Showing posts with label FEER. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FEER. Show all posts

Sunday, July 19, 2009

Will Japan Ever Grow Up?

by Masaru Tamamoto
Posted July 10, 2009

Japan stands on the threshold of a change that could signal a step toward political maturity. After six decades of being ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party, voters in the upcoming general election are expected to give a mandate to the opposition Democratic Party of Japan. While this possibility is certainly an encouraging sign that Japanese people are ready for open competition over national policies, what's really remarkable is that it has taken so long. And indeed there is still a long way to go for Japan to become a "normal nation," in the words of opposition politician Ichiro Ozawa. Japan remains in many ways infantilized.

It's easy to forget how unusual Japan is in many ways, both politically and culturally. This is, after all, a country that is largely content to exist under the wing of a foreign protector, and one in which Tokyo University-trained bureaucrats have long enjoyed unquestioned authority. It's also a country where initiative is stifled in the workplace, and a worrying number of children never leave home or have the chance to compete with other children. There are some signs that Japan is being forced to change, but this change is coming excruciatingly slowly.

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Friday, July 3, 2009

Can the DPJ Bring Democracy to Japan?

by Tobias Harris and Colum Murphy
Posted July 3, 2009

On a sweltering afternoon in June, the rice fields outside the small town of Omagari in Japan's northern Akita prefecture are eerily deserted. Only the voice of Kimiko Kyono belting out from the speakers atop her orange Nissan breaks the silence. "Konnichiwa!" she exclaims to the open fields. "This is Kimiko Kyono of the Democratic Party of Japan!" Finally she spots a farmer: "Over there!" A campaign aide drives the car through the field in hot pursuit of the lone voter.

Ms. Kyono, one of the DPJ's potential candidates in parliamentary elections likely to be called at the beginning of August, has an unenviable task. She is trying to win over risk-averse voters person by person to the opposition party formed in 1998. Yet this youthful looking mother of four is not fazed. "Last time I lost by 30,000 votes," she says. "This time I hope to win or at least close the gap."

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Thursday, April 9, 2009

North Korea's Triumph


by Nobuyoshi Sakajiri
Posted April 9, 2009

Regardless of whether we identify it as a “missile” or a “rocket,” Sunday’s launch of what Pyongyang called a “satellite” seemed to be an unambiguous triumph for North Korea. This is not because Kim Jong Il expressed “great satisfaction” to be able to “put the satellite into orbit” as the state news media reported on Monday, but because the launch successfully spotlighted the serious divisions among members on the U.N. Security Council and the six-party talks regarding how best to resond.

Washington, Tokyo and Seoul insisted that North Korea’s launch of a “long-range ballistic missile” violated the Security Council resolutions passed in the aftermath of North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test. China and Russia, both countries with veto power, are not convinced it was a breach. At the press conference in Beijing on Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jaing Yu urged a cautious response to North Korea and even referred to “the right of all countries to peaceful use of outer space.” Her remarks are similar to those made after China’s unannounced anti-satellite test in 2007.

However, the reality is that these same three countries, the U.S., Japan and South Korea, asked China to chair the six-party talks in Beijing despite having a fundamental strategic disconnect with China on what North Korea represents as a threat. The real threat of North Korea to China has been its potential catastrophic collapse.

Since the establishment of the six-party talks in 2003, North Korea has tested a nuclear device, was delisted from a terrorism blacklist by the previous U.S. administration, and received heavy fuel oil in exchange for reversible disablement of the nuclear program.

Sunday’s launch, according to Western experts, showed that North Korea increased its missile capability and range. The massive first stage of the Taepodong-2 missile functioned well and it propelled the upper two stages over Japan into the Pacific. The successful launch marked a major upgrade over North Korea’s first test in 2006 which failed after less than a minute. This time the missile traveled twice as far as any missile North Korea has launched in the past.

Although North Korea still may be years away from building a missile to threaten the U.S., Japan faces clear and present danger and yet it failed miserably during this first test. Japanese Self Defense Forces deployed two Aegis destroyers to the Sea of Japan and one to the Pacific Ocean to monitor and possibly intercept the missile. Two vessels equipped with SM-3 surface-to-air interceptor missiles were also dispatched to the Sea of Japan.

Despite being on alert, the Japanese government mistakenly declared that there had been liftoff at one point minutes before Prime Minister Taro Aso was to release his statement denouncing North Korea. Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada apologized that evening. This showed the world how poorly the transmission of information was within the Japanese government.

Prime Minister Aso eventually denounced the launch, saying, “The fact that North Korea went ahead with the launch despite repeated warnings from around the world, especially the United States, South Korea and Japan, was an extremely provocative act and one that Japan cannot let go unchallenged.” The Japanese government extended some of its sanctions, but this will have little if any effect since Japan’s trade with North Korea has already decreased dramatically. In 2006, Japanese exports to North Korea totaled 5.1 billion yen, in 2008 that figure was just 800 million yen.

On the diplomatic front in New York, Japan allied with the U.S. but was unsuccessful in getting the U.N. Security Council to condemn Pyongyang, with China and Russia indicated they favor a cautious approach. The Security Council resolutions in 2006 have proved ineffective because few countries have strictly complied with their terms. Any punitive steps by Japan alone would be insignificant. To make matters worse, Japan’s voice in the six-party talks has been weakened since it refused to participate in the provision of heavy fuel oil as a carrot for North Korea.

So what can or should Japan do now? At the very least, it must not offer North Korea an excuse to drop out of the six-party talks. Beyond the missile launch, North Korea may still expel international inspectors, restore nuclear facilities, and even detonate a second nuclear device. Extending inefficient sanctions and isolating itself under the framework of the six-party talks might make Japan the biggest loser.

Sunday’s launch violated U.N. resolutions and Japan’s tough verbal response is understandable. However, Japan also has to realize that the ultimate goal for the international community is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which is also in Japan’s national interest. In addition to that, the Japanese government has the urgent objective of rescuing its citizens who were abducted by North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. Japan cannot afford to embrace a fantasy that it can unilaterally contain the hermit kingdom.

The issue is not how to punish North Korea but how to pull it from brinkmanship to the negotiation table. Diplomacy is painful, especially when you deal with a dictator, but the Japanese government’s embarrassing mishandling of its response to the North Korean launch last weekend proves that Japan has only one option: strategic diplomacy.

Nobuyoshi Sakajiri is a Bernard Schwartz fellow of the Asia Society based in Washington, D.C. He was the Beijing correspondent of the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun from 2005 to August 2008.

Friday, March 20, 2009

Exploring Japan’s Leadership Deficit

March 2009
by Tobias Harris
Posted March 20, 2009

The travails of Taro Aso and, more recently, Ichiro Ozawa, combined with the ascendance of Barack Obama in the United States have left many Japanese with leadership envy.

Prime Minister Aso himself may have a mild case of it: following the recent passage of the Obama administration’s stimulus bill, Mr. Aso admired the speed with which the new U.S. administration acted and lamented that he was unable to do the same. Similarly, in his 2006 book “Ozawaism,” Mr. Ozawa wrote of Japan as a “country without leaders” and detailed his efforts to train future leaders in his annual workshop. Messrs. Aso and Ozawa are joined by politicians and journalists from across the political spectrum who bemoan the country’s ability to produce inspiring leaders, leaders like Mr. Obama capable of inspiring people far beyond their nation’s borders instead of serving as the butt of jokes at home and abroad. The foreign press has echoed domestic Japanese sentiment. As Christian Caryl recently asked in Newsweek, why are Japan’s politicians so bad?

There is more than a grain of truth to this notion that Japan has, in the words of Australian academic Aurelia George Mulgan, a “leadership deficit.” The three prime ministers who have followed the dynamic Junichiro Koizumi have shared a degree of tone deafness to the concerns of the Japanese public; have done little to fix the many problems facing Japan, problems compounded by the country’s stunning economic collapse; and have struggled to control their unruly Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). With each passing year the need for action has grown at the same time that the prime minister’s ability to act creatively has diminished, thanks in part to falling public expectations of the prime minister’s ability to act, a vicious cycle that former Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda and now Mr. Aso have been singularly unable to break.

There is no shortage of theories for why Japan’s politicians are so inept. One popular explanation is that Japan is cursed with hereditary politicians. The argument is that the princelings, having ambled into politics without having to forge close relations with the voters who elect them, have lost touch with the concerns of the average citizen. With roughly a quarter of the members of both houses of the Japanese Diet being representatives by inheritance—and reportedly 40% of LDP members—the idea is that Japanese politicians are a pampered lot, insensitive to the concerns of the people.

But it is unclear how hereditary politicians are any worse than their ancestors or their nonhereditary peers. There is a sense that this argument amounts to “Abe, Aso, and Nakagawa Shoichi, Q.E.D.” Except that lineage is not destiny. After all, Mr. Koizumi, recognized as one of postwar Japan’s most able leaders, is a third-generation politician; his predecessor, Mori Yoshiro, regarded as one of postwar Japan’s worst prime ministers, was not a hereditary Diet member. If Japan has a leadership deficit, its source likely lies elsewhere.

That was precisely Aurelia George Mulgan’s argument in her 2002 article on the leadership deficit. She suggested that Japan lacks strong leaders as a result of institutional design, not culture or personality. Japan’s prime ministers and cabinets, she argued, were constrained because unlike in other parliamentary systems, they had to contend with strong institutional rivals in the bureaucracy and the backbenches of the LDP.

Despite reforms initiated under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto during the 1990s and accelerated under Mr. Koizumi earlier this decade, the prime minister and the cabinet are still forced to do battle with the bureaucracy and LDP members outside the government in order to move their agendas. While the LDP’s factions have lost much of their strength—removing at least one constraint on the prime minister’s freedom of action—the LDP’s internal divisions are now more ideological than they once were, in part due to Mr. Koizumi’s having bolstered the ranks of reformists within the party. Political turmoil within the LDP, meanwhile, has created an opening for bureaucrats to reassert themselves in the policy-making process.

Contrary to the argument made since the opposition took control of the upper house in 2007, gridlock begins in the government benches. The DPJ’s having a foothold in the policy-making process is another obstacle to the government’s advancing its agenda, but it is far from the most important obstacle, especially considering that the government has held a trump card since 2005 in the form of its lower house supermajority.

In addition to institutional constraints on leadership, there may also be a generational constraint at work. Namely, the political skills necessary to exercise leadership in the 21st century are not the skills possessed by the politicians in the pool of potential LDP presidents. In particular, recent LDP prime ministers, would-be prime ministers, and cabinet ministers have been distinguished notably for their tendency to wind up with their foot in their mouth. Mr. Aso may be most notable for his inability to express himself clearly, but he is hardly alone.

Part of Mr. Koizumi’s success must be attributed to the fact that compared to the competition, he was a mastermind of political communication, as recognized by both friends and foes. He used—perhaps even created—a prime ministerial “bully pulpit” in a way that no prime minister had done before, lambasting his political rivals and appealing directly to the public for support.

Most senior Japanese politicians, however, lack the skills to communicate effectively in a modern media environment, perhaps in part because before becoming prime minister they have little need to do so. Winning re-election still depends more on an ability to raise funds to finance a permanent campaign and develop personal ties than on using modern communications technology to mobilize voters and deliver a policy message to a broader segment of the Japanese public. The younger generation of politicians is undoubtedly more astute in the arts of modern political communication, but at least in the LDP they are not in a position to vie for the leadership yet. (Forty-something Maehara Seiji was briefly the president of the DPJ, which only goes to show that youth is no guarantee of political adroitness.)

For much of modern Japanese history, the political system has prized different qualities in its leaders than in other countries, particularly the U.S. Whereas Americans have valued leaders capable of inspiring and persuading the public, successful leaders in the Japanese system are better known for their work behind closed doors, their ability to assemble coalitions within the ruling party, with the bureaucracy, and with opposition parties. They may not look or sound like the leaders of North American or European governments—Charles De Gaulle once infamously referred to Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda as a “little transistor salesman”— but a number of postwar Japanese prime ministers surely qualify as capable leaders, including Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister Aso’s grandfather, who was not called “One Man” Yoshida for his humility.

Another element affecting the quality of contemporary Japanese leadership may simply be the immensity of the problems facing Japan, even before the global economic tsunami hit Japan’s shores. Facing a fiscal crisis, a demographic crisis, a health-care crisis, a pensions crisis, an employment crisis, and a “regions” crisis, Japan’s leaders have simply been overwhelmed, unsure of which problem to tackle first and constrained by the debt compiled in the late 1990s when the government was struggling to escape the post-bubble “lost decade.”

Now, in addition to all of these pre-existing problems, the Aso government is overseeing a macroeconomic crisis as Japan suffers the consequences from having depended on export-led growth for its economic recovery. The long overdue structural transformation of the Japanese economy will now occur beyond the control of Japan’s leaders and with considerable pain for the Japanese people, perhaps more pain than if the government had moved deliberately over the past decade to stimulate domestic demand. Japan’s leaders as a whole deserve the blame for having let it come to this, but in this instance is the problem leadership deficit or institutional failure? In any event, contrary to an argument made by Ms. Mulgan in her book “Koizumi’s Failed Revolution,” economic crisises, far from providing an opportunity for creative leadership, can just as easily trigger paralysis on the part of a country’s leaders, particularly when compounded with other crises.

Given this last point, it is easy to be skeptical about the significance of a DPJ-led government should the opposition party win this year’s general election. Whoever the prime minister is he will face the same crises faced by LDP governments. If it is the DPJ’s Mr. Ozawa, a more doubtful prospect following the arrest of his top secretary on corruption charges, the prime minister will be of the same generation as Messrs. Fukuda and Aso and without a particularly sterling reputation as a political communicator.

But what a DPJ government could change are the constraints that have undermined LDP prime ministers. The DPJ has carefully studied why LDP governments have failed and has formulated transition plans with an eye to avoiding the LDP’s mistakes. Accordingly, the party has developed a scheme that would greatly expand the number of political appointees in cabinet and sub-cabinet posts, which if implemented would kill two birds with one stone: it would tighten the cabinet’s control of the ministries—as would the DPJ’s plan to ask for the resignations of senior bureaucrats and other officials hostile to the party’s program—while bringing potential rivals within the DPJ into the government. These are just the major pieces of a wide-reaching administrative reform plan that the party hopes will permanently strengthen the power of the cabinet and the prime minister over the bureaucracy and ruling party.

The DPJ, should it get the opportunity to govern, could easily fail to implement this program. Should Mr. Ozawa be forced out of power, it will surely have a harder time implementing its scheme, because Mr. Ozawa is respected (and feared) like no other politician in the DPJ. But the DPJ at least recognizes that Japan’s leadership deficit, such as it exists, is the result of institutional defects associated with the LDP rule that the DPJ must be careful to avoid.

What is clear is that the LDP is incapable of making these changes itself. If the most charismatic politician in his generation is incapable of cowing party and bureaucracy, what hope is there for lesser talents? All of which goes to show that Japan’s problems do not lie in its decadent politicians but in its broken institutions. In some way Japan would have had it easier if its problems could be traced to its politicians. There is no shortage of politicians in a democracy. Good institutions are harder to come by.

Tobias Harris is a doctoral candidate in political science at MIT. He is the author of Observing Japan (www.observingjapan.com), a blog on Japanese politics.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

A Dreadful Failure to Lead


February 2009
by Nobuyoshi Sakajiri
Posted February 25, 2009

Given the global financial crisis, the G-7 press conference was an important stage for financial and monetary authorities to send a clear message to the markets. But Shoichi Nakagawa, the finance minister of Japan, looked groggy and slurred his words as if drunk. Mr. Nakagawa, reportedly a heavy drinker, initially claimed, “I drank the night before, but didn’t touch a drop before the news conference.” Later he admitted that he had “enjoyed some wine at lunch.”

Although Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso refused to fire Mr. Nakagawa, the finance minister ultimately resigned after images of his wobbly performance played repeatedly on TV and the Internet world-wide.

In fact, Mr. Nakagawa’s blunder at the G-7 meeting was not his first. He made as many as 26 errors while reading his policy speech at the House of Representative in late January. This latest resignation highlights the Aso administration’s lax crisis management. Mr. Nakagawa is the second minister to step down from the Aso cabinet since last September, following former Construction and Transport Minister Nariaki Nakayama who left last September after just five days on the job, amid mounting criticism of a series of controversial remarks.

Meanwhile, Japan’s economy continues its downturn. The real gross domestic product tumbled by an annual rate of 12.7% in the last quarter of 2008, the sharpest contraction since 1974 amid the first oil crisis, and only the second double-digit decline in the postwar era.

Yet it could be argued that Japan's political decline is even worse than its economic decline. Mr. Aso is Japan’s third prime minister in less than two years, all three chosen by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Prime Minister Aso must call for a general election before September when the term of the Lower House ends, but his approval ratings are dismal (around 10%) and the LDP is surely in danger of losing power in an election.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Aso received an invitation last Tuesday from U.S. Secreatary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to visit Washington this month, which would make him the first foreign leader to meet with President Barak Obama at the White House. But this platinum ticket might be too little too late for Mr. Aso’s popularity back home.

When asked about the disarray of Japanese politics and its impact on U.S-Japan relations during a Tokyo interview, Mrs. Clinton responded that the U.S.-Japan alliance would continue to be durable “no matter who is in charge here in Tokyo.” That generally has been true. But the Japanese minister of defense whom Mrs. Clinton met in Tokyo is the sixth defense minister in just two years. This may be acceptable for an inconsequential country but not for the second largest economy in the world.

People in Japan are becoming increasingly aware of a major reason why so many Japanese politicians are perhaps not suited for the job—the ever increasing number of seshu giin, or hereditary politicians, who followed family members into politics without ambition or passion.

Japanese politics is open only to a limited number of elite, and the dynamism of Japan’s democracy has been in crisis for decades. In addition to Mr. Nakagawa—whose father is a former minister of agriculture—Prime Minister Aso and 11 of his 18 cabinet ministers are also seshu giin. The three most recent leaders, Mr. Aso, Yasuo Fukuda and Shinzo Abe, are all sons or grandsons of past prime ministers. Sadly, becoming prime minister is no longer a common dream for children in Japan.

Witnessing these sudden resignations in the less than year-old Aso cabinet, people have begun questioning the capability of the second and third generation of political families. The Japanese traditionally admire bloodlines or family trees as much as they admire the emperor, but they are also gradually realizing that politics should be different from the arts or entertainment like kabuki. However, it is unfortunate for voters who are frustrated with the increase of seshu giins that the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Ichiro Ozawa, is yet another politician who directly succeeded his father.

For the next election, Shinjiro Koizumi, age 27, the second son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who announced his retirement last year, is running for his father’s old seat. Shinjiro Koizumi lacks any professional experience other than as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a highly-regarded think tank in Washington D.C., but he does have ready-made local support and an existing political machine. His opponent from the DPJ is an equally young lawyer with no political background in his family. Recent media polls predict Shinjiro Koizumi’s landslide victory.

Once elected, he will be the fourth generation to join the “family business.” But those polls were held before Mr. Nakagawa’s resignation. Whether the finance minister’s disgraceful behavior will be a wake up call to the Japanese voters, who are far more embarrassed than the minister himself, is not yet clear.

Nobuyoshi Sakajiri is Asia Society’s Bernard Schwartz Fellow based in Washington, D.C. He was the Beijing correspondent of the Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, from 2005 to August 2008.

Wednesday, November 26, 2008

Corporate Japan's War Stories


November 2008
by William Underwood and Mindy Kotler
Posted November 26, 2008

Since the end of World War II, businesses in Japan have seemed intent on fighting a rear-guard action to rewrite the wartime history of their country. This recurring tendency has a pernicious effect on Japan’s postwar relationships and undermines its corporate citizenship efforts.

The latest example of rewriting is the “True Modern Japan” essay contest, sponsored by the hotel and condominium developer APA Group. Gen. Toshio Tamogami, Japan’s air force chief of staff, won the contest with a paper asserting that Imperial Japan fought a just war that was forced upon it by a Soviet-manipulated American president.

Although Gen. Tamogami was promptly dismissed, his public writing is not an isolated incident. Many Japanese companies, including the successor to Prime Minister Taro Aso’s family firm, have promoted their own idealized versions of the Asia Pacific War.

In 1975, to mark the centennial of the family business empire, Taro Aso as president and CEO of Aso Cement Company oversaw the publication of its history. The resulting 1,500-page book glorifies Aso Mining’s role in the Japanese war effort and suggests, like the winning APA Group essay, that Japan was tricked into attacking the United States.

The “Aso Fights” section of the book states that top U.S. leaders had detailed knowledge of Japanese military plans prior to Dec. 7, 1941. Japan was purposely allowed to strike the first blow, in this telling, so that “Remember Pearl Harbor” could become a rallying cry for Americans. Like Gen. Tamogami, the Aso historians conclude that “this cleverly united American opinion for war against Japan.”

Aso Mining then became a "kamikaze special attack production unit," according to the book. “People like Korean laborers and Chinese prisoners of war filled the void" in Kyushu’s coalfields as Japanese miners left for military service.

The history, however, omits all mention of the 300 Allied prisoners of war (197 Australians, 101 British, and two Dutch) who were also forced to dig coal without pay for Aso Mining. This fact became widely reported in 2006, but Japan’s Foreign Ministry disputed the media accounts and insisted that “our government has not received any information the company has used forced laborers.” Mr. Aso was foreign minister at the time.

Yet, in early 1946, the Japanese government presented Allied war crimes investigators with the Aso Company Report, detailing living and working conditions for the 300 prisoners. Written on Aso Mining stationery and bearing company seals, the report can be found in the U.S. National Archives. It is not too different from the reports submitted to Occupation authorities by over 50 Japanese companies who profited from POW labor.

An opposition party lawmaker, using a blow-up of the Aso Company Report as a prop, directly questioned the prime minister about his family’s use of forced labor in parliament earlier this month. Prime Minister Aso noted he was only five years old when the war ended and defiantly insisted that “no facts have been confirmed.”

The problem with these airbrushed histories is that they have allowed corporate Japan to avoid taking steps toward reconciliation with its Allied POW, Korean or Chinese victims of forced labor. This resistance to confronting past conduct is no longer due to fear of legal responsibility, since courts in Japan and elsewhere have consistently ruled that postwar treaties waived the right to file private lawsuits against the Japanese state and industry. Only moral responsibility remains.

The British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, Dutch and Norwegian governments have responded to Japan’s failure to act by compensating their own surviving POWs. They consider it a debt of honor. South Korea’s government also has begun national payments to its victims of Japanese labor conscription.

Although all suits in Japanese courts by Asian and Western forced laborers have been rejected, the courts have acknowledged their suffering and the lack of compensation. Some Japanese judges have recommended that either the government or the Japanese firms involved voluntarily provide redress.

Sadly, corporate Japan fends off these solutions, relying on the same faulty history as Gen. Tamogami and Mr. Aso. In a 2005 defense strategy, lawyers for Mitsubishi Materials Corporation lambasted the “victor’s justice” of the Tokyo Trials and questioned whether Japan ever “invaded” China at all. They warned the Fukuoka judges that compensating the elderly Chinese forced labor survivors would saddle Japan with a “mistaken burden of the soul.”

“Was Japan an Aggressor Nation?”, the title of Gen. Tamogami’s polemic, was neither an aberration nor original. The essay and Japanese industry’s evasion of its wartime past form a pattern that continues to damage Japan’s international credibility as a responsible partner.

Dr. William Underwood is an independent scholar specializing in Japan’s forced labor history. Mindy Kotler is director of the Washington-based Asia Policy Point that studies Asian security.

Saturday, May 10, 2008

Mr. Fukuda's Final Days


May 2008
by Tobias Harris
Posted May 10, 2008

Tokyo—Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Chinese President Hu Jintao were all smiles this week as Mr. Hu toured Japan and the two men did their best to improve strained relations between their two nations. But political conditions within Japan make it unlikely that the two leaders will make significant progress in solving the contentious issues in the relationship.

No matter how statesman-like Prime Minister Fukuda may appear, the Japanese public has largely abandoned him, and his own party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), is increasingly discontent with his leadership. From here on out Mr. Fukuda will have a hard time taking bold initiatives—in China policy or any other area—and is likely nearing the end of his tenure.

Speculation about a premature end to Mr. Fukuda’s premiership has raged since February, when public opinion polls began recording a sharp spike in the prime minister’s disapproval rating. Even the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, whose opinion polls tend to reflect the newspaper’s editorial line, showed the prime minister’s disapproval rating climbing to 58.4% as of April 14, nearly double his 30% approval rating. The left-of-center Asahi Shimbun recorded a similar gap a week later, with 60% disapproving and only 25% approving of the prime minister.

Until recently, Mr. Fukuda shrugged off the parade of dismal poll numbers and ignored discordant voices within the LDP, not least because he could rely on the support of the party’s senior leaders, many of whom are in his cabinet. But that all changed after the LDP’s embarrassing defeat in the by-election held in Yamaguchi prefecture’s second district on April 27. The first by-election since Mr. Fukuda took office last autumn, it was considered a test of his leadership of the LDP, a test which the prime minister failed. Hideo Hiraoka, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) candidate, defeated Shigetaro Yamamoto, the LDP candidate, by approximately 22,000 votes out of the 212,540 cast.

It wasn’t exactly a fair test for Mr. Fukuda. Mr. Hiraoka won the district in 2000 and 2003 before losing narrowly (588 votes) in 2005, a showing still strong enough to send him to the Diet via proportional representation. The LDP’s Mr. Yamamoto, on the other hand, was a first-time candidate who had recently retired from the transportation ministry. The stream of senior LDP politicians who visited the district to campaign for Mr. Yamamoto wasn’t enough, and Mr. Hiraoka won by the greatest margin of victory of his four campaigns.

But regardless of the DPJ’s strengths in the district, Mr. Fukuda’s inability to bring home a victory in a prefecture known as a “conservative kingdom”—Shinzo Abe, the former prime minister, represents its fourth district—has stripped him of whatever lingering claims he has to the LDP leadership.

His policy agenda, insofar as it exists, has been stymied, whether by the bureaucracy, LDP opponents, or the restive DPJ. On the signature issue of the current Diet session, the future of Japan’s “temporary” gasoline surcharge and the system whereby all gasoline tax revenue is earmarked for road construction, Mr. Fukuda produced a compromise plan—which calls for phasing out the road construction fund from 2009 while reintroducing the expired temporary surcharge —that pleases no one. Reformists in the LDP feel that the prime minister’s plan doesn’t go far enough; the road “tribe,” advocates of the status quo in road construction, feel that it goes too far. The DPJ wants to see an end to both the temporary tax and the road construction fund. Mr. Fukuda has attempted to placate everyone and as a result has pleased no one, least of all the Japanese people, who are increasingly discontent with both the Fukuda government and the LDP.

As the by-election showed, even traditional LDP constituencies are dissatisfied. A major factor in the size of the LDP’s defeat in Yamaguchi was the government’s poorly executed rollout of modifications to senior health-care a week before the election. This frightened and angered elderly voters, who customarily support the LDP in large numbers, and sent them into the arms of the DPJ. This continues the trend seen in last summer’s upper house elections, in which the DPJ performed well in LDP-leaning rural prefectures due in large part to discontent over the government’s mismanagement of pension records.

In short, LDP backbenchers now see Mr. Fukada as an electoral liability. Mr. Fukuda may limp through the remainder of the Diet session and survive to host the G-8 summit in Hokkaido from July 7-9, but it is unlikely that he will remain in office shortly thereafter. The LDP’s poor performance on April 27 seems to have been enough to convince party elders that Mr. Fukuda is not fit to lead the LDP into the general election that may come by year’s end.

In the meantime, the campaign to replace Mr. Fukuda, already active before the by-election, will likely intensify in the months leading up to the G-8 summit. Many believe that replacement will be Taro Aso, runner-up in last year’s leadership election. In a recent poll by the Jiji wire service that asked which politician would make the best prime minister, Mr. Aso ranked a close second behind Junichiro Koizumi, the beloved former prime minister—and far ahead of Mr. Fukuda. Whether Mr. Aso will be able to fix the broken LDP is another matter entirely.

Mr. Harris is a former aide to a DPJ member of the House of Councilors. He is now a freelance writer and author of Observing Japan (www.observingjapan.com), a Japanese politics blog.