SDF assistance to U.S. military triples

The Asahi Shimbun
December 20, 2005

The number of cases in which the Self-Defense Forces provided supplies or support for the U.S. military more than tripled in fiscal 2004 from the previous year, the Defense Agency said.

The increase stems from a 2004 revision to the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), enabling the SDF to provide such assistance to the U.S. military even during routine training drills.

The agreement was originally intended only for U.N. peacekeeping operations or joint training drills.

But Tokyo and Washington have become increasingly interdependent in terms of military cooperation. In addition, enhancing Japan's role in logistics support for U.S. troops is part of an interim report on U.S. military realignment.

According to the Defense Agency, the SDF provided goods and services to the U.S. military in response to requests 212 times between April and December 2004.

For all of fiscal 2003, the figure was 67.

Of the 212 cases, 150 involved assistance approved under the 2004 revision of the ACSA.

Conventional SDF assistance, including providing accommodation, fuel, transportation and other duties during Japan-U.S. joint exercises, remained at the same level as the previous year, which was 58.

Of the 212 cases, 148 involved U.S. aircraft being refueled at SDF air stations.

The Asahi Shimbun

U.S. used Japan's Gulf War isolation to push it onto world stage

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News
December 16, 2005

(Kyodo) _ In the early 1990s, after Japan faced criticism for its passive checkbook diplomacy during the first Gulf War, the United States sought to take advantage of Tokyo's "defensiveness and fear of isolation" to prod it to play a greater role on the global stage, according to a recently declassified U.S. government document.

The document -- a cable dated March 14, 1991, by then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost -- is part of more than 1,750 declassified documents totaling over 8,000 pages that highlight how during 1977-1992 U.S. pressure spurred Japan to increase its international contributions and resolve trade friction.

The papers also clarify the process of how the two nations worked together to deepen their defense cooperation during these critical years, which saw the end of the Cold War and the launch of the Gulf War, even though their trade and economic ties were deteriorating.

Now, more than a decade later, Japan and the United States have recently agreed on the realignment of the U.S. military in Japan to strengthen defense ties by integrating the operations of the U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force and to transform their security relations into a global alliance.

The documents were obtained by the National Security Archive, a research center and library affiliated with George Washington University in the U.S. capital.

In the cable sent to the U.S. State Department shortly after the Gulf War, Armacost said the Japanese government took an "essentially passive approach" to the war and that the Diet debate failed to "educate the pubic on the fundamental interests and principles at stake."

"Much of the responsibility belongs to the rigid parliamentary practices built up over the 40 years of single party rule and to the bureaucratic mentality" with which the government, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposition parties "have traditionally approached issues," he said.

But Armacost said, "In pursuing our interests here, we have the opportunity to take advantage of Japan's defensiveness and fear of isolation in the wake of the Gulf crisis to gain greater GOJ (government of Japan) cooperation."

"In sum, we have a real opportunity to influence the direction of Japanese foreign policy and to point Japan's financial and political influence in directions supportive of U.S. interests if we devote the time necessary for consultations and if we give the GOJ some room for maneuver within the context of different approaches to achieving shared objectives," he said.

Armacost warned against "the bashing" seen in the U.S. Congress and media over Tokyo's contributions, saying that it "has fueled resentment" in Japan.

"Of more importance is the growing theme here that America's welcome new self-confidence may turn to arrogance and that the United States, unconstrained by the need to maintain alliances to contain the Soviet Union in a 'uni-polar world' and frightened by Japan's economic challenge, will now 'turn its guns' toward Tokyo," he said.

"We need to avoid an overly confrontational approach that risks provoking a backlash," Armacost said.

In a memorandum dated April 20, 1981, for U.S. President Ronald Reagan ahead of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's visit to Washington, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stressed the importance of encouraging Japan to increase its defense capabilities.

"Japan is our only Asian ally with the potential significantly to increase its defense efforts," he said. "Therefore, your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Suzuki provides a fine opportunity to urge Japan to help provide for its own defense while the United States continues to provide the offensive capability in the region."

More specifically, Weinberger advised the president to propose that Japan "approximately double your maritime and air defense capabilities in the Northwest Pacific within this decade...to protect shipping lanes north of the Philippines and west of Guam plus the air defense of Japan."

As for trade disputes, a memorandum of talks between Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig on March 23, 1981, documents the proposal officially made by the United States for Japanese automakers to voluntarily restrain their exports to resolve the auto dispute amid escalating retaliatory pressure in the U.S. Congress and industry.

"Our concern is to preempt in both Europe and the United States the protectionist trends by some manifestation in the near-term of Japanese restraint in the areas of small car and small truck exports," Haig said.

But Ito told Haig that the Japanese government "was not yet prepared to respond in specific terms," according to the document.

Asked whether Washington wanted a government-to-government agreement, Haig said, "We were not seeking a formal agreement, but rather voluntary guidelines by the Japanese on which both sides had expressed their views and had the ability to assist in developing."

Haig and Ito agreed that some steps were needed to address the issue, although they shared the view that Japanese imports were not the cause of the U.S. auto industry's problems.

The two nations eventually struck a deal on voluntary plans and resolved the auto dispute.

Kyodo News via Yahoo! Asia News

Value of US base land in Japan enough to buy all of New York City

Mainichi Daily News
December 15, 2005

If the value of all the Japanese land "occupied" by the U.S. military was combined, there would be enough money to buy all of New York City, including the Statue of Liberty, which is a symbol of how little liberty Japan actually has, according to Flash (12/27).

The men's weekly claims to be outraged by what it calls Japan's blind obedience to the United States even as it was supposed to be negotiating with its ally to reduce the burdens, fiscal and otherwise, local governments carry here to host the U.S. military.

Flash says its own independent study revealed that Japan is home to 88 U.S. military installations, which combined take up 312 million square meters with a total land value exceeding 14 trillion yen.

"Using the results of the global real estate market survey carried out in 1999 by the former National Land Agency and the Japanese Association of Real Estate Appraisal, 14 trillion yen would be a sum large enough to buy all the land in New York City, based on the standard value of residential land," an appraiser familiar with the residential market tells Flash.

Of course, the figure doesn't include New York's mercantile nature and commercial value, but that doesn't change the fact that over 14 trillion yen worth of Japanese territory is being "occupied," the weekly says.

Tokyo ranks third among Japan's 47 prefectures in terms of the amount of territory used by the U.S. military, following only Okinawa and Kanagawa prefectures. Tokyo Metropolitan Government officials are actively seeking the return of land in the capital that is currently under the control of the U.S. military.

"Bases in Tokyo should have their status reviewed, downgraded and ultimately be returned to the control of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Yokota Air Field (U.S. Air Force Base) in particular is being strongly sought as the location of a third airport in Tokyo, where demand for flights increases yearly," a metropolitan government spokesman tells Flash. "As far as the metropolitan government is concerned, our policy for the time being is to continue to propose to the national government and U.S. military that the joint civilian-military use of facilities be permitted. We want the U.S. military to immediately return the Akasaka Press Center and Tama Service Annex should be opened up to as many Tokyo residents as possible."

The U.S. military presence in Tokyo also causes a decline in local land values, according to the veteran appraiser.

"Ground around Yokota Air Base is strong and able to withstand earthquakes, which makes it really good for housing. Other popular residential areas like Tokorozawa and Sagamihara are also homes to U.S. bases," the appraiser tells Flash. "Basically, what I'm trying to say is that there are these huge U.S. bases located in commutable areas within about an hour's train ride from central Tokyo and these prove to be considerable obstacles as far as things like land values and residential construction are concerned." (By Ryann Connell)

U.S. and Japan: When an Alliance is Not an Alliance

December 6, 2005
By Todd Crowell
Global Beat Syndicate
(KRT)

TOKYO—Virtually unnoticed, and without much fanfare, a historic and major shift is about to occur in Japan, where its post-war “peace constitution” may soon be revised in significant ways. This could affect the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security–the so-called “military alliance” between Japan and the United States.

But in fact, the treaty is not an alliance at all, and strictly speaking, Japan is not an ally. It is a close friend, a partner, a collaborator on the world stage. But “ally” is strictly a courtesy title.

The current treaty obligates the United States to defend Japan should it be attacked. But Japan does not have an equal obligation to help defend us if we are attacked. That is because Article 9, the war-renouncing clause written into Japan’s post-war constitution, has been interpreted as barring any kind of “collective defense.”

The newest update to the treaty are designed to promote better cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and to lessen the burden on host communities, especially on Okinawa. The new watchword is “interoperability.” One noteworthy change moves the Japanese air defense command center from Fuchu to the big American base at Yokota. The Ground Self-Defense Forces rapid reaction forces headquarters is also to move to the U.S. Army base at Camp Zama in the interests of closer coordination.

As a young Air Force officer stationed at Yokota in the late 1960s, it seemed to me the U.S. Forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force might as well have been on different planets. In nearly two years, I never met a JSDF officer. To my knowledge there was no liaison or sharing of classified information. No contact. Nothing.

When U.S. forces dealt with Japanese, it was usually with local civilian authorities over such mundane matters as off-base housing. When contingencies arose, such as capture of the U.S. Pueblo or the shooting down of an EC-121 over the Sea of Japan, Japanese forces were not a factor in any war plans.

That began to change in the 1990s. Japan had provided billions of dollars to support the Gulf War coalition, but, consistent with its anti-war principles, provided no troops. Afterwards, Tokyo was stunned at how ungrateful Washington and others were for their generous financial support.

That became the catalyst for a slow evolution in Japan’s use of its military. The Diet passed laws that allowed Japanese troops to participate in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and elsewhere. In 1996 Washington and Tokyo inked the Joint Security Declaration, in which Japan promised to provide logistical support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and which authorized joint research in missile defenses.

There is such a disconnect between reality and paperwork in Japan—and the gap has widened so much, that Japanese leaders are now seriously considering for the first time revising their constitution in a way that faces long-standing reality: for example, officially recognizing the Self-Defense forces, which have existed for nearly six decades. The draft revision is expected to allow Japan all the rights of self-defense, including forming alliances with other countries and deploying Self-Defense forces overseas.

Does this mean the existing security treaty will be turned into a real alliance? That is unlikely because, even though nearly 50 years have passed, memories remain of the riots surrounding the last revision of the treaty in 1960, riots that forced President Dwight Eisenhower to cancel his proposed state visit.

A lot has changed in Japan since then. The radical student movement that provided so many foot soldiers in 1960 hardly exists today. And it seems doubtful that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would have to ram any revisions through the Diet at midnight, like his predecessor Nobosuke Kishi.

Koizumi has a huge majority in the Diet, and the main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan abandoned knee-jerk opposition to the security treaty in the interests of electability.

That leaves perhaps only the tiny Social Democratic Party to carry the flag of traditional Japanese pacificism. Seiji Mataichi, the party’s secretary general, said of the latest defense agreement, “It goes beyond the contents of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.” Mr. Mataichi is almost certainly correct. But his party holds only six seats in the Diet.

ABOUT THE WRITER
Todd Crowell was a senior writer for Asiaweek in Hong Kong. He now comments on Asian affairs on his website Asia Cable.

Okinawa - Rising Magma

By Miyagi Yasuhiro (Councilor, Nago City, Okinawa)

Koizumi's Japan enjoys the warmest of relationships with Bush's US, for the very good reason that Koizumi has proved himself willing, even enthusiastic, to deliver what Washington requires – uncritical support in general, continuing provision of facilities for the US military in Japan, and Japanese boots on the ground to support the American mission in Iraq. On one significant issue, however, Koizumi has failed to deliver: the 1996 promise to replace the antiquated and inconvenient facilities of Futenma Marine Air Station, that now sits uncomfortably in the middle of the bustling township of Ginowan in the middle of Okinawa island, with a new facility in Northern Okinawa, to be built on the coral reef offshore from the fishing village of Henoko, in the township of Nago. It was a relatively remote and backward area, and Tokyo assumed it could rely on persuasion and financial inducements to overcome local opposition. It got rid of the Governor, the stubborn scholar and constitutionalist, Ota Masahide, in 2000, installing in his place a conservative figure expected to be more pliable, and poured in money to soften up the local opposition. Despite everything, however, it has not prevailed. In October 2005, the plan to construct the base on the reef had to be abandoned. Koizumi admitted the opposition had been too great. The Japanese state had, in effect, been defeated, by a coalition of fishermen, local residents, and citizens. One of the most remarkable events in recent Japanese history passed without notice by the media and the pundits.

While conceding that defeat, however, Tokyo decided to press for an alternative site a very short distance away from the one it abandoned, in the shallow waters offshore from Cape Henoko, in Oura Bay. Washington agreed. As in 1996, Tokyo plainly intends to use persuasion and inducement and hopes it will not be necessary to resort to force, This time, however, even the Governor installed in 2000 as the best man to advance the Tokyo agenda, Inamine Keiichi, has declared himself fundamentally opposed to the new plan, and surveys show Okinawan opposition running at over 70 per cent, higher than at any time in the 1990s. Governor Inamine has spoken often of the magma rising and Okinawa being on the brink of an eruption. Such a catastrophe is nearer now than ever before.

Miyagi Yasuhiro has been a key figure in the movement of opposition to militarization in Okinawa for the past decade. Here he issues a somber warning to Tokyo and Washington: the Okinawan people will not be overcome, the base will not be built.

Over the names of the Foreign and Defense Secretaries of Japan and the United States (2+2), a document with the provisional title “The Japan-US Alliance – Future Oriented Change and Reorganization,” dated 29 October 2005, sits on my desk. Asked to write my impression of it, I try again and again to read it, but my gloom is so deep that it is hard to bring myself to do so. This “Agreement” has been described as an “Interim Report,” as if there might be also a “Final Report,” but the words “Interim Report” are nowhere to be found in it. It was drawn up without any consultation whatever with the local governments affected by it and, by calling it “Interim Report,” the Japanese government wants public opinion to believe, mistakenly, that there might be changes in the “final version” still to come.

From its opening paragraphs the Agreement reaffirms “newly emerging threats” that might affect the security of the countries of the world and “issues giving rise to uncertainty and instability” in the Asia-Pacific. Yet it is the implementation of the Agreement itself that constitutes a threat and a problem.

On the question of the shift of Futenma Marine Air Station that is a major focus of attention, the major mainland newspapers carried editorials backing the Agreement. Nihon keizai shimbun (9 October) carried an editorial about “overcoming the confrontation on the Futenma issue by the exercise of political responsibility” and hinted at the introduction of police force against the opposition movement by residents in accord with that political resolve. Mainichi shimbun (27 October) wrote: “surely this time at last we will be able to see a resolution” and referred to the Schwab area as if it were unpopulated, describing it as a “step forward” for the base to be moved “from Futenma, where it sits amid a crowded residential area, to the Camp Schwab vicinity.”

The mass media tends not only not to learn from history but to shamelessly distort contemporary events. To us Okinawans, who have experienced the catastrophe of the last war and the subsequent US military occupation, this country, that is unable to comprehend the reaction by South Korea and China when the Prime Minister worships at Yasukuni where the leaders of the aggressive war are enshrined, seems to have lapsed into distorting narrowness of vision.

Prime Minister Koizumi may think that, so long as there is the Japan-US alliance, all will be well, but it would not be out of character for Bush’s America to provoke a “Tonkin Gulf Incident” (when fabricated attacks on a US naval vessel in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 were used as pretext for the US to begin bombing North Vietnam) in the Taiwan Straits. Clearly cognizant of the existence of China, this Agreement includes provision for merger of Japan’s Self Defense Forces with the US military. The isolation of Japan in East Asia resulting from total subordination to the US is dangerous in the extreme.

From 1996, Nago City where I live, and which contains the Marine Base of Camp Schwab, has been subject to an unbroken siege to try to force it provide an alternative base for Futenma.

The Futenma replacement facilities referred to in the present document are to be built in an L-shape linking the seas of Oura Bay across the Camp Schwab coastline. They will be characterized by “manifold concern to minimize any adverse impact on the environment.” In fact, the scale has been enlarged since the 1996 final report of SACO by lengthening the runway and adding space for parking planes. As usual, the US gets most of what it wants and the site will be easily capable of expansion to achieve 24-hour readiness status.

The proposed Henoko L-shaped facility

A national college of technology has just opened in the adjacent area and these plans are too much to bear for those connected with the school, including the students. In the coastal area designated for the construction on Schwab there are also historic remains and various cultural treasures, and sea turtles lay their eggs on its sandy shores. However much they might try to “minimize environmental damage,” the pristine quality of such an environment itself cries out against the threatened human intervention. At first, a sea-based location was chosen for construction, far from human settlement in order to minimize noise pollution, but that sea turned out to be home to the dugong, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) had to take the most unusual step of twice (at Amman in 2000 and Bangkok in 2004) issuing warnings against acts likely to damage its habitat. For eight years the matter remained deadlocked. The coastal site adjacent to human settlements now chosen as substitute for the sea-based site confronts a dark future of endless conflict between local residents and self-governing organizations, and the peace and environmental movements, on one side, and a government prepared to use force to settle the matter on the other. In order to implement the Agreement, the government is said to be considering passage of special legislation to remove from local governing authorities their powers under laws including the Public Waters Reclamation Law, the Environmental Assessment Law, and the Cultural Properties Protection Law. It shows not the slightest regard for national sovereignty, local self-government, or human rights. Make no mistake about it: the whole of Okinawa is going to resist.

What can the politicians who played the key role in reaching this agreement have been thinking? Do they want to contribute to destabilizing the Japan-US alliance? Even if the conditions attached by the US military made it difficult to accomplish the removal of the base to somewhere outside Okinawa, as the majority of Okinawans are demanding, they could at least have explored and made other, more realistic proposals. Instead, they have taken a proposal that had been deadlocked for eight years, and revived it as a zombie. Despite the fuss being made, the Camp Schwab proposal amounts in the end to nothing more than shifting the project by a few hundred meters. It is a farce pure and simple.

What we are witnessing is actually a plan that was drawn up by the US army in the 1960s, when it administered Okinawa, but which it could not then implement because of the political risks associated with local, Okinawan opposition. It is now revived because the Japanese government is now in charge and believes the opposition can be overcome.[1]

Most Japanese people see Okinawa as a military colony provided by Japan for the US military. A colony needs collaborators among the natives. However, the mayor of Nago City and the head of the Nago City Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who in the past undertook to collaborate and play the role of persuasion, having listened to the government’s explanation, now say that they will not be able to persuade the residents to accept the new plan.[2] When even self-styled collaborators find themselves unable to collaborate, colonial rule enters a critical phase. The suzerain country may in the end find itself called on to expose its true, violent character. I cannot help but think that the mainland mass media are playing the role of its advance guard. The outlook is bleak.

It is not just opponents of the US-Japan Security Treaty and ideological conservatives, i.e. proponents of the Treaty, that live in Okinawa. All of us here live face-to-face with harsh reality. For the sake of the Japan-US security treaty, our peace of mind and our safety is threatened. Why should it be that Okinawa alone has to shoulder “the burdens and costs?” [3] Our eight years of struggle have taught us to believe that it will not, after all, ever be possible to build a new base, whether at Henoko or Camp Schwab.

Following the end of the war sixty years ago, the bases were steadily expanded and reinforced under unbroken US military administration, and even when governmental powers were returned to Japan in 1972 they were maintained. Since the Cold War ended new threats have been found and the burden on us has grown. Surely this militarization, and the discrimination that we experience, cannot go on forever. Living in Okinawa, it is hard to resist being overwhelmed by depression.

In this situation, anything could happen, even an act of terror. Faced with an opponent who monopolizes the means of violence to such an unequal degree, it is understandable that the people insist on the right to possess means of resistance and to use them. I would not be surprised if acts of resistance were to occur tomorrow, in Nagatacho, Ichigaya, Kasumigaseki, or Okinawa. The present Agreement is not a prescription for dealing with “newly emerging threats,” but a device to stir up such threats.


Day 110 of the Henoko anti-base struggle

I had intended to end this essay by writing “Unless the farce is quickly ended, the spectators will become angry,” but it seems to me that the spectators are not angry. As one of the cast who happens to live in Okinawa (though ignored by the Japanese and American governments), I am angry, but the majority of the spectators either watch with half-dead eyes or laugh or yawn. Now that the political theatre (of the national elections of September 11, 2005) with its much ado about “assassins” and “winners and losers,” is over, there comes this farce conducted by politicians who pretend to be experts on security but actually plunge Japan into danger. Perhaps now the curtain will rise on a new drama, but if so it is likely to be the theatre of pain rather than spectacle. Still, I know that multiple lines of resistance will be drawn and many kinds of people will turn to struggle. I also know that people living ordinary, modest lives will face the situation wisely. Another day, another struggle - it is Okinawa’s destiny.


Councilor Miyagi at work.

Miyagi Yasuhiro, born in Nago in northern Okinawa in 1959, was a central figure in the Nago City Plebiscite Promotion Council (later Council against the Heliport Base) from 1997, and from 1998 has been Nago City Councilor. He is also joint representative to the Dugong Protection Campaign Center and author of several works on Okinawa, the dugong, etc. Email: miyagi@soleil.ocn.ne.jp

Translated by Gavan McCormack from the text of a chapter by Miyagi for a forthcoming Japanese volume to be published by Kobunken. Posted at Japan Focus December 4, 2005.

Notes

[1] Makishi Koichi et al., eds, Okinawa wa mo damasarenai, Tokyo, Kobunken, p. 108
[2] Mayor Kishimoto Tateo, after meeting Defense Agency officials on 27 October, made a statement about the “impossibility of persuading residents,” but on 9 November, after meeting with the head of the Defense Agency, Nukaga Fukushiro, said he “would like to be able to achieve agreement.”
[3] After the Bush-Koizumi meeting in Kyoto on 16 November, Koizumi said, “to enjoy the benefits of peace and security, some burdens and costs are necessary.”

http://japanfocus.org/-Miyagi-Yasuhiro/1878