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April 29, 2007
By Richard Halloran
An American military intelligence officer, asked some years ago how far the Chinese could project their military power, answered only half-jokingly: "About as far as their army can walk."
That is changing rapidly today as China's leaders fuel the budgets of the Peoples Liberation Army, which comprises all of their armed forces. Says a new report from the Council on Foreign Relations, the think tank in New York, China is driven both by "a clear operational objective," which is to take Taiwan, the island Beijing claims, and "a clear strategic objective," which is to be a modern power.
China's military priorities are four: the navy, in which submarines take first place; the air force of jet fighters and long range bombers; space, not only threatening US and other satellites but putting up their own; and what the Chinese call the Second Artillery, their land-based nuclear weapons including 1000 missiles aimed at Taiwan.
"Submarines currently dominate China's naval development," say analystsAndrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson, writing in a recent US Naval War College Review. China has long been rumored to be eager to build aircraft carriers but for now, these analysts say, discussion of submarines "is much more advanced and grounded in reality than that of carriers."
At first, the Chinese got submarines and submarine technology from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, from France and Israel. Now they are building their own. Moreover, they are retiring older boats and replacing them with fewer but more advanced boats, both diesel-electric and nuclear powered.
Over the next eight years, the Chinese plan to have in operation five Han and six Shang class nuclear-powered submarines whose mission will be to attack aircraft carriers and other surface warships. In addition they will have 15 Song and 17 Ming diesel-electric boats with the same task but closer to home, according to Global Security, a private research organization.
China also plans to put to sea a nuclear-powered submarine, Jin, armed with ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads and to retire an older boat, Xia, with the same arms. An analyst in Taiwan, Cheng Dai-ch'eng, wrote: "The communists are probably not going to use their submarine launched missiles against us, but against the United States who may come to our aid in future conflicts."
The Chinese have vigorously denied that their navy is a threat to other countries. An article in Huangiu Shibao, a government newspaper, asserted last month that Americans were "talking nonsense about details of China having expanded its submarine fleet." Some Americans agree, at least in part, saying it will be many years before Chinese submarines will be able to challenge the US Navy.
Even so, Chinese military planners have revised their operational thinking on attack submarines. Before, they patrolled close to China's coast to repel an invasion. Now, says a fresh study from the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), they are deployed further out to resist invasion, protect territorial sovereignty, and safeguard the nation's maritime rights.
Chinese submarines have been detected well past what the Chinese call the first island chain that runs from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Indonesia. "Offshore defense" evidently calls for Chinese submarines to venture "as far at the PLA Navy's capabilities will allow it to operate," ONI says. Some Chinese officers suggest that a future objective will be patrols as far east as Hawaii.
A critical question is Chinese seamanship. An American naval officer has 500 years of seagoing experience behind him, 250 years of the British navy and 250 years since the sailing ships of Salem plied the seven seas and John Paul Jones founded the US Navy. American submariners have 100 years of experience, since the early 20th century, to draw on.
In contrast, China in 5000 years of history has produced only one great sailor, Admiral Zheng He or Cheng Ho, who sailed the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the 15th century. Chinese submariners, hampered by the Sino-Soviet split and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, are just beginning to learn their craft in highly complicated vessels.
US military leaders, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have for many months contended that the Chinese should be more open about their military intentions, including why they are expanding their submarine fleet. Pointing to China's surging economy that pays for the boats, an American submariner, wondered out loud: "I suppose they do it because they can."
April 27, 2007
Aloha Kakou
Today the Hawai'i Okinawa Alliance and a number of groups in Honolulu held a solidarity action for Henoko at the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu.
We held signs and picketed in front of the Consulate. We made one giant sign cut out in the shape of a Dugong with the words: "Peace for Okinawa, Nuchi du takara (all life is a treasure), Save the Dugong and No U.S. Military Bases".
Several weeks ago, we had requested a meeting with the Consul General and the consultative document prepared by the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Bureau describing the activities of the pre-survey and survey for construction of the U.S. military base expansion at Henoko. The Consulate denied both requests.
So we showed up in person and requested to meet the consulate staff. This time Yamada-san came out to talk with us. They tried to shoo us off their property, but we maintained that we had official business and stood our ground. Yamada offered to meet with two persons inside, away from the media, but we said that we would like everyone to hear and participate in the discussion. He seemed quite shaken by the action. Last time we tried to talk with them, they were quite dismissive of our small delegation. We told them at that time that we were offended by the lack of respect and that "We'll be back."
We read the message to Prime Minister Abe aloud and handed it to Yamada to deliver to the Japanese national government.
Yamada said he would convey our message to the government. We asked when we might hear a reply, but he was noncommittal. I gave him a red ribbon as he left.
Then, on cue, everyone fanned out in the parking area and began tying hundreds of red ribbons inscribed with solidarity and peace messages onto the consulate fence. The security guard scurried around in vain to try to stop us but soon the fence was aflutter with red messages of resistance, solidarity and hope. We told them that these were prayers for peace and that the red color referred to the red card in
soccer signifying that the player is out of the came. We told them to convey these to the Japanese government as well.
Mahalo to AFSC Hawai'i, DMZ-Hawai 'i / Aloha 'Aina, Anakbayan - Honolulu, Not In Our Name Hawai'i, Kapakaukau, Save UH / Stop UARC coalition, the Korea Truth Commission in Hawai'i, and the Hawai'i People's Fund, all of whom helped organize and sent representatives to the action.
In addition to a television station, a reporter from the Okinawa Times was there to do a story.
Below is our message to Prime Minister Abe.
In Solidarity
Kyle Kajihiro
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
April 27, 2007
Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe
c/o Consulate General of Japan-Honolulu, Political Divison,
1742 Nu'uanu Ave. Honolulu, HI 96817
Dear Prime Minister Abe
This is an urgent appeal from Okinawa's friends in Hawai'i to the government of Japan calling for an immediate halt to the expansion of the U.S. military base in Henoko, Okinawa. We are shocked and outraged that the Japanese government has begun the marine survey for construction around Henoko Point despite the overwhelming opposition of the local residents.
We call on the Japanese government to respect the human rights of the people of Okinawa and immediately cease all activities related to the expansion of the U.S. military base in Henoko.
On April 18, 2007, we requested the consultative document submitted by the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Bureau to the Okinawa Prefecture government regarding the marine survey. To date, the Japanese government has refused to release these documents that are essential to understanding the impacts of the project.
Instead the consulate staff told us to submit a freedom of information request, which is simply ridiculous. The project would be too far along, or even completed when, and if we ever received the documents. The fact that these plans have been made in secret without public review or input demonstrates contempt for the residents of Henoko.
We demand that all plans related to the military base expansion in Henoko be made public and that the Okinawan people be given decision making powers over those matters that will affect them.
Furthermore, our Chamoru brothers and sisters on Guam will be devastated by the proposed relocation of U.S. troops to their island. We demand that Japan not support or pay for the relocation of U.S. troops to Guam.
The dangerous remilitarization of Japan and the submission of the Japanese government to the demands of the U.S. military will forever be a mark of shame and dishonor on Japan in the eyes of the world. We urge you to choose the path of peace and to heed the Okinawan proverb: "Nuchi du takara" - Life is most precious.
Aloha
The Hawai'i Okinawa Alliance
Back
E-mail the Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles at roninred@yahoo.com
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
DoD News Briefing with Deputy Undersecretary Lawless and Deputy Undersecretary Grone
On the Web: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1271
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131/697-5132
Public contact:
http://www.defenselink.mil/faq/comment.html
or +1 (703) 428-0711 +1
Presenter: Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Philip Grone April 25, 2006 12:00 PM EDT
MODERATOR: Good afternoon, everybody. As you know, the U.S.- Japan security relationship remains vital to both our countries and to the entire Asia-Pacific region. We've been working with Japan to transform our alliance and are making important progress in those consultations. Because of the importance of this relationship and the recent progress that has been made, we felt it would be helpful to ask two senior Defense officials to share some time with you on this subject. So for about 30 minutes today we have Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Affairs Mr. Richard Lawless and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and Environment Mr. Philip Grone.
And with that, I'll turn it over to you gentlemen.
MR. LAWLESS: Okay. Thank you very much.
Phil and I are pleased to be with you here today. What we wanted to do is put the events of the weekend, particularly the highlight that Secretary Rumsfeld's meeting with Defense Minister Nukaga received in the press here and in Japan. And it's important, I think, for us to allow you to understand and make the connection, put that meeting in context, of the fact that what we're really doing here is completing one last important piece of a much larger and much more important arrangement. The Guam piece, the Marine relocation to Guam, should be seen in the context of a whole range of changes we are making to transform the alliance, and that involves both a major realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, a major change in the way we base ourselves and our partners in the alliance -- the Japanese self- defense forces -- as well as a range of changes we're making in the way that we operate and operationalize the relationship.
All of these changes were previewed to a degree with an agreement in principle that we reached back in late October, October 29th, 2005, and then captured in a document at a ministerial level meeting, which we called Alliance Transformation Realignment.
In that document, we committed to reach agreement on all of the detailed implementation plans that were to require -- that would be required to realize these changes by March 2006. Obviously, we're a little bit behind that timeline, but not by much. We've basically pulled together all the components of that package, reached agreement in details and in principle on all of these components, and one of the remaining issues that we hadn't resolved as of this past weekend, until Sunday night, was the Marine relocation to Guam.
That issue has now been resolved. It will be retailored back into the entire package, and hopefully with the decisions and discussions that are going on today -- we have a Japanese delegation with us today in the building that are working on some of the fine points of that agreement -- we will have a comprehensive implementation plan to present to our leadership either later this week or early next week.
And that's where we are, and I wanted to put the Guam piece of this into context because it's a very important part, but it's just one part of something that's much, much larger in this relationship between ourselves and the government of Japan.
With that, what I'd like to do is open this up for some questions, perhaps, and we can respond to any concerns or inquiries you might have.
Please?
Q: Would you have the two-plus-two to finalize the negotiation with the Japanese government?
MR. LAWLESS: The two-plus-two is something we will be prepared to move forward with ideally next week, but we will only have a two- plus-two if we reach agreement on the entire package. And we are now, as I say, going over some very fine tuning on that package, but I cannot say that that package has been completed as of today.
Q: Could you also explain that if Russia is behind the move -- moving the Marines from Okinawa to Guam, what's the benefit from the U.S. side?
MR. LAWLESS: Well, it isn't a benefit. As Secretary Rumsfeld I think characterized that we've reached agreement Sunday night on an arrangement that benefits both countries.
So the issue here is that the government of Japan asked us in the context of alliance transformation to see if there wasn't a better way that we could arrange ourselves, possibly reducing, as the government of Japan says, the burden on the people of Japan, but at the same time making sure that we do nothing to in any way reduce the credibility and the deterrent power of the American presence as it contributes to the alliance and peace in the Pacific.
I think that what we've done is, we've hit upon a solution that allows us to do both those things: maintain credibility, maintenance deterrence, but at the same time relocate a portion of the Marines to a position in the Western Pacific that still makes them immediately relevant to the defense of Japan. And that's the balance we've struck with this particular arrangement.
The other issue that relates to the Marine relocation from Guam -- it's 8,000 Marines that are -- excuse me -- the relocation to Guam -- 8,000 Marines, approximately, will be leaving Okinawa. That allows us to do some other things there. That allows us to consolidate -- and the consolidation of our footprint is a separate, discrete, very important element of what's going on -- consolidating our footprint on Okinawa, thereby giving back or being able to return land to the Japanese people, very valuable land, on Okinawa, particularly in the south.
So that's part and parcel of this whole arrangement -- a very important component.
Yes?
Q: You've gone over one of the biggest hurdles. Can you us an idea of what are the smaller sticking points that you have to resolve before you get final agreement?
MR. LAWLESS: The implementation arrangements are, in a sense -- they're very basic, but in some ways implementing them is very complex, because they involve relationships with local communities. And what the Japanese side has done is, we think very appropriately, said to us what we have to do in every case is, we have to go back and achieve coordination with the local communities, be it at a provincial level, be it at a city level, township level. And in each case, we know that getting coordination with the local communities is what allows us to really implement the agreements. In the past, when we had, for example, the SACO agreement, we had a great agreement in principle on certain aspects of relocation, but we failed to achieve up front detailed agreement and arrangements on the actual implementation.
We're doing it differently this time. So we're making sure that every T is crossed and I is dotted, so that these are agreements that we can actually step out on and implement, beginning this year.
So that's the difference, and that's what we're doing. We're cleaning up, if you will, and fine tuning every single one of those points.
Q: Are you confident that the Japanese leadership is going to put enough weight behind the push to make sure that's done to resolve the differences with the local community?
MR. LAWLESS: Yes, we're confident. They have told us that they're very confident that this is a plan that they can execute. We have told them in no case give us something or reach agreement with us or commit to us something that you cannot execute, and they have told us these are all things we can do, but we have to do them in the right way. And, frankly, that's what's taken us to get from where we were in October with agreement in principle to where we are today with specific agreement on each of the individual implementation plans.
Yes.
Q: The agreement on Sunday night left the U.S. responsible for a greater percentage of the cost that you -- than you had anticipated spending for the relocation of the Marines to Guam. You know, where is that money going to come from? And how much does this -- this series of agreements or this whole umbrella of separate, you know, realignments going to cost? And is that something that you'll be looking for in a supplemental budget request, or --
MR. LAWLESS: I'll answer the second part first, and then Phil Grone is going to answer the first part. Is that okay?
MR. GRONE: Sure.
MR. LAWLESS: As I mentioned, trying to put the Guam relocation in the context of this much broader realignment. The Japanese government, because most of the relocations and realignment moves are taking place on Japan proper, including Okinawa, are responsible for a huge commitment. That commitment probably ranges somewhere between -- whether you include Guam or not -- 20 (billion dollars) to $30 billion over a six- to seven-year period. This is a huge expenditure on their part, a huge investment on their part in the alliance, and we recognize it as such. The relocation to Guam is added into that approximately $20 billion domestic figure.
So when you look at it in that context, we feel that this is fairly struck bargain, that we are sharing costs on reasonable basis on that Guam discrete portion of the budget, but we ask that you understand that this expenditure on their part is much, much larger than just the Guam piece.
Phil.
MR. GRONE: Now --
Q: What's the U.S. part of that?
MR. GRONE: Well, and certainly from the U.S. part of this, this is a -- as Mr. Lawless indicated -- a series of strategic realignments that will occur over a number of years. We currently anticipate that we'll be able to accommodate this within our normal budget process as we make resource choices on a going-forward basis. In many ways this is similar to the resource trades that we make to secure broader transformation domestically with BRAC.
So these are choices that we make in the broader national interest, and it's something we'll be working through in the coming months to make sure that our program matches up with the commitments that we make through these agreements.
Q: And sir, can I just follow up? So you do not anticipate asking Congress to allocate extra funds in the supplemental?
MR. GRONE: Currently we have a supplemental pending before Congress for immediate needs of the department. As I say, this agreement is a multiyear agreement, and as I say, we'll handle this through the normal course of budget and programming.
MR. LAWLESS: Yes?
Q: Thank you.
Given these changes, do you still see 2012 as the target date for completing this move, or will that now be delayed?
MR. LAWLESS: Actually, overall the plan talks about 2012 because most of the changes can be made well within that 2012 or approximately within that 2012 period. But as we fine-tuned it, we hope we can stay within 2012. A lot of the budget obligations, although not all, will be within that 2012 period, but some of the discrete moves will take more time than others.
For example, we have just agreed on and selected a new site for the Futenma facility on Okinawa. Whether that site -- we can execute against that site by 2012 technically I don't know. Our Japanese counterparts are very confident that they can do that, but again, there's probably a little bit of flex in that. But right now for planning purposes we've agreed that our target dates are all related to the year 2012. But again, some things will be done before that.
Q: Just to follow up. We had heard that the Futenma plan should precede the Guam move.
We had heard that from the DOD side before. Is that still the thinking?
MR. LAWLESS: No, I wouldn't -- I'd characterize it a little bit differently. Not "precede." The Guam move is dependent, to a degree, on a successful execution of the Futenma move. Futenma, in turn, involves a relocation of forces on Okinawa. It's part of that consolidation I mentioned to you because when we give up the old Futenma and move into the new facility, that property will go back, but at the same time other adjustments must be made at Camp Schwab, the new location.
So there's a lot of movement around Okinawa key to these two actions -- Futenma relocation and the Marine Corps movement to Guam -- that allows us to consolidate and give back all that land that we want to give back and have agreed to give back, by the way, in the agreements that we've reached with the Japanese.
MODERATOR: Yes.
Q After agreeing with the Japanese on the burden-sharing of the cost of moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam, the demonstration of the global posture realignment in Japan seems to be almost concluded. So now, from your point of view, what is the most important change in this posture realignment with Japan? For example, how about the integration of command facilities in Yokota and Tama?
MR. LAWLESS: Very important. And a lot of the things that we're doing relate to existing facilities and our ability to share our facilities with Japan's self-defense forces and the Japanese willingness to share some of their facilities with us on a training basis or other basis.
On the case of Yokota, it's an excellent example. The government of Japan has decided to build its new air defense command center, a multiyear, very large project on Yokota so that they can be there with us and we can cooperate and have some degree of interoperability with that. And that is a very tangible benefit to the alliance that we are co-locating our forces. It makes us much more interoperable, and it creates a truly bilateral, interoperative, balanced alliance, and that's one of the things we're hoping to achieve with this alliance transformation.
It isn't realignment first. It's alliance transformation and realignment. So we're helping to transform the fundamentals of the alliance; realignment, physical realignment is just a small piece of that.
Q: And a follow-up. So far -- and there is so much opposing of policies among local communities. So do you think that the integration of command facilities will be achieved? Is there any concern about this --
MR. LAWLESS: No. We have -- we have total confidence in the agreements we've reached with the government of Japan. Minister Nukaga is very confident that we can execute the agreements that Japan has entered into with us. We believe we have the full support of the Koizumi government. And I think we would not have entered into these individual agreements if we thought there was any possibility that the government of Japan could not execute them. So we have great confidence in what we've agreed to, yes.
Q: Part of this broader realignment that you're talking about, does Japan fully support basing a nuclear aircraft carrier in its waters, and are there any conditions or obstacles out there that could derail the plan to send the George Washington carrier to Yokosuka in 2008?
MR. LAWLESS: No, I'm not -- I'm not going to characterize the aircraft -- or, the ship that is going to go there. I don't believe we've made any announcements on the specific vessel that's going to go.
(To staff.) Have we?
STAFF: Yes, George Washington.
MR. LAWLESS: We have announced George Washington? Then fine.
I think that that coordination activity is ongoing. We expect it to continue to be ongoing for some period of time. And we're -- at this point in time we don't have any problems with it. We are satisfied with the dialogue we have with the government of Japan. The government of Japan is responsible for coordinating all aspects of this with the local community. I think we've reached out -- it's been in the press that delegations have traveled to the United States. They've visited -- I believe, San Diego, John?
STAFF: Yes.
MR. LAWLESS: And familiarized themselves there with the way that nuclear-powered carriers and other ships are based and housed and maintained. And we're building a steady level of understanding, confidence and credibility with the Japanese people on how we operate nuclear-powered vessels. That's where we are, that's about where we wanted to be in this stage of the process. We're fully, still, what, two years away from the eventuality of that carrier actually arriving and being home-ported there.
But one other point that's sometimes missed. The decision by the United States to base what is truly one of its most significant national assets, a multi-billion dollar national asset -- it isn't the 8,000 people that go, or 10,000 people that go with that task force, and it isn't just the carrier itself, it's everything you have to send with it -- that carrier battle group, being a national asset of the United States, a strategic asset, being based and being sent there to be based, is our tangible contribution to the alliance, and it makes a statement about our commitment to the alliance.
The American people have risked and put forward that national asset to be in that location. It's the only place that a carrier is based outside the United States of America. And I think it is a unique situation that we have in this alliance that we commit that carrier battle group to that alliance. We told the Japanese people that we would not send anything but our very best capability, and that's what we're doing with the George Washington.
Yes?
Q: I'm going to ask about the U.S. forces status agreement, the remaining issue between United States and Japan. Do you have some talking about this agreement?
MR. LAWLESS: Well, everything we're doing complies with or in a sense relates to our status of forces agreement. We wouldn't do anything, you know, necessarily outside of our status of forces agreement, but it really hasn't been an issue, because everything that we've looked at doing has a relationship to our joint committee structure there. And the individual realignment moves that occur in Japan will take place in the context of that joint committee agreement process. So we're very comfortable in the context of the current status of forces agreement there with all of these realignment moves.
Yes?
Q: I want to follow up again on the money issue just to make sure I've got that right. So the cost is about $20 billion for Japan -- said between 20 and 30, and then later said about 20.
MR. LAWLESS: No, the way I characterized it -- let me correct that. I'm sorry. For the realignment in Japan proper, including Okinawa, a reasonable cost estimate, a general cost estimate is about $20 billion. I said the cost that they would incur for helping us with the relocation to Guam is additive to that. So you can add $6 billion to the $20 billion, approximately. Now, this has to be worked out, it has to be figured out over the next several years, but these are very rough but, I think, probably reasonably conservative estimates of what it's going to cost to do this for them.
Q: Okay. Does that mean that the U.S. portion of that realignment is an equal share? Or what's the U.S. part of it? I mean, I realize you --
MR. LAWLESS: The Japanese press has correctly characterized -- okay? -- that the cost for the relocation of 8,000 Marines to Guam, for the developmental costs to develop and deploy the new facilities there that will have to be built for that 8,000 Marine personnel contingent and families, probably 9(thousand) to 10,000 family members in addition to the 8,000 Marines, will be approximately $10.3 billion.
Of that $10.3 billion, they are covering about 60 percent, technically 59 percent, and we are covering the balance
MR. : The balance is about 4 -- or approximately $4 billion.
MR. : Does that nail it?
Q That's not the number I'm looking for. I'm looking for a big number. You keep saying this is just a small piece of the big agreement. You characterized the cost of the Japanese of the big realignment, the overall effort, and I'm looking for the, you know, attendant or related U.S. figure.
MR. LAWLESS: On the home islands of Japan including Okinawa, it's -- let us say, it's approximately $20 billion; add to that their costs on Guam, which are $6 billion, makes the total about $26 billion. That's the bigger context I'm talking about.
Q: It would be shared by the U.S.?
MR. GRONE: No. No.
MR. LAWLESS: Japan sharing Japan? It's their responsibility.
MR. GRONE: It's full.
MR. LAWLESS: It's -- (inaudible). That's what I'm saying.
Q: I know. But I'm asking what it's going to cost the U.S.
MR. LAWLESS: I just said the only cost is the $4 billion in Guam.
Q: (Off mike.)
MR. LAWLESS: I'm sorry.
MR. GRONE: Yes, the only -- the only piece of ours is the Guam piece. That's correct.
MR. LAWLESS: Okay.
Yes? Let's do this gentleman here.
Q: Let me confirm on one thing. You said something can be done before the 2012.
MR. : Yes.
Q: Does that mean part of the 8,000 Marine Corps will start leaving Okinawa or you mean, all 8,000 Marine Corps will leave after the completion of a new facility in Guam?
MR. LAWLESS: No. I didn't say either one. I said some of the individual moves in Japan will be accomplished before 2012 because it'll be -- we can do that. We'll do it as fast as we can do it. If we can do some things by 2010, we'll do it by 2010. If we can do it by 2011, we'll do it by 2011.
On Okinawa, for example, what has to happen is Futenma has to be relocated and opened so that the old base can be given back, and the Marines have to leave Okinawa so that those facilities that they currently occupied can be consolidated. And this large-scale consolidation take place probably over two or three years, and then, those facilities, that property given back the Japanese people. That's what I was saying.
I'm sorry. We've got time for one more question.
Let's do somebody new.
Q: On the overall agreement, if I could get a sense from you, from either one of you, you talked about maintaining a balance between reducing the burden from the Japanese side and maintaining an effective deterrent force. So looking at the overall agreement, what thing or couple of things can you point out as being the positive elements that maintain that deterrent force?
MR. LAWLESS: I think that there -- first of all, there have been a lot of legacy issues in our current arrangements that have sort of dogged or impeded the development of the relationship -- legacy issues such as the desire to relocate Futenma, because it's been a long- standing agreement, but we've never managed to actually get it done. So it was sort of a sore point, an open issue.
The idea is here, we resolve, hopefully in one fell swoop, all or almost all of the long-standing issues that we have that have sort of inhibited the alliance going forward -- resolve those issues, put it on a more balanced basis, have Japan assume more responsibilities in the relationship for the defense of Japan, do a lot of things interactively with Japan that we aren't doing now, or we're only doing in a very small scale.
For example, training together, operating together, having -- sharing facilities together -- all of these are major areas where we could improve the relationships and the functionality of the alliance.
And up until this point in time, we've done it incrementally, but we haven't done it in a wholesale manner. And that's what we're trying to do here. We're trying to transform this alliance to one that is much more balanced, interoperational, and where roles and missions are more clearly shared among one another, that we develop complementary capabilities -- for example, when we buy equipment that can interoperate together or work together. And it's a very broad adjustment that we're making to the alliance, and we need to realign and get all these legacy issues right before we can go forward. And that's what we're doing.
Thank you.
Peter Alford
Tokyo correspondent
April 23, 2007
THE Japanese Government wants Washington to overturn an export ban on the F-22A Raptor so the most advanced stealth fighter aircraft in service can be considered for Tokyo's next-generation military aircraft procurement.
The US refused to consider selling the F-22 to Australia, its other closest Pacific ally, but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to raise the matter when he meets George W.Bush in the White House on Friday.
Japan's Defence Minister, Fumio Kyuma, will ask his opposite number, Robert Gates, for access to F-22 performance data, transfer of which is also forbidden by US law, when they meet next weekend.
Japanese acquisition of F22As, which came into service in December as the first so-called fifth-generation fighter, could have major implications for the strategic balance in northeast Asia, affecting issues such as Taiwan and North Korea, which vitally concern China.
For that reason, according to The Washington Times, those officials within the Bush administration who favour China engagement are struggling to head off anti-China staffers pushing Japan's case for buying the aircraft.
The newspaper, a favoured outlet for neo-conservative China-containers, quoted one US official saying: "One hundred F-22s in hands of Japan could change the Taiwan balance of power for two decades."
The Chinese are believed to be working on their own fifth-generation fighters, which could be in service about 2009, when Japan wants to have completed the replacement of its aged F-4Phantom fleet. At this stage, Tokyo is looking at acquiring only seven aircraft and though defence planners are studying other types, they have made it clear to thePentagon they really want the F-22.
A Raptor squadron is on a three-month deployment at the US air force's Kadena airbase, on Japan's southern territory of Okinawa, the first F-22s to operate abroad.
Raptor manufacturer Lockheed Martin and its congressional supporters hope that permitting sales to designated US allies -- Israel is also seeking to buy F-22s -- would prevent further attempts to restrict or curtail the enormously expensive and over-budget Raptor program.
The House of Representatives voted last year to overturn the 1998 law prohibiting foreign sales, which was principally aimed at preventing advanced weapons technology leaking to China, but the bill has yet to be considered by a Senate committee.
Given its refusal to consider Australian sales, the Bush White House is likely to prefer that Japan joins the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program with Australia and eight other countries.
The F-35, also a stealth fighter, has been characterised as a more affordable "kid brother" to the Raptor. It is not yet in production and its price estimate is $40million to $60million per aircraft, compared with $135 million for the F-22.
Defence Minister Brendan Nelson claimed Canberra would not have opted for the F-22 anyway, because it lacked the operational flexibility of the F-35.
However, the Japanese are attracted by the Raptor's missile-fighting capabilities, including the capability to track and kill small cruise missiles in flight.
While Japan is building a ballistic missile defence system with the Americans, it has no independent capability to ward off cruise missiles, of which the Chinese and North Koreans have thousands.
The Japanese also argue their constitutional and legislative restrictions on arms exports and defence co-operation prevents them from engaging in a joint weapons development program such as the JSF project.
However, the Abe Government has various problems to overcome in Washington before it could buy Raptors.
The 1998 law was introduced by congressional Democrats, who won control of both houses in November, and there is more anxiety about Japan in that party than among Republicans.
Japan's case has another potential weak spot -- military internal security.
US officials here were astonished recently to learn that classified details of the Aegis destroyer-borne anti-missile radar system had been found on the home computer of a Marine Self Defence Force junior officer who is married to a Chinese national.
The MSDF is introducing Aegis destroyers to operate alongside US navy vessels as part of the western Pacific BMD shield.
The same material, apparently accidentally downloaded with pornography, was found on the computers of two other sailors, also without clearances to handle Aegis information. The Japanese Defence Ministry has refused to comment on the case while it is under investigation.
There have also been cases of sensitive military information becoming available on the internet because JSDF personnel were using Winny, a notoriously insecure file-sharing network developed in Japan.
Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, April 8, 2007
SEOUL — The senior Defense Department official who played a key role in U.S.-South Korean relations in the last four years has announced his retirement.
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Richard P. Lawless is to retire in July, according to a Defense Department news release.
Lawless has served with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 4½ years, according to the release.
“I appreciate the opportunity to serve the nation in a time of war in the face of multiple challenges, and to have been able to do so in the company of truly selfless patriots,” Lawless stated in the release.
U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander Vershbow thanked Lawless for his service.
“All who value the U.S.-ROK alliance owe a debt of gratitude to Richard Lawless,” Vershbow told Stars and Stripes. “The alliance is stronger today, and evolving in very positive ways, thanks to his tireless efforts. He is turning a page in his distinguished career, but I know that Richard’s friendship for, and commitment to, the Republic of Korea will long endure.”
AFP, WASHINGTON
Friday, Apr 06, 2007, Page 5
Top US defense policymaker for Asia Richard Lawless has quit at a critical time for the administration of President George W. Bush, which is under pressure to devise a strategy to counter China's military ambitions.
Lawless, the deputy under secretary of defense for Asia and Pacific security affairs, "has elected to retire from the US government in July 2007 after four-and-a-half years of distinguished service" in the Pentagon, the Defense Department said in a statement.
Aside from dealing with China, Lawless had been a key figure in handling the US security alliances with Japan and South Korea, particularly in talks over the future of military bases in two Asian allies.
"I appreciate the opportunity to serve the nation in a time of war in the face of multiple challenges, and to have been able to do so in the company of truly selfless patriots," Lawless said in a brief statement.
Although Lawless, who had serious back problems and underwent surgery, resigned because of personal reasons, his absence would be felt, especially as the Pentagon considers strategies to cope with an expanding Chinese military, experts said.
The Pentagon is soon expected to submit its annual report to Congress on China's military power.
Lawless's departure "is an extraordinary loss," said Daniel Blumenthal, the Pentagon's senior director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia until November 2004.
"He does not see Asia through Sino-centric lenses like so many in the administration. He is committed to a Japan and allies-first policy in Asia, where others think that what is good for China is good for America," Bluementhal said.
"He is the rare policymaker with both a strategic vision and operational capabilities," he added.
Richard Bush, an Asian expert at Washington-based Brookings Institution, cautioned against "overreading the departure of one person," and said he did not expect a big shift in policy and direction in favor of China.
"This is happening at the same time when Congress is exerting some pressure on the economic side of our relationship with China and underlying all this is the reality of the situation and reality of certain interests," he said.
Apr 4 09:46 AM US/Eastern
TOKYO, April 4 (AP) - (Kyodo) — A draft version of the 1996 report by a Japan-U.S. defense panel that confirmed the relocation of U.S. base facilities in Okinawa included a plan to deploy the MV-22 Osprey aircraft, which has had a history of accidents, but references to the plane were deleted in the final report in the face of Japan's opposition, according to U.S. documents and a U.S. negotiator in the talks.
While the Japanese government has said it has not received any response from Washington on whether a specific decision to deploy the Osprey tilt-rotor vertical takeoff and landing aircraft has been made, the documents support the view that its deployment in Okinawa has been in the pipeline since 1996.
A U.S. Defense Department official said last year that the U.S. Marine Corps plans to begin deploying the Osprey aircraft, a next-generation mainstay vehicle for transporting personnel, in place of old helicopters in Okinawa in fiscal 2013, which begins Oct. 1, 2012.
In the Final Report by the bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa, released in December 1996, Washington and Tokyo planned to build an offshore facility within the prefecture to vacate the U.S. Marine Corps Futumma Air Station in the densely populated downtown Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, in five to seven years.
A draft report drawn up in late November, shortly before the announcement of the final SACO report, said that the sea-based facility "will be designed to support the basing of helicopter and MV- 22 (Osprey) units."
In the SACO report adopted Dec. 2 the same year, however, it said that the sea-based facility "will be designed to support the basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations."
On the reasons for the Osprey-related phrase being deleted, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell told Kyodo News that the Japanese "were very concerned...particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." Campbell was the key negotiator in the talks.
The United States informed Japan of its plan to deploy the Osprey during a working group meeting in Washington on Oct. 21-23 in 1996, when the two sides discussed runway plans for Futemma's replacement facility, according to a memorandum of the U.S. forces dated Oct. 23, 1996 obtained by Kyodo News.
The Japanese government "stated that they may have problems selling a facility sized to the V-22," the memorandum said. The Marine Corps' V- 22 is dubbed MV-22.
The memorandum also said that the Japanese government "solicited advice on how to discuss runway length with the Okinawans," citing the following options -- "Don't mention V-22","Specifially mention V- 22","Build for current aircraft, and ask for an extension later when U.S. announces fielding of V-22."
But the United States "skirted the issue without a concrete answer," the memorandum said.
A memo on U.S.-Japan discussions on Nov. 26, 1996, said that "the stationing of V-22 Osprey aircraft has not yet been announced" by the Japanese government and that the U.S. forces in Japan "desire a release of this information soonest."
Eventually, the final SACO report was adopted without a phrase directly referring to the Osprey.
According to a U.S. think tank, the Osprey has a history of accidents including a test model's crash in 1991 and fatal accidents in 1992 and The Marine Corps currently has 42 Osprey units.
Tue Apr 3, 2007 5:50pm EDT
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon's top civilian official on Asia and Pacific affairs, Deputy Under Secretary Richard Lawless, has resigned, U.S. defense officials said on Tuesday.
Lawless cited personal reasons for his resignation, according to one official. He will leave his post in a few weeks, that official said.
Lawless, a Korea expert, played a major role in negotiations with U.S. allies South Korea and Japan over the realignment of U.S. forces and military bases in those two Asian countries.
His departure comes as defense officials, analysts and lawmakers focus on China as a potential military peer and possible threat to the United States. The Pentagon is due to give Congress a report on China's military power within weeks.
It also comes as American military officials try to improve ties with the Chinese military, a move to give U.S. officials better insight into China's strategy and intentions. Efforts during Lawless' tenure have boosted dialogue between U.S. and Chinese military officials.
The head of China's naval operations is scheduled to meet Wednesday at the Pentagon with his U.S. counterpart, Adm. Michael Mullen. They will likely discuss agreements meant to prevent incidents at sea from evolving into unintended conflicts, according to a U.S. Navy official.
(Additional reporting by Paul Eckert)
April 4, 2007 at 6:04 am
Lawless was responsible for pushing the South Koreans into USFK restructuring and cost-sharing agreements, and unlike years of predecessors, had been tough enough to sit down and negotiate as firmly as his counterparts. No one pushed Richard Lawless around. As a result, the Korean government and press were not fans. See, e.g., this picture the Joongang Ilbo printed. “Hulk angry!”
Lawless cited personal reasons for his resignation, according to one official. He will leave his post in a few weeks, that official said.
Lawless, a Korea expert, played a major role in negotiations with U.S. allies South Korea and Japan over the realignment of U.S. forces and military bases in those two Asian countries. [Reuters]
Lawless was personally close to Don Rumsfeld and had good access to him. With Gates, not so much, and Lawless might have had reason to believe that his recommendations might not hold up in the new Pentagon bureaucracy. Witness the example of the South Koreans already walking away from the timeline for Camp Humphreys relocation.
Let the renegotiations begin. Lawless’s enduring legacy — the one least likely to be undone — is the reduction of USFK from 37,500 to 29,500 personnel, and one hopes that will dip to 24,000 as agreed.
By Mariko Sanchanta in Tokyo, Financial Times
Published: Apr 02, 2007
Japanese textbook publishers have been ordered by the government to gloss over the Imperial Army's role in mass suicides by Japanese civilians on the island of Okinawa in the final weeks of the second world war.
The move is seen as a further sign that historical revisionists are becoming emboldened in Japan under the conservative nationalist leadership of Shinzo Abe, the prime minister.
It follows recent denials by Mr Abe that the military had coerced women into sexual slavery during the second world war. In a bid to avert a public relations disaster, Mr Abe last week finally apologised for his country's wartime enforced use of young women to work in military brothels.
The textbook modifications will be noted in China, South Korea and other Asian countries, which are deeply sensitive to moves by Tokyo to revise its militarist history.
Wen Jiabao, China's premier, is to visit Japan next week amid diplomats' assurances that history will not be allowed to wreck the two countries' new-found will to build a "strategic, mutually beneficial relationship".
Gerry Curtis, a Japan expert at Columbia University, said a decision by Mr Abe to avoid visiting the Yasukuni shrine to Japan's war dead had appeased China until now. Evidence of that, he said, lay in Beijing's restrained response to Mr Abe's recent comments on so-called "comfort women". Officials in Beijing, he said, "are determined for Wen's visit to Japan to go well".
But Mr Abe's favouring of a "revisionist view of history" had "emboldened" the education ministry and risked upsetting other allies, Mr Curtis said.
"What is so unfortunate is that these views are not widely supported by the Japanese public and it creates the impression abroad that the whole country is rightwing," he said.
Mr Abe said he believed the system for reviewing textbooks "has been followed appropriately".
Officials at Japan's education ministry have asked for the deletion of text stating that Okinawa residents were "forced by the Japanese military" into committing suicide in the days before the island fell to US forces.
Ministry officials also requested modifications to passages concerning the sending of Japanese troops to Iraq and references to the number of victims in the 1937 Nanjing massacre in China.
On the Battle of Okinawa, which claimed the lives of a quarter of Okinawa's civilian population, one of the textbooks in question at present says "the Japanese army gave hand grenades to residents, making them commit mass suicide and kill each other", according to Kyodo News.
After the screeners took issue with the statement, the textbook was revised to say: "Mass suicides and killings took place among the residents using hand grenades given them by the Japanese army", according to Kyodo. Other textbooks played down descriptions, deleting the words "by the Japanese army".
April 29, 2007
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