Vietnam) in the Taiwan Straits. Clearly cognizant of the existence of China, this Agreement includes provision for merger of Japan’s Self Defense Forces with the US military. The isolation of Japan in East Asia resulting from total subordination to the US is dangerous in the extreme.

From 1996, Nago City where I live, and which contains the Marine Base of Camp Schwab, has been subject to an unbroken siege to try to force it provide an alternative base for Futenma.

The Futenma replacement facilities referred to in the present document are to be built in an L-shape linking the seas of Oura Bay across the Camp Schwab coastline. They will be characterized by “manifold concern to minimize any adverse impact on the environment.” In fact, the scale has been enlarged since the 1996 final report of SACO by lengthening the runway and adding space for parking planes. As usual, the US gets most of what it wants and the site will be easily capable of expansion to achieve 24-hour readiness status.

The proposed Henoko L-shaped facility

A national college of technology has just opened in the adjacent area and these plans are too much to bear for those connected with the school, including the students. In the coastal area designated for the construction on Schwab there are also historic remains and various cultural treasures, and sea turtles lay their eggs on its sandy shores. However much they might try to “minimize environmental damage,” the pristine quality of such an environment itself cries out against the threatened human intervention. At first, a sea-based location was chosen for construction, far from human settlement in order to minimize noise pollution, but that sea turned out to be home to the dugong, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) had to take the most unusual step of twice (at Amman in 2000 and Bangkok in 2004) issuing warnings against acts likely to damage its habitat. For eight years the matter remained deadlocked. The coastal site adjacent to human settlements now chosen as substitute for the sea-based site confronts a dark future of endless conflict between local residents and self-governing organizations, and the peace and environmental movements, on one side, and a government prepared to use force to settle the matter on the other. In order to implement the Agreement, the government is said to be considering passage of special legislation to remove from local governing authorities their powers under laws including the Public Waters Reclamation Law, the Environmental Assessment Law, and the Cultural Properties Protection Law. It shows not the slightest regard for national sovereignty, local self-government, or human rights. Make no mistake about it: the whole of Okinawa is going to resist.

What can the politicians who played the key role in reaching this agreement have been thinking? Do they want to contribute to destabilizing the Japan-US alliance? Even if the conditions attached by the US military made it difficult to accomplish the removal of the base to somewhere outside Okinawa, as the majority of Okinawans are demanding, they could at least have explored and made other, more realistic proposals. Instead, they have taken a proposal that had been deadlocked for eight years, and revived it as a zombie. Despite the fuss being made, the Camp Schwab proposal amounts in the end to nothing more than shifting the project by a few hundred meters. It is a farce pure and simple.

What we are witnessing is actually a plan that was drawn up by the US army in the 1960s, when it administered Okinawa, but which it could not then implement because of the political risks associated with local, Okinawan opposition. It is now revived because the Japanese government is now in charge and believes the opposition can be overcome.[1]

Most Japanese people see Okinawa as a military colony provided by Japan for the US military. A colony needs collaborators among the natives. However, the mayor of Nago City and the head of the Nago City Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who in the past undertook to collaborate and play the role of persuasion, having listened to the government’s explanation, now say that they will not be able to persuade the residents to accept the new plan.[2] When even self-styled collaborators find themselves unable to collaborate, colonial rule enters a critical phase. The suzerain country may in the end find itself called on to expose its true, violent character. I cannot help but think that the mainland mass media are playing the role of its advance guard. The outlook is bleak.

It is not just opponents of the US-Japan Security Treaty and ideological conservatives, i.e. proponents of the Treaty, that live in Okinawa. All of us here live face-to-face with harsh reality. For the sake of the Japan-US security treaty, our peace of mind and our safety is threatened. Why should it be that Okinawa alone has to shoulder “the burdens and costs?” [3] Our eight years of struggle have taught us to believe that it will not, after all, ever be possible to build a new base, whether at Henoko or Camp Schwab.

Following the end of the war sixty years ago, the bases were steadily expanded and reinforced under unbroken US military administration, and even when governmental powers were returned to Japan in 1972 they were maintained. Since the Cold War ended new threats have been found and the burden on us has grown. Surely this militarization, and the discrimination that we experience, cannot go on forever. Living in Okinawa, it is hard to resist being overwhelmed by depression.

In this situation, anything could happen, even an act of terror. Faced with an opponent who monopolizes the means of violence to such an unequal degree, it is understandable that the people insist on the right to possess means of resistance and to use them. I would not be surprised if acts of resistance were to occur tomorrow, in Nagatacho, Ichigaya, Kasumigaseki, or Okinawa. The present Agreement is not a prescription for dealing with “newly emerging threats,” but a device to stir up such threats.


Day 110 of the Henoko anti-base struggle

I had intended to end this essay by writing “Unless the farce is quickly ended, the spectators will become angry,” but it seems to me that the spectators are not angry. As one of the cast who happens to live in Okinawa (though ignored by the Japanese and American governments), I am angry, but the majority of the spectators either watch with half-dead eyes or laugh or yawn. Now that the political theatre (of the national elections of September 11, 2005) with its much ado about “assassins” and “winners and losers,” is over, there comes this farce conducted by politicians who pretend to be experts on security but actually plunge Japan into danger. Perhaps now the curtain will rise on a new drama, but if so it is likely to be the theatre of pain rather than spectacle. Still, I know that multiple lines of resistance will be drawn and many kinds of people will turn to struggle. I also know that people living ordinary, modest lives will face the situation wisely. Another day, another struggle - it is Okinawa’s destiny.


Councilor Miyagi at work.

Miyagi Yasuhiro, born in Nago in northern Okinawa in 1959, was a central figure in the Nago City Plebiscite Promotion Council (later Council against the Heliport Base) from 1997, and from 1998 has been Nago City Councilor. He is also joint representative to the Dugong Protection Campaign Center and author of several works on Okinawa, the dugong, etc. Email: miyagi@soleil.ocn.ne.jp

Translated by Gavan McCormack from the text of a chapter by Miyagi for a forthcoming Japanese volume to be published by Kobunken. Posted at Japan Focus December 4, 2005.

Notes

[1] Makishi Koichi et al., eds, Okinawa wa mo damasarenai, Tokyo, Kobunken, p. 108
[2] Mayor Kishimoto Tateo, after meeting Defense Agency officials on 27 October, made a statement about the “impossibility of persuading residents,” but on 9 November, after meeting with the head of the Defense Agency, Nukaga Fukushiro, said he “would like to be able to achieve agreement.”
[3] After the Bush-Koizumi meeting in Kyoto on 16 November, Koizumi said, “to enjoy the benefits of peace and security, some burdens and costs are necessary.”

http://japanfocus.org/-Miyagi-Yasuhiro/1878

U.S., Japan to Boost Military Cooperation

Oct 29 12:04 PM US/Eastern
By HARRY DUNPHY
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - The United States and Japan agreed Saturday to step up military cooperation and substantially reduce the number of Marines on the strategically important southern island of Okinawa.

The agreement calls for the phased withdrawal of 7,000 Marines from Okinawa to the Pacific island of Guam, a move that is expected to take six years.

There are 14,460 Marines in Japan, the largest Marine contingent based overseas. Nearly all are located on Okinawa, ideally situated for dealing with potential problems in the Pacific, such as a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Okinawans have long complained of crime ,crowding and noise associated with the Marine bases.

The agreement came after talks involving Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Japanese Defense Minister Yoshinori Ono and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura.

Rumsfeld said at a joint news conference at the Defense Department the United States and Japan "agreed to findings and recommendations to strengthen the alliance and reduce the impact of the U.S. military on local communities."

Ono said the agreement represented a "transformation of the alliance" that will provide it with "a fresh start and new energy."

The 14-page agreement said the measures Japan and the United States agreed on are "designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability."

It says Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies "such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerrilla and special forces and invasion of remote islands."

At the same time, the accord reaffirms the role of U.S. forces in the defense of Japan, a mission they have carried out since the end of World War II.

The two sides said they will increase military planning and hold training exercises together. This is expected to become easier next year when Japanese forces adopt a joint command structure.

Under the agreement, the United States will share with Japan use of the Kadena air base, Camp Hansen and other U.S facilities and areas in Okinawa.

A senior defense official, who spoke to reporters on condition of anonymity because he helped negotiate the agreement, said the United States was prepared to discuss more troop movements from southern Okinawa to the northern part of the island.

The agreement says the realignment of forces in Okinawa "will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel plus dependents out of Okinawa" to Guam, a U.S. Pacific territory seven hours by plane west of Hawaii.

It said Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents for a rapid force reduction, will work with the U.S. government to examine what financial and other measures it can take to help facilitate the Marine movement to Guam.

Under an agreement reached earlier in the week, Japan and the United States decided to close the Futenma Marine Air Corps Station in the crowded southern part of Okinawa and move its functions to Camp Schwab in the north.

Both sides compromised on the major sticking point in the deal: construction of a heliport on reclaimed land off Okinawa, which Japanese environmentalists had argued would threaten a coral reef, according to Japanese media reports.

The U.S. agreed to build only part of the heliport on reclaimed land but managed to negotiate a longer runway than the Japanese had sought, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported.

The United States and Japan followed up that agreement with an announcement Thursday that Japan will allow a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be based there for the first time.

Although American troops have been based in Japan since the end of World War II, the Japanese public has long been wary of a U.S. nuclear presence because of the fear of radiation leaks. The decision comes 60 years after the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to force the Japanese empire to surrender.

Aso fails to win nod from Okinawa officials over base plan

NAHA, Japan, Nov. 25 2005 Kyodo

Foreign Minister Taro Aso was unable to win understanding Friday from the governor of Okinawa and the mayor of Nago in the prefecture over a Japan-U.S. agreement to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps Futemma Air Station within Okinawa.

Aso met with Okinawa Gov. Keiichi Inamine and Nago Mayor Tateo Kishimoto to seek their understanding on the relocation plan, which was included in an interim report compiled at Japan-U.S. top security talks in Washington in October for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

The foreign minister called on the governor for understanding of the plan, saying, ''Japan's safety and security have been built on the premise of the existence of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.''

But Inamine said, ''The relocation plan is not consistent with the prefecture's basic idea. That's unacceptable,'' according to government officials.

Japan and the United States agreed Oct. 29 on a set of realignment plans that include relocating the Futemma Air Station and cutting by 7,000 the number of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa.

The accord calls for moving the helicopter function of the Futemma base to an airport to be built on the coast along Camp Schwab in Nago.

''We want the central government to compile a final realignment report by taking the local community's position into account,'' Inamine was quoted as telling Aso.

Nago Mayor Kishimoto was quoted as saying the relocation plan is unacceptable because it has ''ignored'' local people's position.

Earlier in the day, Foreign Minister Aso visited the U.S. Marine Corps' Camp Schwab in Nago to see the planned relocation site for the main functions of the Marines' Futemma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture.

He said a military airport envisioned under the current relocation plan would be ''easier to build'' than an initial plan to construct an offshore airport near the camp.

But Nago Mayor Kishimoto told Aso the new plan is feared to lead to a noise problem because the relocation site is closer to private homes than the site under the initial plan is.

Speaking before a news conference later Friday, Aso indicated the central government has no intent to revise the Futemma relocation plan in its joint work with the United States toward preparing a final report by next March.

''We should work to get as much understanding as possible from the local community while basically maintaining the current relocation plan,'' Aso said.

The local communities have voiced strong opposition to the plan and criticized the government for ignoring their opinions in concluding the agreement with Washington.

It is Aso's first trip to Okinawa since he took the post of foreign minister in the Cabinet reshuffle on Oct. 31.

At least $9 billion eyed for Okinawa Marines move to Guam

(Kyodo) _ The U.S. Pacific Command has estimated that at least $9 billion, or about 1.07 trillion yen, is needed to construct facilities in Guam after the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa is transferred there, U.S. military sources said Wednesday. Japan is expected to shoulder part of the expenses for the relocation the two countries agreed on, and Tokyo plans to put up the money by enacting a special law in an unprecedented move to finance the construction of overseas U.S. military facilities.

The command envisaged the Japanese money will finance part of projects to build the unit's new headquarters, drill sites and hospitals in Guam to ensure a smooth relocation, the sources said.

The planned transfer of the Marine unit, currently based in Uruma, Okinawa, to Guam was put forward in an interim report on the military realignment that Japan and the United States adopted during bilateral top security talks last month.

The Japanese and U.S. governments came up with the relocation plan as part of efforts to cut the number of U.S. Marines in Okinawa by 7,000 so as to, Tokyo and Washington say, reduce the base-hosting burden on the prefecture.

The relocation plan involves about 6,000 Marines centering on the staff of the expeditionary force, while the remaining 1,000 will be moved to other areas in Japan, according to the sources.

November 23, 2005

FOCUS: Koizumi-Putin summit fails to break ice over isles issue

TOKYO, Nov. 22 KYODO 2005

As anticipated, Russian President Vladimir Putin's summit talks with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ended without any tangible progress over their countries' territorial row or any surprises.

With neither a joint political document nor a new proposal to speak of after the talks, Koizumi and Putin simply confirmed their commitment to continuing dialogue on the longstanding dispute over a group of islands off Hokkaido.

''We recognized the need to resolve the island ownership issue and conclude a peace treaty. But frankly speaking, there are considerable gaps between the two countries,'' Koizumi said in a news conference with Putin after their talks.

Putin said he understands that the resolution of the issue is ''not easy'' but both leaders said they will strive to find a solution to the territorial dispute in an acceptable manner.

Ahead of the talks, Japanese officials and experts believed there would be no substantial progress on the dispute, which has prevented the two countries from signing a post-World War II peace treaty.

A senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official said Tokyo had tried hard to issue a political document addressing the issue, but added, ''It is better not to have a joint statement at all than one that would become a setback (for Japan) in talks on the disputed islands.''

Another official said Japan should not release any statement that could be taken as a ''concession'' on Japan's part.

It is rare for leaders of two countries to fail to issue a joint political document on such an important issue, and means the road ahead will continue to be rough.

Japan and Russia have long been divided over the sovereignty of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai islet group, known in Japan as the Northern Territories and in Russia as the southern Kurils.

Japan has been demanding the return of all four islands, citing the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, which says the governments of the two countries should conclude a peace treaty through a solution to the dispute.

Russia wants to resolve the dispute in line with the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, which stipulates that Moscow would return Shikotan and the Habomai islets off Nemuro on the eastern tip of Hokkaido to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The Koizumi-Putin meeting could not have generated any better results in view of the circumstances surrounding the two countries.

Japan miscalculated in its diplomacy toward Russia, especially after Russia recently started taking a tougher line on the territorial issue, said Shigeki Hakamada, an Aoyama Gakuin University professor specializing in Russian affairs.

Russia has become tougher on the territorial row with Japan, apparently because its reliance on Japan for economic assistance has decreased amid the robust economic expansion in Russia, stemming from higher crude oil prices.

Japan and Russia ''failed to continue playing catch'' after Russia threw the ball, Hakamada said, adding Japan could have shown more wisdom in responding positively.

Hakamada was referring to Japan's sharp reaction to Putin's televised press conference in September in which the Russian president said there is no room for further discussion of Russia's sovereignty over the islands.

With the territorial issue deadlocked, economic issues took center stage in the Koizumi-Putin summit.

Prospects seem brighter for bilateral ties on the economic front, including a pipeline project that would help Japan secure oil supplies.

After the summit, the Japanese and Russian governments adopted 12 documents including ones on antiterrorism and economic cooperation measures.

In a document on the pipeline project -- another main focus of the summit -- Russia promised Japan that it will build a Pacific-bound oil pipeline linking eastern Siberia with the Russian Far East but fell short of setting a date for constructing it.

In a news conference later Monday, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi dismissed concerns that economic cooperation could put the territorial dispute into the shadows, saying Japan will continue to work toward resolving the territorial row.

For starters, Koizumi accepted an invitation by Putin to make a state visit to Russia next year. Meanwhile, Koizumi invited Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov to visit Japan also next year and Putin basically accepted it, Japanese officials said.

But if Russia's intransigence on the territorial issue continues, it could trigger ire from the Japanese government.

''It's like the Yasukuni issue,'' one Japanese Foreign Ministry official said, claiming that Russia is stubbornly making a case out of the territorial row in the way China and South Korea do with regard to Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine.

==Kyodo

Consul General Speaks to Ryukyu Shimpo on DPRI

Nov. 22, 2005

The Ryukyu Shimpo newspaper published the following interview with Consul General Thomas G. Reich about the recently unveiled Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) as it affects Okinawa. Following is the gist of interview with Consul General Reich and reporter Tsuyoshi Matsumoto at the Consulate General on Nov. 22.

Photo: Consul General Thomas Reich, left, speaks to reporters Nov. 22 at the Consulate General.

Question: How would you assess the interim report on US Forces Japan [USFJ] Realignment?

CG Reich: This will lead to a substantial reduction of the base burden in Okinawa. It will make possible a faster return of the Futenma air station than the SACO [Japan-US Special Action Committee on Okinawa] report, and (the reduction of 7,000 marines) will mean the reduction of 10,000 Americans. It is also possible that most of the bases south of Kadena Air Base will be returned.

Question: Why would this mean burden reduction?

CG Reich: The Futenma base will be moved from an area where 80,000 live to one where only less than 2,000 reside. You cannot say this is not burden reduction. If the return of the base is realized, a military base that is located in a densely-populated area will be moved to the north, where there is a small population, and into a military base, too. This will be very beneficial for Okinawa.

Question: Why was an agreement reached on the plan to relocate Futenma to the coastal area of Camp Schwab?

CG Reich: The Japanese government had a strong determination to make this happen. This was the decisive factor for the United States.

Question: Governor Keiichi Inamine rejects the coastal plan and 90 percent of Okinawans oppose this plan.

CG Reich: There are two types of rejection or opposition among the Okinawans. The local residents are concerned about aircraft flying over them, but the flight route is yet to be determined. Some other people think that the bases in Okinawa should be returned gradually and should disappear, so they interpret relocation inside Okinawa to be linked to the permanent presence of bases. I can understand the ideology, but adjustment is needed to ensure the reduction of bases.

Question: Is a solution to the Futenma relocation issue the condition for the reduction of marines, the return of the bases in central and southern Okinawa, and so forth?

CG Reich: That this is one package is as stated in the report.

Question: The United States does not regard this report as an interim one.

CG Reich: I do not know where the expression interim report came from and why. The agreement was decided upon by both countries. The final report next March will spell out the concrete, detailed measures to be taken for implementation. We would like to listen closely to the local communities' opinion and incorporate this in the implementation process.

Question: Local communities in all the relocation sites all over the country are objecting.

CG Reich: We ask the Japanese government to implement [the report]. The agreement is in line with the objective of the Japan-US alliance for reliable security.> Prime Minister Koizumi says that this is in the interest of the whole of Japan, including the local communities hosting bases.

Question: Mayor Kishimoto of Nago is saying that he is willing to continue discussing revisions to the shoal option. Is there a possibility that this will be incorporated in the final report?

CG Reich: The agreement is only one month old. It is too early to discern the consensus in Okinawa. We have heard strong opinions from Nago City regarding accepting the coastal plan or a revised [shoal proposal]. We would like to communicate closely with the leaders of Okinawa.

Question: What would you like to ask from the Okinawan people?

CG Reich: I am sure there is a dilemma between accepting the agreement and enjoying the benefits of burden reduction and sticking to an ideology attractive to Okinawans and let this golden opportunity slip. We hope they will face reality and make a decision. China is strengthening its military power, and there are problems with North Korea. Okinawa is becoming geographically more important for the Japan-US alliance. The realignment proposals will be able to reduce the burden on Okinawa. I hope they understand.

Question: Is the relocation of Futenma outside Okinawa out of the question?

CG Reich: Japan and the United States studied whether all the functions of Futenma can be moved outside Okinawa, and they realized that it is impossible. In particular, they concluded that the helicopter units need to be stationed in Okinawa.

Government must heed locals on bases

Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), Nov 21, 2005

Hidemichi Katsumata

Nov. 21--TOKYO -- The interim report on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan has caused strong resentment from communities requested to host U.S. military forces. How can the discontent be quelled?

The interim report, released late last month, says the U.S. Army will station a new Asia-Pacific command headquarters at Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture, with the Ground Self-Defense Force to establish the headquarters of its Central Readiness Force at the same base.

The report also said the 57 carrier-borne aircraft stationed at the U.S. Navy's Atsugi Naval Air Facility will be shifted to the Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

A new heliport will be constructed offshore of the marine corps' Camp Schwab in Okinawa Prefecture, as a replacement for the Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Ginowan in the same prefecture, the interim report stated.

At a meeting of prefectural governors on Nov. 11, governors whose prefectures will be affected by the realignment plan expressed their discontent with the report, saying they had not been given any briefing by the central government or opportunity to express their opinions during the negotiation process to draw up the report.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed his understanding of their unhappiness, but said: "Usually, people agree with a plan to realign U.S. forces in general, but don't compromise on areas related to their interests. If this continues, where can we relocate U.S. military facilities in Okinawa Prefecture to?"

He asked the governors to accept the report's findings.

However, Koizumi appears to have played down the difficulty of dealing with the communities asked to host U.S. forces.

In February this year, the central government postponed by half a year making any decision on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, saying it needed time to negotiate and coordinate with related prefectural and municipal governments.

Former Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono said at the time, "We aim to reach a conclusion on the issue within this year."

However, the central government was overly afraid that the contents of the realignment negotiations with Washington would be leaked.

In September, the general election cut in. Tokyo, therefore, only disclosed the contents of the report to the affected prefectural and municipal governments almost simultaneously as it was publicly released.

The central government selfishly believes the regional governments will ultimately accept hosting U.S. forces in return for certain benefits.

For example, Tokyo expects that the government of Kanagawa Prefecture--which will both lose and gain some U.S. forces--will accept the transfer of the new U.S. Army command to Camp Zama from its 1st Corps in Washington State in return for the transfer of the 57 carrier-borne aircraft to the Iwakuni air base from the Atsugi base because the planes have caused noise problems and sparked fears of accidents.

The central government also believes the Iwakuni municipal government will accept the transfer of aircraft to the base in the city if Tokyo purchases land planned by the city government as residential areas. That is because the housing land development needs a sizeable amount of funds that the city government will face problems raising.

These are good examples of the central government's disregard of related parties.

The provision to affected municipalities of revitalization programs as carrots for the facilities, which many governments seem to oppose due to the not-in-my-backyard syndrome, has been thoroughly pursued.

But if the central government attempts to settle the issue with the related municipalities in the same old way, it will be forever trivialized as a problem exclusively related with these municipalities instead of one that the entire nation should address.

Therefore, Koizumi should explain to the related municipal governments and residents the background to the drafting of the interim report, not leaving the responsibility to other ministers.

The Japan-U.S. agreement on the realignment is weighted toward the maintenance of a military deterrent.

It will be important for Koizumi to present a vision to dramatically reduce U.S. bases in Japan if the potential threat from China and North Korea recedes in the future.

The word "alliance" is used four times in the first paragraph of the "overview" of the interim report. Koizumi and U.S. President George W. Bush also confirmed the enduring bilateral alliance during their meeting Wednesday in Kyoto.

The Japan-U.S. relationship is so important that the Japanese government cannot be allowed to fail in its negotiations with related municipalities on the realignment of U.S. forces.

Strategic changes for Japan-U.S. alliance

Thursday, Nov. 17, 2005
By RICHARD HALLORAN

HONOLULU -- Much of the American and Japanese news coverage of the new security agreement between Washington and Tokyo has focused on its political aspects but overlooked the far-reaching strategic changes it has projected for the revitalized alliance.

This pact is intended to draw together a sweeping realignment of U.S. forces in Asia and the forthcoming revision of Japan's Constitution. That revision is calculated to raise the Japanese military and diplomatic posture after six decades of pacifism that was the consequence of Japan's defeat in World War II.

Robert Scalapino, a prominent American scholar on Asia, noted the changes: "Japan wants to be a major power," he said in an interview. "It wants to be in a partnership with the United States but not in a patron-client relationship."

The agreement on Oct. 29 was the most significant milestone in a process that began nearly three years ago when the Bush administration started negotiating with Japan to reposition forces, revise command lines and make U.S. forces more flexible and responsive to contingencies.

Before the negotiations had gone far, the Japanese and the Americans agreed that they needed a basic reassessment of the alliance begun in 1952 after the postwar American occupation of Japan. "We had reached a place in our alliance where we needed to look beyond force structures and to make fundamental changes in our roles and missions," said an American official aware of the negotiations who asked not to be named.

The outcome is the document titled "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," which has been signed by Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno as well as U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

In a press conference after the agreement was issued, Rumsfeld said: "Like all alliances, this relationship must and is in fact evolving to remain strong and relevant." Ohno agreed, saying that the purpose of the earlier alliance was to defend Japan. Now, Japanese and U.S. forces could undertake joint operations elsewhere.

The agreement says: "These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies." Those "diverse contingencies," a term appearing repeatedly, were not specified but referred to potential threats from China, North Korea, terrorists and pirates who operate in the shipping lanes of the South China Sea.

Key to Japan's deployment of forces alongside U.S. forces is the revision of Japan's Constitution, especially Article 9, the "no-war" clause that has been interpreted as permitting Japan to defend itself but little more. A final draft is working its way through the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the legislature.

The provision pertaining to national security says that in addition to operations to defend Japan, "defense forces can take part in efforts to maintain international peace and security under international cooperation, as well as to keep fundamental public order in our country."

The new agreement says the U.S. will continue to hold its "nuclear umbrella" over Japan: "U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense," it says. That renewed guarantee should also blunt a Japanese move to acquire nuclear weapons, if it appears.

The agreement further says "a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF (Japan's Self-Defense Forces) will strengthen operational coordination." That common assessment of potential adversaries will be reflected in joint training and jointly devised contingency plans.

The nuts and bolts of the U.S. force realignment, some of which were adopted to accommodate political demands in Japan, include establishing a joint operations center at Yokota Air Base, now a U.S. base, in western Tokyo. Japan's Air Defense Command will move from Fuchu, also in western Tokyo, to Yokota.

The U.S. Army will deploy a corps headquarters at Camp Zama, southwest of Tokyo in Kanagawa Prefecture, where Japan will set up a Central Readiness Force Command for its ground forces.

Bowing to political pressure in Okinawa, Japan's southernmost prefecture, the U.S. Marines will move a headquarters and 7,000 marines to Guam, which is U.S. territory in the central Pacific. Some aircraft will be removed from a controversial base at Futenma and the airfield itself will be redesigned to move runaways away from residential areas.

These changes in Japan's military posture have raised cries in China and the two Koreas that Japan is undertaking a full-scale rearmament. Cold-eyed scrutiny, however, shows that Japan's military spending is not scheduled to rise, military forces are not slated to expand, and the defense industry remains small.

Richard Halloran, formerly a correspondent for Business Week, The Washington Post and The New York Times, is a Honolulu-based freelance journalist.

Koizumi pledges 'maximum efforts' for U.S. military realignment

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
November 16, 2005

(Kyodo) _ Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged "maximum efforts" by his government Wednesday to help realize a realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan.

Speaking at a joint news conference with U.S. President George W. Bush, Koizumi said of an interim report on the realignment, "Maximum efforts will be made by the government uniting as one so that the compiled plan will be realized."

Bush expressed hope that Koizumi demonstrate leadership on the issue.

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News

Iwakuni mayor rejects gov't explanation of relocation plan

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
November 16, 2005

(Kyodo) _ The mayor of Iwakuni, Yamaguchi Prefecture, on Wednesday rejected the Defense Agency chief's call for the city's cooperation over a plan to relocate U.S. carrier-based aircraft to the U.S. military's Iwakuni base, government officials said.

Mayor Katsusuke Ihara told Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro Nukaga in Iwakuni that the city cannot accept the U.S. plan to shift the aircraft from the U.S. Navy's Atsugi base in Kanagawa Prefecture to the Marine Corps' Iwakuni base.

"It is not too much to say the U.S. plan is like shifting the entire Atsugi base to Iwakuni, thus doubling the size of the Iwakuni base," Ihara was quoted as telling Nukaga.

Iwakuni's burden in hosting the base would increase to "intolerable levels" under the plan, the mayor added, urging the central government to scrap the plan.

Nukaga met with the Iwakuni mayor to seek his city's understanding of the relocation plan that the Japanese and U.S. governments included in an interim report for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

"The central government will do its utmost to reduce the burden on Iwakuni," Nukaga said, referring to a plan to transfer troops from Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces from Iwakuni to Atsugi.

But Ihara opposed that plan, citing an expected decline in tax revenues gained from the stationing of the MSDF troops, which total more than 1,000 including their families, in Iwakuni.

The same day, Nukaga also met with Hiroshima Gov. Yuzan Fujita to seek that prefecture's understanding of the relocation plan. Iwakuni is near the border of Yamaguchi and Hiroshima prefectures.

But the governor also rejected the plan, saying, "The relocation plan is tantamount to transferring noise from Atsugi to Iwakuni."

Other Hiroshima municipalities near Iwakuni have expressed opposition to the relocation plan.

A group of air fighters currently based at the U.S. naval base in Atsugi would be moved to Iwakuni if the interim report for the realignment is finalized, possibly next year.

The interim report, worked out at the Oct. 29 top-security meeting between Japan and the United States, features a set of U.S. military relocation plans including those related to Iwakuni.

But the Japanese government has since been criticized by communities that would be affected.

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News

Koizumi, Bush to expedite realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
November 14, 2005

(Kyodo) _ Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and U.S. President George W. Bush are expected to seek to expedite bilateral efforts to realign the U.S. military presence in Japan in their talks Wednesday in Kyoto, Japanese officials said Monday.

Receiving Bush in Japan for the first time in more than two years, Koizumi is also likely to offer positive indications about Japan extending its troop deployment to Iraq and reopening its beef market, as well as to exchange views on various global and regional issues with the leader of a country on which he puts top priority.

Attention is also being paid to how Bush will encourage the Japanese premier to promote future-oriented dialogue with China and South Korea amid strained ties between Japan and the two countries over Koizumi's visits to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine.

Tokyo is apparently expecting that the upcoming summit will help catalyze its effort to persuade opposing local communities to support the specific realignment plans the two countries agreed to in late October for transforming and strengthening the bilateral security alliance.

"There haven't been any in-depth Japan-U.S. summit talks recently, but we have been dealing vigorously with several issues particularly in the latter half of this year including the issue of U.S. military realignment," Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said in a press conference Monday.

Koizumi and Bush are hence expected to "reaffirm the very importance of stable Japan-U.S. relations for world peace or the peace and stability of Asia, praise the achievements made so far and call for further constructive efforts," he said.

The agreement reached on Oct. 29 includes a reduction of 7,000 Marines in Okinawa, but local government chiefs and residents are protesting aspects such as the new relocation plan for the Marines' Futemma Air Station in Okinawa and a new U.S. Army headquarters at Camp Zama.

The Japanese government decided last Friday to expedite fiscal and other measures for the plans' implementation and is set to hold the first meeting of concerned Cabinet ministers to that end on Tuesday, the officials said.

Koizumi, meanwhile, is slated to decide by December on whether to extend the Dec. 14 deadline for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces troops' aid mission in Iraq and whether to lift the ongoing import ban on U.S. and Canadian beef.

Koizumi has said he will take into account the latest U.N. resolution extending the Iraqi deployment of multinational forces for a year when making a decision on how much longer the Japanese troops will stay for the reconstruction mission there.

On the economic front, Bush is expected to urge Koizumi to open Japan's beef and other farm markets as well as to promote further domestic reforms for Japan to figure as an engine of global economic growth, officials in Washington have said.

But the U.S. pressure over Japan's embargo on American beef, in place since the discovery of mad cow disease there in December 2003, is unlikely to be intense as Tokyo's domestic procedure for lifting the ban is under way, the officials said.

Bush may also seek Japan's compromise on tariffs and other farm issues in the Doha Round of trade liberalization negotiations ahead of a World Trade Organization ministerial meeting Dec. 13-18 in Hong Kong, which is crucial for the round's success.

The two leaders, meanwhile, are likely to discuss bilateral ties in dealing with such global and regional issues as avian influenza, nuclear and other issues with North Korea, the fight against terrorism and Iran's nuclear development.

Koizumi may refer to the Japanese parliament's recent legislation that makes it possible for Tokyo to maintain SDF maritime refueling support for the U.S.-led antiterrorism campaign for another year, the officials said.

Prior to their talks at the Kyoto State Guesthouse in the ancient Japanese capital, Koizumi and Bush are slated to visit Kinkakuji, a Zen Buddhist temple also known as the Golden Pavilion, early Wednesday along with first lady Laura Bush.

Their first talks since November last year in Santiago, Chile, are aimed chiefly at showing off the strength of bilateral ties at home and abroad, as the two countries have cleared the stickiest points involving such major current issues as the military realignment and beef trade, the Japanese officials said.

Bush will arrive Tuesday night in Japan on the first leg of a four-nation Asian tour that will also take him to South Korea, China and Mongolia.

Bush has said he intends to encourage South Korean and Chinese leaders as well as Koizumi to promote future-oriented dialogue to mend the strained ties between Japan and the two neighboring countries during his trip through Nov. 21.

Koizumi is also scheduled to visit South Korea for the Nov. 18-19 leaders' meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and meet with South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun on its sidelines.

But whether Koizumi can meet his Chinese counterpart in the near future remains uncertain following his Oct. 17 visit to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo despite protests from China and South Korea as the shrine honors Japan's Class-A war criminals as well as the war dead.

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News

U.S. Forces' realignment--Entering a new phase / U.S. deterrent remains intact

13 November 2005: Daily Yomiuri

The problems associated with relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture have entered a new stage following the United States' acceptance of Japan's proposal to relocate the facility to the coastal region
along Camp Schwab, in the northern part of the prefecture. This is the third installment of a five-part series focusing on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

Speaking at a National Press Club lunch in Washington on Nov. 7, Gen. Michael Hagee, commander of the 180,000-strong U.S. Marine Corps, backed a recent agreement between Tokyo and Washington to relocate some U.S. marines stationed in Okinawa Prefecture to Guam.

Hagee said, "Just as an example, going from Okinawa to Korea, we can move a battalion, with all its equipment, in just about 24 hours."

Hagee added that excellent training areas around Guam made it logical to relocate some U.S. troops to that island.

The relocation of the command of the Marine Corps' 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (3rd MEF) and 7,000 marines to Guam is seen here as a symbolic move aimed at reducing the burden on communities hosting U.S. forces.

The United States needs to maintain friendly relations with Okinawa to ensure an environment in which it can stably run military bases.

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's policy of stationing troops "in places where they are wanted, welcomed and needed" greatly influenced the outcome of bilateral negotiations on the realignment.

Indeed, his policy has resulted in U.S. plans to withdraw 12,500 of 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea by the end of 2008.

However, a genuinely decisive factor behind the reduction of the presence of marines in Okinawa was Washington's judgment that its military would be able to sufficiently maintain a deterrence in Northeast Asia thanks to the "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) doctrine.

RMA proposes a major change in the nature of warfare with the application of innovative technology. An interim report on the transformation of U.S. forces refers to surface transport capabilities, including high-speed vessels (HSVs), as a key part of the RMA concept.

It takes four days for U.S. marines to move from Guam to Okinawa aboard an amphibious assault ship. But an HSV carrying 1,000 troops can complete the journey in half the time.

Following this logic, headquarters staff of 3rd MEF, logistics and other noncombat units no longer need to be stationed in Okinawa, while Washington will retain the 31st Marine Expedition Unit--part of the Unites States' forward deployment in the Pacific--in the prefecture.

Japan, for its part, is studying whether to buy HSVs to improve interoperability with U.S. troops.

U.S. Air Force and Navy units on Guam have been upgrading their presence by deploying state-of-the-art stealth bombers and nuclear-powered submarines.

Richard Lawless, U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific, recently said Guam would become the most important hub for the Unites States' forward deployed troops in the Pacific. The U.S. side obviously wants Japan to help pay for the revamping of U.S. military facilities on Guam.

While the 3rd MEF command will leave Japan, the army will station a new army command--called a unit of employment (UEx)--at Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, by reorganizing the army's 1st Corps in Washington state.

The army is currently in the middle of a major restructuring program called the Modular Force Initiative to make itself "more powerful, flexible and more rapidly deployable" by shifting the emphasis from divisions to brigades.

The transformation is designed to enable the army to be better prepared for small-scale conflicts involving terrorist and guerrilla attacks, rather than conventional full-scale war involving tank divisions.

In its "Military Balance 2005-2006" report, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies said irregular threats such as terrorism were overwhelmingly land based, and armies would assume a major combat role against them over the next few decades.

A 1,000-strong UEx is more mobile and capable of being deployed more quickly than conventional troop headquarters. The command directs not only the army, but also the joint operations involving navy, air and marine corps.

A Defense Department official said, "The UEx can be deployed anywhere in the world, as marines corp members in Okinawa were deployed in Iraq."

The UEx to be based at Camp Zama will primarily command operations in the event of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. But it could assume a wider role, including fighting international terrorism and engaging in humanitarian aid in a natural disaster.

In a report released in early November, Andrew Krepinevich, executive director at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, cited the challenges facing the United States as:
-- Islamic extremists.
-- A nuclear-armed India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran.
-- The emergence of China.

Japan is geopolitically close to Southeast Asian countries with large Islamic populations, well acquainted with the arc of instability that stretches from Northeast Asia to the Middle East, and face-to-face with China.

With this in mind, the role of U.S. forces in Japan in dealing with these three "threats" is bound to grow.

Thousands of people rally against realignment of US forces in Japan

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
November 13, 2005

(Kyodo) _ Thousands of people demonstrated in Zama and Sagamihara, joint hosts of a U.S. military base, on Sunday to protest against the planned expansion of the base functions.

More than 3,000 people surrounded Camp Zama, headquarters of the U.S. Army Japan, forming a "human chain" to protest against the expansion move, part of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

In Sagamihara, about 1,700 people gathered Sunday morning to protest against the plan.

At Camp Zama, the demonstrators held hands to make a 2.1-kilometer circle three times Sunday afternoon. The demonstration was initiated by a group of assembly members of Sagamihara and Zama. Organizers put the number of demonstrators at Camp Zama at 3,200.

"Given the Iraq war and the deployment of Self-Defense Forces (in Iraq), something is wrong with the relationship between Japan and the United State," said a 31-year-old businessman who participated in the demonstration. "I feel it's dangerous."

Under the planned realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan, the U.S. Army 1st Corps headquarters will move from Washington State to Camp Zama and a Ground Self-Defense Force headquarters will be newly established in the camp.

Japan and the United States on Oct. 29 adopted a report on the plan to realign the U.S. forces in Japan, which involves U.S. military bases in Kanagawa, Okinawa and other prefectures. Concerned localities have voiced opposition to the plan, which they said would impose more burdens on them.

U.S., Japan to begin moving Marines to Guam in 2008

(Kyodo) _ Japan and the United States plan to begin moving U.S. Marine Corps troops in Okinawa to Guam in 2008 with completion by 2012, U.S. House of Representatives Delegate Madeleine Bordallo from Guam said in a recent interview.

The two nations intend to start the construction of new facilities in Guam for the Marines, for which Japan has committed to share the cost, in 2006, Bordallo said in the interview Thursday, noting that costs are estimated at more than $4 billion.

Bordallo said the construction will include housing, medical facilities, schools, utility infrastructure and bases in Guam as well as "world-class" training areas not only in Guam but also in the neighboring Northern Mariana Islands.

Bordallo made the comments based on her talks Nov. 3 with Lt. Gen. John Goodman, commander of the U.S. Marines in the Pacific, who briefed her about the Oct. 29 agreement with Japan on the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan.

As its centerpiece, the two nations agreed on a full set of measures for Okinawa, including a move of 7,000 Marines -- 6,000 to Guam and 1,000 to somewhere else in Japan -- out of the 18,000 now stationed there and an alternative plan for constructing an airport at U.S. Camp Schwab in Nago and in adjacent waters to accelerate the stalled relocation of the Marine Corps' Futemma Air Station within the prefecture.

While the agreed scale of troop reduction came as a surprise, Bordallo suggested the U.S. Defense Department has been contemplating it for some two years under the instruction of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as part of the ongoing plan to transform global military posture.

Bordallo said she knew that there would be a "certain amount of movements" since about two years ago when Rumsfeld made his first visit to Guam, during which she accompanied him.

Rumsfeld took a helicopter and looked over the Air Force and Navy bases in Guam and was "very impressed," Bordallo said.

"I think that it was then that he decided we should focus on Guam because of its strategic location in the Far East...I'm sure that things began to be planned at that point in time because later on I did meet the secretary and he said you will be very pleased with what our plans are for Guam," she said.

Guam has been advocating the relocation of Marine troops from Okinawa for years.

Asked when she believes the United States decided on the large scale relocation, Bordallo said, "It probably was a couple of years ago when they began to look at reorganizing the forces."

Given the agreement now, the first Marines from Okinawa will start arriving in 2008 after extensive construction.

"I understand that we'll see the movement by about 2008," Bordallo said. She added that Goodman "did say...he thought the entire operation would be completed by 2012."

The U.S. military has already begun looking at three different sites in Guam to set up headquarters and bases for the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force to be relocated from Okinawa, she said.

A source close to the matter said Japan's Defense Agency is interested in building and using training facilities in Guam because the Oct. 29 accord calls for enhancing joint operations with the U.S. military.

As for the construction costs, the source said the estimated $4 billion is based on a local calculation that Guam's capacity for carrying out construction work is about $400 million annually and that the project will take about eight to 10 years.

But the shorter six-year goal set by the two nations will make the cost higher than $4 billion because it requires bringing in advanced construction technology and more contractors and workers from outside, the source said.

In an interview earlier this week, U.S. Defense Deputy Undersecretary for Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless acknowledged there is a "very rough estimate" of between $3.5 billion and $4 billion but noted that this will be revised over the next few weeks as "it looked at a lower number of Marines and it might have looked at a longer timeline."

Lawless also said the two nations have set a goal of completing all agreed realignment plans in Okinawa by 2012 as an "integrated undertaking," and stressed the reduction of Marine troops will not be carried out as agreed if the Futemma relocation is not implemented.

The plan to move 7,000 Marines to Guam "would be dramatically slowed and reduced," he said.

Bordallo also acknowledged the plan could be delayed and take much longer and said the two nations are continuing negotiations over the cost-sharing.

"But I'm sure they'll come up with the right solutions. We're very good friends with Japan, and I'm sure both sides will be able to compromise with something," Bordallo said.

"We...want to continue our very good relationship with Japan not only in tourism but in business as well," she said. "We want to continue our good relationship."

The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Unbalanced and Unfulfilled

Commentary (November 11, 2005)
Mindy Kotler (Director, Japan Information Access Project)

U.S. President George Bush will soon meet with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to affirm a number of promising agreements. Decade-long quarrels over the relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station in Okinawa and of home-porting a nuclear carrier in Yokosuka appear resolved. Five long years of talks to foster greater U.S.-Japan security cooperation look successful. Japanese officials are also close to reopening their market to U.S. beef. Yet, in all cases, the negotiations were bitter and Japan's citizens remain opposed.

Americans are becoming increasingly skeptical of Japan's promises and negotiations that end simply with recommendations. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, in Tokyo last month, argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance risks being damaged by "interminable dialogue over parochial issues." In both the security and trade arenas, legislators and negotiators exhibit frustration with Japan over a series of issues and delays that continue to mark the interaction between the two countries. Strains in "the best ever" U.S.-Japan relationship are showing.

Congressional hearings on Japan during the last week of September illustrate well some of the problems. The House Committee on Ways and Means held a hearing on United States-Japan economic and trade dealings, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations convened a broader review of U.S.-Japan political and military relations. Although downplayed by the administration, dismissed as merely "letting off steam" or congressional posturing, and generally ignored by the press, these hearings were significant.

The Ways & Means Committee hearing was the most contentious. Private sector witnesses from the auto, insurance, medical device, and beef industries described a litany of still closed or manipulated markets in Japan. They pointed out that there hasn't been substantial Japanese financial reform or modernization of banking and investment laws. Transparency remains an obstacle. In fact, new regulations and laws are being proposed and enacted to limit foreign investment. Japan continues to protect a range of high-technology products. And, like China, Japan manipulates its currency.

Bush administration witnesses from the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Agriculture, and the Treasury tried to emphasize the progress achieved by listing how few economic and trade disputes exist. Yet, the administration witnesses conceded that several major issues remain unresolved. Assistant USTR Wendy Cutler admitted that "while we continue to make good progress up and down the trade front, we still run into heavily reinforced bulwarks against change."

Cutler said the administration shared congressional "frustration over the glacial speed with which Japan has been moving to reopen its market to U.S. beef." She also warned that at the World Trade Organization ministerial talks, Japan "must pitch in to make substantial progress in the three agriculture pillars of export subsidies, market access, and domestic support. Frankly, the Japanese have allowed their protectionist domestic agriculture interests to prevail, and this has been disappointing." Ending, Cutler noted that "We have come a long way with Japan over the years and have found ways of doing business on the trade front that are generally yielding good results..... We have some very real trade problems with Japan today that require our focused and constant attention and engagement at all levels."

U.S. lawmakers were genuinely surprised that the 1980s issues of apple, beef, and rice are still alive. They were annoyed by the positive spin the government officials presented, pressing the officials to make more definitive statements. Ways and Means Committee staff dismissed assertions that the hearing was mere pandering to a trade constituency. The hearing had been planned since spring and postponed several times. What is significant, they say, is that there was a consensus among Democrats and Republicans on the importance of the hearing. One congressman, Rep. Ben Cardin (D-MD), "thanked" Japan for "bringing the two parties together.

The Senate hearing on security and foreign policy was more nuanced and polite. Both Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless welcomed the warmer relationship between the U.S. and Japan and described how much new cooperation had occurred since 1999. Yet, like their colleagues focused on trade, both Hill and Lawless felt that there was much more to do.

There was clear frustration with Japan. As Lawless stated, "... measured against Japan's capabilities to contribute to international security, and measured against Japan's global interests and the benefits Japan derives from peace and stability around the world, these changes remain quite modest.... We can both see the trend in Japanese security policy toward a more active role in international security affairs. It is a welcome trend. But we can also see that this trend will take considerable time to reach fruition." In regard to the decade-long discussion over the relocation of Futenma, Lawless told reporters after the hearing, "we are saying to the Japanese government - you undertook this obligation in 1996 to replace Futenma, we've been waiting. It is not our fault, we want you to help us replace Futenma for the benefit of the alliance because the alliance needs this capability, as simple as that."

Most symbolic of Japan's self-absorption is the issue of continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Columbia University's Gerald Curtis, who followed the officials at the Senate hearing, noted the Yasukuni Shrine and nearby museum are "not simply a shrine to honor the young men who fought and died for their country....Yasukuni is a shrine that honors the ideology and the policies of the government that sent these young men to the battlefields of Asia and the Pacific."

Continuing visits to the shrine aggravate regional relations just as the U.S. is working hard to stabilize them. Stopping visits to Yasukuni will not necessarily improve Sino-Japanese relations, but, said Curtis, "it is a necessary condition for making improvement of those relations possible." Accordingly, Prime Minister Koizumi's fifth visit to the Yasukuni shrine soon after the hearing was not seen as a positive development.

The U.S. goal of encouraging Japan to become a more internationally active and responsible modern democracy is welcome. Yet, it fails in the face of traditional Japanese business and domestic politics. In both hearings, the legislators seemed to interpret the witnesses' emphasis on relative progress as more "waiting for Japan to change." They are tired of waiting. So is this administration.

The day before the Futenma agreement was reached, an exasperated Lawless fumed, "We are trying to bring the substance of the alliance up to the level that it probably should have achieved some time ago." He is right to be concerned. The late October interim report on the "transformation and realignment for the future" of the U.S.-Japan alliance is an impressive set of recommendations - if it can be implemented. Built into the document, however, is an implicit deference to Japan's political process.

Continuation of "the best ever" U.S.-Japan relationship will have to be based on results and not mere wishes. President Bush meets with Prime Minister Koizumi in Kyoto on Nov. 16 and again at the APEC Leaders Summit in Busan, Korea a few days later, believing that both the beef and security issues have been resolved. Yet, negative Japanese public opinion, ministry rulemaking, and inevitable tariffs must still be surmounted before Japan reopens its doors to U.S. beef. The security agreement faces indignant local opposition, difficult technology negotiations, and equivocal leadership. Resolution of these disagreements may be further away than anticipated.

The Japanese government has maneuvered the U.S. into agreements structured to be delayed. Commissions, local governments, public opinion, and inter-ministerial politics are certain to justify Tokyo's continued inaction and lack of leadership. U.S. patience has its limits. There is a growing realization in Washington that brushing aside myriad differences in hopes of creating a working ally in Asia is an unsustainable policy. For now, U.S. President Bush's threshold for patience and friendship with the Japanese prime minister is the great unknown.

(Posted here with the permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)