More political stalemate for Japan

Jul 15, 2010
By Bruce Klingner

A year ago, the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) landslide victory in the Lower House election ushered in euphoric predictions of bold new policies and even a transformation of the Japanese political system. There were widespread hopes that the DPJ would break the streak of Japan's revolving door of short-lived leaders.

Instead, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's tenure has proved to be a slow motion train wreck and "Hatoyama leadership" has became an oxymoron. Indeed, the DPJ quickly showed itself to be no more competent in governing Japan than its much-derided opponent, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

After shedding its twin albatrosses of Hatoyama and DPJ general secretary Ichiro Ozawa, as well as many of its earlier campaign pledges, the DPJ hoped for a respectable showing in the July 11 Upper House election.

Instead, the electorate delivered a painful thrashing to the DPJ that may prove fatal for Prime Minister Naoto Kan. The DPJ will now be even more focused on politics than policymaking, leaving the Japanese ship of state rudderless and adrift in the troubled waters of East Asia.

Hatoyama's troubled tenure

The DPJ lost its initial strong public support after Hatoyama and Ozawa became embroiled in money scandals, tarnishing the party's reputation and undermining its claims of clean politics and transparent governance.

The prime minister was also derided for lacking a strategic vision and his frequent policy reversals. United States officials privately referred to the DPJ as "amateurs" due to the party's non-existent policymaking process and inability to make decisions.

Hatoyama's ineptitude, coupled with the DPJ abandoning several of its campaign pledges, triggered plummeting approval ratings from an increasingly cynical and embittered electorate. After Hatoyama and Ozawa resigned, the DPJ enjoyed a resurgence of public approval.

But DPJ optimism for the Upper House election proved to be short-lived since its problems went beyond Hatoyama and were instead endemic to the party's policies and processes.

That the DPJ chose Hatoyama as its first leader after its unprecedented 2009 electoral victory reflected poorly on the party and its future potential for success. Having to go to the bullpen for a relief pitcher in only the second inning of the baseball game doesn't instill confidence in the DPJ. Newly-selected Kan saw his disapproval ratings surpass his approval ratings after only one month in office, far quicker than any of his predecessors.

A year ago, it was common for Japan watchers to predict that the DPJ would gain enough seats in the July election to secure a unilateral majority; that it would no longer be reliant on coalition partners; and that by punting the leftist Socialist Democratic Party from the ruling coalition, the DPJ would adopt more centrist foreign and security policies.

Instead, the DPJ defied pollsters by doing more abysmally than even the most pessimistic prediction. The DPJ won only 44 seats, far short of its goal to retain its 54 contested seats. A year ago, expectations had been the DPJ would garner 60 or more seats, giving it a sole majority in the Upper House when combined with its 62 uncontested seats.

DPJ coalition partner the People's New Party lost all three of its contested seats, leaving it only with its three uncontested seats, giving the coalition a total of 109 seats, far short of the 122 necessary for a majority.

As a result of its underwhelming election results, the DPJ coalition can no longer ensure approval of its legislative initiatives. Although the DPJ has a majority in the more powerful Lower House, it does not have the two-thirds majority necessary to override bills rejected by the upper house. A "twisted parliament" portends even greater legislative stalemate and political gridlock.

The main opposition LDP, banished with disdain by the electorate following last year's Lower House election, rebounded with 51 seats, up from 38, for a total of 84 in the Upper House. The LDP shouldn't become complacent about its victory, however. Just as the DPJ won last year's election mainly because it wasn't the LDP, the LDP gained ground on Sunday simply because it was moderately less offensive to voters than the DPJ.

The LDP must guard against claiming vindication since it too has failed to articulate coherent alternative policies. The LDP will likely adopt the obstructionist tactics that the DPJ utilized when it was the opposition, namely blocking all legislation and then blaming its opponent for the political stalemate.

Challenges ahead

Kan already faces internal party calls for his resignation but that is unlikely before the DPJ presidential election caucus in September. Working in Kan's favor will be the party's hesitancy to imitate the LDP's oft-criticized revolving door of prime ministers. Kan's tenure beyond September's party election is far more precarious, however, and he could still become one of Japan's shortest-ruling leaders.

The recently disgraced and exiled Ozawa may strive to make a comeback at the September party caucus. Though he remains too unpopular to return as the party leader, he will try to exercise power through a proxy candidate. He may assess that he has greater leverage because a threat by him to depart the party, along with scores of "Ozawa's children" - legislators who won in last year's election and remain beholden to him, could precipitate a collapse of the DPJ government.

The DPJ must now seek coalition partners, either in a formal power-sharing arrangement or on an ad-hoc basis to approve individual pieces of legislation. Doing so would add an additional layer of deal-making and compromising to Japanese policymaking.

During the past year, the miniscule People's New Party and SDP were able to hold the much larger DPJ hostage on both domestic and foreign policies. The need to form a coalition to secure a majority gave outsized importance to these minor parties.

The DPJ may seek to join forces with Your Party, making it the new tail that wags the political dog. Your Party leader Yoshimi Watanabe, however, repeated his vow not to join the ruling coalition without major changes in the DPJ party platform. Watanabe also called on Kan to dissolve the Lower House since Your Party would likely gain additional seats and leverage at the DPJ's expense.

Even before the election, the DPJ was plagued by an inability to produce - let alone implement - policies. The DPJ encompasses broadly divergent ideological factions which hinders the party's ability to achieve consensus. On domestic issues, the party is divided between those advocating populist pump-priming economic stimulus initiatives to secure an election victory and those calling for fiscal restraint to overcome Japan's burgeoning public debt.

On foreign policy, the DPJ is divided amongst those favoring a continued strong and close alliance with the US and those advocating a more independent security policy. This was encapsulated in the fierce debate over the fate of the US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station in Okinawa. Although Hatoyama and Kan eventually affirmed the pre-existing bilateral agreement, it was done in a manner that inflamed Okinawan anger against both Tokyo and Washington.

The DPJ's election debacle will further constrain Japanese policymaking capabilities since party members will henceforth be more focused on politics than policies. Rampant speculation over the timing of Kan's departure will cause potential successors to vie for position while avoiding potentially unpopular policy stances. The DPJ's ability to deliver on promises will be severely undermined at a time when an increasingly impatient Japanese electorate is demanding results.

The Japanese political instinct will be to sacrifice Kan on the altar of expediency to have him take the fall for the DPJ's failings.

When Hatoyama was quickly replaced by Kan, the Japanese political system "worked" in the sense that it efficiently produced another leader, although without direct popular mandate. Yet, a system that results in four prime ministers in four years is flawed since it produces an assembly line of ineffective leaders.

Having leaders jump overboard at the first gust of disapproval undermines important political concepts of perseverance and enduring leadership. Nor does it instill any inclination for a Japanese leader to remain faithful to principles and ideals by resolutely enduring critical yet vacillating public opinion in order to achieve national objectives. The result of such quick capitulation by the leadership is rapidly plummeting public confidence in the individual, cumulative cynicism of the parties and system, and decreasing national influence on the world stage.

The DPJ has yet to prove it can lead and Kan is increasingly looking like yet another weak Japanese administration plagued by legislative stalemate and policy gridlock.

But in a broader sense, neither the LDP nor the DPJ have displayed the vision or ability to govern the country effectively. This does not bode well for Japan's future. With the DPJ's aura of invincibility tarnished, the LDP and DPJ are now like two punch-drunk fighters bludgeoning each other to score tactical points but unable to deliver the knock out punch. The result is a Japan unable to fix its stagnant economic and massive government debt, address growing security challenges, or play a regional leadership role.

Some analysts hope that the political tumult will eventually lead to a strategic political realignment in which the existing political parties disintegrate with new ideologically-based parties arising from their ashes. If that were to occur, it would offer the Japanese electorate a real choice between opposing political ideologies and policy objectives.

This scenario, however, would require far greater dynamism than Japan has exhibited to date. In the meantime, the two Japanese political combatants will continue to inflict considerable damage on each other, as well as the country's hopes of economic revival or international influence.

Bruce Klingner is a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.

US base reversal draws ire on Okinawa

May 26, 2010
By Eli Clifton

WASHINGTON - Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced on Monday that he would renege on his campaign promise to renegotiate the move of a controversial US airbase off the island of Okinawa.

Hatoyama's announcement was greeted with outrage on Okinawa, as residents met his arrival on the island on Sunday with angry protests and signs denouncing the decision to go through with the rebasing plan, which he had promised to renegotiate.

Prior to taking office in September 2009, Hatoyama's election platform included a call for re-examining Japan's ties with the US, with a particular focus on the 50,000 US military personnel based in Japan.

After taking office, Hatoyama was faced with the difficult task of negotiating a mutually agreeable basing arrangement with Washington while maintaining the support of a constituency who threw their backing behind his promises to renegotiate the relocation of the Marine base.

"I want to commend Prime Minister Hatoyama for making the difficult, but nevertheless correct, decision to relocate the Futenma facility inside Okinawa. We are working with the Japanese government to ensure that our agreement adopts Japanese proposals that will lighten the impact on the people of Okinawa," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told reporters in Beijing on Monday.

"We are confident that the relocation plan that Japan and the United States are working to conclude will help establish the basis for future alliance cooperation," she continued.

The disagreement over where or how to move the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma to a less populated area had become a major point of disagreement between the Barack Obama White House and Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government.

With Monday's announcement, Hatoyama brought a steady stream of criticism from members of his own governing coalition and an angry reception in Okinawa as residents heard reports that Hatoyama was likely to concede on the rebasing negotiations.

"[The announcement is] pretty distressing. It seems as though [Hatoyama's] own personal feelings about the matter, reflected by the campaign pledge and after being elected, have given way to pressure from both within Japan and outside of Japan," John Feffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies, told IPS.

"He clearly felt the need to come to a decision by the end of the month with elections coming up. The Okinawans represent almost 1% of the Japanese population. Political calculations would suggest that they're dispensable," Feffer said.

The negotiations over Futenma had become the sticking point in relations with the Obama administration as Hatoyama sought to form a "more equal" relationship with the US while the White House pushed Hatoyama to honor the rebasing agreement from 2006.

The plan will move the existing helicopter base from the center of Ginowan city in the south to the Henoko area in the north.

Okinawa residents have raised concerns over the environmental impact of the rebasing and the size of the US military's footprint on the island.

The US military presence on Okinawa holds a strategic interest for Washington since the island's southern location offers easy access to the Taiwan Strait.

Recent security concerns in Northeast Asia after the sinking of the Cheonan - a South Korean warship which appears to have been sunk by a North Korean torpedo - have put new pressures on the Hatoyama government to reaffirm the Japan-US alliance.

"I decided that it is of utmost importance that we place the Japan-US relationship on a solid relationship of mutual trust, considering the current situation in the Korean peninsula and in Asia," Hatoyama told reporters on Monday.

Hatoyama was quick to point to the sinking of the Cheonan as a reason for patching up relations with Washington but some experts have argued that the relatively small size of the base at Futenma - it hosts 4,000 Marines out of the nearly 50,000 US military personnel based on Okinawa - should make the rebasing negotiation a less important component of the US-Japan alliance.

"I would say [concerns over stability on the Korean peninsula] are real in the sense that the Japanese government and the US government believe that the Cheonan incident suggests that the neighborhood of Northeast Asia is dangerous and requires military vigilance," said Feffer.

"The perception is real, however I think it's unconnected to Futenma in that such a small number of Marines aren't going to do much in a war between North and South Korea," Feffer continued.

Hatoyama's political future in Japan remains uncertain after his decision to concede the basing issue - one of, if not the most important, components of his foreign policy platform during last year's election.

With Upper House elections scheduled for July 11, some observers have speculated that Hatoyama may have no choice but to step down if the DPJ performs poorly on election day.

Hatoyama's political career may be in question but local politicians on Okinawa have vowed to prevent the construction of the new base.

"My guess is that we may see a different sort of alignment of forces after the Japanese election so this issue is far from settled. It took 15 years for [US and Japanese officials] to plan the closure of Futenma. I don't think we're going to see base construction any time soon," said Feffer.

(Inter Press Service)

China's navy cruises into Pacific ascendancy

Apr 22, 2010
By Peter J Brown

In mid-April, two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers, the Choukai and Suzunami, unexpectedly encountered several Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, including a pair of submarines and eight destroyers, approximately 140 kilometers west-southwest of Okinawa near the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands.

The Chinese warships were heading out of the East China Sea and into the Western Pacific. They passed north of Miyako Island - the northernmost island in the Nansei group - through the Miyako Strait and then proceeded to head southeast.

They were there to practice anti-submarine warfare, underway refueling and helicopter flight training, to name a few of the procedures.

During one PLAN helicopter flight, the Suzunami was subjected to a close encounter which prompted a formal protest by Japan's SDF Joint Staff Office. The presence of the PLAN subs also sparked a protest.

Japan's Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi was upset that so many Chinese warships had sailed so near to Japan on their way to the western Pacific Ocean without any prior notification by China. [1]

Kitazawa said nothing about whether or not any of the five new Chinese earth observation/military reconnaissance satellites launched since late 2009 were engaged in assisting the PLAN warships during their unannounced passage.

Gary Li, a PLA specialist at the London-based Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS) said the PLAN's actions in this instance were very significant. Li describes the incident as unprecedented and an attempt by China to "send a very clear message to the region that it should be prepared to see a China unafraid to really test its reach and move into new areas". [2]

Drew Thompson, director of China Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC, did not agree with Li, adding that the recent PLAN "blue water" activity off Japan did not prove that the PLAN has entered a disturbing new phase in its development.

"Calling this a new phase is overly dramatic. The PLA has been working for a long time on expanding their ability to operate farther from their shores and conduct joint operations closely coordinating air, land and sea platforms," said Thompson. "These PLAN exercises certainly demonstrate expanded capabilities, or at least the willingness to exercise the hardware they have more vigorously, but it should be viewed as part of a continuum rather than a departure from a previous period of development."

Certainly, it is not getting any easier for the US and the rest of Asia to determine where exactly China is heading and what China's exact intentions are.

"Reports of a transit by the PLAN forces close to Okinawa only remind US allies in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific, that China's future course is unclear," said Abraham Denmark, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. "It is important to retain a military hedge against the possibility that China could become confrontational and militarily aggressive."

The PLAN has long been charged with two primary tasks: defending the mainland and operations related to a Taiwan contingency, which would primarily involve anti-access/area denial operations in the Western Pacific, according to Denmark.

This exercise may be further evidence of the growing emphasis placed by the PLAN on protecting vital so-called "Sea Lines of Communication" (SLOCs). Chinese President Hu Jintao has referred to this role as one of the PLA's "new historic missions".

"China's leaders have slowly come to recognize that its continued economic development relies on access to foreign resources and markets. For example, 80% of China's oil imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, yet the PLAN currently does not have the capability to protect Chinese vessels far from home," said Denmark. "This has made China's military leaders begin to examine a third role for the PLAN, which would entail SLOC protection."

Richard Fisher, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, described this recent East China Sea exercise by the PLAN as representing "a significant step in reaping the past decade's investments".

"The PLAN deployed at least two small multi-platform surface action groups to include submarines, long-range anti-air defenses, logistic support ships, supported by new long-range ground based and space-based surveillance, and reportedly, significant ground-based air," said Fisher. "This was a multi-fleet operation that reportedly involved Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] aircraft and fighters, which if true would constitute a major expansion of the PLAN's operational capabilities."

v For Taiwan and for any US forces that may have to break a future PLAN blockade, the message is clear.

"In a decade, there could be two carriers, larger destroyers, and, even ship- and submarine-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles [ASBMs] in the mix. Absent a sustained investment by the US and Japan in space defenses, naval energy weapons to counter ASBMs, plus their own, and, fifth and sixth generation fighters for air force and naval deployment, they will lose maritime dominance in the Western Pacific by the mid-2020s," said Fisher. "These investments are less likely as long as Washington and Tokyo remain transfixed by the mirage that Beijing will become their 'pivotal partner' in meeting future challenges, they simply want to ignore the fact that it is China which is the challenge."

As for the role of space assets and space defense-related issues, they have slipped under the radar in large part thus far. What is unfolding overhead in support of any or all of the PLAN operations may be the most significant aspect of this recent Chinese war gaming in the Western Pacific. In fact, absent evidence to the contrary, the presence aloft of so many new Chinese earth observation/military reconnaissance satellites is what sets this exercise apart from all previous PLAN exercises.

According to Associate Professor Andrew Erickson with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College, China is rapidly improving its increasingly diverse network of space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors in support of military land, sea and air operations.

"Synthetic Aperture Radar [SAR] in particular offers wide coverage at sufficient resolution. Maritime surveillance, prioritized at the national level under China's 863 State High-Technology Development Plan, is receiving significant funding," said Erickson.

Over the past decade, China has launched two Haiyang (Ocean) maritime observation satellites, and a third is now scheduled for launch this year after its original launch date in 2009 was scratched. In addition, China's has recently expanded its fleet of Yaogan satellites, which China describes as merely engaging in civilian earth observation missions. However, many experts identify them as dual role, military reconnaissance satellites. The Yaogans carry a mix of optical as well as radar-based sensors.

"Of particular note are the five Yaogan satellites that China has launched in the past five months. Yaogan 7 and 8 were launched in December. Yaogan 7 is optical and Yaogan 8 appears to be equipped with SAR," said Erickson. "Yaogan 9A, 9B, and 9C, launched in March, share the same orbit, suggesting that they have a special mission to perform."

Interestingly, when the official announcement was made by China's Xinhua news agency of the pending Yaogan 9 launch - a day before it took place as is the custom whenever secret Chinese military payloads in particular are ready to go up - Xinhua reported that a large satellite, and not a payload consisting of three smaller formation-flying satellites, was sitting on the launch pad. [3]

All of these Chinese satellites, together with China's development of ground-based over-the-horizon radars, suggests that China is developing unprecedented capability to monitor and conduct operations along its disputed maritime periphery, according to Erickson. He marks this exercise as proof positive that the PLAN is now finally and fully prepared to meet strategic goals originally articulated by Admiral Liu Huaqing, who headed the PLAN from 1982 to 1988. In effect, PLAN is now starting to conduct "far seas operations" beyond the so-called "First Island Chain".

US Navy Admiral Robert Willard commands the US Pacific Fleet. His testimony in March that China is "developing and testing" an ASBM only adds to the sense that China is fast assembling a far more formidable naval force.

"Such PLAN operations at increasing range from China's shores are ever-better-supported by improving satellite-based communications, positioning, and surveillance capabilities," said Erickson. "Unprecedented and innovative use of satellite communications has been a major highlight of China's counter-piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden; there the PLAN apparently relied solely on indigenous capabilities for the first time. While US and most Western [as well as the former Soviet] navies have engaged in related operations for years, this was a new and important step for the PLAN."

In advance of the PLAN's December 2008 deployment to the Gulf of Aden, PLAN commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, and PLAN political commissar, Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, demanded "comprehensive coverage, all-time linkage, and full-course support".

The PLAN's newspaper, People's Navy, reported that the PLAN Political Department worked with the PLAN Headquarters Communications Department and the State Information Center to improve a platform that:

[I]ntegrates a land base information collection and transmission system, an information integration and distribution system, a shore-to-ship information wireless transmission system, and an information terminal receiving system. They also sent technical personnel to Sanya [on Hainan Island] to conduct satellite receiving equipment debugging, system installation, and personnel training on the three combat ships that were about to set sail for escort operations. Moreover, they specially developed and improved a total of seven information processing software programs, which can send text, images, as well as video and audio documents quickly.

Satellite-based navigation and positioning via China's Beidou-1, currently a 4-satellite constellation, has very limited range and can support ship-positioning on China's immediate maritime periphery, but not further afield.

"It could not be used [during a missile attack] for short-range precision guidance because it is too slow, allowing for insufficient information [flow] during a missile's relatively short flight time," said Erickson "In part to support broader operations, China is deploying a 35-satellite Beidou-2/Compass system that would provide much improved accuracy, with regional navigation and communications coverage anticipated by 2011 and global navigation coverage by 2015-20. Three Compass satellites have been launched thus far."

While the PLAN is gradually increasing focus on areas beyond mainland China, this is part of a two-level process - Erickson refers to a "tale of two navies" - with nearby priorities still at the core.

"Preparing to defend China's territorial and maritime claims by asymmetric means is likely to remain the PLAN's focus for the foreseeable future, even as it pursues secondarily lower intensity missions further afield," said Erickson "China's capabilities are clearly growing, but its naval intentions - at least beyond asserting control over its claimed territorial waters, to include Taiwan - are somewhat unclear."

Fisher finds no lack of clarity, however, when it comes to the steady progression in the core Chinese military strategy including its military space strategy which reinforces the PLAN's operational prowess at every turn.

"The PLAN's first requirement for regional and global projection is dominance of the Low Earth Orbit theater of operations. We know that this is now a very high priority for the PLA, not just to enable an array of PLAN weapons," said Fisher. "The PLAN will eventually field anti-satellite weapons, other space combat capabilities, and, submarine and ship - launched ASBMs."

Fisher identifies submarines as the second major PLAN program of global importance.

"These will be much quieter, and improved versions may allow the beginning of independent deep water ballistic missile-equipped submarine operations."

A third program is the construction of as many as four aircraft carrier and large amphibious ship battle groups by the late 2020s.

"There is also a fourth essential program, the PLA's ability to sell world class naval and other military technologies, which together with commercial envelopment, forms core strategic relationships that will yield maritime alliances," Fisher said.

Denmark cautions that whatever conclusions are drawn, there is no question that PLAN still has a long way to go before it can be classified as a formidable "blue water" naval force.

"The PLAN currently does not have the experience required to operate for extended periods of time far from home, nor does it have sufficient numbers of ships to be able to operate in the Indian Ocean without significantly diminishing its ability to respond to threats closer to home," said Denmark. "Moreover, the PLA is traditionally dominated by leaders with experience in ground operations, and significant doctrinal and conceptual changes will have to take place within the PLA before the PLAN would be able to protect SLOCs."

Despite the Gulf of Aden missions to date, SLOC protection, specifically in the Indian Ocean, remains very challenging for the PLAN.

"China has no military bases in the Indian Ocean, and its ships conducting counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia are primarily supported by oilers from China. If the PLAN develops the capability to establish a regular presence in the Indian Ocean, such a force would either be dependent on logistical ships transiting back and forth through Indonesia or on a network of regional support bases or ports," said Denmark. "While much has been written about Chinese involvement in port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma [Myanmar], these ports appear to be commercial only. Still, it is conceivable that the PLAN could use commercial ports in the Indian Ocean, especially in friendly countries, for logistical support during peacetime."

Whether the five new Chinese satellites launched since late 2009 may have been tasked to assist the PLAN warships during their April exercise far from the shores of China remains open to question. However, there is no denying that those same satellites were still stuck on the ground the last time any prior large-scale PLAN exercises took place in the same vicinity.

Notes
1. Chinese submarines, destroyers spotted in high seas near Okinawa (from South China Morning Post), JapanToday, Apr 13, 2010.
2. Exercises off Japan and Taiwan show PLA navy's new prowess, IISS, Apr 18, 2010.
3. China to launch Yaogan IX remote-sensing satellite, Xinhua, Mar 4, 2010.

Peter J Brown is a satellite journalist from Maine USA.

Webb walks the line on redeployment

Japan
Feb 20, 2010
By Peter J Brown

United States Senator Jim Webb of Virginia has completed a week-long tour of the Asia-Pacific region to meet officials in Tokyo, Okinawa and Guam, among other places. Webb serves as chairman of the US Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations' East Asia and Pacific Affairs sub-committee as well as chairman of the personnel sub-committee on the Committee on Armed Services.

He planned this trip for a number of reasons. Webb has a strong interest in personnel-related basing decisions in Japan. He is also keenly interested in the "big picture" when it comes to US relations with Asian countries in general.

The primary purpose of Webb's trip was to evaluate the status of the US plan to relocate the US Marine Corps' Futenma air base from Ginowan to Nago on Okinawa. That is, if Japan ultimately decides to carry out this proposal, which was approved by a previous government in 2006.

Webb now realizes that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's government will fall apart instantly if the premier decides to go ahead and, in effect, break a promise that he made during his election campaign last year to uphold the wishes of the local electorate on Okinawa. A clear majority there do not want this relocation to happen.

Webb was also interested in finding out what has to be done on Guam to prepare for the proper housing and accommodation of thousands of marines, their families and support personnel who will be transferred there as part of the relocation plan.

When Webb visited Guam, he was not caught off guard by several senior elected officials telling him point blank that Guam is simply not prepared to meet the 2014 timetable for the relocation of the USMC personnel moving from Okinawa to Guam. These would be just some of the estimated 80,000 people, slightly less than half the island's present population, who will arrive over the next four years as part of a huge US military buildup on the island.

US Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo, who represents the island and describes Webb as "a friend of Guam", seems increasingly annoyed that it will soon have to deal with a sudden population surge.

"Nobody wants 80,000 additional people on Guam in 2014," she said. "We will do everything that we can, federally and locally, to stop that from happening. As I said before, we have our foot on the brakes. I will not support appropriations and authorizations that will result in a construction pace that brings 80,000 people to Guam in 2014."

For Bordallo, Governor Felix Camacho, and other elected representatives, there was a growing sense of urgency as they tried to convince an influential member of the US Senate that the US military presence on Guam is entering an awkward phase, and that more coherent planning and better coordination was necessary.

It is safe to say that Okinawa is not the only place where the local population is frustrated and increasingly uncomfortable with US military bases as neighbors. While Guam may be reluctant to admit, it appears to be slowly tilting in the same direction.

This is no minor matter. US President Barack Obama will visit Guam next month as part of his upcoming trip to the region, which will include stops in Indonesia and Australia.

The last thing that the Obama team wants to confront is a media circus spawned by upset residents complaining about the US government's seizure of more land on Guam, or about how acres of precious coral reefs may be destroyed in the military makeover.
Webb's timing for this trip was ideal. He arrived on Guam just days after Bordallo had openly confronted US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and US Navy Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff during a defense budget hearing on Capitol Hill.

She planted important buzzwords like "coral reefs" and "aircraft carriers" in the ears of the two top US military decision makers after complaining loudly that any outright seizure of additional land by the US military outside its existing "footprint" on Guam was unacceptable. It is doubtful, by the way, that Bordallo enjoyed making Gates and Mullen squirm in their seats. This was simply meant to send a strong message to the White House.

Bordallo probably is aware that Webb is in the midst of another base-related showdown involving aircraft carriers. There is a proposal to shift an aircraft carrier battle group from Webb's state of Virginia - more specifically from Norfolk, the home base of the US Atlantic Fleet in Virginia - to a base further south in Florida. Webb's antenna went up immediately when this proposal first surfaced, and he adamantly opposes it.

US politicians have battled over the future of US military bases both at home and abroad for years. Webb happens to be an astute Navy-centric politician who is keen on enhancing the US role in Asia at a time when the US government is drowning in red ink.

Webb, a Democrat, is also in a very good position at a time when his political party is going through a very rough time.

Like it or not, Obama needs good advice as he prepares for his second trip to Asia, and Webb who has already upped his profile as a mender of fences following his surprisingly successful foray into Myanmar last year may have important insights to share.

Webb is not Gates. Webb went to Japan, Okinawa and Guam simply to listen, whereas Gates went to Japan in particular not just to listen, but to end the debate and instil in the Japanese a sense of purpose.

When Webb informed Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima a few days ago that the planned airfield relocation on Okinawa from Ginowan to Nago should go forward for safety reasons, one gets the sense that Webb's statement may have been more polite and predictable than firm and distant.

There is an obvious reason for this assessment. A day before this meeting took place, Webb spoke at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo, where he urged both countries to find a solution to the problem which allowed both to "feel comfortable".

"There are ways that the American military could be readjusted, but they also have to be able to perform their mission," he said. "I do believe that we must find a solution on the Futenma issue for the well-being of the citizens in that area."

"And I am open to listening to all the suggestions from the Japanese government and also from the people of Okinawa," he added.

Webb is mindful that the presence of US forces on Okinawa has been a political hot potato for years. Former governor Keiichi Inamine, for example, proposed a complete withdrawal of US military personnel from Okinawa in 2003.

Webb even wrote an article in early 2001 for Parade magazine entitled "Should We Leave Okinawa?" in which he mentioned that former Japanese prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto "speaks often of 'the suffering of the Okinawan people' as a result of the American bases, implicitly supporting their removal".

"Okinawa - 350 miles [563 kilometers] from Taipei, 700 from Seoul, 800 from Manila and about 1,500 from Singapore - is ideally situated not only for the defense of Japan but also for rapid deployment to a wide array of potential crises," Webb wrote. "Ironically, some US defense planners believe that the limits American forces have placed on themselves in order to satisfy the Okinawan people are too restrictive, leading them to recommend a substantial withdrawal from the island."

Webb also highlighted a US National Defense University study in 2000 which recommended a "diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region" of US forces on Okinawa.

In 2010, Webb did not fly into Tokyo in order to somehow rescue Hatoyama, who has been unable and unwilling to make a final decision on this matter. In fact, Hatoyama is experiencing significant coalition government-induced stress lately thanks to the Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) endorsing the idea that all US forces on Okinawa should ultimately be relocated elsewhere, and the People's New Party (PNP) irritating the SDP considerably by conjuring up relocation alternatives that the SDP is not inclined to approve.

Absent support from the SDP and PNP, the government led by Hatoyama and the Democratic Party of Japan would quickly crumble.

In effect, Hatoyama finds himself pitted against Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine, who is no doubt starting to appreciate the situation in which Bordallo finds herself. These two politicians are not exactly cut from the same cloth. Whereas one finds himself at odds with what is being done to - or more precisely being imposed on - his constituents by the US military, the other grapples with how it is being done and what is best for her constituents.

"I won [the recent mayoral election in Nago], promising local people that I will not allow [the US government] to build any new base," Inamine said recently. "I believe that reflects the will of the local people."

Consider these excerpts from Bordallo's recent congressional report, an annual address presented to the Guam legislature.

The first common ground position concerns the overall military footprint on Guam and the navy's desire to acquire additional private and public lands. We will challenge the Navy to conduct the military build-up on their existing land. The navy should better utilize its land and consider moving housing and some support facilities for the marine aviation unit to Andersen Air Force Base. The navy wants to move 8,600 marines to Guam and their question is how much land will that take? Our question is the navy only has so much land on Guam and how many marines will that land accommodate?

Bordallo means business, and she is not timid when it comes to dealing with Gates, the US Navy or anyone else for that matter.

"The plans for the carrier berth in Apra Harbor will result in a significant loss of coral. I will challenge the navy to identify other alternatives that will minimize coral damage and that will take advantage of currently dredged areas," she said. "There is no ideal solution to the transient berth proposal at Apra Harbor but I would urge a solution that requires the least damage to our coral and the least dredging."

The sensitivity of this situation cannot be overlooked. Obama must step off Air Force One and be seen immediately by the public as a global climate-concerned, coral-hugging friend of Guam.

So, as both the Mayor of Nago, Japan and Guam's lone representative in the US Congress find themselves fending off US military planners and each struggles to preserve the future wellbeing of their communities, a bond may be forming.

This is what Webb's world looked like in mid-February as he trekked across the Pacific trying to emphasize the importance of partnerships at each stop. He walked a fine line and then went home to Virginia.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.

Okinawa call to shape new US-Japan era

Japan
Feb 6, 2010
By Axel Berkofsky


Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has given his government a deadline of May to decide whether or not Tokyo will stick to a Japan-United States agreement from 2006 on the relocation of US troops in Japan.

The 2006 accord foresees the relocation of the US Marine Corps air station Futenma from the residential area of Ginowan, located in the southern densely populated part of Okinawa, to Henoko, a less densely populated area on the northern part of the island.

As part of the agreement, signed after 13 years of cumbersome and controversial negotiations, Washington agreed to reduce the number of US troops stationed in Japan (47.000 in total) by relocating 8.000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

Make the 'right' call, Washington says

Plans to revisit the existing relocation agreement have been on the agenda ever since the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led by Hatoyama took power in September. The longer he waits to make the "right" call - which, as far as Washington is concerned, would be to stick to the existing agreement - the more he and his ministers are messing up the US-Japan alliance, said the Wall Street Journal in an opinion piece published on January 28 entitled "The Hatoyama Drift".

"The more Japan's ordinary citizens ... worry that the US-Japan security alliance is at risk, the more they'll lose confidence in their national leaders. Hatoyama's approval ratings are already hovering around 45%, and falling," the WSJ article claimed.

Yet Japan's "ordinary citizens" are not mostly concerned with the country's defense and security policies, as recent opinion polls have shown. The economy and the prime minister and DPJ secretary general Ichiro Ozawa's alleged involvement in financial and corruption scandals are higher priorities.

As it turns out, Hatoyama not caving in to Washington on defense and security matters is one of the few things the Japanese public approves about his government.

US alarmism

United States analysts have in recent months rounded on Japan's prime minister, claiming in print and behind the megaphone that Hatoyama's decision to resist US pressure on the relocation agreement puts the US-Japan alliance at risk and jeopardizes Japanese national security.

This is alarmism, says Linus Hagstrom, acting director of research at The Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm. "The US reaction so far is utterly out of proportion with the gravity of the issue. When US officials and analysts call the base relocation issue a litmus test for the US-Japan alliance, they are overreacting. It is probably part of a strategy to compel Japan into compliance," he told Asia Times Online.

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum in Honolulu, says Japan's relatively new government has yet to fill in some blanks in regards to knowledge of international relations in general and the troops' relocation plan in particular.

"The Japanese administration doesn't have much security expertise and doesn't understand how the agreement works. It is an integrated whole, you can't just do part of the package," he told ATol.

This view is not shared by Christopher W Hughes, professor of international politics and Japanese studies at the University of Warwick, Britain.

"Japan has the right to try to negotiate the base agreements if it wants to. The Pentagon's frustration with Japan after all these years of trying to solve Futenma is understandable, but it is not as if the US does not review and rethink policy or agreements with new administrations. These are two sovereign governments, and supposed allies, so they had better start talking again."

Enough talk

Renegotiating the base relocation agreement, however, is not exactly on top of Washington's Japan policy agenda, as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton informed her counterpart Katsuya Okada in mid-January. At a meeting in Honolulu, Clinton again urged Tokyo to stick to the existing agreement and Japan's alleged "commitment" to relocate the marines from Ginowan to Nago.

The agreement is - at least as far as Washington is concerned - most probably still what US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called "non-negotiable" during his visit to Tokyo last November.

This is pretty much in line with how Washington has always dealt with Japan, as a junior alliance partner, says Linus Hagstrom. "Washington has urged Tokyo over the last 20 years to take on more responsibility in international affairs, engaging in so-called 'burden-sharing'. Judging by the US reaction to the Futenma issue, however, it seems that Washington only supports an increased Japanese role as long as it can control Japan. Washington does not want a more independent ally and is not at all interested in 'power-sharing'."

Nobody wants them

Hatoyama in the meantime is hanging in there, although he has given up on his original idea to find a new home for the Futenma marine corps station outside of Japan.

"From the perspective of a deterrent force, moving all base functions to Guam will probably be impossible. The process will now focus on choosing a site in Japan," the prime minister said recently after Washington made it repeatedly clear that it does not want more than 8,000 of its own soldiers in Guam by 2014.

Indeed, there is no shortage of suggestions coming from within the Hatoyama cabinet on where to relocate the base, but most are unrealistic.

Among others, it was suggested to move the marines to Shimoji, a small island about 280 kilometers southwest of Okinawa's main island, or to Iwoto island, which is close to Tokyo. Others in Hatoyama's cabinet thought it would be a good idea to keep the Futenma station in Ginowan and transfer some of its helicopter drills to what was referred to as a "remote island".

All of them are bad ideas as far as Washington and interested parties in Japan are concerned, Hughes says.

"Of the alternatives in Okinawa, no one wants the marines corps airfield, and no one else in Japan seems to want it. And if someone did, I don't think that would be acceptable to the US side if the idea is to keep the marines' helicopters close to the marines' ground forces," Hughes fears.

Then again, Hughes adds, it might eventually not really matter where the troops move to as long as Washington continues pretending to be interested in negotiating with Tokyo. "I think Hatoyama's plan, if he really has one, is to contain this crisis and get the US to negotiate. Then he might come up with some kind of compromise plan in May which his coalition partners, Okinawa's population and the US will swallow."

More trouble ahead?

All is well that ends well then? Perhaps not quite, since Washington remains worried that Japan's attempts to renegotiate the base relocation agreement could be the beginning of the end of the asymmetric US-Japan alliance.

Hatoyama and his DPJ are already thinking out loud about changing the US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement that protects US troops from legal prosecution in Japan. What's more, Hatoyama and party friends are planning to move the reduction of the Host Nation Support, ie Japan's financial support for the US military in Japan (amounting to US$4 billion per year) up on the US-Japan agenda in the months ahead.

In the meantime, however, Tokyo and Washington are assigning funds for the relocation of US marines to an as yet unclear location in May.

In its fiscal budget for 2010, Tokyo has allocated 28.8 billion yen (US$321 million) for the relocation of the Futenma station and has put aside 34.6 billion yen for the transfer of marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Washington and the US Congress are doing the same, having in December adopted a $310 million budget for the transfer of marines from Okinawa to Guam in 2010 - though they could threaten to delay the allocation of funds beyond 2010 if Tokyo decides not to stick to the 2006 troop relocation agreement.

Familiar tit-for-tat US policies for sure, but Washington might for a change join Tokyo at the receiving end in the months ahead.

Professor Axel Berkofsky is Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University of Pavia, Italy and senior associate research fellow at the Milan-based Istituto per Gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI).

Clinton has some fences to mend

By Eli Clifton
Jan 14, 2010

WASHINGTON - United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is traveling in the South Pacific this week to strengthen longtime US alliances with Australia, improve relations with New Zealand and bring some forward momentum to US-Japanese negotiations over the controversial relocation of the US air station in Okinawa.

While not traveling to China and Japan, as US President Barack Obama did in November, Clinton's trip will likely be dominated by the role of an increasingly powerful China in the Pacific, tensions in the US-Japanese relationship and vocal Chinese objections to the US decision last week to sell nearly US$1 billion in anti-missile batteries and missiles to Taiwan.

Kicking off the nine-day trip from Honolulu, Hawaii, Clinton on Tuesday met with Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada in meetings intended to reduce tensions over the currently stalled agreement to realign US forces based at Futenma, a US Marine Corps air station on Okinawa.

"I don't think we're looking at a breakthrough [in the meetings between Clinton and Okada]. What we're looking at is a feverish attempt to look beyond Futenma," Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Inter Press Service. "Whether they'll be successful is another question."

Prior to taking office in September 2009, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's election platform included a call for re-examining Japan's ties with the US with a particular focus on the 50,000 US military personnel based in Japan.

"Hatoyama wants to show that he is looking out for Japan's interests and wants a more 'equal' relationship but he's not going to win votes by undermining US-Japan relations. He is trying to walk a tough line to be seen as standing up for 'greater equality' but not undermining the [US-Japan] relationship," said Cossa.

Clinton has also been careful in the lead-up to the meetings to play up the strength of the US-Japan alliance and emphasize the policy arenas in which the US and Japan have cooperated.

"We've had a very positive set of interactions with the new Japanese leadership," Clinton told reporters on Monday. "We're grateful that they are playing such a leading role in Afghanistan. Their commitment, a very large trust fund, $5 billion, dwarfs anything that any other country has done."

Indeed, Japan has played a noticeable role in coordinating donor meetings for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and has worked with the US and other allies in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

After delivering a speech in Honolulu on the US's Asia-Pacific policy, Clinton will continue to Papua New Guinea to call attention to environmental protection issues and women's rights.

She will then travel to New Zealand and Australia, where the war in Afghanistan, nuclear and trade issues, China's rising influence in the Pacific and Iran's nuclear program will likely be on the agenda. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key and Clinton on Friday will have a meeting predicted to cement relations between their two countries.

Key's center-right government, which took power in 2008, is widely seen as more friendly to the US than the Labor Party leaders who held office for the previous nine years and maintained more strained relations with Washington.

New Zealand is also likely to lobby Clinton to give momentum to the "Transpacific Partnership" free-trade pact, which would include the US, New Zealand, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, Singapore, Chile and Peru.

On Sunday, Clinton and US Defense Secretary Robert Gates will meet with Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and their Australian counterparts.

These meetings will likely focus on the war in Afghanistan, and Clinton and Gates are expected to lobby for the Australians to increase their commitment of 1,500 troops during the US "surge" of an additional deployment of 30,000 troops in Afghanistan.

While China is not on Clinton's itinerary, the effects of recent US arms sales to Taiwan will loom over the trip. The Obama administration has been quick to point out that the deal did not include F-16 fighter jets or Blackhawk helicopters, a decision that the White House said was a concession to Beijing's objections to the arms deal.

China has voiced concern over the US decision to go through with the $1 billion arms deal negotiated under the George W Bush administration as well as Obama's decision to meet with exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.

On Monday, Clinton, eager to dispel the notion that US-China relations are deteriorating, told reporters that the US and China had a "mature relationship" and that "it doesn't go off the rails when we have differences of opinion".

On Obama's upcoming meeting with the Dalai Lama, Clinton said, "We have a difference of perspective on the role and ambitions of the Dalai Lama, which we've been very public about."

(Inter Press Service)

Japan: A new battle over Okinawa

Nov 14, 2009
By Kosuke Takahashi

TOKYO - United States President Barack Obama lands in Tokyo on Friday on the first stop of his maiden trip to Asia, but a less than 24 hours visit may not be enough to change public opinion in the country.

In Japan, it's often said you can gauge social undercurrents by looking at advertising billboards on trains, as they mirror society. "Don't cave in to the threat of the US!" says one such advert for a popular Japanese weekly magazine, currently hung in crowded commuter trains in Tokyo.

The name of the magazine is Shukan Asahi, it has denounced as high-handed the US government's approach to the long-standing, thorny issue of the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa prefecture.

The magazine cites a "warning" made by US Defense Secretary Robert Gates during a visit to Tokyo last month: that unless the heliport functions of the Futenma facility were moved by 2014 to a coastal area in the marines' Camp Schwab located in the less densely populated city of Nago, northern Okinawa - as agreed in the 2006 bilateral pact on the realignment of US forces - the transfer of around 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to the US Pacific territory of Guam would not occur.

Recently, US heavyweights such as Richard Lawless, former deputy under secretary of defense, have also appeared frequently in Japanese media to reiterate Gates' warning .

Tensions over the US troops stationed on the island, which have simmered since three US servicemen were convicted for the rape of a 12-year-old girl in Okinawa in 1995, are again on the rise .

Despite the sweltering heat, about 21,000 Japanese gathered on Sunday on the island to demand that the base in Futenma be moved off the island. The demonstration was triggered by a deadly hit-and-run incident involving a US serviceman. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has backed demands that the serviceman detained over the alleged crime, which killed a 66-year-old Okinawan man, be handed over to Japanese justice.

A joint poll conducted by the Ryukyu Shimpo and the Mainichi Shimbun on October 30 and November 1 found that 69.7% of Okinawans said the Hatoyama administration should renegotiate with the US about plans to move the Futenma base out of the prefecture, or even the country. The poll also showed that 67% of respondents opposed relocation to Camp Schwab.

The long-running relocation dispute over Futenma is rocking the foundations of the Japan-US relationship, just ahead of next year's 50th anniversary of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty between the countries.

"Much of the punditry in the media would have us believe that Japan and the US were on the verge of a breakup over where to relocate 60 marine helicopters," Patrick Cronin, a senior adviser and director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, told Asia Times Online in an e-mail interview. "Yet durable alliances are based on common interests, not simply disagreements over means."

"As difficult an issue as the relocation of Futenma Marine Air Station has been, the salient question is whether next year's half-centenary celebration of the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty will mark the end of the alliance as we know it or the beginning of the alliance we both need for the 21st century," Cronin added.

During the Japan-US summit, the relocation of the base in Okinawa will not be a major item on the agenda. Obama is widely expected to stress relations with Japan as a "cornerstone" of US foreign policy, seeking re-engagement with Tokyo's new administration.

Obama and Hatoyama are expected to re-affirm cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 - without mentioning any specific base year for calculation, or Japan's consideration for the US, one of the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, along with China. They will also renew their determination to create a world without nuclear weapons.

Japan's new dawn
As Hatoyama's new administration undertakes a thorough review of Japan's alliance with the US, one which is likely to raise concern in Washington, Japan-American relations face a fundamental political change.

Hatoyama and his center-left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) unseated the pro-US Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in a House of Representatives election on August 30, ending the LDP's near-perpetual one party rule of the past half century.

Nonetheless, the LDP appears to have finally completed its historical mission in the post-Cold War era - supporting Japan's military role as an anti-communist bastion of the US against China and Russia.

The US "nuclear umbrella" has protected Japan against potential adversaries such as China, North Korea and Russia, while assuring other states in the region that suffered under Japan's colonial rule that Tokyo would not return to its militaristic past.

Due to the US nuclear deterrent, Japan has enjoyed a generally stable strategic outlook, with its population wary of major change and militarization since the end of World War II, a legacy of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Previous LDP governments have mainly focused on national interests and on economic growth.

The era of Japan's strong pacifism, as enshrined in the US-imposed "peace constitution", determined the posture and structure of Japan's military forces to defend the nation and made the security alliance with the US the centerpiece of Japanese security policy in the post-war period.

"The [Harry S] Truman and [Dwight D] Eisenhower administrations saw a resurgent Japanese economy as the engine of growth in the Asia-Pacific region," Cronin said. "Providing an unsinkable aircraft carrier in exchange for Japan's economic revival was a deliberate political choice made by Washington and Tokyo based on their vital interests at the time of the original 1951 treaty."

During the 2001 to 2006 Junichiro Koizumi administration, a symbol of Japan's reformist policy, Japan aimed to strengthen bilateral military and security ties with the US - a drive reinforced by China's military buildup, North Korea's nuclear crisis and the global threat of terrorism.

The US-Japan security alliance under former US president George W Bush and Koizumi is often referred to as a "golden era" between the two countries. Koizumi deployed Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) units to Iraq to contribute to America's war against terrorism.

The new leaders in Tokyo still regard US strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the US as essential for Japan's overall security - as well as for peace and security in the region - but they do not necessarily see it as essential for the nation's economic development. Enormous economic growth in East Asia - especially in China, which is a 1.3 billion consumer market - is changing the structure of worldwide and regional business and industry.

Hatoyama has called for an East Asian "community" to develop to the extent that it resembles an Asian version of the European Union. He also advocates a common Asian currency as a natural extension of the rapid economic growth in the region. Hatoyama aims to conduct a swift shift in Tokyo's axis of cooperation towards other Asian nations.

The DPJ, the dominant party in the ruling coalition led by Hatoyama, has advocated policies of multilateral cooperation while calling for a more equal partnership with the US. The DPJ has often refused to support US policies, most notably the war in Iraq, and has criticized post-war Japanese diplomatic policy as "toeing the US line".

Japan's newly elected government was voted into office on a platform of curtailing the US military presence on Okinawa, where 75% of all US forces in Japan are located. In an Upper House question-and-answer session on October 29, Hatoyama said the review of Japan's alliance with the US would be "comprehensive". He later told reporters that it would cover Japanese funding of US bases, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the relocation of the Futenma station.

Hatoyama said his government was exploring the possibility of reducing Japan's host-nation spending on US military bases. This so-called "sympathy budget" began in 1978 and covers utilities and other expenses.

The allocation for fiscal year 2009 comes to 189.7 billion yen (US$2.1 billion). With government debt expected to reach 187% of gross domestic product this year, foremost among major economies, Tokyo no longer wants to outlay the large sums of money it currently pays to support US military forces in Japan. This fiscal restraint also places a limit how much it can spend to modernize its Self Defense Forces (SDF) domestically.

The SOFA, which governs US military operations in Japan and legal arrangements for its personnel, has not been revised for nearly half a century. A group of governors representing prefectures that host military facilities, such as the Okinawa and Kanagawa prefectures, have called for a clause covering environmental pollution and destruction at US military bases in Japan.

In terms of the relocation of Futenma, the prime minister said "various options" would be considered. The government inherited the 2006 Japan-US agreement that calls for relocating the base within Okinawa, but Hatoyama has indicated that he will seek to relocate the air station outside of Okinawa, possibly even outside Japan.

Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada has floated the idea of merging Futenma's heliport functions with the nearby Kadena Air Base - the largest US military base in the Far East.

"It is possible, I believe, to merge operations at Kadena - for normal day-to-day circumstances," Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, where he specializes in US national security policy, told Asia Times Online. "But in that event, we need much better preparation for crisis operations, including greater access to SDF and even civilian airfields on Okinawa [and preparations in advance at those sites]."

Under US pressure, Japan has also announced it will spend as much as $5 billion over the next five years to help with the reconstruction of war-torn Afghanistan.

"The majority of the Japanese won't accept that Afghan aid," Japanese military analyst Toshiyuki Shikata told Asia Times Online. "Historically, Alexander the Great, the British Empire and the Soviet Union all failed to conquer Afghanistan. The US, as an oceanic state, will have further difficulties to control Afghan, which is just surrounded by mountainous areas and lands. It's not cost-effective for the US."

Kosuke Takahashi is a Tokyo-based journalist. Besides Asia Times Online, he also writes for Jane's Defence Weekly as Tokyo correspondent.

US frets over Tokyo drift

Japan Nov 5, 2009
By Peter J Brown

As Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama speaks of the need for change, and signals his desire to forge a more robust partnership with China to create a viable East Asian "community", he must remain in close contact with fellow Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) members, other members of his new coalition government and Japan's military - known as the Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

The United States will also need to be informed of exactly where things stand as Hatoyama tries to find a way "to show that he changed course on the alliance - creating more 'independence' for Japan without actually doing any damage to the security relationship that guarantees Japan's survival in a dangerous neighborhood", according to Michael Green, senior adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

"So, we are in for another few months - if not years - of uncertainty. In the end, public opinion and the reality of the strategic situation in Asia suggest the US-Japan alliance will stay strong and may even get stronger, but now there is a certain amount of drift and uncertainty that is not welcome in Washington," said Green.

"While Hatoyama is not willing to change Japan's relationship with the US, the US has begun to question the posture of the Hatoyama government," said Kazuto Suzuki, an associate professor of International Political Economy at Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy. "Hatoyama is not fully aware of the change in the mood in the US, particularly at the Pentagon."

What happens at sea in particular - both in the Pacific and to a lesser extent in the Indian Ocean - is of the utmost importance to the Japan-US alliance. The US is not about to alter its military cooperation and technology-sharing arrangement with Japan based on a few of Hatoyama's more seemingly altruistic pronouncements about the need for a shift in direction in Japan's foreign policy.

"Short of a major rupture in the alliance, such a linkage does not exist yet for the sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense [BMD] system," said associate professor Toshi Yoshihara of the US Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department. "Both need each other for the sea-based component of missile defense as it is currently configured to work. The US needs the forward bases in Japan for its Aegis destroyers and the radar sites based on Japan to detect, track, and intercept missiles launched from the region. Japan needs the anti-missile umbrella and the technologies for an independent capability furnished by the US."

The JSDF are certainly aware of the not-so-subtle shift in attitude in the US. Yet at the same time, the JSDF has been flexible and pragmatic when it comes to its dealings with China. Why not? This appears to be a very logical and sound approach at a time when General Xu Caihou, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, has been meeting in the Pentagon with US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and when other Chinese generals have been welcomed aboard the US aircraft carrier George Washington as it recently lay at anchor in Hong Kong harbor for the first time.

"The regional community, or East Asian Community, issue is strictly limited to the economic and cultural domain at this moment. The [JSDF] do not consider that this concept will evolve into military cooperation," said Suzuki, who added that the JSDF are on good terms with the Chinese military on a bilateral basis. "The contacts of senior officers, and a constant exchange of information are facilitating this bilateral relationship."

The JSDF are aware of the boundaries which inhibit Japan from going too far down this road for a number of reasons, including the fact that numerous joint projects are now underway with the US. Many are very sensitive involving anti-missile, satellite and anti-submarine technology.

For example, one joint US-Japan project involves the SM-3 block 2A interceptor missile, along with a follow-on known as the SM-3 Block 2B. These missiles are not only key components in the BMD system that both Japan and the US embrace, but also now vital to Europe's BMD plans.

In addition, Japan is still seeking access to very sophisticated US military equipment such as the F-22 advanced fighter aircraft, although many observers see this as a quest that has run almost entirely out of steam.

"The JSDF are generally optimistic about a more dynamic political leadership emerging from the DPJ ranks. Moreover, the uniformed military has better relations with the DPJ than many of the bureaucracies more closely associated with the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] such as the Foreign Ministry or the Health Ministry," said Green.

This does not mean that the JSDF support everything that Hatoyama and the DPJ have said and done during the past few months.

"[The JSDF appear to be concerned by] the DPJ's rather cavalier rhetoric about China and the US. [Another concern] is the downward pressure on the defense budget by the DPJ which is likely to emphasize things that get votes at home," said Green. "Finally, the senior officers were unhappy that Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa criticized their performance in the Indian Ocean, believing that criticism of the LDP's policies should not lead to criticism of the JSDF for doing their duty."

Hatoyama informed the Diet (parliament) in early November that Japan would terminate its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in mid-January. On the very next day, Kitazawa said there was a very strong possibility that Japan would commence another refueling mission in early 2010 in support of the multi-national naval force assigned to anti-piracy duties off the coast of Africa.

While US President Barack Obama makes his first official trip to Asia this month, it seems unlikely that some sort of sweeping declaration about joint US-Japan defense issues will be made during his visit to Japan.

According to Yoshihara, "North Korean missile tests and China's impressive missile modernization program showcased during the National Day celebrations on October 1 underscore the missile danger to Japan and the US."

"This is a shared threat perception that goes back more than a decade with the DPRK's [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea] Taepodong missile launch in July 1998. As a result, there is consensus within the trans-Pacific strategic community that deterrence-by-denial through missile defense is one important element for providing security," said Yoshihara.

That said, any BMD cooperation involving Japan and the US cuts both ways politically.

"On the one hand, a genuine joint BMD architecture would mean unprecedented integration and information sharing. This could be interpreted as putting Japan on a more equal footing with the US, a key foreign policy item of the DPJ's campaign manifesto," said Yoshihara. "On the other hand, Tokyo could become even more reliant on cutting-edge US capabilities for its defense, thus lending credence to those who fear overdependence on the United States."

For a joint BMD system to work properly, Japan needs to resolve clearly the issue of collective self-defense, "a right that Tokyo has denied to itself", according to Yoshihara. In fact, BMD is fast becoming a key barometer of the alliance's long-term vitality at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

"Suppose North Korea fires a missile at the US. Would Japanese tracking or interception of the missile constitute collective self defense? What if Japan failed to intercept the missile because Tokyo feared violating the ban on collective self defense? What if, as a consequence, Washington accuses Tokyo of dereliction of duty as a treaty ally? So, BMD cooperation is not problem - free for Japan," said Yoshihara.

Since August's election in Japan brought to an end nearly 50 years of continuous rule by the LDP, Suzuki says "there are too many things going on, and defense [policy] is one thing that they [the DPJ] do not have to bother with too much because stability is so important".

However, when it comes to Japan's defense budget, the DPJ and the JSDF might find themselves in a very sticky situation.

"Although the Japanese military is willing to accept new changes [proposed by the DPJ], their primary concern is how to protect the defense budget from any huge budget cuts," said Suzuki. "However, Kitazawa maintains a good relationship with the Japanese military, and acts on their behalf. So, senior members of the military [generally support the DPJ's efforts to create a new defense strategy], but are holding firm against the budget cuts."

The outcome here is quite difficult to predict. Certain members of this new left of center coalition government, especially the Social Democratic Party (SDP), have consistently charted a pacifist course and almost automatically endorse all reductions in defense spending. Still, the SDP has not resorted to a spirited nor prolonged attack as far as Japan's plans for BMD are concerned.

"Although the SDP has never acknowledged that BMD is constitutional, it seems that they find BMD to be acceptable within their idea of Japan's constitution," said Suzuki, who added that for the SDP to adamantly oppose everything on Hatoyama's current defense agenda "would be suicidal".

"The SDP will not spread their front into lots of different issues as long as there are specific issues that need to be solved. If the US adopted some hawkish approach towards North Korea or China, the SDP may be a problem, but so far, the Obama administration has not done so," said Suzuki.

While some point to the ranks of the former Socialist Party or coalition members with close ties to academics on the left as those likely to seize upon the BMD issue to help unravel US-Japan relations, the simple truth is that anti-BMD sentiment has always been quite close to the surface within the ranks of the DPJ itself.

In September, for example, soon after the election, one DPJ Lower House member and DPJ deputy spokesman urged the new government to eliminate BMD altogether. Tsuyoshi Yamaguchi branded BMD as "almost totally useless" and nearly set off a political firestorm in the process. Yamaguchi objected strongly to a request for more than a 50% increase in missile defense-related expenditures in next year's budget.

"Regardless of the threat from North Korea, defense specialists must know that no number of SM3s or PAC3s can directly protect us," Yamaguchi told Bloomberg.

"Even current Foreign Minister [Katsuya] Okada has expressed doubts about BMD in the past. But the program is well established and has worked in field testing and in surveillance of North Korean launches, so I do not expect any serious setbacks," said Green.

Last month's successful completion of a joint tracking exercise, the final in a series of four tests conducted by the Japanese destroyer, JS Myoko, is the latest indicator of the continuing success of this joint collaboration.

"This is an increasingly proven capability that would benefit both sides. Given the 'sunk costs' and prospective benefits for both sides, I doubt that Hatoyama's policies would end or curtail BMD cooperation. Indeed, it is one of the emerging success stories for the alliance," said Yoshihara. "This is not a capability that Washington can withdraw or deny without consequences."

Beyond BMD, Green emphasizes the importance of the decision by the DPJ to not oppose the JSDF anti-piracy mission which suggests the "normalization" of Japanese security policy may not slow down that much under the DPJ.

"This involves two new precedents, including Japan's first overseas base in Djibouti and Japan's first rules of engagement allowing the use of deadly force to protect a third nation's vessels - though against pirates rather than another state," said Green. "[Normalization] could even accelerate after next summer's [Upper House] election clears out the socialists and other obstacles to moving the government back towards the center of the ideological spectrum."

Hatoyama is well aware of the forces at work here, including external forces that help to shape US-Japan relations over China, Taiwan and North Korea. In Taiwan, President Ma Ying-jeou has recently accused the US government of being too easily influenced by China as he declared that the US is stalling with respect to the planned sale to Taiwan of 66 F-16 fighter aircraft. Ma knows that he is irritating China enormously by even mentioning this sale, and he also knows that if this sale goes forward, China will be furious with the US, and will find ways to punish the US accordingly.

Certainly, North Korea does not appreciate the timing of new revelations in the Japanese media these past few days concerning the abductions of Japanese citizens by the North Koreans and the allegation that Kim Jong-il exercised command authority over North Korean abduction operations starting in the 1970s. When Kim met with prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2002, he denied any role in these operations.

This almost guarantees that Pyongyang's volatility and confrontational stance will be ramping up over the coming days, especially when Obama's trip to the region already lent itself to exploitation by the North Koreans. Their rhetoric concerning reprocessing and nuclear weapons-related matters of late, for example, is definitely an indication that Pyongyang has more news flashes in store for Obama's trip to Asia.

All of this noise from North Korea and increasing static in Taiwan elevates the status of the BMD and gives the US-Japan alliance added weight, whether Japanese politicians like it or not.

Hatoyama is engaged in a delicate balancing act here. As everyone mulls the otherwise anemic economic rebound, he must closely monitor events in China, Taiwan and North Korea while hoping that when Obama arrives in Tokyo, Obama understands that the air is charged and that his every move in Japan and elsewhere in the region could profoundly affect the stability of the Japanese government and the future of East Asia.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.

Gates gets grumpy in Tokyo

Oct 28, 2009
By Peter J Brown

United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has to be more mindful of his body language. It says a lot about his state of mind. This is something that can be developed by playing poker, among other things, and given the very high stakes game that is unfolding in Asia, perhaps a round of cards might be just what Gates needs.

Two photos of Gates this month - one taken in Tokyo and a later one taken in Seoul - convey two different messages entirely. The photo of Gates meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa in Tokyo shows an unhappy, even irate, Gates. There is no mistaking his body language. His latest trip to Japan was no doubt frustrating, or perhaps worse, a waste of his time.

In Seoul just a few hours later, Gates was all smiles as the cameras clicked.

Back in Washington DC, the Washington Post ran a picture of a grumpy Gates in Tokyo along with a story in which a senior US State Department official declared that, these days, China was easier to deal with than Japan.

Gates had hoped to depart from Tokyo last week with a firm agreement in place concerning the relocation of the US Marine Corps base on Okinawa, which in turn would allow President Barack Obama's visit to Japan next month to proceed more smoothly. Instead, Gates got nothing but a garbled message from Japan, which benefits neither Japan nor the US.

Gates simply wanted Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama to say, "We have a deal, and we will have it all finalized by the time President Obama touches down in Tokyo next month. I promise, and there will be no surprises." Instead, Gates got a healthy dose of "don't knows" as in, "We don't know when we will make a decision, and we don't know what exactly that decision will be."

One retired senior Japanese military officer described the visit by Gates as one that brought to the surface the many deep problems in the national security agenda of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which came to power after elections in August.

"For one thing, the Social Democratic Party [a partner in the ruling coalition], which has insisted on a total pullout of US forces from Japan, has been given far too much leverage because of the fragile nature of the base of this coalition," this officer said. "Also, the decision by the DPJ to delay the release [pending review of Japanese defense policy] of the so-called National Defense Program Guideline, which was expected by the end of this year until next year, shows how confused the DPJ is when it comes to identifying major defense policy objectives. And it is not the result of the fact that the government is so new."

At the same time, while the Gates visit may have involved a look at the reality of the situation - something that the new government was not ready to deal with at this time - it simply provided the DPJ government with another opportunity to portray itself as a force for change without compelling Hatoyama and his coalition to take a stand as well one way or the other.

"It is as if better solutions will result only if more time is allowed to pass," said this retired officer. "This explains the uncertain status of the Okinawa relocation plan. Hatoyama is simply avoiding the hard decision, and is instead buying time so as to avoid upsetting the two opposing parties in this instance, that is, the US government and the residents of Okinawa."

Hatoyama and the DPJ may have forgotten that there are two new governments involved here and not one. The important role that Gates plays may also have been forgotten. Gates in the only cabinet officer left standing from the prior administration of George W Bush. He represents a desire for continuity and competence in a US administration which promised sweeping changes, while the reform-centric team of Hatoyama and Kitazawa has promised the people of Okinawa that their wishes will be upheld and that Japan was not bound to the current relocation scheme.

The relocation plan involves moving 9,000 US Marines from the southern island of Okinawa to the US Pacific island of Guam, at a cost of US$10 billion - two-thirds of which would be paid by Japan. It also requires the relocation of a US air base from the Okinawa town of Futenma to a less densely populated part of the island.

Gates knows all about battles with bureaucrats and politicians from both major political parties in the US, so he knows what Hatoyama is confronting, but what he cannot be so sure about is what sequence of events or underlying motives actually triggered the outcome here, which compelled him to leave Japan with all this unfinished business still in limbo last week.

After decades of living in close harmony with the US, Tokyo is starting to drift. It may be deliberate or it may be quite by accident; either way, Japan will have to realize that making the US nervous may lead to unpleasant consequences for all parties.

US Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied Gates. Mullen met for the first time with Japanese General Ryoichi Oriki last week, and he described the US-Japan alliance as rock-solid. Mullen also thanked Japan for its many contributions to peace around the world.

While the defense of Japan is the top priority, the alliance "has also provided a basis for regional stability and for response", Mullen said. The future plans for US forces in Japan are focused on "the military capability, the operational flexibility [and] the adjustment to the continuing threats in the region", he said.

Mullen addressed the dual threat posed by North Korea and China's military build-up that seems targeted at US and Japanese naval forces.

"We all agree that a de-nuclearized North Korea is the outcome we all seek. We can't accept anything else," he said. "I have also been concerned about [China's] increased investment in their defense capability, their clear shift of focus from a ground-centric force to a naval- and air- centric force that seems to, now, push off-island, if you will, beyond the first island chain and out to the second island chain."

At the same time, Mullen emphasized that the US appreciated the enormous value of military-to-military relationships and exchanges with China. In fact, on Monday, less than a week after leaving Tokyo, Gates was scheduled to welcome General Xu Caihao, the vice chairman of the People's Liberation Army Central Military Commission and China's second-highest ranking uniformed officer, to Washington. Xu will be in the US from October 24 to October 31.

However, these exchanges by themselves are not enough to dispel the uncertainty that surrounds the strategic intent of the buildup now underway.

"I have said for a long time that the peaceful rise of China, the economic engine that China is - there's a lot of positive potential there," Mullen said. "And so I would hope in the end that, in fact, their strategic intent is a positive one of security for their people and their country and not one that puts us into a position that could generate a conflict."

Mullen's comments were clearly aimed at a Japanese audience that stepped into voting booths at Japan's national election in August and overwhelmingly signaled its enthusiasm both for Hatoyama as a person and for the new DPJ agenda.

Hatoyama has his hands full as he balances the Japanese electorate's expectations with the security needs of his country.

In his first speech to the Diet (parliament) on Monday, Hatoyama spoke of the importance of a ''close and equal [and multi-layered] Japan-US alliance" and he portrayed this as the basis for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He perceived the alliance as one where both the US and Japan carried equal weight when it came to shaping the role both Tokyo and Washington would play in maintaining global peace and security.

Hatoyama hedged on the realignment of US forces in Japan. While he once again acknowledged the "burden, pains and sorrows experienced by the people in Okinawa [prefecture]" - as if to distance his government from the deal that Japan and the US forged in 2006 - he never went as far as to declare the 2006 agreement dead in the water.

Much to the extreme disappointment of many Japanese military officials and defense planners, what is dead is any hope that the US will export the F-22 to Japan. This stealthy and sophisticated fighter jet has been high on Japan's list for months, even while F-22 weather-related problems, and those related to heavy rain in particular, made this aircraft seem not as invincible as it appeared.

In turn, Gates got not so good news when it came to Japanese exports. Perhaps this was another reason for that unhappy look on his face. After all, besides the base controversy, Gates was in Tokyo to win Japanese approval for SM-3 Block 2A missile exports.

SM-3 Block 2A missiles are state-of-the-art anti-missile weapons that can be deployed on ships. The US and Japan have been working together on this system as well as other high-tech anti-submarine and other cutting-edge defense hardware and software.

Gates, however, is once again confronting anti-US sentiment in the ruling coalition with the Social Democratic Party clearly in the driver's seat on this one. And any deal that would overturn the long-established Japanese ban on weapons exports to nations - other than joint US-Japanese anti-missile systems and components exported to the US - let alone any US-driven deal to this effect, faces stiff resistance.

In other words, when Gates brought this issue up during his meeting with Kitazawa, the Japanese defense minister showed that body language is something he does know well, and he succeeded in not rolling his eyes as he politely informed Gates that the request would be given due consideration.

Because all the indicators point to a done deal down the road, Kitazawa was just being diplomatic, and perhaps pragmatic, just days before the latest round of elections in Japan - two by-elections were held last weekend.

Some in the US who have watched the debate over the viability of Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) technology might find this to be a curious offshore twist to the story of this missile defense program. In other words, whereas at one point KEI was close to termination as a program in the US, it seems as if it was alive and well - and well-funded - far away on the other side of the Pacific.

Japan's contribution in this instance involved the integrity of infrared ray sensors, while the US was responsible for the KEI projectile, which is designed to intentionally collide at very high speed with an incoming enemy ballistic missile.

One export item that remained under the radar screen last week was Mitsubishi Electric Corp's Proximity Link System (PLS), which will be used to guide US-based Orbital Science's future Cygnus resupply mission spacecraft to the International Space Station (ISS) during nine upcoming resupply missions for the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), starting in 2011.

Just days before Gates arrived in Japan, Mitsubishi Electric announced the $66 million PLS deal, which involved technology originally developed for use on the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency's H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV).

As unmanned PLS-equipped spacecraft approach the ISS, the PLS serves as an automated guidance, rendezvous and docking mechanism. It establishes a link to the Proximity Communication System, which was installed in the ISS with the Japanese Kibo Experimental Module.

The successful operation and reliability of the PLS has no doubt caught the attention of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and specifically the DARPA team working on the "Future, Fast, Flexible, Fractionated, Free-Flying spacecraft" project known simply as F6.

F6 involves replacing today's large monolithic spacecraft with clusters or groups of wirelessly linked elements, or nodes, which execute or replicate a specific spacecraft function. You simply unite these nodes together in space, and presto, you have a satellite.

PLS would greatly enhance recoupling to the extent that pairs of F6 nodes would engage in refueling or other mated operations in space. However, because under the existing Japanese export rules, a PLS system could not be exported to the US for use by DARPA - again the "D" stands for "Defense" - DARPA will have to look elsewhere or Japan will have to further revise and amend its export regulations.

So, whereas SM-3 Block 2A missiles can be exported to the US under exemption approved in 2004, perhaps PLS systems can only be exported the US on a limited basis, and only to non-defense US customers at this time absent further revisions or amendments.

Wonder who is smiling now.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.