FOCUS: Marines' relocation big business opportunity: Guam

HAGATNA, Guam, May 16 KYODO

''This is the biggest event for Guam since the end of World War II,'' said Michael Benito, board chairman of the Guam Chamber of Commerce.

''We are very exited at the news of the U.S. Marines' relocation,'' Benito said. He was referring to the 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 family members Washington is moving from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 as part of a May 1 accord with Tokyo on realigning the U.S. military presence in Japan.

''We are sure to have great business opportunities,'' Benito said.

It will cost an estimated $10.2 billion to transfer the Marines and their families to Guam, population 170,000, according to the May 1 U.S.-Japan realignment accord. But details of the cost have yet to be disclosed.

Mark Forbes, speaker of Guam's legislature, said Guam supports the relocation because of the impact it will have on the territory's economy. He cited increased tax revenue and the professional contributions of the Marines and members of their families as nurses and teachers.

But Forbes added that Guam's infrastructure is already being strained ''beyond its limits to accommodate the current residents and will require significant investment and upgrades.''

On March 31, Guam's parliament passed a resolution requesting $24 billion in assistance from Washington to upgrade civilian infrastructure such as a new electrical plant, sewer maintenance, road construction and new schools outside military bases.

Forbes said that Guam would be dissatisfied if the budget Hagatna and Washington put together in connection with relocating the Marines fails to include sufficient expenses for improving Guam's civilian infrastructure.

An enthusiastic mood dominates the island and almost everyone knows the news. According to a Pacific Daily News poll conducted via the Internet, 77 percent of Guam residents said ''yes'' to the question of whether they support the Marines' relocation. Twenty-two percent indicated they do not support it.

After the relocation was announced, land prices rose dramatically. Prices in the Tumon beach area -- one of the best places for viewing the sunset -- jumped almost 50 percent within just six months, according to a local real estate agency.

''Guam needs military-related industry as well as, of course, tourism,'' Benito said. Some 12.2 million tourists visited the U.S. territory last year.

James Martinez, executive director of the Guam Contractors Association, said his group has received numerous calls from mainland contractors.

''They are very much interested in the Marines' relocation,'' he said. More than 200 local and mainland contractors including KBR Inc., a subsidiary of Halliburton Co. that was once headed by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, are already on Guam.

Martinez quoted Japanese lawmaker Mikio Simoji, who is from Okinawa where the Marines to be relocated are currently stationed, as having offered during his recent visit to Guam to send ''skilled workers from Okinawa and Japanese high-tech construction companies.''

''We are sure to need more skilled workers for military-related construction,'' Martinez said, adding that these could include Filipino and Japanese workers on special visas.

Some islanders are more cautious in their assessment of the Marines' relocation.
Lieutenant Gov. of Guam Kaleo Moylan said the island basically welcomes the Marines but said he worries about potential harm being done to Guam's image as a tourist spot.

Debbie Quinata, leader of the Chamorro Nation, an organization of natives and anti-base activists, strongly opposes the relocation.

''Military presence results in a negative impact on our society,'' she said. ''Crime rates will increase. (The Marines) should relocate to the U.S. mainland.''

==Kyodo

Assessing Guam's new military value

Tuesday, May 16, 2006
By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The Japan Times

HONOLULU -- The U.S. Air Force is surging ahead with plans to revitalize its bases on Guam from which to project power into the skies over the western Pacific and the islands and continent of Asia.

Bombers are already stationed regularly at Andersen Air Force Base on rotation from the United States, as are aerial tankers essential to long-range operations. A wing of 48 fighters is on the way. Perhaps most critical will be unmanned surveillance and intelligence aircraft known as Global Hawks, which can remain on station for 24 hours at a range of more than 1,900 km from base.

Reconstruction of runways from which bombing runs were flown over Vietnam 35 years ago has started. A new hangar has been built and more are on the drawing board. They will be typhoon-proof so that aircraft need not be flown out to escape the storms to which Guam is exposed.

Housing for air and base crews and support facilities must be built. Altogether, says Gen. Paul Hester, who commands the Pacific Air Forces from its headquarters at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, executing Air Force plans alone will cost "well over $ 2 billion."

The Marine Corps, under a new U.S.-Japan agreement, will move 8,000 Marines, including the III Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters and a brigade of combat troops, from Okinawa to Guam. The Navy has based three attack submarines at Guam and is planning to send two more, but repair and maintenance facilities must be refurbished.

To support this military buildup, Guam's electrical grid, its roads, and water and sewage systems need to be refurbished after years of neglect. Schools must be expanded. The bill for these plans will probably come close to $ 10 billion over 10 years.

Guam has become a focus for U.S. military planners for three reasons:

* American control. Guam is U.S. territory so the forces don't need permission from a foreign government to go into action. Nationalistic pressures drove U.S. forces from the Philippines in 1992. South Korea says it would restrict U.S. forces seeking to deploy from there. Even Japan, considered a solid ally, must take into account local political pressures that may affect U.S. deployments.

* "Backfilling." As ground troops from South Korea, Japan, Alaska and Hawaii, and aircraft carriers, surface warships and submarines have deployed to Iraq, other forces, particularly warplanes, have been realigned in the Pacific to maintain deterrence against North Korea and China.

* "Tyranny of distance." Bases in Guam will put air power within striking range of targets in North Korea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Guam was acquired from Spain in 1898 after the Spanish-American war. The island was captured by Japan early in World War II then retaken in 1944. In the Vietnam War, Andersen was a huge base for B-52 bombers attacking North Vietnam in 14-hour flights during which American aviators flew into the fiercest anti-aircraft fire since World War II.

Some of those same B-52s, modernized with advanced sensors and armed with missiles that can be fired many miles from targets, are rotating through Guam, as are B-1 and B-2 bombers.

Despite its age, "the B-52 is a great truck," Gen. Hester said, adding that a wing of 48 F-15 fighters and their replacements, F-22 Raptors, will deploy to Guam on similar rotations.

Three of the Global Hawk surveillance aircraft, which look like small, blind Boeing 747 passenger planes, will be based at Andersen, with three more coming later. The Global Hawk, packed with radar, optical and infrared sensors, flies at 21,000 meters and can cover 104,000 sq. km in 24 hours, relaying its findings quickly to operational commanders.

Beyond acquiring intelligence on troop and weapon movements, Hester said, Global Hawks will be able to track terrorists such as those infiltrating Indonesian and Malaysian island chains after being trained in the southern Philippines.

Further, the reconnaissance aircraft could track ships in a maritime security regime in a U.S. effort to encourage Asian nations to account for merchant ships just as they track nearly every airplane. The objective is to detect illicit drug smugglers, dealers in human trafficking, pirates and terrorists.

"We must have the ability," Hester said of the ships, "to know who you are, where you are going, and what cargo you're carrying."

Richard Halloran, formerly a correspondent for Business Week, The Washington Post and The New York Times, is a freelance journalist.

Schwab plan 100 bil. cheaper than Henoko

Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), May 10, 2006

May 10--TOKYO -- Building a replacement facility for the U.S. Marines Corps' Futenma Air Station in the Camp Schwab area of Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, will cost about 300 billion--100 billion less than the original plan of relocating it off the Henoko district in the city--according to the outline building plan revealed Tuesday.

The total area of the Futenma replacement facility will be about 180 hectares, of which 20 percent will be built on land and 80 percent on reclaimed land. The government estimates the cost of construction will be between 300 billion and 350 billion before completion in 2014.

The government will discuss with the Okinawa prefectural and Nago city governments to decide the detailed plan by summer, aiming to assess the environment impact in the autumn.

According to the U.S.-Japan Road Map for Realignment Implementation, issued May 1, the length of each of the two runways, which are aligned in a V-shape, is 1,600 meters with two 100-meter overruns.

According to the newly disclosed outline, the cost of reclaiming land will be about 200 billion, while the cost of runways, tarmac and hangars, as well as relocating existing facilities in Camp Schwab to an inland area will be more than 100 billion.

The estimated area proposed by the government is about 130 hectares, 30 percent of which is to be built on land.

To avoid flying over residential areas near the facility, the number of runways has been increased to two. As a result, the total area has been increased by 50 hectares, while the reclaimed area shifted offshore by 100 to 200 meters.

A marine forest area--which is also a dugong feeding ground--to be reclaimed will increase from 10 to 20 hectares, drawing concern over the deterioration of the marine environment.

Relocation of the facility to Henoko was estimated to cost about 430 billion, including 330 billion in land reclamation.

Under the Henoko option, the whole length of the facility was to be 2,500 meters, including a 2,000-meter runway for joint military and civilian use. The total area was to be 207 hectares, including a 23-hectare seawall.

Land reclamation for this plan was costly as it had to fill an area more than 60 meters deep and construction was estimated to take more than 12 years.

Editorial: Road map to enhance Japan-U.S. alliance

Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), May 03, 2006

The following editorial appeared in The Yomiuri Shimbun on Wednesday, May 3:

The Japan-U.S. security alliance has undergone a qualitative change and entered a new phase. Defense and foreign affairs ministers of the two countries on Monday finalized plans to realign U.S. forces in Japan.

According to the agreement, most of the relocation items will have been carried out by the end of 2014. These tasks include relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station's heliport functions in Ginowan to a coastal area adjacent to Camp Schwab in Nago, both in Okinawa Prefecture, the transfer of 8,000 U.S. Marines from the prefecture to Guam, and the transfer of carrier-based aircraft at Atsugi Naval Air Facility in Kanagawa Prefecture to the U.S. Marine Corps' Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

The government is responsible for implementing this "road map" for realignment according to an agreed schedule.

The government also must win the understanding and cooperation of prefectures and municipalities to be affected by this realignment, and as Japan's share of relocation costs will reportedly total 3 trillion yen, it has to show accountability to the public by explaining how the estimate was calculated.

While the realignment is part of the global realignment of U.S. forces, it is not being carried out solely for the benefits of the U.S. military.

A major objective of the realignment is to improve Japan's defense, under the Japan-U.S. alliance, against so-called new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and international terrorism.

Under the new plans, the commands of the U.S. Army and the Ground Self-Defense Force will be established at Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. Likewise, the commands of the U.S. Air Force and the Air Self-Defense Force will share Yokota Air Base in Tokyo.

A deepening of cooperation between Japanese and U.S. forces during peacetime will enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Tokyo and Washington should discuss ways of improving the effectiveness of the security alliance in implementing joint operations, sharing information and carrying out international peace-cooperation missions. They also should accelerate work to clarify role-sharing between the two nations.

In 1996, Tokyo and Washington redefined their alliance in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security.

The two nations clarified the importance of their bilateral relations in the Asia-Pacific region, taking into full consideration changes in the region that occurred after the end of the Cold War.

Ten years later, Defense Agency Secretary General Fukushiro Nukaga on Monday proposed that both nations discuss a new framework for security cooperation with Japan.

Nukaga said the Japan-U.S. security partnership as defined in the 1996 declaration is out of date given the many changes to the international security landscape, including the post-9/11 environment, and the rapid military buildup in China.

In recent years, Japan has enacted laws to deal with contingencies in the area surrounding Japan and emergency legislation on national security. In addition, Self-Defense Forces troops have been working in Iraq providing humanitarian assistance for reconstruction. They were also dispatched to other Asian countries devastated by a strong tsunami that struck in waters off Sumatra, Indonesia, in December 2004.

A joint statement issued after Monday's agreement said the Japan-U.S. alliance plays "a vital role in enhancing regional and global peace and security."

Iran and Iraq are named in the statement to clarify the engagement of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the Middle East.

It is natural that the purpose and concept of the Japan-U.S. alliance be flexibly revised, and that Japan's role and responsibility in the alliance be clarified, according to the changing international situation.

That is also a way to further deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Japan, U.S. Army Realignment Deal Opposed

May 2 2006 04:57 AM US/Eastern
By CHISAKI WATANABE
Associated Press Writer

TOKYO (AP) - The new agreement to realign U.S. forces in Japan met strong opposition Tuesday in Japan, with governors and mayors saying the plan was unacceptable.

In Washington on Monday, top American and Japanese officials approved details of a plan to realign U.S. forces in Japan by 2014 while giving Japan's military greater responsibility for security in Asia and the Pacific.

But local officials in Japan said the plan doesn't address certain issues or take into account the sentiments of local residents. Local governments and civic groups have argued that priority should be given to reducing U.S. forces and returning bases to Japanese control.

Katsusuke Ihara, mayor of Iwakuni City, said the plan goes against a nonbinding plebiscite held shortly before the city's merger with other towns in March in which voters overwhelmingly rejected the relocation of a U.S. naval air wing to the area.

"The plan does not reflect the results of the referendum and election. This is not something I or the city residents can accept," the mayor said.

Katsuji Hoshino, mayor of Zama city, which is to host the operational headquarters for Japan's troops, said he also opposes the final report.

"I cannot accept it at this point. I will keep working (with residents) toward finding a solution to end allowing the base permanently," he said.

The United States has about 50,000 troops stationed in Japan. The presence includes more than 10,000 Marines, several air bases and the home port for the Navy's 7th Fleet.

The realignment is the U.S. military's biggest in Japan in decades. A price tag for the plan's implementation has not been released, but a top American official estimated last month that Japan would pay about $26 billion of the total cost.

In the joint U.S.-Japan report approved Monday, the countries made special mention of the burden faced by Japanese communities hosting U.S. bases. Locals, especially on the crowded island of Okinawa, often complain of the crime, accidents, land use and noise associated with the bases.

Japan and the United States are close allies. Last month, Japan's Cabinet approved a six-month extension of its non-combat support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. Japan has also deployed about 600 troops in southern Iraq on a non-combat, humanitarian mission.

US, Japan Prepare for 'New and Emerging' Security Challenges

By Patrick Goodenough
CNSNews.com International Editor
May 02, 2006

(CNSNews.com) - In the most comprehensive rearrangement of U.S. military presence in Japan since the end of World War II, Washington and Tokyo have agreed to changes that will take the crucial security alliance into a "new phase," senior officials said.

A "roadmap" for defense ties released on Monday aims to make U.S. forward-deployed forces more streamlined and effective in meeting 21st century challenges in the Pacific, as part of the Pentagon's post-Cold War global force posture realignment.

At the same time, it strengthens bilateral defense cooperation and nudges ahead Japan's gradual transformation from a formally pacifist stance to one of active security engagement.

As such, the developments will be closely watched by Chinese leaders, who are sensitive about Japanese ambitions both because of Japan's historical aggression and because of Beijing's own rise and regional aspirations.

A joint statement issued after the U.S. and Japanese defense and foreign ministers concluded talks in Washington made reference to China - although not by name - in calling for regional conflicts to be settled diplomatically, and for military modernization to be carried out with more "transparency."

U.S. and Japanese officials have long raised concerns about what they say is a lack of transparency in China's military buildup and defense spending, a concern cited once again Monday by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a briefing with the National Conference of Editorial Writers.

The meeting brought together Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso and the head of Japan's Defense Agency, Fukushiro Nukaga.

The four said in a joint statement the alliance was "the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region."

They referred to "new and emerging threats pose a common challenge that affects the security of nations worldwide," and expressed the need for close cooperation to stop Iran's controversial nuclear activities. They also called on North Korea to shut down its nuclear programs.

The two governments agreed to cooperate in improving ballistic missile defense, following Japan's decision last December to join the U.S. BMD project. The issue has become increasingly important to Tokyo since North Korea test-fired a missile in 1998 that overflew Japan before splashing down in the Pacific. Since then, Pyongyang has announced that it possesses a nuclear weapons capability.

The agreed roadmap is the result of negotiations that began more than three years ago.

It lays out planned redeployments of U.S. force in Japan, particularly in the southernmost island of Okinawa, home to more than half of the more than 40,000 American military personnel in Japan.

The most radical change over the next eight years involves moving 8,000 of the 18,000 U.S. Marines based on Okinawa, along with their family members, to the island of Guam, some 1,400 miles to the east.

U.S. forces' presence on Okinawa has long been politically sensitive, but those problems are less likely to be replicated on Guam, a U.S. territory.

Guam, which is currently home to U.S. Navy facilities and an Air Force base, is set to become an increasingly important strategic hub and staging point for the U.S.

While further away than Japan from regional hotspots Taiwan and North Korea, Guam is almost 4,000 miles closer than the next nearest sizeable military presence on U.S. soil, in Hawaii.

Rumsfeld said Monday the planned realignment "will make Guam a key part of this alliance and the Pacific security architecture."

Guam, an island about three times the size of Washington DC and with a population of around 171,000, is expected to see a construction boom, with the building of a headquarters, training facilities, helicopter landing pads, barracks, schools, family housing as well as highways and other infrastructure.

Under the bilateral agreement, Japan will carry just under 60 percent of the costs of the relocation.

Apart from the transfer to Guam, Okinawa will see other changes including the building of new runways as part of a move to relocate a U.S. Marine Corps Air Station from a densely-populated part of the island to a quieter area.

Bringing commands together

There also will be changes elsewhere in Japan, as part of plans to improve "interoperability" - the ability to work together efficiently - between the U.S. military and Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

The U.S. Army's headquarters in Japan and a counterpart Japanese Ground SDF command will be located at the same base near Tokyo by 2012, while a similar move will bring together the U.S. Air Force and Japanese Air SDF commands, also near the capital.

The two navies already share a base, at Yokosuka, where the U.S. Navy permanently homebases the USS Kitty Hawk, a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier. From 2008, the U.S. will for the first time forward-deploy a nuclear-powered carrier in Japan, when the USS George Washington is due to replace the Kitty Hawk.

A recent report by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), a research body affiliated to Japan's Defense Agency, listed as "destabilizing factors" in the region North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, and China's "not entirely clear" East Asia strategy.

It cited Beijing's deployment of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan; the first joint China-Russia military maneuvers held last August; and China's long-range missile development, aimed at countering U.S. BMD capabilities.

Unconventional challenges included terrorism, separatist conflicts, maritime piracy in Asian waterways, and the problems posed by disease outbreaks and natural disasters.

The Defense Policy Review Initiative: A Reflection

Last Updated: 14:34 03/09/2007
Commentary (May 2, 2006)

Yuki Tatsumi (Research Fellow at the East Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center)

At the end of 2002, the United States and Japan launched an ambitious initiative to transform the U.S.-Japan alliance. Officially called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the talks aimed at figuring out how to adapt the U.S.-Japan alliance to the security environment in the 21st century when the nature of threats has changed dramatically. With the agreement over the weekend regarding payment for the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam, it looks like the DPRI will finally come to a conclusion. The two governments will likely announce agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan at the next Security Consultative Committee meeting, which is expected to be held soon. But the "success" of the DPRI may prove illusory.

The circumstances under which the DPRI began seemed to promise good results. The terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 provided an imperative on the part of the United States to adjust its alliances to meet new security challenges. Sept. 11 also created a political environment in Japan in which security issues could be discussed more openly. Japan was led by Koizumi Junichiro, a prime minister who was overwhelmingly popular, adept at communicating his policy goals to the public, and instinctively inclined to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. The two countries' leaders enjoyed a genuinely close personal relationship, which was supported by a group of officials who valued the alliance and were dedicated to sustaining and strengthening it. If difficult decisions needed to be made about the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the DPRI would have been the opportunity to address them. The DPRI could have been a springboard from which the two countries made their partnership truly global.

The DPRI did not go as hoped, however. Despite rhetoric that the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been better, the DPRI came to the verge of collapse several times over the past three years. Each time, it took political intervention at a very senior level to save it. In particular, the base realignment process has been a painful process for both countries.

There are several explanations for the slow progress of the DPRI. No significant political figure in Japan has championed the DPRI in the way that Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro did for U.S. force realignment in Okinawa in the mid-1990s. Even Prime Minister Koizumi's interest in this issue has been sporadic at best. Japan also scores poorly on interagency coordination and its attitudes toward the negotiations. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) often neglected to consult with the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Treasury, and relevant offices in the Cabinet Affairs Office. The lack of notification to affected local governments slowed progress in the JDA's efforts to convince them to accept the force realignment plan that was agreed between Tokyo and Washington in October 2005. A string of leaks to the Japanese media on the negotiation generated resentment and mistrust among U.S. officials, fueling their frustration. Most importantly, stubbornness on both sides created a sense of "us" vs. "them," often overshadowing the ultimate purpose of the negotiation - to strengthen the bilateral alliance.

The U.S. side was not without problems. The preoccupation with other security challenges, such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran left Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless with virtually the entire burden of concluding an agreement with the Japanese government. Most senior officials in other U.S. agencies who could have been helpful in facilitating a successful conclusion of the DPRI have left the government and their successors do not have a similar level of interest and expertise. Today, the U.S. negotiation team, primarily consisting of Defense officials, is overworked and frustrated with little interagency support to buttress its effort.

Such observations aside, the DPRI suggests a more fundamental problem in the U.S. - Japan alliance. Simply put, there is a gap between Tokyo and Washington in their perceptions and expectations of each other. U.S. negotiators were encouraged by developments in Japan in the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, including its decision to send Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the Indian Ocean and Ground Self-Defense Force troops to Iraq. Other developments - the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report, the enactment of contingency legislation, the decision to introduce ballistic missile defense, and the revision of National Defense Program Guidelines - encouraged U.S. officials to believe that Japan was ready and willing to fundamentally change its security policy, and rapidly expand its role within the U.S.-Japan alliance and beyond.

That expectation was "betrayed" in the DPRI. To be sure, Sept. 11 created momentum for Japan to take ad hoc measures, as demonstrated by the passage of two special measures laws to support U.S.-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sept. 11 also created enough political support to create a basic framework that guides Tokyo if Japan faces clear and present security threats.

But the steps often identified as the sign of fundamental changes in Japan took place without any change to the existing constitutional framework. At the end of the day, Japan still chooses not to exercise its right of collective self-defense. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) cannot operate overseas without the government-imposed and often unrealistic restrictions on its area of operations and rules of engagement, which practically rules out any meaningful contribution to efforts by multinational coalition forces. The political context - which prohibits the SDF from being dispatched to high-risk areas - remains unchanged. Constitutional reform, which was often thought to be ready to move forward, has essentially stalled. In short, all the legal and political constraints that existed at the end of the Cold War remain.

As a result, exchanges between the two governments in the DPRI remained largely unchanged: Washington requests (or demands) changes and Japan drags its feet in response. This is hardly an exchange between two mature allies, and is met with great frustration in Washington. Japan's behavior begs the question: Are Japanese government statements about its willingness to change and become a proactive partner in the U.S.-Japan alliance genuine? Or, more troubling still, do the U.S. and Japan really share a common vision for their alliance

The realignment plans will be announced with much fanfare, and celebrated as another step forward in the transformation of the alliance. But the frustration and animosity that emerged during the negotiations may linger. In fact, as both sides enter an even more difficult phase of implementing the force realignment plan, resentment can easily resurface. If Japan can execute the realignment plan without using political calendar-based excuses to delay the process, it would go a long way to restore the confidence that was lost during the DPRI. But that alone is not enough.

The DPRI challenged the assumption that the U.S. and Japan share a vision and goals for the future of their alliance. If the two governments are serious about transforming the U.S.-Japan alliance into a global strategic partnership, they must find ways to identify the gaps in perception and expectation and address them in an honest yet constructive manner. In the absence of such efforts, the U.S.-Japan alliance may enter another period of drift.