The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined

Number 75, May 1996

The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined

by Patrick M. Cronin

Conclusions

* In April 1996, in one of the most important bilateral summit meetings in the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto convincingly reaffirmed the significance of the security relationship to the emerging security environment.

* Alliance managers in both countries faced growing pressure to reduce U.S. troop presence, particularly in Okinawa. An interim report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, released just prior to the summit, recommending the return of one-fifth of the total acreage (including the Futenma Air Station) of U.S. facilities to Okinawa within the next 5-to-7 years, won a ringing endorsement from most Japanese.

* The two leaders were able to focus on a Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration on Security which publicly articulated the alliance's goal: to provide regional stability and build a broader, more durable security architecture for the Asia-Pacific area.

* Challenges to the summit's success could arise from two sources: exaggerated public understanding within Japan and the United States over what to expect from the other partner, and miscalculations of other regional actors, especially the potential for China to perceive U.S.-Japan collaboration as threatening.

An Historic Summit

The bilateral summit exceeded expectations; it should prove to be a pivotal moment in the alliance's history. Three reasons are fundamental to its success.

The first is rooted in the overlapping national interests of Japan and the United States. Simply put, if the two wealthiest Pacific democracies were to preserve the stability and prosperity of the region on which their countries depend, they would have to successfully mold their Cold War alliance into an effective instrument of policy for the post-Cold War era. That process, spurred by debate over Okinawa and Chinese and North Korean actions, has now begun in earnest.

A second and more specific reason for the success was the dogged preparation undertaken by government officials in Washington and Tokyo. The summit did not occur as a last-minute photo opportunity, but instead came only after 18 months of tireless diplomacy begun by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, and continued by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Tom Hubbard.

The third reason is the remarkable degree of political consensus achieved in both countries over the past year and a half. Various leading Republican specialists provided a steady stream of ideas to the Democratic Administration; for instance, there was no more forceful advocate for boldly redefining the alliance than Ambassador Richard Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Reagan Administration. On the Japanese side, perhaps the most striking instance of nonpartisanship was the example set by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. As a member of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, Mr. Murayama actively encouraged the security dialogue and helped to set the mood for the eventual summit by meeting with Vice President Al Gore in November 1995. Yet only two years previously, Mr. Murayama's party had adhered to the dogmatic position that the alliance was unconstitutional.

Trust and Reciprocity

Although the summit achieved several concrete steps, the more essential accomplishments were less tangible: increased trust, and the promise of greater partnership and reciprocity in the relationship. It is because of this larger perception of the relationship that so many see the summit more as a redefinition than a simple reaffirmation of the alliance.

Hence, the foremost achievement of the summit was the restoration of a high degree of certitude in U.S.-Japan relations overall. Trust had been eroding because of the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the rise of trade tensions, and inertia or inattentiveness to alliance management. The official channel for security coordination, the Security Consultative Committee, involves regular meetings between defense and foreign ministry officials on both sides. This official channel worked well in the late-1980s, but the overall U.S.-Japan dialogue since 1990 had declined in candor, thereby losing some of its effectiveness. A central purpose of the security initiative, begun at the end of 1994, was to restore the dialogue's vitality. In this regard, the summit was an unqualified success.

Alliance managers on both sides also saw a need to broaden support for the alliance. In Japan, public support plummeted after the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl last year. The alliance faced a serious crisis because of the gap in perceptions between Japanese officials and the public. Post-summit polls, however, demonstrate overwhelming (about 80 percent) support for the U.S.-Japan alliance. A crucial reason for that support is the impact of the interim report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was set up last November to help accelerate consolidation of U.S. forces in Okinawa. The report, issued the day before the summit began, recommended a 20 percent decrease in the total acreage of U.S. facilities in Okinawa (more than all the land returned since the United States began returning portions of Okinawa to Japan in 1972), the return of Futenma Air Station, and more restrictive operational practices to address the complaints of the local population. The seriousness of these steps was welcomed by most Japanese, even while the United States was able to maintain its current force level of more than 45,000 in Japan.

A second achievement, enshrined in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued by the two leaders, was a clear articulation of the alliance's rationale in the post-Cold War era. The Prime Minister and the President "reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security..., remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 21st century."

The leaders redefined the alliance in terms of both uncertainties and opportunities. To hedge against regional "instability and uncertainty," the bilateral security relationship will become a more effective vehicle for coordinating policies to prevent pre-war crisises from arising and, in the event of a crisis, it will be a seamless web of security access, support and interoperability. The alliance has essentially been transformed from one oriented primarily on Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty (MST)--the narrow self-defense of Japan--toward one more balanced between Articles 5 and 6--regional security.

A third achievement has been to continue to spark a broad public debate in Japan on its role and the importance of the alliance. Because of the legacy of World War II in Japan, pacifism is deeply rooted in the popular mindset; and, as a consequence of the American security umbrella, many Japanese assume that security is as automatic and plentiful as oxygen. While Japanese officials have long known otherwise, there is a chasm between the policy-making elite and the electorate in Japan about the responsibilities of creating and preserving regional security.

Also, defense work has occurred in a largely an opaque fashion, handled by the bureaucrats more than publicly elected officials. Too often host nation support was viewed as a "sympathy budget" to the "declining" United States. As a result of the recent U.S.-Japan dialogue, Japan's new National Defense Program Outline released in November 1995 stressed how the alliance was in Japan's national interest. Since then there has been more written in the Japanese press on this than in all previous 10 years. Japan crossed the threshold of the past alliance relationship of a patron-client into a more equal partnership, with each alliance partner making contributions commensurate with its overall national strength. While those contributions will continue to reflect comparative advantages and constitutional and legal limitations on both sides, the marker has been laid down by the Japanese Govern-ment for Japan to increase its role in regional and (through peace operations and humanitarian assistance) international security affairs.

The public debate is likely to widen if not deepen in Japan in the months ahead because the President and the Prime Minister also agreed at the summit to undertake a reexamination of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. The 1978 Guidelines called for focusing bilateral defense cooperation on:

* the deterrence of aggression
* actions in response to an armed attack against Japan
* Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of external crises affecting Japan's security.

The likely scenario is that the leaders will conduct a 2 plus 2 meeting, perhaps in the fall, and provide a broad statement of direction for future Defense Guidelines--to be followed in 1997 by the new guidelines themselves.

The official review--to be undertaken through the Security Consultative Committee--is likely to focus on several issues, including: (1) Japanese contributions to regional crises; (2) expanded base access and facilities cooperation; material, logistical, infrastructure, and repair support; and some operational cooperation (within the limits of the MST and the Japanese Constitution); (3) enhanced cooperation on international peace operations and humanitarian assistance; and (4) multilateral cooperation and confidence building measures.

Misperception and Miscalculation

The major policy debate for the U.S. and Japan is "how far to go." While the outcome of future debate is unknown, there are some natural brakes that will prevent significant discontinuities in policy. In that regard, it is important to be clear about the challenges confronting alliance managers in both nations.

One major challenge is to minimize excessive public misunderstanding between Japan and the United States. Americans might now expect too much from Japan in a crisis, whether on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the Persian Gulf. For instance, the Mutual Security Treaty's Article 6 for regional security limits Japan to an ill-defined "Far East," but whatever the boundaries of that, it does not include the Persian Gulf. Second, Taiwan remains a potential weak link in the alliance, as Japanese people would be more likely to see a crisis across the strait as an internal Chinese matter, while many Americans might be less likely to do so. The American public should appreciate that alliance coordination and planning is working better, closer, with more trust and certitude today--important prerequisites for an effective alliance--but public opinion in each country could differ in times of crisis.

On the Japanese side, some see a U.S. attempt to push Japan beyond the boundaries of its peace constitution. The Secretary of Defense has explicitly stated that U.S. cooperation will be within the framework of the Security Treaty and the Constitution. Japan's constitution has some flexibility. Under it and Article 9 of the MST, for instance, it is entirely possible that Japanese officials would be able to do what is necessary without having to resolve a constitutional battle over Japan's right to "collective self defense." It is appropriate for the United States to call for more certitude and reciprocity, but it is for the Japanese public to decide how they should interpret their constitution.

Economic Clashes--Security Partners

Some might suppose that the security summit will also solve the economic clashes that have occurred between the two countries in recent years. Economics as a factor in international relations will continue to strike close to home. However, economics and security are two largely separate but related legs to the relationship between the two countries: if one is ailing, then the other will be affected. Coercive leverage against another major power seems counterproductive. Hopefully, the United States has moved beyond the trade imbalance as the sole measurement of bilateral relations.

The largest dissenting element against the summit, and the security reaffirmation, comes from revisionists who believe that Japan remains a free rider and that the United States loses economic benefits by playing the dominant policeman role in the Asia-Pacific (clearly losing contracts to the French after the Taiwan Strait dispute this winter). The extent to which the summit has set the stage for greater Japanese contributions undercuts the fundamental argument of the revisionists.

External Challenges

However, a larger challenge to the alliance's redefinition comes not from the U.S. or Japan but from the other countries of the region, particularly in Northeast Asia.

First, there is a need to harmonize the relationship with the ROK. Attempts to reinvigorate the U.S.-ROK alliance would be a long overdue effort. Trilateral diplomacy is also essential to effective understanding. The leaders of Japan and the ROK need to restore more civility and cooperation--which suffered over the past year during the Korean elections and due to enhanced Chinese diplomacy with the ROK, often at Japanese expense. And, if a 2 + 2 mechanism can be established to effect a soft landing for North Korea, Japan will surely be asked to play an important role--perhaps brought into the process the same time as Russia. Limitations in the U.S.-Japan alliance will quickly be met without equivalent efforts in the U.S.-ROK alliance. This is a role increasingly familiar to Tokyo, and a way for Japan to make a real contribution to regional security.

The key issue is China, which probably perceives the success of this summit as a setback for Chinese foreign policy. The United States and Japan must work together to assist China's integration. In the past 20 years, no country has benefitted as much from the stability provided by the U.S.-Japan alliance as China. If the alliance is aimed at stability and not containment, then Tokyo and Washington must promote a regional security environment that could win Chinese cooperation. Of course, only the Chinese can decide the extent of that cooperation.

The late Seiki Nishihiro said his concern was that the U.S.-Japan alliance was not secure--not "locked in" for the 21st century. His concern was that the end of the alliance would instantly change all terms of reference for Asian-Pacific countries in how they viewed security and that such a colossal change should not be tested. The leaders of the United States and Japan, with tremendous bipartisan support, have finally taken the critical first steps toward assuming mutual stewardship responsibilities for the 21st century.

Recommendations

* Follow through with building greater public trust and alliance reciprocity by seriously reviewing Defense Guidelines. The Guidelines can help further convert the alliance's old focus on primarily Article 5 of the MST to a more balanced emphasis between Articles 5 and 6.

* Avoid asking Japan to do too much.

* Avert public misperceptions by encouraging greater public discourse and transparency on the role of the alliance and increased parliamentary exchanges.

* Capitalize on progress made so far by implementing the SACO recommendations to reduce the burden on the Okinawans.

* Harmonize the U.S.-Japan alliance with the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although the bilateral alliance with South Korea remains able to defeat aggression from the North, it is less prepared to adapt to a situation in which peninsular tensions are radically reduced. The United States needs to look at the future of the relationship with South Korea by drawing Korea into trilateral diplomacy with Japan so these alliances are not working at cross purposes but are instead mutually reinforcing.

* Use the U.S.-Japan alliance to facilitate China's integration into regional and international institutions and dialogues. By seeking a common policy with key allies in East Asia and perhaps in Europe, the United States can help encourage Chinese leaders to cooperate on a wide range of issues that go well beyond the security sphere. Unless China can be integrated, the alliance risks polarizing East Asia, which would have unknown, but surely detrimental, effects on East Asia's dynamism.

Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Research Professor and Asia team leader at the Institute for National Strategic Studies; and he is the co-author of Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance. For more information call Dr. Cronin at (202) 685-3846, ext. 523, fax at (202) 685-3972, or Internet e-mail to: croninp@ndu.edu.

Security and Defense

	SECURITY AND DEFENSE APRIL 15, 1996 TRANSCRIPT

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President Clinton began a tour of several East Asian cities Sunday. First is a trip to South Korea only weeks after tensions erupted between it and the communist North. Clinton will also visit Japan, where many are calling for the U.S. to limit its military presence. Elizabeth Farnsworth talks with three experts in Asian geopolitics.

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ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: As President Clinton left the White House last night, top administration officials were stressing that this trip to South Korea and Japan would be different from previous Asian summits. Security and defense would be the main issues, not the trade disputes that have bedeviled U.S.-Japanese relations since the 1970's. On Friday, the President and top economic officials were saying that immense progress had been made in opening Japanese markets to U.S. exports.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Today, exports to Japan support more than 800,000 good-paying American jobs, including 150,000 new ones since 1992.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: The focus on security, rather than trade, is partly a result of recent events in Korea and China. Over the past two weeks, North Korea has sent troops into the demilitarized zone dividing the Korean Peninsula and has said it would not longer abide by the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. The United States has 36,000 troops stationed in South Korea. They would be on the front line in case of a North Korean invasion of the South. President Clinton arrived in South Korea this afternoon. He will meet with President Kim Young Sam later this evening and is expected to offer reassurance that American troops remain committed to defending the South against any incursions from the North.

The other recent crisis in East Asia, China's threats against Taiwan, has cooled since elections on that island March 23rd. To forestall any further moves towards Taiwanese independence, China carried out military exercises in the Taiwan Strait over a period of weeks last month. In response, the United States deployed two aircraft areas in the area. Dealing with China and the positioning of U.S. forces in Asia will be key topics when President Clinton reaches Japan on Tuesday. Just today, new details were released of an agreement signed Friday changing the deployment of some of the 47,000 American troops in Japan and especially in Okinawa. The troop issue has become more contentious in Japanese politics since the abduction and rape of a 13 year old Okinawan girl by three American servicemen last September. Large demonstrations have called for an end to the U.S./Japan security treaty. But the Japanese government of Premier Ryutaro Hashimoto instead worked out arrangements for redeploying some American troops and shutting down some military facilities on Okinawa. In all, Okinawa will get back about 20 percent of the land used by the U.S. for training and other operations.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Now we get three perspectives on the President's trip to Asia and U.S. policy in that region. Ayako Doi is a journal and editor of Japan Digest, a daily summary report of Japanese news published in Virginia. Joseph Nye is the former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. He is now dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He joins us from Boston. And Chalmers Johnson is an author and president of the Japan Policy Research Institute. He joins us from San Diego. Thank you all for being with us. Joseph Nye, you heard in the News Summary, and I will read you a little bit of this wire, we just have unconfirmed reports from both Reuters and AP that President Clinton will propose unconditional peace talks between North and South Korea with the United States and China as participants. Does this surprise you? Is this something that began under your watch at the Defense Department?

JOSEPH NYE, Former Pentagon Official: (Boston) I think it's a good idea. The difficulty will be to see whether the North Koreans will participate. They've been trying to break us away from the South Koreans, and in that sense, they've resisted things that include the South Koreans on an equal basis. So I think it's a good proposal, but it remains to be seen whether the North will actually accept it.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: What about the South Koreans?

MR. NYE: I think the South Koreans are willing to have a dialogue on peace as long as they're treated coequally. What they're not willing to do is have a dialogue that the North Koreans initiate which is between the North and the U.S. only. And that's been the tactic that North Korea has been trying.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Chalmers Johnson, what do you think? And do you think? And do you think that the recent incursions into the demilitarized zone are about, were caused by North Korea's desire to deal directly with the United States, which is what some people say?

CHALMERS JOHNSON, Japan Police Research Institute: (San Diego) The North Koreans have been trying to deal with this for some length of time, and so far, their record of willingness to negotiate is actually quite good ever since Jimmy Carter's visit to the North two years ago. I believe that finally we woke up that they want to negotiate and that we quit stonewalling; therefore, I very much welcome the President's initiate. I think it should have come at least a couple of years ago.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Do you agree with Joseph Nye, that it's possible the North won't accept this, though, because they don't want to sit with the South Koreans and negotiate this peace?

MR. JOHNSON: That's possible, but I think the thing that has been achieved in this proposal is to bring in China and that China very likely might put important pressure on Pyongyang to join this. I believe that, that the North needs these negotiations and that the question of South Korea's presence may turn out to be less significant than we have feared.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: This would be a rather historic event.

MR. JOHNSON: It would be a breakthrough. It would be of tremendous importance. I'm glad to see that the President has taken this initiative.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Ayako Doi, how seriously was the, the North Korean--were the North Koreans incursions into the DMZ and the other problems of recent weeks taken in Japan? Anything that happens between North and South Korea would involve the U.S. military, which has bases in Japan, so it would involve Japan too.

AYAKO DOI, Japan Digest: Well, I don't think North Korea was ever taken as a direct military threat to Japan. But anything that happens on the peninsula that's so near to Japan, of course, is a concern of Japanese people and the big question has been if something happens in Korean Peninsula, what will Japanese forces do to aid the American operation, or joint American-South Korean operation? And the consensus--well, I wouldn't say the consensus but the present government interpretation of the things is that Japanese cannot come to the aid of the U.S. forces if it involves a real crisis that does not involve directly Japan, attack on Japan.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Actually, this gets us into the whole question of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and I wanted to ask you, Joseph Nye, speaking of historic agreements, these recent agreements in Japan that were announced Friday and then some of the details were released today, it does appear that the U.S. and Japan are working out ways to cooperate at least in peacekeeping and perhaps preparing the way to cooperate, if there is trouble in, in Asia, and this has always been an issue because of Japan's constitution, which forbids most Japanese military activity. Do you see this as a--what's happening right now as being very important?

MR. NYE: I think this is extremely important. Some years ago, Prime Minister Nakasone called Japan an unsinkable aircraft carrier. And certainly the U.S. forward presence in East Asia is welcomed by all countries in the region. The fact that this relationship is being reaffirmed, indeed, that President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto are going to sign a joint security declaration saying that this is the basis for stability in East Asia after the Cold War, is indeed a great occasion and of primary significance for the period after the Cold War.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Make the case for us. Why are U.S. troops necessary after the Cold War and Japan and Korea?

MR. NYE: Well, unlike Europe, where you'll find that there are a lot of institutions such as the European Union and so forth, in East Asia, there is no glue that holds these countries together, and there are a great many historical disputes which could flame up or flare up even though the ideological divisions, the Cold War, are over. The fact that the Americans is the largest power in the world are willing to sort of hold the reins to keep order is profoundly important to economic growth in East Asia. Indeed, I've sometimes said that security is like oxygen. You don't need it--notice it until you begin to lose it. In that sense, the American presence is the oxygen that keeps the East Asian economic miracle flourishing, and that's directly beneficial to the United States, as the President said in the clip you heard earlier.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Chalmers Johnson, what do you think about that? Are U.S. troops still necessary in Japan?

MR. JOHNSON: I'm enormously skeptical of all that has been going on, that is to say the promise Futenma Marine Corps Air Station or the--

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: On Okinawa.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. On Okinawa, or the Northern territories to the island. These are the same promise that was made 23 years ago about the, the Nahad Docks. We claim that we will return things only if the Japanese will make alternative areas available, knowing that they're really not there. My feeling is that a breakthrough would mean withdraw the Third Marine Division. We do not need ground forces in East Asia. We need the Navy. It is--America's real capacity is, is the Seventh Fleet, is the ability to project power into the Taiwan Straits, into the South China Sea, into the sea lanes of Southeast Asia. We've threatened the continued existence of the Navy by having the ground forces there since they may lead to further incidents that will ultimately cause the Japanese to throw us out, as the Philippines did four years ago over our biggest base, biggest Naval base at Subic Bay. So, so far, it would be, I would like to believe that they are serious this time, but Futenma comes back five to seven years from now. That's ample time for the President, the ambassador, the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Hashimoto all to have gone onto new jobs.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Why don't we need U.S. military ground forces in Japan or in Asia?

MR. JOHNSON: The--our official military doctrine right now, the Weinberger doctrine, says that will not use force except when we can see the end game. It was one of the issues that came up so significantly over the sending of troops to, to Bosnia. We are not going to use ground forces in any sort of contest with China. In the case of Korea, they're simply not needed, i.e., Korea today is defended by a 650,000-man army. Jiang Zemin, the president of China, made a state visit to Korea last November, probably greater for South Korea than, than anything the Americans are doing. Korea is today 20 times richer and twice as large as North Korea. North Korea is a failed Communist regime, an East Asian Romania, but the greatest real danger is its collapse, not its military adventurism. Our role there is to, is to provide nuclear defense. That is done from the Seventh Fleet. That's what should be emphasized in our policies. I'm afraid the Marines remain there simply because of inertia, vested interests in the military, and that they should be withdrawn. I'm afraid that these are just palliative measures that have been announced this far.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: What do you think Ayako Doi, palliative measures, or will the closing of a major Marine air station in, in Okinawa remove some of the heat from the demonstrations and the demands for a greatly reduced U.S. presence in Japan?

MS. DOI: Well, at least for now. I mean, this will get the successful summit meeting going on okay this week. Nobody knows what will happen, whether it will really happen, or what it will do later on. I think--I'm not much of a military expert to say what kind or what level forces are needed to, to defend Japan or keep the stability of the region, but one of the things that ticked off the Okinawan people last Fall, after the rape and before President Clinton's cancelled visit to Japan in November was that, was the report that those two leaders were going to confirm that U.S. forces will remain at 100,000 troop level in Asia and 47,000 of them in Japan for the next 20 years. And that greatly upset the Okinawan people, and the rest of Japan as a result was made aware of the discontent of the Okinawan people of having to bear their--the burden of having to--having so many bases in their, their island, and, um, I think the good thing about the rape and China-Taiwan crisis is that it finally made the Japanese people--forced the Japanese people to think what are they going to do themselves, along with the U.S. forces under the security treaty to defend Japan and keep the stability of the region. And that's the question that the Japanese have never had to ask themselves during the Cold War.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: You mean, what would they be willing to do by themselves?

MS. DOI: Right.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: If the U.S. weren't there, or are they facing asking the U.S. to leave eventually?

MS. DOI: Well, I don't think--I think very few Japanese would say, leave, the United States, right now. Umm, they don't have the alternative yet. They haven't figured out what, what they would like to do. I think the most important thing about this Futenma agreement is that having, having had to ask the U.S. to give up their important Marine base, at least the Pentagon thought that it was a very important base--nobody thought that it was coming back so soon, but having forced the Americans to give it up, the Japanese government had put in in this agreement, in the same agreement that they will consider what, what facilities they can offer to facilitate the U.S. operation in time of crisis. And that's a--that's a very new thing.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Just now we only have a minute left. Can you respond to Chalmers Johnson's call to get ground troops out of Japan?

MR. NYE: Well, as long as North Korea has 1.1 million men, 2/3 of them right along the demilitarized zone, we have a clear and present danger. And when we force sized for that area, we just that we needed 100,000 troops forward based, and North Korea had a lot to do with it. They don't need to stay there 20 years. Nobody ever said the would stay 20 years. What we need in the short run is enough troops to counter the North Korean threat, and in the longer-term, enough presence to provide that sense of security and stability throughout the region. And the changes that have just been announced are going to make that possible. Those are real changes, not phony changes.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Thank you all very much.

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/clinton_trip_4-15.html

Clinton trip to shift Japan's role in alliance

Barr, Cameron W.,
Christian Science Monitor, 08827729,
4/15/96, Vol. 88, Issue 97

This week's summit between President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto seems likely to inaugurate a period of expanded and unprecedented military cooperation between their nations.

In a presummit move, the two governments announced on Friday that the US would return a military base that has long rankled residents on the Japanese island of Okinawa. The decision to hand back the Marines' Futenma Air Station in five to seven years is at once an attempt to appease Okinawans and an investment in the future of the US-Japan military alliance.

Ever since the rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa last September by three US servicemen, Japan and the US have worked to ensure that Okinawan resentment does not turn into a widespread movement to evict the US military from Japan. At the same time, critics of the alliance have been asking what, exactly, are 47,000 US troops doing in Japan?

Answering that question -- in a way that convinces the American and Japanese public -- is the main task that the two leaders face during the April 17-18 summit.

Some Asian observers may see the closure of the Futenma base as a sign of a reduced American commitment in this region, especially in light of the US military's withdrawal from its Philippine outposts in 1992. Although East Asia has witnessed much stability and prosperity in recent years, it is a part of the world where no one takes peace for granted.

The US has fought in three major conflicts in this region in little more than five decades. A partial legacy of those wars is the continued US military presence. Under a defense treaty signed in 1960, Japan is home to an American aircraft carrier and a Marine division -- the only ones of their kind based outside the US -- and a host of other US forces.

Japan's own military is limited by a pacifist Constitution, drafted by US authorities in the wake of World War II, that ensures that Japan maintain only defensive capabilities.

Many leaders and analysts here see the continuance of a US military role in the region as the key to peace. Just last month, US warships were used to warn China not to take its intimidation of Taiwan too far. Likewise, 36,000 US troops help protect South Korea from possible aggression by North Korea.

"The US military's presence," says Seizaburo Sato, a political scientist at Tokyo's Institute for International Policy Studies, "is an absolute prerequisite for the peace and stability of the region." China, with its growing economy and a modernizing military, is the major reason why Asians want the Americans to stay.

In the coming days, US and Japanese officials will take a series of steps regarding their security arrangements. The two sides will announce more efforts to make the US presence in Okinawa prefecture -- where 20 percent of the main island is occupied by US forces -- less burdensome, such as the return of other facilities and plans to curb noise.

The two governments are also expected to sign an agreement that will smooth cooperation between their militaries -- allowing them to provide each other with food, fuel, and spare parts during joint exercises, UN peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian missions.

They will also begin revising guidelines that govern cooperation in more adverse circumstances, such as during a possible crisis in East Asia. Finally, the two leaders will issue a document "reaffirming" their security ties.

Judging from press reports here, this reaffirmation could well be a broadening and deepening of the US-Japanese alliance. As it stands, the treaty signed by the two countries in 1960 is narrow in scope. It obliges the US to defend Japan and Japan to provide the US with facilities to carry out that objective. It also says the US may use these facilities to maintain "international peace and security in the Far East."

There is much speculation in Tokyo that Japan will endorse an expansion of the geographical scope of the US-Japan alliance, offering the US more support in its unofficial role as the policeman of Asia. Such an expansion would also hasten the day when Japanese troops -- most likely in concert with American counterparts -again take part in military activities in other parts of Asia.

A lot will have to happen, however, before that day comes. For one thing, Japan's Constitution forbids the use of force in resolving international disputes. Japanese governments have long interpreted it to mean that Japan may not participate in collective security arrangements, in which several countries come to the aid of another.

THE legacy of World War II has also resulted in a strong pacifist movement in this country that will not easily countenance steps to broaden the activities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, as the military is known. The Japanese have long been loath to even discuss military and security issues, and even the recent crisis in Taiwan seemed to provoke dread, not debate, from Japanese politicians. But increasingly, those who advocate a more engaged military are raising their voices. "In the case of an emergency, Japanese forces should go with the US," says Professor Sato. "I'm not saying Japan should send combat troops right now, but Japan should not hesitate to help the US."

Even a more dovish thinker, such as Kuniko Inoguchi, a politics professor at Tokyo's Sophia University, advocates "maximum effort" to help the US resolve a crisis in East Asia, even if it involves military action. Should such a crisis crop up, she says, "it has to be quick, and it has to end in victory -- everything must be considered in those terms."

While she rejects the idea of using Japanese troops in combat situations, she does so for practical reasons: "In modern strategic warfare we have a bad record, or no record at all."

It remains to be seen what the Japanese PUblic will make of any effort to have Japan assist the US militarily in Asia. The conventional wisdom says they would bitterly resist such steps. But, insists Hiroyuki Hosoda, a member of parliament from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, "I think the people would change overnight if they faced an emergency."