Showing posts with label East_Asia_Forum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label East_Asia_Forum. Show all posts

Monday, January 25, 2010

Japan’s security options limited by economic realities






    January 25th, 2010

    Author: Brad Glosserman, CSIS, and Robert Madsen, MIT

    Since the inauguration of the Hatoyama administration in Tokyo last September, US-Japan relations have resembled a slow-motion train wreck. The Hatoyama government’s desire to ‘rebalance’ Japan’s foreign policy and to forge ‘a more equal relationship’ with its ally have triggered alarms and raised fears of a rupture, rather than the recalibration that everyone professes to want. But those fears are misplaced. Japan in fact has no viable alternative to its alliance with the United States. The real danger is that the current troubles might do lasting damage to what Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently described as a ‘truly indispensible’ partnership.

    There are many, generally well-known, reasons why the alliance will almost certainly survive this difficult period. Most obvious here are the many values and geopolitical interests that Tokyo and Washington share. Also important is the high degree of security that the relationship has brought Japan at very low cost. Voters may complain about the roughly $4 billion that they contribute annually as host nation support, but much of that money actually goes to Japanese workers on the US bases and hence benefits the local economy. Moreover, even the $6 billion that it would cost Tokyo to relocate US Marines to Guam is a pittance compared to the cost of replacing those capabilities indigenously. Nor are alternative security schemes very attractive. As for collective defense, there is no multilateral security architecture in Asia, at least none to which Japan could reasonably entrust its fate at a time of North Korean belligerence and persistent anxieties about China’s rise. The possibility of something approaching an alliance with Beijing is likewise unrealistic. Historical tensions, competing aspirations to lead East Asia, and clashes over territory restrict the range for cooperative relations between these neighbors and render the possibility of an intimate Sino-Japanese security relationship illusory. At this point rudimentary confidence-building measures are the order of the day.

    A policy of much greater self-reliance is also improbable. The Japanese public is still uncomfortable with a fully functional military. The scars on the political landscape from the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have not fully healed, leaving a sincere and deep anti-nuclear pacifism. The transformation of the Japan Defense Agency into a ministry did little to overcome that popular skepticism regarding both conventional and nuclear armament. To the contrary, the aging of the population implies a gradual turn in a more conservative direction – not the sort of thing that would encourage political parties to undertake bold new security initiatives.

    Yet these political and diplomatic obstacles are just foothills. Behind them stand the mountains of economic exigency, mountains that definitively block the path to a new security system. All of the alternatives would require raising the military budget far above the 1 per cent of GDP that Japan has maintained for several decades. Self-reliance, to adduce one example, would require that Tokyo shoulder the entire financial burden of national defense while a shift toward China or regional defense would necessitate retooling the existing, US-based weapons systems. Such changes would inevitably prove expensive.

    The importance of economic considerations may be inferred from the established direction of security policy. Although the economy grew robustly in the middle 2000s, bringing the government significantly more tax revenue, during these years, successive governments reduced the defense budget, which fell from ¥4.94 trillion in 2002 to ¥4.74 trillion in 2008. Critical armament programs were scaled back over this period, which meant that Japan gradually grew more dependent on the US security guarantee. Reversing this trend is something that the Ministry of Finance, other relatively parsimonious parts of the civil service, and large portions of the electorate would firmly oppose.

    The trend toward economisation will presumably intensify under the DPJ government. Although Ozawa Ichiro and other DPJ luminaries want Japan to adopt a more independent and assertive foreign policy, the government’s focus is squarely on domestic affairs. Its foremost objectives are asserting control over the civil service and winning this summer’s Upper House election. If those goals are attained, the prime minister and his Cabinet will then embark on their domestic agenda of promoting green technology, offering more subsidies for farmers and other favored lobbies, expanding childcare support and other assistance to families, and meeting the immense healthcare needs of a rapidly aging population. These priorities matter both because they indicate the government’s lack of interest in strategic departures and because they will consume resources that would otherwise be available for military expansion. Therefore, it is not surprising that Prime Minister Hatoyama has postponed indefinitely the formulation of the new National Defense Program Guidelines as well as the Mid-Term Defense Program.

    More restrictive than the direction of government policy, however, is a lack of money. Put simply, Japanese GDP will not grow fast enough over the next decade to fund expensive new demarches. In the short term, the country could produce a burst of growth if there were sufficient demand to employ the swathes of excess capacity that presently exist. But the scope for increased fiscal stimulus and greater overseas demand are both fairly predictable and, unfortunately, limited. Over time, companies will close down excess facilities and the potential rate of GDP growth will fall below 1.5 per cent. The combination of inadequate demand in the short term and the inability to expand supply quickly in the medium term means that the actual rate of economic growth through 2015 will probably barely exceed 1.0 per cent per annum. This leaves little margin for Tokyo to expand defense expenditures through tax revenues.

    The remaining option for financing a new defense strategy is borrowing, but here too, Japan’s room for maneuver is severely constrained. The gross national debt is already approaching 200 per cent of GDP, a vertiginous level by international standards and one that alarms government officials and much of the electorate. Furthermore, that debt is rising fast because, after shrinking during the commercial efflorescence of the middle 2000s, the government budget deficit has widened again. New borrowing will reach 8 per cent of GDP in 2010 before – assuming a politically questionable degree of fiscal discipline – dropping back to just under 6 per cent of that standard by 2016 and slightly less in subsequent years. Interest rates are now so depressed that there is little danger of a financial crisis anytime soon, but there is widespread agreement that it would be rash to undertake significant additional burdens.

    In short, Japan cannot afford to abandon its alliance with the United States. This does not mean, however, that Washington can adopt an obdurate stance in its talks with Tokyo, for doing so would vitiate the public support that is critical to the bilateral relationship. It would make more sense to accommodate Japan’s reasonable needs while also acknowledging that economic trends imply that Tokyo’s financial contribution to the alliance may well diminish over time. The goodwill engendered by such a moderate negotiating strategy would then reinforce the alliance during the probably difficult transition to Chinese regional dominance. Put simply, the United States should not dwell on the fact that Japan has no alternative to the bilateral partnership but rather seek to enhance the mutual confidence that underlies it.

    Brad Glosserman is executive director of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Robert Madsen is senior fellow at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Mrs Clinton and Mr Ozawa






Author: Tobias Harris
This entry was posted on Saturday, February 14th, 2009 at 11:00 pm

The US State Department is reportedly sounding out the DPJ on the possibility of a meeting between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro when Secretary Clinton visits Japan next week.

hillary3

Sankei reports that it would be the first ever meeting between a US secretary of state and the leader of a Japanese opposition party. The DPJ and Mr. Ozawa, however, are treading carefully before committing to a meeting. Mr. Ozawa reportedly told the party leadership, "If the schedule works, we'll meet, but election preparations are my top priority."

On one level, meeting with Mrs. Clinton should be a no brainer for Mr. Ozawa. A meeting would show that the alliance is in the process of transitioning to a post-LDP alliance. The DPJ could signal that the alliance would be safe in its hands, that it is keen to forge a new relationship with the Obama administration that rectifies the mistakes the DPJ believes were made under the Bush administration in cooperation with the LDP.

But on the other hand, it is worth asking whether the DPJ would gain anything from a meeting. Washington will not pick the next government; the Japanese people will. And at the moment the Japanese people do not seem to be interested in business as usual in the alliance. Inevitably the public script for a Clinton-Ozawa meeting would involve some sort of reaffirmation of the importance of the alliance, a photo op to reassure the folks back in Washington, undercutting the DPJ's message of calling for a revision of the realignment agreement that moves US forces from Okinawa entirely. Private discussions between the two would be little more useful, as Mr. Ozawa is not in power yet. Jun Okumura sees similar problems with this meeting.

But now that the story has been leaked that Mrs. Clinton wants a meeting, Mr. Ozawa will undoubtedly be pressured to accept, lest he be lambasted in the press — with the help of LDP politicians — for "unstatesmanlike" conduct. (Just as he was criticized after missing a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last year.) Ultimately the opportunity to forge some link with the Obama administration, plus the possible public relations blow to the DPJ's reputation, will lead Mr. Ozawa to meet with Mrs. Clinton.

As for the wisdom of the meeting on the part of Mrs. Clinton, I appreciate that the Obama administration is reaching out to the largest opposition party instead of treating the DPJ (or Ozawa, anyway) like an enemy at the gates of the alliance, as, for example, this article more or less does. It is the US-Japan alliance, not the US-LDP alliance, although after more than fifty years of LDP rule it is understandable that it is hard to tell the difference sometimes.

At the same time, however, perhaps it would be better off if Mrs. Clinton stayed away from Japan altogether in the midst of the tumultuous political situation. Naturally the US government is officially blind to the domestic politics of its allies. But US interference in Japanese politics since the occupation, from comparatively benign gaiatsu to the CIA's distribution of funds to Kishi Nobusuke and other conservative politicians (and activities to suppress left-wing activities) is a matter of the public record. More recently, the Bush administration played an undeniably important role in raising the profile of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, giving him access to senior administration officials while he was just an LDP functionary (as opposed to a government official), which raised his profile and helped him leapfrog more experienced politicians and succeed Koizumi Junichiro. The point is that given this history, the new administration should be extremely wary of doing anything to influence the outcome of the forthcoming general election.

It may be unlikely that Mrs. Clinton's visit has any impact on the political situation, but it is not impossible, especially if she meets with Mr. Ozawa or the abductee families.

There are other reasons for Mrs. Clinton to stay away, of course, starting with the vacancies in the ambassadorships in Tokyo and Beijing. Joseph Nye still hasn't been officially named the ambassador-designate, and the Senate has yet to confirm other Asia policy officials, including Kurt Campbell, Mrs. Clinton's assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific.

Everything about this trip smacks of a hasty scheme to assuage Japanese fears with symbolic gestures. But symbols can have consequences, whether for the alliance or for Japanese politics.

Related articles:

  1. Ozawa responds
  2. What's wrong with Japan's alliance with America?
  3. Japan's LDP and DPF face the future
  4. Obama already passing Japan?

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/02/14/mrs-clinton-and-mr-ozawa/

Saturday, January 31, 2009

Aso calls for a new Japan







Prime Minister Aso Taro, having had his second stimulus package pass the Diet Tuesday, appeared before the Diet on Wednesday to deliver his latest policy address.

Rhetorically, the address contains few surprises. In the opening sections, in which Mr. Aso addressed the principles behind his policies. He spoke of the “once in a century economic crisis” (although he omitted the phrase “emanating from America”). In discussing the work of building a new society and overcome Japan’s third major crisis in the past two centuries, he once again stressed the importance of the virtue of industry, of hard work. To ensure Japan’s continuing prosperity, he said, “It is necessary to build a society in which hard work is rewarded, a society in which senior citizens, the handicapped, and women find it easy to work.” The fact that he needs to group women with the elderly and the handicapped when talking about remaking the Japanese labor force speaks volumes, doesn’t it? As before, when Mr. Aso speaks of the elderly working, he speaks of it as a virtue, as opposed to something that should be kept to a minimum. Once again he gives the impression of a coach giving a pep talk to the Japanese people instead of a leader who understands the hardships his people are facing today. And as the Japanese press has noted, Mr. Aso has joined in the anti-capitalism boom, marking an “about-face from the Koizumi structural reforms.” (Of course, such talk assumes that the LDP has not already moved away from Mr. Koizumi’s agenda, which it clearly has.)

Aso Taro has called for a new Japan that does not sound that new.

After explaining his principles, Mr. Aso addressed policy specifics, making the case for a three-stage process in making his new Japan. Step one is short-term economic stimulus, as contained in the two 2008 supplementary budgets and the 2009 budget to come. Far from saving Japan, however, the measures come across more as treading water in the midst of a tsunami than as a carefully designed plan to make up for lost foreign consumption. Japan’s fate may depend more on what’s happening in Washington than on what’s happening in Tokyo.

Having explained the government’s stimulus plans, Mr. Aso proceeded to the next phase, the medium-term phase in which the Japanese government is to set its fiscal house in order. This phase entails both the introduction of a consumption tax increase from 2011 — depending on the health of the economy — and cutting waste by lowering expenditures on public corporations and cutting the number of bureaucrats. In a single line Mr. Aso also promised to shift all of the road construction special fund into the general fund, a policy question that readers will recall wore down Prime Minister Fukuda’s resolve in spring 2008. He also promised to accelerate decentralization.

Finally, the medium- to long-term phase of Mr. Aso’s vision calls for a “new growth strategy.” At the heart of this plan is the creation of a world-leading “low carbon society.” He also calls for Japan’s becoming a world leader in medical care for the elderly and rebranding Japan as a country with beautiful countryside, world-famous pop culture and fashion, and delicious, safe food. Connected to this, he promised to introduce a bill during the current Diet session that will trigger the Heisei agricultural reform, with the goal of raising Japan’s self-sufficiency in food production. Mr. Aso’s plan calls for a shift from “ownership” to “use” of agricultural land. He also wants greater use of rice-based products and more production of wheat and soya.

Mr. Aso also promised to remake the Japanese welfare state, starting with the pensions system. He apologized for the still-unresolved pensions scandal while stating that the government is making steady progress in cleaning up the mess. He addressed concerns about the declining quality of medical care, promising an increase of doctors working in the public service. Near the end of the speech, he actually mentioned education reform, which may be the most important piece of any effort to rejuvenate the Japanese economy and implement a “new growth strategy.” Mr. Aso celebrated the introduction from April 2009 of a ten-percent increase in the number of math and science classes and new restrictions on cell phones in schools, but he actually says very little in this section about reform to how Japan educates its children. After mentioning forthcoming changes, he devotes the rest of the education section to discussing the achievements of Japanese scientists and researchers. A serious plan for reforming Japanese economy and society would treat the education system as more than an afterthought.

Mr. Aso concluded the speech by discussing a three-pronged foreign policy based on the US-Japan alliance, relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors, and the UN and other international organizations, in short an approach wholly consistent with Japan’s foreign policy mainstream and not altogether different from the DPJ. Mr. Aso and Mr. Ozawa might emphasize different legs of the three-legged foreign policy, but the differences are less than meet the eye. Mr. Aso did speak at some length about cooperating internationally to promote freedom and prosperity and combat terror and piracy, but his appeal lacked the same spirit that his calls to promote an arc of freedom and prosperity once had.

Bringing his speech to a close, Mr. Aso took a swipe at the DPJ for slowing down the political process and dismissed the talk of pessismists, who he says ought to look back and see how Japan rebuilt itself after the war into the very model of a high-tech, culturally attractive society.

There is very little of note in this speech. After mentioning the need to make it easier for women to work (see above), Mr. Aso offers few specifics for how to equalize the Japanese workplace. He has no real solutions to reversing demographic decline. Education reform is given a passing mention. While Mr. Aso is right to emphasize the “rebranding” of Japan, starting in stagnant rural areas, he says very little about how this transformation will actually be achieved. As is typical of these policy speeches, the connection between policy inputs and the desired outcomes is more often assumed than explicitly demonstrated.

Mr. Aso seemed more willing to acknowledge the extent of the economic collapse facing Japan today, but he also seemed as defiantly optimistic as ever, convinced of Japan’s ability to overcome all challenges.

It is possible, however, that the current crisis may be too much for Mr. Aso and his weary LDP.

This entry was posted on Saturday, January 31st, 2009 at 10:00 pm

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

What’s wrong with Japan’s alliance with America?


Author: Tomohiko Satake
International Relations, ANU



Tobias Harris is one of the few people who understand the reality of Japan’s security situation, without taking an alarmist posture nor being a ‘free-rider’ advocate. I especially agree with his overall message: ‘The security relationship is important, but it cannot be the whole of the US-Japan relationship’.

He argues that the US should ’socialise’ Japan to have greater diplomatic responsibilities on regional issues, especially in dealing with Korean Peninsula, by taking advantage of its long-term relationship with Japan.

Photo: New US Ambassador to Japan Joseph Nye

What I am concerned about, however, is that he is too pessimistic about Japan’s military involvement in the international security issues in the future. Or, as he puts it, the ‘idea of a global alliance was far-fetched and doomed to fail’.

It is true that Japan came to have a fear of entrapment by US military action because of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, as an ally ‘dependent’ on the US, Japan’s fear of abandonment is still much greater than its fear of entrapment. Japan is still likely to try to make its contribution to US-led coalition efforts for global security more efficient so as to maintain good alliance relations with the US, although this will certainly take time. This stems not only from Japan’s fear of abandonment, but also from its ambition to be a global player, both in the region and the world.

True, the DPJ, a would-be governmental party after the next election, opposes Japan’s current approach to the US-Japan alliance. Yet that doesn’t mean that the majority of the DPJ is against Japan’s contribution to international security like the Socialist Party was during the Cold War.

What any leader of the DPJ should say is that, as long as there international coalition efforts are based on a UN Resolution, Japan should dispatch the JSDF to it. Note that few years ago Ozawa surprised many people by publishing an article that suggested Japan’s participation in the ISAF in Afghanistan, a move even the LDP was reluctant to make.

It is also likely that the DPJ will change its security posture toward a more ‘realistic’ approach after coming into power, as the SPJ did in the mid 1990s. What the US should do is very clear – refrain from any unilateral military action and link its international security activities (for example, the war on terror) with other international security frameworks, especially with the UN, as much as they can. This seems more likely under Obama.

This makes it easier to engage US allies, including Japan, in these security activities. This is what Bush failed to do, and this is what Obama and Nye need to do, and probably will.

Tobias Harris’ post on the topic, a letter to Ambassador Nye, can be found here.

This entry was posted on Wednesday, January 28th, 2009 at 10:00 pm

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Japan’s LDP and DPF face the future





Author: Tobias Harris

The LDP and the DPJ had their annual conventions in Tokyo over the weekend, steeling their resolve for the Diet session already underway and the general election that will occur within the year.

For the second straight year, the incumbent LDP president and prime minister told the party faithful that the "responsible governing party" (how the LDP now refers to itself) faces the worst crisis it has ever faced — at the same time that Japan confronts (to use what has now become a mantra from Aso Taro and his cabinet ministers) "the worst economic crisis in one hundred years, which has emanated from America." Mr. Aso told the convention that "only the LDP" can overcome the economic crisis, which would presumably be enough to save the party from what looks like certain electoral defeat later this year. (Interestingly, Hosoda Hiroyuki, LDP secretary-general, has criticized Mr. Aso's frequent use of this exculpatory expression because it is too negative, arguing that it dampens consumer confidence and undermines the government's own policies. And here I thought the problem was that by using this expression Mr. Aso was more or less ignoring discussing the crisis and therefore ignoring a serious effort to diagnose its cause and offer an appropriate and effective response…)

On that note, Mr. Aso used his address to repeat his pledge that Japan will be the first to escape the crisis and once again express his belief in the ability of the Japanese people to overcome any challenge. He also made sure to note that the nejire kokkai(read: DPJ obstructionism) is to blame for any lack of progress in moving the government's agenda in recent years.

None of this was particularly new or particularly inspiring; the 2009 LDP convention may be about as exciting a party as the 2009 World Economic Forum, another gathering that Mr. Aso may address.

The mood at the DPJ convention, held at a former postal meeting hall in Tokyo's Minato ward (as opposed to the luxury hotel that hosted the LDP gathering), was different, and not only because of the relatively spare meeting hall, a reflection of the party's need to conserve funds for the general election campaign. If Mr. Aso's speech had a pugnaciousness reflecting his party's and government's dire circumstances, Mr. Ozawa's was characterized by what looks like an attempt to strike an Obamanian note, full of talk of building a new Japan. In fact, Mr. Ozawa's leitmotif appears to have been borrowed from Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: he declared that the DPJ's fundamental purpose is a "politics of the people, by the people, and for the people," and then offered policies to create an economy "of human beings, by human beings, and for human beings" (contrasted with "a market economy of capital, by capital, and for capital") and finally a society "of citizens, by citizens, and for citizens." Rhetorically, this construction is clumsy and actually cheapens the phrase.

Meanwhile, does Mr. Ozawa have to copy Shii Kazuo and the JCP? I am sympathetic to his point about building a safety net and counteracting the "dehumanization" caused by capitalism — score one for Karl Polanyi — but Mr. Ozawa would do well not to get too carried away in the anti-capitalist rhetoric sweeping the Japanese political system.

This election year is turning into a fight over who can be the most energetic in criticizing "market fundamentalism;" even the LDP's reformists, the vanguard of the Koizumi revolution, have shifted their emphasis from pushing for economic deregulation to attacking the bureaucracy and fighting the consumption tax. But sooner or later, one party or another will have to govern, at which point it will discover that the market is still there — and that the Japan will have to find a way to be more competitive while providing an appropriate and politically desired level of social assistance. I recognize that in criticizing "market fundamentalism" Japanese politicians are specifically criticizing neo-liberalism and the ideology that fueled the US financial crisis, but at times their rhetoric strays into more radical terrain. There needs to be less focus on pointing fingers and assigning labels and more focus on providing answers to the questions of how Japan can provide greater opportunity for its citizens and greater protection for the aged and infirm — in particular, how it can pay for it. My hunch is that the Japanese people are more interested in these answers than in learning who among their leaders are card-carrying members of the neo-liberal party.

In the latter half of the speech, Mr. Ozawa does turn his attention to these matters. He calls for two New Deals, an "environmental" New Deal and a "safety" New Deal. The former basically appends to the party's standing promise of subsidies for farmers a pledge to promote the "greenification" of rural Japan through the widespread use of solar panels and the "greening" of roofs and walls of homes and offices. The latter calls for making schools and hospitals earthquake-resistant, basically an overt pledge of support to small- and medium-sized enterprises that would benefit from these contracts. As Mr. Ozawa said himself, the goal is to promote job creation in rural Japan.

All in all, Mr. Ozawa's proposals are less ambitious than his rhetoric would suggest. And there's still no indication of how a DPJ government will pay for the two new deals. Once again, Mr. Ozawa has borrowed a phrase from American political history only to drain it off its evocative power. The New Deal was an ambitious experiment in American governance; it is still unclear how a DPJ government will be a dramatic departure from the past, other than the fact of its existence.

That's not to say it's impossible for a DPJ government to break decisively with the status quo, but for now the DPJ has a lot of work to do to determine precisely how it intends not just to jump start the Japanese economy, but to put it on a more viable footing. As an article by Waseda's Noguchi Yukio in Shukan Diamond argues, the decimation of the past several months may mark nothing short of the end of Japan as "skilled manufacturing, exporting nation."

While time will tell whether this is hyperbolic, the DPJ ought to have a better answer to this transformation than two feeble "new deals."

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/01/20/japans-ldp-and-dpf-face-the-future/

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Japan’s LDP: slouching towards irrelevance?


Tuesday, December 16th, 2008 at 2:15
Author: Tobias Harris

Prime Minister Aso Taro, faced with dismal poll numbers, a potential rebellion within the LDP, and an economy galloping into recession, sought to stem the tide against him by announcing a second stimulus package at a press conference on Friday.

The government’s purpose is to ease the insecurities of the Japanese people, but also to make Japan “the fastest among the developed countries to escape the current recession.” To that end, Mr. Aso promised ten trillion yen (around $109.7 billion) in countermeasures for employment and business finances, including one trillion yen in residence and capital investment taxes. He promised thirteen trillion yen (around $142.7 billion) for shorimg up the financial system.

On employment, he focused particular attention on the plight of irregular and part-time employees, promising to create employment opportunities in rural areas. He pledged that the forthcoming budget will offer assistance to these workers in finding new employment, and will increase subsidies to local governments by one trillion yen in order to promote job creation.

The new plan’s assistance for financial institutions adds an additional ten trillion yen to the two trillion included in the assistance bill that just passed the Diet, with an eye toward encouraging banks — particularly banks in rural areas — to resume lending to firms, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises.

But the impression one gets is that Mr. Aso’s latest plan is lots of trees, no forest. Coverage has focused on the sheer scale of the package, although it’s not clear just how much the second stimulus package will total, because the prime minister was unclear which figures are totaled in other figures and which constitute separate categories of spending. If other governments are improvising their responses to their respective economic crises (as argued by John Gapper in the Financial Times), Mr. Aso’s approach seems to amount mostly to throwing ideas against the wall in the hope that something sticks. For all the pieces of the new plan, it amounts mostly to hope: hope that the government’s subsidies for local governments will create more jobs, hope that banks will start lending upon being shored up by government funds, hope that tax cuts can get businesses and homeowners investing again. It is unclear how the government plans to stimulate consumer demand to replace slack demand from abroad — demand that is unlikely to return anytime soon if the yen stays as strong as it is for any considerable length of time.

It’s all well and good that Mr. Aso appreciates the importance of saving rural Japan and preventing the emergence of yet another lost decade, but perhaps the time to do that was in the “longest postwar expansion.” Now, in the midst of what government officials repeatedly call “the worst crisis in a century,” it is uncertain whether fiscal policy will have any effect whatsoever. It certainly won’t in time to reverse the downturn before the LDP has to face the voters. The government faces the monumental task of solving Keynes’s paradox of thrift, getting the public to spend at the same time that it is bombarded with bad economic news that has the effect of discouraging consumption.

There’s also the question of how the government will pay for its new commitments. The prime minister insisted that the government will not depend on bonds to cover the new stimulus, turning instead to the unemployment insurance special account and the Fiscal Investment and Loan program (FILP). But the tax question will not go away. This is hardly the time for the LDP to increase taxes, and it’s understandable that Mr. Aso is reluctant to commit to a date for comprehensive tax reform and a consumption tax increase. Doing so can only worsen his political prospects. Why should he commit to a tax increase in 2011 when he may not even be prime minister, considering that he could suffer political consequences in 2009 as a result of his pledge? (Yosano Kaoru, his economy minister, is reportedly outraged at the prime minister’s inability to commit.)

The government has little choice but to throw caution to the wind in the hope that somehow, miracuously, the economy recovers. Not to reopen the debate about whether Japan or the US is in worse straits, but Japan truly appears to be teetering on the brink of disaster. I don’t mean merely another lost decade or a depression. I mean slouching to irrelevance. Another prolonged downturn could mean another lost generation, with questionable job prospects and correspondingly low ambition. Another lost generation will only compound Japan’s demographic crisis. Fewer steady jobs presumably means fewer Japanese getting married and having children. Hokkaido University’s Yamaguchi Jiro, writing about the employment crisis, argues that it’s essential for Japanese to reconsider the meaning of work. True, but will that reconsideration happen in time to rescue Japan?

This is the great failure of the Aso government. Faced with a widespread and deepening crisis, the government has offered a cobbled-together plan that may only entail suffering firms to limp on until the next crisis. Mr. Aso has not, however, offered a compelling intellectual framework for a post-crisis Japanese economy. Rural Japan is in desperate need for some scheme to ensure future prosperity — public works and agriculture will no longer suffice. Perhaps it’s too difficult a question to ask of the government when it is simply trying to stanch the bleeding, but at some point the government (or a government) will have to answer it.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, December 16th, 2008 at 2:15 pm

Monday, December 15, 2008

Can Japan’s LDP save itself?


Monday, December 15th, 2008 at 2:35 pm
Author: Tobias Harris

In a vitriolic post at Shisaku, MTC goes after those who insist that despite the LDP’s current crisis — which has only gotten worse sinceback in January when Fukuda Yasuo called it the worst since the LDP’s founding — the LDP will recover as it has done before.

I have encountered this argument all too frequently, and share MTC’s frustration. LDP leaders

Rarely have I encountered someone who offers a causal mechanism to explain how the LDP will escape the reaper this time. The argument is usually presented as the simple assertion that the LDP has survived to the present day, so it will continue to survive. This argument is logically flawed. The LDP’s survival in the past, despite defections and internal divisions, tells us nothing about whether the LDP will survive in the future. Arguably the LDP has never faced the possibility of defections while facing a major opposition party that was a plausible contender for power (indeed, an opposition party that was the largest party in the upper house). More importantly, the LDP has never contended with a major opposition party that was a plausible home for LDP defectors. While it is common to complain that the LDP and the DPJ are too similar, on the plus side the ideological overlap — if their similarities can be attributed to ideology — means that the DPJ is better prepared to welcome LDP malcontents than the Socialist Party ever was. The DPJ might be less attractive to LDP defectors by virtue of Ozawa Ichiro’s being the party president, but it’s not inconceivable that Mr. Ozawa could cut a deal regarding the premiership in order to bring in LDP members.

That said, it is far from certain what will happen. The next six-twelve months in Japanese politics will depend on contingencies and accidents, on the decisions taken or not taken by key individuals. But I’m still willing to predict that the LDP will fail to win a majority in the next general election, that the DPJ will, if it doesn’t win an absolute majority, will still win enough seats with which to form a government. I’m less certain about whether the LDP will splinter. I’m certainly convinced that the LDP divided among seemingly irreconcilable ideological tendencies, but I’m willing to admit the possibiliy that the party’s leaders will find a way to keep the party together, despite being unclear about the tools LDP leaders have at their disposal to keep dissatisfied members in the fold.

Various LDP bosses have publicly chastized Watanabe Yoshimi and other young turks for their “anti-Aso” activities, but I don’t know what pressure is being applied in private. I’m guessing that there is little the party can do to stop Mr. Watanabe, a second-generation politician who has won his four terms in Tochigi’s third district by sizeable margins and enjoys a certain prominence. But what the LDP can do is lean on the other young turks who might otherwise follow Mr. Watanabe in opposing and possibly leaving the LDP (Yamauchi Koichi, a first-term member from Kanagawa-9, is desperate in this post to make clear that Nakagawa Hidenao’s new study group is not aimed as undermining Mr. Aso). It is unclear whether Mr. Nakagawa is willing to cut his ties with the LDP. Sankei suggests that the Machimura faction is working to contain Mr. Nakagawa; Abe Shinzo’s participation in Mr. Nakagawa’s study group on social policy is conspicuous in this regard. The group had fifty-seven members attend its inaugural meeting, but it is far from clear how many of those members are contemplating rebellion or whether their leader is prepared to support an effort to overthrow the government. He is still criticizing Mr. Aso — he criticized the prime minister’s handling of the tax reform debate on a radio program Friday — and desires an election sooner rather than later, but he is giving few hints as to whether he’d be willing to back a break with the LDP.

It may take an election to break the LDP. Depending on the balance of power within the LDP post-election, certain blocs could be convinced to split should the LDP fall short of the majority while a certain bloc strengthens its hold. I imagine that Mr. Nakagawa hopes that his group of reformists will be left standing after an election, giving them the upper hand in a power struggle.

Given the LDP’s divisions, can the LDP possibly save itself at the ballot box?

History is not in the LDP’s favor. The LDP has failed to win majorities in every election under the new single-member district/proportional representation system but for the idiosyncratic 2005 election. It is nearly universally acknowledged that the LDP and Komeito will lose the supermajority they won in 2005. The question, then, is how far the LDP will fall. It is reasonable to surmise that the LDP will win no more than what it won in 2000 (233 seats) or 2003 (237 seats). It could conceivably do worse, as a result of widespread dissatisfaction throughout Japan over how the LDP has governed since the 2005 election.

As far as I’m concerned, the important question is whether the DPJ will come close enough to an absolute majority that it will have no trouble forming a government.

It’s possible that I’m wrong. Like a good social scientist, I’m willing to accept the possibility that I’m mistaken, that my assumptions are faulty. In fact, my theory can be easily falsified: if the LDP remains in power after the next election and (presumably) remains united, I’ve clearly missed something, at which point it will be necessary to figure out precisely what was missing. In the meantime, as I — along with others, like MTC — have postulated, all signs point to the LDP’s facing a reckoning at the next general election.

I’m waiting for someone who believes that the LDP will recover to tell me, in advance, what I’m missing. What will serve to keep the LDP in power? Will rural voters ultimately be unable to vote for the DPJ in a general election? Will the LDP’s reformist candidates survive in urban districts that are trending back in the DPJ’s favor? Will Mr. Ozawa repel a sufficient number of voters to save the LDP (as the LDP hopes)? Is there anyone out there who is convinced that the LDP will survive who can venture a causal explanation for how it will save itself, other than “it has done so in the past, and it will do so again?”

I’m not even convinced that the LDP has saved itself in the past so much as it has been lucky in its opponents. Its luck may have run out. It’s amazing how that as the Aso government’s support has plummeted, there are fewer stories about the divisions within the DPJ in the media. Nothing like the prospect of success to quiet discontent in the ranks.

Speaking of predictions, the destruction of the Machimura faction is proceeding apace.

Before the LDP’s September election, I asked whether anyone thinks that “the Machimura faction, that 89-member monster of a faction that sits at the intersection of the LDP’s divisions between ‘neo-liberal’ reformers, party leaders, and ideological conservatives, will survive this party election.”

Events appear to confirm that the Machimura faction is on its last legs, if it is not already dead.

Yomiuri reports that in connection with Nakagawa Hidenao’s perceived “anti-Aso” efforts, the rift between Mr. Nakagawa and party and faction elders Mori Yoshiro and Machimura Nobutaka — already pronounced before Aso Taro’s ascendance — has widened. Mr. Machimura, along with fellow faction member Abe Shinzo, has emerged as a prominent critic of the prime minister’s critics, including Mr. Nakagawa.

Is it reasonable to speak of the Machimura faction as a single faction? Is membership in the faction the most meaningful affiliation for its members, as opposed to membership in study groups and other organizations?

How long before the faction officially splinters? And if the Machimura faction cannot hold, can the LDP, of which the Machimura faction is a microcosm, endure?

This entry was posted on Monday, December 15th, 2008 at 2:35 pm.

Tuesday, December 9, 2008

The Aso cabinet is in free fall


Author: Tobias Harris

The Yomiuri Shimbun has released its December public opinion poll, which found that not only has the Aso cabinet's approval rating fallen by half since the beginning of November (from 40.5% to 20.9%), but the cabinet's disapproval rating rose by twenty-five points to 66.7% during the same span of time. The poll contains bad news for the LDP on every front. The DPJ has edged ahead of the LDP in baseline approval rating (28.2% to 27.2%) and opened a commanding lead in support in the next general election (40%, a ten-point increase, to 24%, an eight-point drop) — and, moreover, Ozawa Ichiro scored higher than Prime Minister Aso when respondents were asked who is the most appropriate choice as prime minister (Mr. Ozawa's support rose to 36%, a fourteen-point increase, while Mr. Aso's fell twenty-one points to 29%). This last figure is a critical indicator for the next general election, because voters have not only abandoned Mr. Aso, they also appear to be warming to Mr. Ozawa, depriving the LDP of the argument that no matter how unpopular the LDP is, the public still does not trust Mr. Ozawa.

(AP Photo/Itsuo Inouye)

(For the record, Asahi's monthly tracking poll recorded similar numbers. Twenty-two percent approval rating compared to a sixty-four percent disapproval rating and a dramatic fall and rise in support for Mr. Aso versus Mr. Ozawa for prime minister.)

The only heartening news — if one can call it that — is that more respondents preferred a political realignment over a DPJ-centered or LDP-centered government, or a grand coalition, the second-most preferred option.

Of course, a political realignment is not good news at all for the LDP, seeing as how for the moment the realignment could consume the LDP while leaving the DPJ comparatively unscathed. While Nakagawa Hidenao has spoken of uniting reformers from both parties, it appears for the moment that there is no better cure for the DPJ's internal disputes than the belief that the party is poised to seize power.

But the LDP's reform movement continues apace. Appearing on Fuji TV Sunday, Watanabe Yoshimi doubled down on his challenge to Mr. Aso, suggesting that he is steeling his resolve to overturn the cabinet and arguing that an election at the close of the extraordinary Diet session is essential if Japan's government is to be capable of formulating policy. As MTC argued recently, Mr. Watanabe may be poised to do what his father was unable to do — deliver the death blow to the LDP. It is yet unclear whether he will be able to muster the support to overturn the cabinet, perhaps by voting against the government when one of the bills requiring a second vote by the House of Representatives comes before the lower chamber. He may have some help from Kato Koichi, who could be prepared to make a second bid to overturn an unpopular LDP prime minister and has been in talks with the DPJ and the PNP about electoral cooperation and the formation of a new party. Nakagawa Hidenao, undoubtedly an indispensable player in any rebellion by LDP reformists against Mr. Aso, is reportedly skeptical about leaving the LDP before a general election, presumably because to do so would be to diminish his bloc's bargaining power. At this point the plan seems to be close ranks, prepare to contest a general election under the LDP's banner but in opposition to the standard-bearer, and then see the post-election balance of power. If neither the DPJ nor the LDP achieves a majority, the LDP reformists may make all the difference in determining who controls the government. (Koike Yuriko, one of his lieutenants and another player in the fight between reformists and the LDP establishment, is reportedly "tired" of forming new parties, given that she spent the 1990s jumping from new party to new party. Her attitude may simply be a means of reinforcing Mr. Nakagawa's efforts to proceed deliberately.)

Mr. Aso's allies appear to be closing ranks, with both Abe Shinzo — representing the conservative bloc — and Machimura Nobutaka — representing the party elders — criticizing Mr. Watanabe and the other reformist opponents of the Aso government. Yamamoto Ichita, a natural leader of the reformists, has also been hesitant to echo Mr. Watanabe's full-throated opposition to Mr. Aso. In a post at his blog, he relates what he sees as the honne of the young reformers. Mr. Yamamoto dismisses the idea of replacing Mr. Aso before an election, arguing that the public would be gravely insulted, even if an election were held immediately after the formation of the new cabinet. Furthermore, he suggests that it is unreasonable to think that the LDP will be able to fix its problem simply by finding a new, more dynamic leader (he dismisses this as the Kimu Taku option, referring to Kimura Takuya's teledrama Change). This sounds like another version of Mr. Nakagawa's argument. Hold steady and prepare for the next election, but be ready to act following the election.

In considering the rapid decay of the Aso government, it bears mentioning that the reformist rebellion is not primarily an opportunistic response to the government's falling popularity. As I have argued previously, the rift between the LDP's reformists and the rest of the party has been building for years. Mr. Aso may have forced the rift open by making it clear upon taking office that his government would move away from Koizumi-ism and consolidate the LDP's counter-reformation, making it clear to reformers that the party no longer had a place for them, but he did not create the conflict between the LDP's ideological tendencies. The poll numbers may have provided the reformists with an opportunity to launch their attack, thanks to the combination of public sympathy for their efforts to trigger a realignment and a government powerless to stop their machinations, but this conflict has been a long time coming.

With even the LDP executive beginning to contemplate holding an election in January instead of convening the regular session of the Diet immediately following the New Year holiday to pass a second supplementary budget, the conflict may reach its climax sooner rather than later.

It appears increasingly likely that Mr. Aso will go down in history as having presided over the destruction of the party whose creation his grandfather so vociferously opposed. There is a certain rhythm to history, isn't there?

This entry was posted on 9 December 2008 at 8:00 pm

http://eastasiaforum.org/2008/12/09/the-aso-cabinet-is-in-free-fall/

Thursday, December 4, 2008

Conservatives, Clientelists, and Koizumians

Author: Tobias Harris

Asahi has published a long article illustrating the feeling of crisis that has descended upon the LDP, especially following Aso Taro's disastrous showing in the latest Nikkei poll (discussed here).

After months of building, it appears that the dissolution of the LDP may finally be in motion.

The LDP can be roughly divided into three broad groupings, with some overlap: conservatives, clientelists, and Koizumians. I provided an outline of these various divisions in an article published at the Far Eastern Economic Review's website in October, in which I argued that "it is best to think of the contemporary LDP as divided not by faction or policy group, but by broad ideological 'tendencies.'" The members of these groups have largely distinct visions for how Japan should be governed and how the LDP should wield power (with some overlap, especially on foreign policy), and it is increasingly difficult to see how these tendencies can inhabit the same party. Whereas the goal of keeping the LDP in power might have once served to various LDP groups — the party has, after all, always been divided along a number of fault lines — this goal is no longer sufficient to unify the party, perhaps in part because power is no longer shared evenly throughout the party. Over the past seven years, one tendency or another has been marginalized within the party. The Koizumi government was essentially a coalition of the conservatives and Koizumians to wage war on the clientelists, culminating in the fight over postal privatization. The Abe government rested on an uneasy truce among the three groups, with the Koizumians gradually being marginalized as his government proceeded. The Fukuda government saw both the conservatives and the Koizumians marginalized, resting largely on the power of party elders who do still their goal as keeping the LDP in power and constitute a power bloc in their own right. By the end of the Fukuda government, the conservatives had regained some of their strength, taking important positions in the second Fukuda government before electing Mr. Aso with a coalition of conservatives, clientelists, and party elders. The Koizumians, marginalized virtually since Mr. Koizumi left office, have hinted at forming their own party (see this thread), but have done little more than talk.

Until now: Watanabe Yoshimi, a leading Koizumian and adminstrative reform minister under Messrs. Abe and Fukuda, appeared on TV Asahi Tuesday and suggested that he and his reformist colleagues could be prepared to leave the LDP and form their own party. Previously talk of a Koizumian party was fed more by media speculation about various study groups formed by reformists — the latest being Nakagawa Hidenao's new study group on social security — rather than by explicit threats by reformers to leave and form their own party. It's possible that Mr. Watanabe is bluffing. The party leadership certainly thinks he is. The clientelists, through the vehicle of the party's general council, is pressing for a three-year freeze in the the Koizumi government's 2006 plan to cut public works spending by three percent compared to the previous year and restrict the growth in social security entitlement payments. If the clientelists win, it may be the final indicator that the Koizumians are no longer welcome in the LDP, the beginning of the LDP's existence as a rump party of conservatives and clientelists.

The Asahi article suggests that Mr. Nakagawa — and Yosano Kaoru, who, as the leading "fiscal reconstructionst" is in some sense a tendency of his own — may yet have a role to play in destroying the LDP as it exists today, as they have links with each other and across the aisle to Ozawa Ichiro and former DPJ leader Maehara Seiji. The LDP's liberals (the LDP's truly marginalized group), namely Kato Koichi and Yamasaki Taku, may also be making their preparations to defect from the LDP.

Little wonder that Mr. Ozawa has now proposed a plan that is transparently an attempt to break up the LDP, calling for an all-party coalition government to govern until an election can be held (provided Mr. Aso resigns); in fact, Mr. Ozawa's scheme is so transparent I have a hard time believing anyone in the government will buy it. LDP members may be discontent with Mr. Aso, but that does not mean that they will run to embrace Mr. Ozawa.

But the point is that the Koizumians may finally be ready to fight back against their marginalization in the LDP by threatening the Aso government with defection (and the consequent destruction of the government's supermajority). They may be bluffing or not as eager as Mr. Watanabe to depart — Mr. Nakagawa is doing all he can to dampen rumors that he is moving against the prime minister — but the threat has been made. Will the LDP do anything to attempt to retain them?

If it doesn't, will the LDP as it exists today survive to contest the next general election?

This entry was posted on 4 December 2008 at 2:03 pm

http://eastasiaforum.org/2008/12/04/conservatives-clientelists-and-koizumians/

Sunday, November 30, 2008

The LDP will lose the next general election


This entry was posted
on 30 November 2008 at 3:00 pm

Author: Tobias Harris

A mere two months into Aso Taro’s premiership, some LDP members are already looking for a way to throw him overboard.

Mainichi reports that the most vigorous criticism is from the party’s young reformists — not surprisingly, as they fear for their political lives — but the Mainichi article goes on to quote various senior LDP officials voicing their criticism over the beleaguered prime minister.

The criticism focuses mostly on a series of ill-considered remarks (which were clearly the downside risk of choosing Mr. Aso), the latest of which is a remark that the DPJ will undoubtedly repeat over and over again during a general election campaign: Mr. Aso lamented publicly about having to pay for elderly patients who do nothing but eat and drink.

Is Mr. Aso deliberately trying to bury the LDP? Does the LDP stand the slightest chance of regaining the support of elderly voters, whose support for the LDP has wavered in recent years? There is no question now that Mr. Aso is completely out of touch from his country’s citizens, and he completely lacks an internal censor that is a politician’s best friend.

And there is nothing the LDP can do to rescue itself. If it dumps Mr. Aso in place of a new leader (who exactly would the LDP turn to next?), the party will demonstrate conclusively that it is little different from the DPJ, concerned more about its political fortunes than the good of the country. [NB: I don't buy — and I suspect few others do — the LDP's claim that it stands for policy over politics, while the DPJ is only politics. But in case anyone needed further evidence...] If it retains Mr. Aso, there is no telling what he’ll say next to offend some important LDP constituency whose support for the governing party has been wavering. With Japan’s recession worsening and no sign of effective government action, the government’s approval rating will continue to slide, the chorus of disapproving voices from within the LDP will continue to howl, and the DPJ will continue to appear capable of governing when compared with the dysfunctional LDP.

LDP reformists who think that a new leader can reverse Japan’s decline are deluding themselves. As absurd as Mr. Aso’s remarks are, his critics are wrong to think that the problem is Mr. Aso’s insensitivity. Even if Mr. Aso was well spoken and considerate or if the LDP had opted for one of his rivals, LDP members would still be worried about the LDP’s relentless decline in public opinion. The LDP is the problem. Divided between past and future, city and country, reform and reaction, the party is incapable of fixing itself, let alone Japan. If Koizumi Junichiro could not fix the party — although Mr. Koizumi certainly played a role in heightening the contradictions within the party’s ranks — no leader can. The LDP needs to lose. Japan needs the LDP to lose. Replacing the LDP with the DPJ won’t fix all of Japan’s problems. But it is an essential first step.

Thanks to Mr. Aso, Japan is that much closer to taking that first step.

Monday, November 24, 2008

Aso in a tailspin


This entry was posted
on 24 November 2008
at 1:07 pm


Prime Minister Aso Taro is in Peru for this year’s APEC summit, a summit that will undoubtedly be an even greater exercise in futility than usual.

At home, his administration is faltering.

He is under fire from within the LDP for recent gaffes. (It was only a matter of time before Mr. Aso talked without thinking.) The most politically costly gaffe may prove to be his remark that many doctors lack “common sense.” Masuzoe Yoichi, the health, labor, and welfare minister, admonished his prime minister to stay on message, as he has struggled to make the case for the LDP’s efforts to fix medical care for the elderly. Mr. Masuzoe is not alone in criticizing the prime minister. Oshima Tadamori, the LDP’s Diet strategy chairman, cautioned the prime minister to “be careful with his words.” More significantly, Karasawa Yoshihito, the chairman of the Japan Medical Association, called upon Mr. Aso to take back his remark and apologize. Chairman Karasawa’s remarks are indicative of a growing rift between the LDP and the JMA, a longtime supporter of the LDP. While the JMA may no longer wield the clout it once did — as Gerald Curtis noted — the JMA can damage the LDP simply by making a public show of breaking with the ruling party. The Ibaraki prefectural medical association has already announced that it will endorse DPJ candidates in the next general election to protest the new eldercare system. How many more will follow Ibaraki’s lead after Mr. Aso’s remarks?

More significantly, Mr. Aso may be facing a wider rebellion within the LDP on matters of policy.

The prime minister told a press gaggle earlier this week that he is considering a plan that will freeze the privatization of Japan Post. It did not take long for the LDP’s remaining reformers to recoil in horror. Nakagawa Hidenao, de facto leader of the Koizumians, swore that the prime minister must not be allowed to reverse course on postal privatization. Yamamoto Ichita responded with an angry post at his blog, promising that he (and presumably his fellow reformers) would not remain silent. Mr. Yamamoto noted that if Mr. Aso were to proceed with a freeze, it would be a direct repudiation of the supermajority upon which his government is based, seeing as how the 2005 general election was contested on the very question of postal privatization. I’m not certain that the public is as enamored with postal privatization now that Mr. Koizumi’s spell has been broken. But the symbolic effect of reversing course on postal privatization would be unmistakable: it would illustrate clearly that the Japanese people have been the victim of a classic bait-and-switch in the three years since the last general election, voting for a party that promised reform without sanctuary only to be ruled by governments interested in fortifying the walls of existing sanctuaries.

Finally, a group of twenty-four young LDP reformers led by former Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki Yasuhisa and administrative reformer minister Watanabe Yoshimi has appealed to the government for the passage of the second stimulus package during the current Diet session, echoing similar calls from the DPJ. The group called for the government to lead effectively in the face of the crisis. Kawamura Takeo, chief cabinet secretary, responded by saying that the government is reluctant to act because it cannot trust the DPJ to cooperate on the stimulus, thus illustrating the young Turks’ point. What’s the point of having a supermajority if it cannot be wielded decisively in response to a crisis? (Of course, I’m skeptical about the value of the stimulus package — this article has me convinced.) In any case, both Yomiuri and Sankei speculate whether the new group is the beginning of an anti-Aso group.

Clearly Mr. Aso’s landslide victory in September did not spell the end to the LDP’s civil war. The LDP is no less divided over its future, and despite being marginalized by Mr. Aso, the reformists are still capable of stirring up trouble for the prime minister. Mr. Aso appears to have little control over his party or the agenda. His government seems reduced to searching for new ways to rally support for the government rather than finding new policies or implementing old ones. MTC describes this as Mr. Aso’s “lightness.” I agree wholeheartedly. Mr. Aso sold himself as the agent of an aggressive reform conservatism that would reinvigorate the LDP and make the case to the public that under his leadership the LDP can be trusted to fix the problems created by Mr. Aso’s LDP predecessors. But it seems that, as MTC suggests, Mr. Aso is little more than the exhorter-in-chief, long on pep talks for the Japanese people, short on policies that will make the least bit of difference in rescuing his faltering country.

And now the LDP is stuck with him, at least until the prime minister decides to call (or is forced to call) a general election.

In the meantime, we will be treated to the spectacle of yet another prime minister’s approval ratings take a nosedive.

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

General Tamogami refuses to fade away


11 November 2008
at 6:12 pm
Author: Tobias Harris


Is Tamogami Toshio a millstone around Aso Taro’s neck?

The now former chief of staff of the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) appeared before the House of Councillors foreign and defense affairs committee and continued his determined campaign to dispel the postwar consensus on Japan’s wartime past.

In his remarks, General Tamogami appeared to play dumb. Asked about the Murayama statement, in which nn20081112a1athen-Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi made a sincere apology for Japan’s wartime behavior (and argued that “Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism”), the general hid behind his and his fellow airmen’s right to freedom of speech. He noted that his essay said nothing about the Murayama statement and asserted that even JSDF members have the right to freedom of speech.

The essence of civilian control is that the prime minister is the commander-in-chief of the JSDF and the Diet is responsible for “basic administration.” While it is true that General Tamogami did not use the phrase “Murayama statement” in his essay, only a fool would be satisfied with that answer; General Tamogami’s essay was all about the Murayama statement and the worldview that produced it and has sustained it in the thirteen years since it was promulgated. The general certainly knew what he was doing. Say what you will about Japan’s revisionists, but they are not fools (as in the case of the Nanjing massacre: most don’t deny that something happened in Nanjing, but many turn it into a matter of numbers, shifting the discussion from the enormity of what the Imperial Army did in Nanjing to China’s purported manipulation of the figures to make Japan look bad).

Of course, now that he is out of the service General Tamogami did not hesitate to criticize the Murayama statement, describing it as “an instrument for the supression of one’s opinions.” But questioning the fact that ninety-seven members of the JSDF submitted essays to a revisionist essay contest is not the suppression of the freedom of speech — it is the reassertion of civilian control. The SDF ethos encourages SDF personnel to “refrain from taking part in political activities.” While the APA essay contest may not have technically been a “political activity,” the submission of essays by JSDF personnel was effectively political. By questioning the civilian government’s official position on Japan’s wartime history (Mr. Aso reaffirmed the Murayama statement in Diet interpellations in early October, although there are now questions as to whether Mr. Aso has accepted the Murayama statement), General Tamogami was deliberately insubordinate to his commander-in-chief, and given that his essay had the potential to undermine the government’s efforts to build closer relations with China and South Korea, it is hard to see this affair as anything but interference by a senior JSDF officer in political matters. Merely asking the general to surrender his pension is mild, considering that he had been openly calling for historical revisionism for years before this incident.

On balance, I’m not sure whether this hearing was a good thing. I certainly think that it’s better that these views are out in the open, but it seems that all the hearing accomplished was assisting General Tamogami in his transition from ASDF general to right-wing pundit. It won’t be long now before he is a regular contributor to Voice and Will. He is already being treated as a matyr for the cause by his fellow revisionists; for example, Hiranuma Takeo, former LDP member and adviser to Nakagawa Shoichi’s “True Conservative Policy Research Group,” has criticized the defense minister’s request that the general gave up his pension. It may have been better off to let General Tamogami fade away, as another loudmouth general disrespectful of his civilian masters once said of old soldiers. (The general played up his matyrdom, saying, “I think the world is full of examples of dismissal for saying that one’s own country is a bad country, but I don’t think there’s a single example of dismal for saying that one’s own country is a good country.”)

Meanwhile General Tamogami has probably hurt Mr. Aso. In the short term Mr. Aso has won a small victory, for as a quid-pro-quo for the general’s appearance the opposition parties have agreed to bring the bill extending the MSDF refueling mission to a vote in the upper house foreign and defense affairs committee on Tuesday and the whole house on Wednesday, freeing the lower house to pass the bill again on next Thursday. But in the meantime General Tamogami has reinserted history onto the public agenda, which will undoubtedly lead to new questions regarding just what Mr. Aso thinks of these matters. Mr. Aso has categorically rejected the general’s putting his freedom of speech before civilian control, but I suspect for better or worse that Mr. Aso’s comments will not be the last of this issue.

The history issue will not make or break Mr. Aso’s government at home, but it does little to help the prime minister and does serve to distract his government from the gathering economic gloom. (Will the foreign press ask Mr. Aso about this while he visits Washington?) I have yet to see any public opinion polls pertaining to General Tamogami’s remarks, but I expect that the public is generally not sympathetic to this perspective.

I want to conclude with a word about the general’s perspective. In his remarks on Tuesday, General Tamogami raised an argument that has been made in comments on this blog and elsewhere, namely, that Japan has been unfairly singled out for wrongdoing during the war. He further suggestedthat talk of Japan as a bad country damages JSDF morale.

I have no idea how General Tamogami can prove the latter argument, but I am not totally unsympathetic to his former argument. However, as I argued here, simple moral equivalency between Japan and the European empires does not work. It is a lazy assertion, and when making a legal argument, as the general attempted to do in his essay, it is a baseless assertion. I understand and sympathize with the desire to see one’s country as good, but whitewashing the past, pretending that the sorry moments of history were either not sorry or did not happen is no way to glorify one’s nation. As noted previously, many American suffer from a similar problem, failing to see history through the eyes of other and failing to appreciate the harm caused by Americans in the name of high ideals. I can understand General Tamogami’s frustration. But the answer is not reinventing a glorious past that better serves what the general sees as the needs of the present.

This entry was posted on 14 November 2008 at 12:00 pm and is filed under Politics.

Guam recedes into the distance


11 November 2008 at 6:12 pm
Author: Tobias Harris

A US official has finally admitted that it is unlikely that the US and Japan will meet the 2014 target date for initiating the relocation of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of US Pacific Command, was in New York City last week, where he reviewed the state of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). In his remarks, he acknowledged that in light of the financial situation in both countries, it is likely that “it’ll take a little bit longer to effect – we won’t be done by 2014, or maybe even 2015, but it’s about a decade in execution.”

Admiral Keating’s admission is the first such admission — to my knowledge — from a senior US official involved with the process. It confirms the picture presented by the Government Accountability Office in its report on Guam. I still think the official view is too optimistic. I see too many potential obstacles to be confident that the process will be implemented according to schedule and according to plan. The biggest question in my mind is what happens if and when the DPJ forms a government. The DPJ’s “Okinawa vision” paper — discussed in this post — strongly suggests that should the DPJ take power, it will seek to revise the 2006 agreement.

The extent of the delay will depend on the makeup of President-elect Obama’s Asia policy team. If the bulk of Asia policy positions go to China or Korea hands, I would suggest that the outlook for realignment is grim indeed. Realignment will proceed smoothly only if the foreign policy team is seeded with individuals intimately familiar with the issues at stake and capable of making the case for why it is essential that the realignment must proceed as soon as possible. (And, I hope, be willing to consider doing it unilaterally if Japan drags its feet.)

But even with the right people in place the outlook isn’t good for Guam. In the current environment, it will be hard to get the necessary support from Congress and the upper levels of the administration.

Japan may have to accept that the Marines may be in Okinawa for longer than expected.