Strengthening Security Cooperation with Australia: A New Security Means for Japan

No.13
Yoshinobu Yamamoto
9 October 2007

In March 2007, the prime ministers of Japan and Australia, Shinzo Abe and John Howard, issued a joint declaration to expand bilateral security cooperation. The declaration plays up close security relations on the basis of shared democratic values. It says that "Japan and Australia will deepen and expand their bilateral cooperation in the areas of security and international peace and security, as well as human security." The scope of security cooperation includes many areas such as transnational crime, counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, peace operations, and human security. This marks the first time that Japan has forged such close security relations with a country other than the United States.

Japan's security cooperation with Australia has been evolving over the past two to three years. The most notable is the fact that the Japanese troops deployed to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war to engage in reconstruction work were protected by Australian troops. In March 2006, the two countries inaugurated a foreign minister-level tripartite strategic dialogue together with the United States. Since then, bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia has been evolving alongside tripartite security cooperation, leading to the first summit meeting among the three countries held on the sidelines of the APEC summit in September 2007. From the perspective of the United States, which has maintained strong alliances with both Japan and Australia, recently expanded Japan-Australia security cooperation may appear to complement the "hub-and-spokes" alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region. The strengthening of bilateral security relations has merits for Japan and Australia, of course, but it does not end there.

Firstly, bilateral cooperation would contribute to providing regional and international public goods. Cooperation between the two highly developed maritime powers, in tandem with the United States, will contribute to maritime and aviation security in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan and Australia have also agreed to cooperate in tackling non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters and pandemics. By jointly promoting a multilateral framework for energy and environmental cooperation, they will be able to help the region maintain open regionalism as well.

Secondly, bilateral cooperation would contribute to maintaining and promoting democracy and human rights in the region. Now that democracy and human rights have come to be accepted as universal values in many parts of the world, it is appropriate for Japan and Australia as well as the United States to make these liberal values the basis for security and other cooperation as stated in the joint declaration; nonetheless, they should be very careful in how they promote such values. By reflecting these liberal norms in its international policies and cooperation and committing to these values, Japan would demonstrate to other countries in the region that it will never go back to its non-democratic past.

Thirdly, security cooperation between Japan and Australia, as well as the United States, would function as a collective hedge vis-à-vis a rising China. This is the trickiest part of deepening bilateral security ties. Given the firm US-Japan and US-Australia alliances, strengthening security cooperation between the US' closest allies might be perceived as forming a quasi-triple alliance against China. Indeed, China is very skeptical about the purpose and intent of bilateral and trilateral security cooperation lest they target China. However, what the three countries are doing is preparing for uncertainties in the future direction of China's security and defense policies. China may take similar measures in response since the future behavior of these three countries may appear equally uncertain in its eyes. Such mutual hedging may result in creating a situation with China on one side and Japan, Australia and the United States on the other, with all of them trying to promote close economic relations bilaterally and multilaterally at the same time. Cautious behavior toward other countries is not unusual, particularly in a rapidly changing balance of power game. However, we have to remember that the currently evolving security cooperation between Japan and Australia (and the United States) is embedded within larger cooperative security and economic frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East Asian Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Fourthly, the new security agreement would open up new security measures to Japan. Japan-Australia security cooperation, as it now stands, is not a defense pact but rather an entente in the sense that the two countries are to consult closely on security matters and cooperate with regard to various international and regional public goods. Such bilateral security cooperation is not intended to establish a highly regularized security alliance similar to the one between Japan and the United States or NATO. On the other hand, it is different from an ad hoc coalition of the willing formed to solve a particular problem and dissolved upon solution of the problem. Security cooperation between Japan and Australia will sit somewhere between an institutionalized alliance and a coalition of the willing. It will provide Japan with a new means of ensuring international security in a rapidly globalizing world.

It was the leadership of conservative leaders – Japanese Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and US President George W. Bush – that accelerated security cooperation between Japan, Australia and the United States in the post-9/11 environment. Conditions are now changing. In Japan, for example, Mr. Abe, who made "value-oriented diplomacy" a slogan for his foreign policies and pushed for closer security cooperation with Australia, has stepped down due to health problems. Political enthusiasm and drive for enhancing security cooperation on the basis of democratic values may have dissipated for the moment, but Japan and Australia should continue to enhance their security cooperation in a way that serves the good of the region and the world.

Yoshinobu Yamamoto is a professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo.

The New Defense Ministry Raises Japan's Profile Overseas

Akira Hiyoshi 1 June 2007
On January 9, Japan's Defense Agency was upgraded to a full-fledged ministry. From its founding in 1954, the Defense Agency had remained a subordinate body under the Cabinet Office without ministry status. The recent elevation to a ministry has finally made Japan a "normal" country in a sense, but still I am surprised at the fact that it has taken such a long time. The two ministries that should serve as the pillars of Japan's external relations, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, can now work on an equal footing. The meetings held in Washington, D.C. in early May among Japan's foreign and defense ministers and their US counterparts were as respectable as they were substantive.

National defense is fundamental to the nation's existence, comprising one of the core functions of a state – along with diplomacy, law enforcement and finance – that cannot be entrusted to the private sector. The administrative body in charge of national defense should thus be positioned accordingly within the structure of the national government.

The legal revisions that upgraded the Defense Agency have also transformed some of the previously-stipulated secondary duties of the Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) into primary SDF duties alongside national defense and disaster relief activities. Among the international activities that have been added over time to the SDF's mission in response to international developments are emergency relief activities, cooperation in United Nations peacekeeping missions, transportation of Japanese nationals, and provision of logistical support to US forces in the areas surrounding Japan. Demining activities, originally defined as a secondary responsibility when the SDF officially came into being in 1954, were also upgraded to a primary duty. These activities apparently differ in nature from other ancillary responsibilities of the SDF such as civil engineering work and assistance for athletic events, which can be described as utilizing the SDF's defense capabilities in peacetime.

It goes without saying that these legal amendments were vitally needed. Nevertheless, during the Diet deliberations and in some media reporting, concerns were raised about the threats that these amendments posed to the basic principles of our national defense policy, including the doctrine of "defensive defense," the pledge to never become a military power, the "three non-nuclear principles," and the strict practice of civilian control. Opponents feared that the legal revisions would lead to the enactment of a permanent law enabling SDF personnel to take part in broad international peace cooperation activities without prior Diet scrutiny of each mission. They were also concerned that the revisions would encourage debate on easing the rules on the use of weapons by SDF personnel overseas and accelerate efforts promoting the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. However, these issues and concerns have essentially nothing to do with the latest amendments to the status of the Defense Agency and the SDF's missions, and should be addressed separately if necessary.

Underlying the continual reemergence of such arguments is the ambiguous article in the Japanese Constitution regarding the right of self-defense. Article 9 of the Constitution states, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." This article has given rise to the interpretation that even the possession of a military for self-defense, considered to be a natural right of the nation, is constitutionally prohibited. Given that the recent legal changes to upgrade the Defense Agency gained the overwhelming support not only of the ruling parties but also of the main opposition, it is natural to assume that the time is ripe to have a serious discussion on revising the Constitution.

Japan will receive increasing requests to send the SDF to the world's trouble spots. We must make cool-headed judgments on whether and how to meet the requests, taking into consideration our own security concerns and priorities as well as the capabilities of the SDF. Reviewing the standards for the use of weapons will be necessary if we are to make our overseas missions more effective by ensuring the safety of SDF personnel while they work alongside other nations' forces. Furthermore we will not be able to avoid discussions on a permanent law allowing the SDF to engage in overseas peacekeeping missions and on the right of collective self-defense.

Our country is narrow and not well blessed with natural resources. The population of our rapidly aging society is shrinking and the financial crisis is not over. In contrast, one of our neighboring countries is increasing its economic and military power significantly at a time when the international influence of our most important ally, the United States, is declining, and the concerns and interests of Japan have somewhat diverged from those of the United States, as was shown in the recent negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue. In such a complex and difficult situation, drawing up a carefully worked-out, robust security policy from a comprehensive and long-term perspective appears more urgent than ever.

The Defense Ministry should be responsible not only for operation of the SDF but also for comprehensive national security policy planning, as was mentioned in the supplementary resolutions adopted by both houses of the Diet when they enacted the aforementioned set of legal revisions. I hope the ministry will perform its important duties with unceasing efforts and keen insight.


Akira Hiyoshi is President of the National Council of Defense Associations and a Councilor of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS). He was Defense Agency Vice Minister between 1991 and 1993. This is a revised version of the original Japanese article that appeared in "RIPS' Eye" (a biweekly op-ed website of RIPS), No. 72 (January 23, 2007).

Prime Minister Abe's Visit to the United States

Yukio Okamoto 11 May 2007
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has returned from his first Japan-U.S. summit in good spirits and good shape. During his two-day visit to Washington and at Camp David he tackled a broad agenda covering many aspects of the Japan-U.S. relationship.

A first goal for Prime Minister Abe while in the U.S. was the cultivation of a strong personal friendship with George W. Bush. Prime Minister Abe's predecessor, Prime Minister Koizumi, had made a special effort during his term to cultivate a relationship of personal trust with President Bush, an effort that paid dividends in terms of smoothing communications between the two governments on vital issues. Continuity in close personal relations between the leaders of Japan and the United States has become all the more crucial as the departures of noted "Japan hands" from the Administration have somewhat diminished the direct, horizontal linkages between the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels of both governments.

The second goal was to highlight the importance of the Japan-U.S. security alliance. Prime Minister Abe called the alliance "irreplaceable", emphasizing both its importance and its solidity. In talks with both the president and congressional leaders, Mr. Abe emphasized the contributions Japan has been making to the war on terror.

Immediately prior to the summit the announcement was made of the establishment of a blue-ribbon panel on collective defense. With a membership drawn mostly from the hawkish and internationalist part of the Prime Minister's circle, the panel is likely to recommend significant expansions of the rules of engagement for Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) under the present constitution, beyond the limits indicated by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB). Since the CLB's interpretation of the Constitution has been the major stumbling block preventing the fuller participation of Japan in collective defense—either in the context of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty or JSDF deployments in UN peace keeping operations—the removal of these impediments will likely precede a constitutional revision.

One of the gratifying changes over the past few years has been the fading away of the charges that Japan is a free rider in the global security system. Part of this change is due to the activism demonstrated by former Prime Minister Koizumi, sending support vessels to the Indian Ocean as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Ground Self Defense Forces to Iraq in cooperation with the Coalition Authority's reconstruction efforts. The repurposing and ongoing reconfiguration of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a "global alliance" has helped to erase the misunderstandings that used to undermine Japan's image in America.

The possibility that Japan and the United States no longer saw eye to eye on the North Korean nuclear program had been a source of worry in the run-up to the summit. The recent reversal of U.S. sanctions against the Banco Delta Asia left many in Japan feeling betrayed. Sanctions against the bank had been perceived as part of a firm U.S.-Japan line against North Korea's contemptuous behavior as regards its obligations under the Six Party Talks.

Weakening of the tough U.S.-Japan line of "no economic cooperation without a complete, verifiable shutdown and international monitoring" threatened Japan with strategic abandonment. The current state of development of the North Korean missile program leaves the United States facing little threat of a direct North Korean nuclear attack upon its territories. Japan, however, lies within range of the tested Nodong series of missiles or, more brutally, the delivery of a weapon by small ship. A possible consequence is a split in the perceived U.S. and Japanese goals—with the public seeing Japan as seeking a total dismantlement of a North Korean strike capability while the U.S. may be seeking only the capping of the proliferation of North Korean nuclear technology.

Prime Minister Abe also received from President Bush a vow of support for the Japanese government's stance on the abductee issue. The continued lack of believable information from the North Korean government about the fates of the Japanese citizens it abducted in the past has been a touchstone issue for Mr. Abe. His rapid rise through the political hierarchy in defiance of the seniority system was bolstered by his consistent advocacy of the rights of the families of the abductees to know the fates of their loved ones. Fears that the U.S. government had grown tired of the abductee issue --and of the Abe Cabinet's ratcheting up of pressure upon the DPRK to provide more information—were assuaged by President Bush's clear and heartfelt statement.

The Prime Minister also received a message of presidential support for his position on an issue some in America see as related to the abductees—the so-called comfort women issue. A non-binding resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives is suggesting to the Japanese government that the government apologize to the women who served in brothels established to provide sexual services for the Japanese imperial military.

Prime Minister Abe has stated:

"As both an individual and as prime minister, I sympathize with those women who were forced to taste life's bitterness. I also am full of a feeling of a need to apologize over the fact that they were placed in such a painful situation."

In response, President Bush said that in his opinion, the matter is settled.

Another achievement at the summit was a strong message supporting a joint program against the forces driving climate change. The Bush Administration's rejection of the terms of the Kyoto Protocol during the Administration's first term had been a political embarrassment for the Japanese government. The recent belated reversal of Bush Administration's stance on climate change presented an opportunity for the U.S. to make amends with its ally.

Economic policy and trade disputes, the focal point of so many Japan-U.S. summits of the past, did not register this time. Japan's politicians and diplomats can take great pride for keeping temperatures cool at the summit.

Sources say the two leaders spoke about China during their meetings even though at the press availability China was barely mentioned. On so many global issues—rising energy and commodities prices, the arms race in Asia, environmental degradation, the spread of rogue regimes—China plays a vital role. No countries have greater economic stakes in China than the U.S. and Japan. China also represents the Japan-U.S. alliance's main regional competitor. It is simply the elephant in the room—too big to ignore.

The public statements from the summit did not present a clear vision for the proposed "Alliance of Democracies" security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, the two leaders did not say how they intended to reassure the Chinese government that the alliance of democracies was not just a fig leaf for a containment strategy aimed at China.

The summit should be seen as a solid first step. In the coming year, Prime Minister Abe will be probably be asking the Bush Administration to join his government in the crafting of a detailed and inspiring vision of America's and Japan's common future.

It should also be noted that the visit to Washington was the first leg of a greater journey that included an unprecedented tour of the capitals of the Gulf States. A successful first visit to the United States as prime minister focused the attention of the leaders of the Gulf States on Mr. Abe's diplomatic initiatives and highlighted Japan's international position. Using one visit to frame another represents a new diplomatic strategy. Such sophistication will serve Mr. Abe well in the coming years.


Yukio Okamoto is the president of Okamoto Associates, Inc., a management and political risk consultancy. He is a former Special Advisor to two prime ministers. He also was chairman of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizmi's Task Force on Foreign Relations.