Okinawan Election Threatens U.S.-Japan Military Realignment Agreement

Posted:
January 25th, 2010 at 11:10am
in American Leadership
Author: Bruce Klingner

The results of a small town mayoral election on distant Okinawa island risks undermining plans to build a U.S. base and may further inflame tensions in the already strained U.S.-Japan military alliance. Challenger Susumu Inamine, who opposes constructing the U.S. base, beat pro-base Yoshikazu Shimabukuro in the January 24th contest, which had largely became a referendum on the U.S. military facility.

Inamine’s victory will stiffen Okinawan and Japanese resistance to the construction plan. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will use the Okinawan election as further justification for refusing to abide by an existing bilateral U.S.-Japan agreement on the disposition of U.S. military forces in Japan.

In 2006, Washington and Tokyo agreed to a complicated realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including Okinawa. The most contentious component was moving a Marine Corps air unit from a densely populated region of Okinawa to a more desolate location elsewhere on the island. Both countries agree that the Futenma Air Station needs to be moved due to safety concerns arising from urban encroachment on the base. However, plans to build a replacement facility near Camp Schwab faced opposition from local residents.

The left-of-center Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which assumed control of the Japanese government in August 2009, opposes the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan agreed to by the predecessor government. The DPJ has called for the U.S. to instead redeploy the Marine Corps air unit to Guam. The Obama Administration has strongly resisted the Japanese-proposed abrogation of the existing agreement. Washington correctly asserts that separating the Marine air and ground units would have detrimental impact on U.S. ability to fulfill its security obligations under the 1960 bilateral defense treaty.

Although the Nago mayor has little actual legal leverage over base construction, Inamine’s victory will be characterized as Okinawan rejection to accepting the redeployment of the Marine Corps air unit. The election decision could also intimidate the Okinawan governor, who faces reelection later this year, to hesitate in issuing the required environmental impact statement for expanding the base.

The election results will make it even more difficult for the DPJ to compromise with the U.S. on the FRF. The DPJ is reliant on two minor political parties to maintain a majority in the legislative upper house. Both of those parties have threatened to leave the coalition if Hatoyama implements the base agreement.

Hatoyama’s plunging approval ratings will make him even more reluctant to risking his administration in the run-up to the upper house election this summer. Ichiro Ozawa, the powerful DPJ secretary general, would strongly resist any attempt by Hatoyama to accept the advice of his defense and foreign ministers to implement the agreement.

Washington has become increasingly frustrated with Hatoyama’s indecisiveness and DPJ security policies. Regardless of how the FRF issue is resolved, there will be residual animosity in both Washington and Tokyo, complicating debate on other upcoming security issues. As a result, the U.S.-Japan military alliance will continue to be problematic during Hatoyama’s tenure.

Although the Okinawan election will make implementing the bilateral agreement even more difficult, the Obama Administration must remain resolute on the need to implement the force realignment agreement, especially maintaining U.S. Marine Corps air units on Okinawa. To garner increased Japanese support for the realignment plan, Washington should boost public diplomacy efforts to better educate Japanese officials and the populace on the necessity of forward-based U.S. forces to not only defend Japan but to also maintain peace and stability in Asia.

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S. strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military aggression by North Korea, signals Washington’s resolve in defending U.S. allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be necessary.

Japanese Election Poses Challenges for U.S. Alliance

August 31, 2009
by Bruce Klingner
WebMemo #2600

Japan's opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) fulfilled predictions by winning a landslide victory over the moribund ruling party. The change in government is historic: It is only the second time in 50 years that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been out of power. A disgruntled and angry electorate threw the LDP out of office for not only failing to fix Japan's long-standing economic problems but seeming incapable of offering any hope for future improvement.

The degree of change that the DPJ victory will bring to Japan's foreign policy remains in doubt. DPJ security policy pronouncements were vague and contradictory as the party toned down its earlier positions in the run-up to the election. Japan's inherent political constraints, anemic defense funding, and societal apathy will continue to hinder any prime minister's ability to significantly alter course.

But it is clear that the DPJ will be less willing to fulfill existing bilateral U.S. force realignment agreements and more resistant to Washington's requests for Japan to expand its overseas security role. A poll of DPJ candidates taken on the eve of the election revealed that only a minority support U.S. security objectives such as dispatching Japanese forces to Afghanistan, continuing refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, and altering Japan's collective self-defense guidelines to allow for a more robust overseas defense role. More DPJ candidates favored shifting Japan's emphasis to Asia over placing a greater focus on the U.S.-Japanese alliance.[1]

Electorate Eager for Change

The electorate's primary concern was curing Japan's economic woes. The public was determined to drive out incumbents in favor of change, a case of "better the devil you don't know than the devil you do." Advocacy for economic reform, prevalent in previous elections, was abandoned in favor of promises of new government programs to increase household income.

The DPJ tripled its previous number of legislative seats in the lower house. The depth of the LDP's defeat is shown by the ouster of half of the powerful faction heads and party stalwarts Finance Minister Kaoru Yosano, former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, and former Defense Minister Yuriko Koike.

Despite the groundswell of support for the opposition, an Asahi Shimbun survey noted that only 54 percent of respondents believed that the DPJ would actually bring economic and political improvement to Japan, reflecting low expectations for the new government.[2]

Japanese politics are now entering uncharted waters and tumultuous times lie ahead. The DPJ will be hard-pressed to secure immediate achievements to better position itself for the 2010 upper house elections. DPJ coalitions with other parties will strengthen or weaken depending on initial policy choices. Veering to the political right will strain relations with its socialist partners, while adopting policies weakening the alliance with the U.S. could drive conservative members toward accommodation with counterparts in the LDP.

The DPJ's Clouded Strategic Vision

Although Tokyo's foreign and security policies loom large in Washington's view of Japan, these issues were unimportant for Japanese voters. The reality is that the DPJ does not yet know what its foreign policy will be due to the diverse ideological spectrum of its factions. The DPJ selection of its ministers of defense and foreign affairs will be an important initial signal of which faction's views are predominant. But it will take time for a comprehensive DPJ strategy to become evident.

The DPJ has long advocated a Japanese foreign policy more independent of Washington and based on a more equal relationship. But the party shied away from its more strident positions as its chances of winning the election grew. The DPJ's election policy manifesto was a consensus document designed to gain favor with the electorate and reassure the U.S.

Yet there is much in previous and current DPJ policy statements that should be of concern to Washington, since they advocate positions inimical to U.S. interests. For example, DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama emphasizes that the U.S.-Japanese alliance would "continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy" but describes Japan as "caught" between the U.S. and China. He promotes a more Asian-centric strategy for Japan that incorporates long-term economic and political integration of Asian countries. He calls for an Asian economic bloc using a common regional currency and a permanent framework for collective security similar to the European Union.[3]

On near-term security issues, Hatoyama declared that he would not renew the anti-terrorism refueling mission by Japanese maritime self-defense forces when the law expires in January.[4] The DPJ vehemently opposed previous renewals of the legislation. The DPJ also opposes the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps air station on Okinawa from Futenma to Nago--preferring that the air units depart the island entirely--and disagrees with the cost-sharing agreement for redeploying 8,000 U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Furthermore, the DPJ has called for a review of the existing Status of Forces Agreement.

A Bumpy Road Ahead for the Alliance

Washington will nervously watch for clues as the DPJ struggles to overcome internal divisions and achieve policy consensus. Uncertainty begets suspicion and misinterpretation, and the potential for diplomatic faux pas by the new U.S. and Japanese administrations is high.

The Obama Administration must balance achieving its security objectives with maintaining strong relations with critical ally Japan. At times, these goals will be in contradiction with each other, necessitating a delicate balance and deft management of the alliance by both nations.

To a greater degree than ever before, the U.S.'s ability to influence Japanese policy will be hindered by a ruling party that is skeptical--if not suspicious--of Washington's intentions. The way ahead will require subtle sophisticated interaction, even as both sides write the terms of a new relationship.

Washington should expect and accept a certain degree of change in tone from the new DPJ government. An overly heavy-handed U.S. approach could irritate or even alienate a critical partner. The U.S. should refrain from responding to every policy pronouncement by the DPJ members, particularly those advocating dramatic security policy changes.

Additionally, Washington should quietly counsel the new leadership to moderate its campaign rhetoric lest it weaken perceptions of the importance of the alliance and the need to transform it to better address a rapidly changing threat environment. The DPJ party leader and future Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should realize that governing is different from campaigning.

At the same time, however, the Obama Administration should call for the DPJ to affirm the existing alliance relationship and bilateral policies. The U.S. must press for a continuation of Japanese commitments, particularly to U.S. force realignment agreements, refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, and missile defense.

Status Quo?

U.S. patience will be tested, however, by Japan's lingering reluctance to alter the comfortable status quo in which Tokyo emphasizes economic solutions to security challenges and provides minimal military resources to defend its national interests overseas.

Washington can take some comfort from knowing that dire predictions of a dramatic leftward lurch in Japan are wrong. But even minor policy changes or alterations in tone will have far-reaching implications and strain the alliance.

Washington should also be concerned that perhaps the best it can hope for is maintaining the bilateral status quo. However, the current state of affairs is becoming increasingly inadequate to address either Asian or global security challenges. The Obama Administration should make it clear that a slow transformation of the alliance is incompatible with the rapid pace of global challenges.

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Japan's Opposition Buoyed by Leader's Resignation

May 14, 2009

by Bruce Klingner

WebMemo #2444

In Japanese politics, darkness is one step ahead. - Japanese proverb The resignation of Ichiro Ozawa as leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) increases the potential for a political overthrow of Japan's ruling party for only the second time in 50 years. Ozawa had been on track to engineer a political upset and become prime minister until a close aide was arrested for campaign financing violations. Although Ozawa was not implicated in this scandal himself, his growing personal unpopularity threatened to undermine his party's chances in this year's parliamentary election. Growing numbers of DPJ legislators were discussing whether to jettison Ozawa in order to salvage any chance of winning the lower house and thus gaining the prime ministership.[1] The DPJ is a coalition of factions with conflicting views on security policies critical to the U.S. such as: The bilateral military alliance; Parameters for deployment of Japanese forces overseas; and Tokyo's approach toward North Korea. The DPJ will see a struggle between conservative factions that favor maintaining a U.S.-alliance-centered foreign policy and those advocating Ozawa's more independent security stance. A DPJ victory in the lower house election could lead to calls for rewriting the agreement on realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. In the coming months, Japanese politics should garner particular attention from U.S. policymakers who may soon face a new Japanese leadership--one that is willing to hinder U.S. security objectives and even challenge the status quo of the bilateral alliance. LDP: Dead Party Walking. Prime Minister Taro Aso and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been wracked by political gaffes, scandals, and plummeting approval ratings. Although the LDP has had a monopolistic grasp on Japanese political power, ruling uninterrupted since 1955 except for a short period in 1993, it is increasingly vulnerable to losing the second house of parliament and thus the prime ministership. In late 2008, surveys showed a shift in voter preference from Aso and the LDP to Ozawa and DPJ. A November 2008 survey by Kyodo News showed that the public preferred the DPJ over the LDP 43 percent to 36 percent. A December Yomiuri Shimbun survey indicated Ozawa surpassed Aso as the preferable candidate for the first time.[2] The DPJ seemed guaranteed of victory until the arrest of Takanori Okubo, a senior aide to Ozawa, for falsifying political contribution records. Following the scandal, support for the LDP rebounded to 30 percent by April 2009, equaling the support for the DPJ, according to a Kyodo News survey. Moreover, 65 percent of respondents felt Ozawa should resign as DPJ leader.[3] Aso's rebounding popularity was also due to a perception that the economic stimulus might work and strong patriotic sentiment in response to the most recent North Korean missile crisis. Ozawa's resignation will give the DPJ renewed momentum with voters, allowing it to extend its lead over the LDP. Victory, however, remains far from guaranteed. The Japanese Public: A Pox on Both Your Houses Despite the DPJ's lead over the LDP, both parties suffer low approval ratings--a reflection of voter apathy and cynicism. Although the Japanese public is increasingly willing to change horses, it is doing so without a great deal of enthusiasm. An Asahi Shimbun survey showed that 91 percent of respondents were either a little or greatly dissatisfied with the current Japanese political system, with 60 percent being greatly dissatisfied.[4] It is a foregone conclusion that the LDP will lose its two-thirds majority control of the lower house. As such, even if it managed to win a simple majority and maintain control of the lower house, the party would still lose its ability to use parliamentary rules to overrule the opposition-controlled upper house. This scenario would cause even worse political stalemate and legislative gridlock in Japan. If the DPJ wins a majority of the lower-house election, gaining a trifecta of both houses of parliament and prime minister, it would be a historical shift in Japanese politics. If the DPJ were to win a plurality but not an absolute majority, it could trigger defections across party lines or even a post-election realignment with splits within one or both parties. How and when such a realignment would occur or along what fault lines it would divide are unpredictable, since Japan would be entering into uncharted waters. A realignment could create either two major parties divided along ideological lines or many factionalized parties with transitory coalitions. Regardless, the resultant political turmoil would further constrain U.S. efforts to get Japan to assume a larger security and economic leadership role in Asia. Future Japanese Policy in Flux It is unclear what DPJ policies would be if the party gained control, since the party has no ideological homogeneity. The DPJ is driven by factions and has been struggling to achieve consensus on security policy. Some legislators favor the conservative views of former party leader Seiji Maehara, who advocates maintaining a strong alliance with the U.S. Other DPJ leaders supported Ozawa's advocacy for constraining the deployment of Japanese defense forces overseas to only those missions approved by the U.N., a view at odds with U.S. efforts to get Japan to assume greater regional and global security responsibilities. Ozawa supporters would be more resistant to U.S. efforts to secure Japanese participation in counter-terrorism and nation rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan. Ozawa has called for a hedging strategy of downplaying Tokyo's relationship with the U.S. and reaching out to Beijing. Conversely, DPJ conservatives are concerned that a rising China might not respect the wishes of smaller countries or follow international norms of behavior. The U.S. has pressed for Japan to reinterpret its current theory of collective self-defense in order to allow for more expansive missions for the Japanese self-defense forces overseas. Conservative DPJ members agree with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's efforts to adopt a looser interpretation that would allow Japan to protect U.S. forces if they were in danger while defending Japan. Such a view, however, would be anathema to the DPJ's more liberal factions. After the election, it could take some time for the DPJ to achieve consensus. Such a post-election consensus could be dependent on who is selected as prime minister as well as the ministers of foreign affairs and defense. The DPJ may be constrained in implementing a drastic policy shift to the left by a potential rebellion of the younger conservative wing, which could seek to realign with their counterparts in the LDP. Our Condolences, You Won The election of the DPJ could create turbulence in the Japanese-U.S. security alliance and disrupt efforts to coordinate allied policy toward North Korea. Ozawa supporters are more likely to resist efforts to implement punitive measures for North Korea's violation of U.N. resolutions and failure to meet its denuclearization commitments. Furthermore, the next prime minister, regardless of party, will face the same systemic constraints that have long prevented Japan from exerting a strong political and economic leadership role. The next leader will preside over a country that is not only floundering economically but has a political system seemingly designed for inefficiency and a populace apparently acquiescent to China filling the Asian leadership vacuum. When asked to consider the Japanese political system as a ship at sea, 50 percent of respondents said that it is like a ship with a broken rudder, adrift in the ocean, while 31 percent said it is like a ship that has run aground and is sinking.[5] In such a situation, changing captains on the Japanese ship of state will be insufficient to overcome Japan's deep-rooted structural weaknesses--flaws that hinder the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. [1]The DPJ gained control of the less powerful upper house of the bicameral Diet legislature in 2007. The Japanese administration must call an election of the lower house no later than September 2009. Whichever party gains a majority in the lower house chooses the prime minister. [2]Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, "U.S.-Japan Relations: Traversing a Rough Patch," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2009, at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/ id,5193/ (May 14, 2009). [3]Kyodo News, "Aso Cabinet Approval Rating Rises 5.9 points to 29.6%: Kyodo Poll," April 29, 2009. [4]Observing Japan, "The Japanese People Lose Hope," March 19, 2009, at http://www.observingjapan.com/2009/03/japanese-people-lose-hope.html (May 14, 2009). [5]Ibid.

Secretary Clinton's Asia Trip: Allied Reassurance

February 13, 2009
by Bruce Klingner
WebMemo #2293

Coming only three weeks into the Obama Administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Asia trip will be long on signals and short on substance. That is not necessarily a bad thing, especially when it sends several critically important messages to allies Japan and South Korea. Her trip communicates that Asia matters to the United States and that Washington is committed to a predominant role in the region over the long-term.

Traveling to Tokyo and Seoul prior to Beijing reflects the importance of our allies as well as a direct attempt to assuage fears of "Japan passing." As a Senator, Hillary Clinton authored a Foreign Affairs article in which she stated the U.S.--China relationship was the most important relationship in Asia, rekindling Japanese angst from the slight suffered when President Bill Clinton traveled to China but skipped Japan.

By traveling prior to the Obama Administration having even announced its Asian team or finalized its policies for the region, Clinton says she wants to establish a tone of open dialogue and transparency with America's Asian allies. But, of course, talking does not guarantee agreement, and there are a number of contentious issues that could arise during the trip. Clinton must reassure allies disturbed by Bush Administration's abandonment of important principles in its zeal to achieve North Korean denuclearization. Additionally, she should more clearly articulate the Obama Administration's six-party talks strategy and its position on the U.S.--South Korea free trade agreement.

A Changed Political Landscape

Clinton's trip comes amidst global economic turmoil, which will shift attention away from traditional bilateral and regional security issues, such as transforming the existing military relationships into strategic alliances and achieving North Korean denuclearization. Moreover, U.S. allies will have fewer resources to address these objectives, including Washington's request for Seoul and Tokyo to assume a larger global security role in Afghanistan. Rather than discussing these more traditional concerns, it is expected that Clinton's trip will focus heavily on coordinating policies to address the economic crisis.

The election of a U.S. President with very high public approval ratings changes the political landscape in bilateral U.S. relations with Tokyo and Seoul as well as domestic South Korean politics. Obama will have more leverage in bilateral relations because he starts with a clean slate.

For instance, Obama undermines South Korean progressives on the North Korea problem by removing the political cover that their pundits, media, and anti-U.S. groups have hidden behind. Anti-U.S. actions and rhetoric can no longer be justified as only being anti-Bush, nor can U.S. efforts to insist upon North Korean denuclearization compliance be blamed on "neo-conservative conspiracies." The South Korean left will also be less able to blame the deadlocked six-party talks on lack of U.S. "flexibility," i.e., concessions. It will become increasingly evident that the problem is, as it always has been, North Korean intransigence.

Clinton's trip occurs when the Japanese and South Korean leaders are weakened by dismally low approval ratings and hamstrung by legislative inertia. Japan suffers a "twisted parliament" with control of the bilateral Diet split between the ruling and opposition parties, the latter of which employs obstructionist tactics to bring about the prime minister's downfall.

The South Korean ruling Grand National Party is driven by factionalism and acts like a minority party despite having nearly two-thirds control of the unicameral National Assembly. Neither Prime Minister Taro Aso nor President Lee Myung-bak have progressed in expanding the military alliances, and both are likely to be resistant to the Obama Administration's requests for military assistance in Afghanistan.

An Increasingly Belligerent North Korea

Clinton's trip will be overshadowed by North Korea's increasing belligerency and potential long-range missile launch. Pyongyang has stepped up its verbal attacks and threatened military action against South Korea in an attempt to get President Lee Myung-bak to abandon his principled policy requiring conditionality, reciprocity, and transparency in inter-Korean relations.

North Korea's rhetoric is also a shot across the bow of the Obama Administration. In mid-January, North Korea rejected the existing six-party agreement by asserting that it would denuclearize only upon receiving formal diplomatic relations with the U.S., the cessation of Washington's "hostile policy," and removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Pyongyang may also be preparing to test launch a Taepo Dong-2 missile, which could theoretically have the range to reach the continental United States with a nuclear warhead.

North Korea's actions are a clear signal that it will not adopt a more accommodating position despite the change in U.S. leadership. Such behavior is a standard North Korean negotiating tactic, designed to raise the ante, deflect criticism of its own noncompliance by blaming U.S. actions, insist on equality of conditions in response to unequal violations, and prompt renegotiation of the existing agreement. There is, however, a growing risk of a tactical confrontation between the Korean navies in the West Sea that runs the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

What Should Be Done

During her trip, Clinton must strike a proper balance between accommodating allied concerns while still advocating strong U.S. objectives. Although Seoul and Tokyo have both agreed to expand the scope of the respective bilateral alliances, implementation has lagged. Clinton should welcome the improvement in bilateral relations with South Korea as well as the resurgence of military contingency planning that has occurred since the departure of the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

The U.S. should continue to press for an expanded alliance structure with Seoul but temper this effort with a realization of the volatility of the domestic political landscape. Any Obama Administration request for South Korean ground forces to support coalition operations in Afghanistan will be particularly contentious and would require extensive public diplomacy efforts to mitigate the potential for public demonstrations.

The military relationship with Japan has been problematic due to Japanese constitutional, legal, fiscal, and societal constraints as well as extensive foot-dragging by Tokyo. It is now unclear the degree to which Japan is willing to alter the comfortable alliance status quo. There are serious consequences to Japanese inaction. Long-term Japanese policy stagnation is not in Washington's strategic interest and risks increasing U.S. frustration with its ally.

Tokyo's unwillingness or inability to make tough decisions risks Japan losing influence and even relevance in a region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China. Clinton should articulate U.S. concerns while exploring Japanese objectives in preparation for subsequent efforts coordinated with the Secretary of Defense.

Clinton should reassure our allies that the U.S. remains committed to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and unequivocally state that Washington will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Statements by U.S. officials have been misperceived in South Korea and Japan as indicating a shift in U.S. policy away from North Korean denuclearization to merely capping the existing nuclear stockpile and preventing proliferation. Clinton should also delineate the Obama Administration's strategy toward the six-party talks and the means it will employ to ensure North Korean compliance with existing commitments.

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Forging a New Era in the U.S.—Japan Alliance

October 9, 2008
by Bruce Klingner
Backgrounder #2196
The Heritage Foundation

The U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea are critical to maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, as well as to promoting liberty, democracy, and free-market principles. These rela­tionships are growing in importance in light of China's increasing military capabilities, economic weight, and political influence.

The bilateral U.S.–Japan security ties have expanded significantly during the past 10 years, resulting in more closely integrated military[1] operations and a broader in­ternational role for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). To accomplish this, Tokyo removed or adapted several of its self-imposed post-World War II restrictions.[2]

Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. military forces in Asia, including the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier and Marine Expeditionary Force. Ballis­tic missile defense integration is a bright spot in the relationship and joint operations are becoming more coordinated. Tokyo has been moving inexorably toward military reform during the past decade, albeit at a glacial pace and only in response to repeated prod­ding by the United States.

Adjusting to a more durable alliance structure, the U.S. and Japan have already established a blueprint for transforming their alliance. Successful implementa­tion will require sustained and energetic involvement by the senior leadership of both countries. Leadership is not always in evidence, particularly on the Japanese side, but if this is accomplished, it could provide the basis for defining a new strategic vision for the alliance in 2010 and beyond.

Yet, despite the solid bedrock of a strengthened U.S.–Japanese security relationship, uncertainties remain over the future parameters of the bilateral alliance. The degree to which Japan is willing to alter the comfortable alliance status quo is unclear. There are serious consequences to Japanese inac­tion. Long-term Japanese policy stagnation is not in the United States strategic interest and risks increas­ing U.S. frustration with its ally. Tokyo's unwilling­ness or inability to make tough decisions can lead to Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China. As a Chinese proverb cautions, "Two tigers cannot share the same mountain."

The U.S. should urge Japan to take greater responsibility for its own defense as well as an expanded regional and global security role. Much can be accomplished within existing parameters by fully implementing previous bilateral agreements. Washington should call on Tokyo to remain engaged in coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while replacing ad hoc deployment approvals with permanent enabling legislation. The U.S. should also advocate an expansion of the alliance and request that Japan increase its defense spend­ing to fulfill its obligations and achieve broader security objectives. Although newly electedPrime Minister Taro Aso will be more amenable to U.S. requests, political and societal constraints will hinder rapid progress in transforming the bilateral security relationship.

The Ever-Evolving Alliance

The bilateral U.S.-Japanese military alliance is not stagnant and has already undergone consider­able evolution. The concept of transforming the alli­ance from its initial mission of defending Japan to a broader regional and global focus also has a long history. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa affirmed the alli­ance as a "global partnership." In 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto emphasized that the mutual defense agreement constituted the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.[3]

In 2002, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, initiated a Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to analyze the global secu­rity environment; define both nations' roles, mis­sions, capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperate in missile defense and global security challenges.[4] The 2004 Japanese Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) called on Japan to become more engaged militarily in the Indian Ocean region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, permit mil­itary exports to the U.S. to facilitate development of joint missile defense, and increase the size of rapid-reaction forces.[5]

In 2005, the SCC agreed to bold revisions to expand the parameters of the defense alliance. In Feb­ruary, the two countries produced the Common Stra­tegic Objectives which provided a common assessment of strategy and threats. In October, the SCC completed the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transforma­tion and Realignment for the Future(ATARA) which delineated bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities and defined 15 areas for defense cooperation and seven measures to improve policy and operational coordination. As a result of these decisions, bilateral military and intelligence operations have improved, becoming more coordinated and integrated.

Achievements in U.S.–Japan Alliance Transformation

Greater interoperability:

Forward deploy I Corps headquarters from Ft. Lewis to collocate with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Central Readiness Force headquarters at Camp Zama in 2012.

Establish a Bilateral Air Operations Coordination Center established at Yokota Air Force Base with integrated air and missile defense.

Realignment and consolidation of U.S. forces

Relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to a new facility at Camp Schwab.

Redeploy 8,000 U.S. Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam. Japan to pay $6.1 billion or 75 percent of the cost.

Relocate elements of Carrier Air Wing 5 from Naval Air Station Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.

Expanded role for Japan Self-Defense Force

Elevate the Japan Defense Agency to cabinet-level Ministry of Defense.

Participate in international peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations.

Enhanced cooperation on ballistic missile defense

U.S.-built X-band radar system at Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's (JASDF) Shariki air base, which shares data with the Japanese.

Expedite deployment of U.S. Patriot PAC-3 units at Kadena, Okinawa.

Provide Standard Missile (SM-3) capabilities to U.S. forward-deployed naval forces.

Accelerate modification of Japanese Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities.

Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyer intercepted a medium-range target missile near Hawaii.[6]

Japan has also been more willing during the past decade to deploy its defense forces overseas. The SDF deployed disaster relief teams to Burma and China and participated in U.N. peacekeeping oper­ations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, the Golan Heights, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Mozam­bique, Pakistan, and Rwanda. General Bruce Wright, former commander of U.S. Forces Japan, commented that Japan routinely agrees that U.S. forces in Japan should deploy elsewhere (in contrast with U.S. units in Korea which do not deploy off the peninsula).[7]

Tokyo pays $4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S. troops, equivalent to half of the total cost-sharing assistance that the U.S. receives from all NATO nations. Every year, Japan buys $1 billion worth of U.S. military equipment, with $8 billion of military sales cases currently open.[8]

Japan has expanded its role, pushing the enve­lope of acceptable practices, albeit gradually, mini­mally, and with token forces. Much more needs to be done. Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura com­mented that "compared to Japan's capabilities and strengths as a country, there is more room to make an effort in peacekeeping operations."[9] When Japan does send troops overseas, it does so with such restrictive rules of engagement that it undermines their effectiveness. The 600 Japanese troops in southern Iraq in 2005 were in an enclave that had to be protected by Dutch, and later British, troops.

Military-to-military coordination is good, though difficult due to senior political inattention. As one two-star general of the U.S. Forces Japan remarked, "Every inch of progress is an uphill bat­tle." There are no Ministry of Defense champions within Japan's Diet, nor Japanese champions within the U.S. Congress.

Riding the Waves: Japanese Leaders' Con­flicting Views on the Alliance. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. by passing the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. The legislation permitted Japan to deploy ground troops to Iraq, transport aircraft to Kuwait, and refuel supply ships heading to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations. Koizumi's motiva­tion for expanding Japan's global role was primarily grounded in strengthening the U.S. alliance, though couched in terms of common global strate­gic objectives.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006–2007) advo­cated a more assertive Japanese foreign policy that involved further strengthening of the "Japan-U.S. alliance while steadily upgrading our country's national security platform."[10] In order to allow Tokyo to assume an expanded security role, Abe pressed for a revision to Japan's constitution and an expanded role for the SDF.

Abe perceived the inherent long-term strategic benefit for Japan, but his prioritization of security policy over domestic economic issues was rejected by the electorate during the upper house election. U.S. expectations for what could be accomplished in alliance transformation under Abe were raised unrealistically. There are also questions referring to the level to which Abe could have delivered had he remained in office.

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (2007–2008) had a different foreign policy perspective from his pre­decessors. Although he wanted to maintain the alli­ance with Washington as the bedrock of Japanese security, he placed less priority on security issues. Fukuda placed greater emphasis on maintaining regional harmony by improving relations with Japan's neighbors and balancing its relationships with the U.S. and China more evenly. He com­mented privately to a Japanese journalist that he did not think Japan should always say "yes" to the United States. Fukuda had less interest than his pre­decessors in pursuing constitutional revision to attain "normal nation" status and a stronger regional security role for Japan.

The most tangible manifestation of Fukuda's softer security policy was his view on reinterpreting Japan's self-imposed restrictions on the role of its defense forces. Prime Minister Abe had established an advisory panel to review the restrictive interpre­tation of Japan's right to exercise collective self-defense. The group was to make recommendations on four scenarios:

1. Protecting U.S. naval vessels under attack in international waters;
2. Intercepting ballistic missiles that may be tar­geted at the U.S.;
3. Defending foreign troops that come under attack during a U.N. peacekeeping operation; and
4. Providing logistical support in overseas countries.

Chairman Shunji Yanai, former Japanese ambassa­dor to the U.S., commented in July 2007 that "we should bring an end to the interpretation of the [Jap­anese] Constitution that does not match reality." In light of the increasing North Korean and Chinese mil­itary threats, Yanai remarked that the panel believed in an expanded role for the SDF.[11] However, Fukuda did not accept the panel's recommendations, indicat­ing that he had no intention of altering the current interpretation, which prohibits Japan from defending an ally under attack, even though it is entitled to do so under international law.[12]

Fukuda's policy strategy reflected both per­sonal convictions as well as an assessment of the domestic political landscape. Yasuo Fukuda believed in the "Fukuda Doctrine" of his father, Takeo Fukuda, who was prime minister of Japan from 1976 to 1978. Takeo pledged in 1977 that Japan would never become a military power again and was committed to improving relations with all Southeast Asian nations. Yasuo sought to apply this pledge to Japanese foreign policy in Northeast Asia as well.

The political lesson of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) loss of the upper house in the 2007 election, as well as Abe's subsequent abrupt depar­ture from office, was that the electorate was more focused on domestic economic issues than on secu­rity reorientation. There was thus no advantage for Fukuda to spend his and the LDP's limited political capital on an issue that did not resonate strongly with the populace. This is particularly true as the LDP tries to recapture public support in the run-up to a lower-house election which must take place by September 2009.

Fukuda issued no grand strategy nor undertook any bold steps in security policy. Instead, he stalled on reinterpreting collective self-defense, creating a national security council, and revising Article 9 of the constitution. Even Fukuda's decision to use the LDP's two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the upper-house veto in order to renew refueling operations was interpreted differently in Japan and the U.S. Officials and analysts in Japan raved about the speed with which Fukuda was able to restart operations; most had expected a delay until mid-2008. Washington, however, saw Tokyo's inability to make important decisions expeditiously as reflective of a third-rate country.

Prime Minister Taro Aso's conservative foreign and security policies will be a return to those espoused by Koizumi and Abe. He will be more receptive to expanding Tokyo's role in the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and loosening restrictions on the SDF. Aso will push for a reinterpretation of the concept of collective self-defense. His policies will be more similar to Washington's than those of Fukuda. As a result, Aso's election offers the hope of closer coordination on U.S.–Japanese strategic interests. But Aso's policy focus will be primarily domestic, due to the need to recapture strong public support.

Challenges to a Stronger Security Relationship

Lack of National Consensus. Japan remains conflicted over its niche in the post-Cold War envi­ronment and the proper role of its military forces. Overcoming the pacifism of the past 50 years is clearly a factor. But beyond this is the complacency attributed to the Yoshido strategy in which Japan relied on the U.S. for its security guarantee while it devoted itself to a singular pursuit to build eco­nomic power.[13]

Abe's bold blueprint for Japan to assume a broader security role did not gain favor with an elec­torate bore-sighted on pocketbook issues. Abe's security vision was rejected, and not replaced by an alternative policy. There has not been substantial public debate on Japan's security paradigm and its international role. Concern over the intentions and implications of China's growing military capabilities has not overcome national complacency and an inherent preference for the status quo.

Tokyo has been resistant to U.S. requests to assume a larger security role. Domestic angst arising from perceived inequities in the military alliance with the U.S. conflict with a reluctance to undertake budgetary increases. There has been a greater will­ingness to deploy troops overseas in recent years but only on narrowly defined missions with no risk of being involved in combat. The task is further constrained by the lack of dynamic leaders who are willing and able to transform and direct public opinion. In that sense, the charismatic Koizumi was truly an anomaly.

Overcoming Japanese inertia will be difficult and will require a sea change in thinking by both politi­cians and public, neither of which are particularly attuned to international security affairs. Though for­midable, the task is not impossible. But it will require sustained U.S. efforts, beginning with a clear articulation of the future form of the alliance as well as Japan's roles, missions, and capabilities.

Constitutional Limits. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution specifies that Japan forever "renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis­putes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preced­ing paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recog­nized." There was declining public support during 2006-2007 for the constitutional changes that Abe was advocating.

Underfunding Defense Requirements. Japa­nese defense spending has now declined for five consecutive years. The Ministry of Defense requested an increase but was rejected by the Min­istry of Finance. Tokyo needs to increase defense spending not only to assume a greater security role but to simply remain at the same level. Following a procurement holiday, Japan now needs to purchase several systems to replace those it acquired in the 1980s, including F-15 and P-3 aircraft.

If Japan does not increase defense spending over its unofficial ceiling of 1 percent of GDP, and with missile defense consuming a larger portion of its defense budget, Japan will be forced to make addi­tional force cuts. Some cuts to ground forces are acceptable, but extensive reductions would hinder Japan's ability to engage in or transport troops for overseas peacekeeping operations.

Political Constraints. The prime minister is hampered in implementing any security policy changes due to government gridlock brought on by a "twisted parliament" in which the two legislative houses are controlled by opposing parties. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which controls the upper house, remains committed to obstructionist tactics to force an early election of the more powerful lower house of the Diet.

The DPJ refused to approve a special-measures agreement renewing host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan, marking the first refusal of an inter­national agreement by the upper house under the current constitution. The Fukuda administration was forced to use the constitutional provision which allows a two-thirds majority of the lower house to overrule the upper house.

Emboldened by Fukuda's low public approval ratings, the DPJ passed a symbolic "no confidence" censure of the prime minister. Though non-bind­ing, it reflected the extent to which the opposition will go to undermine the current government. The DPJ will continue to obstruct Japan's security mis­sions as a means to position itself for a legislative victory. Although differences between the ruling and opposition parties are smaller than often per­ceived, the DPJ's tactics are disruptive to common alliance objectives.

Transforming the Alliance: Key Concerns

Does the Political Will Exist? The U.S. sees troublesome delays in the implementation of the SCC decisions, most notably the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. These delays have a domino effect on other moves, including that of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless, a key figure in transforming the bilateral relation­ship, expressed concern over a "state of drift" in the alliance ever since Fukuda took office. He warned that if the U.S. perceives Japan as not taking the agreements seriously, the alliance will lose momen­tum and relevance, causing a degradation in mili­tary capability in the region.[14]

Is Japan Putting Strategic Objectives First? Japan has allowed strategic national objectives to take a back seat to arbitrary budget limits and in­dustrial policy. Japan's security objectives are incon­sistent with current government funding decisions. Tokyo has undertaken new missions—including missile defense, expanded overseas operations, and paying a significant portion of the cost of the re­alignment of U.S. forces without a commensurate increase in defense expenditures. Yet, the govern­ment continues to maintain a historical cap on de­fense spending of 1 percent of GDP, in essence allowing the finance ministry to determine Japan's national security strategy and objectives.

Beyond Alliance Housekeeping? Troop reloca­tion, base transformation, and burden-sharing is­sues are contentious, time-consuming, and, if handled poorly, potentially disastrous to the well-being of the alliance. Even when handled adeptly, they run the risk of sucking all the air out of the room by becoming an end in themselves rather than a means to achieving an objective. Yet, as im­portant as these issues are, they are merely alliance management issues, a national-level equivalent to rearranging the furniture.

Redeploying U.S. military forces to lessen their exposure to the Japanese populace serves the com­mendable goal of maintaining public support by reducing potential flashpoints. But, all of this does not provide clarity on the current and future roles, missions, and necessary capabilities of the U.S. and Japanese defense forces. It is critical to redefine the alliance beyond the North Korean threat, emphasiz­ing either the need for Japanese involvement in redressing global security issues or the potential threat that a rising China represents—the "dragon behind the North Korean tree," as a Japanese defense expert characterized it.

Pursuing Incremental Transformation. Wash­ington will need to manage its own expectations; in this Japanese political environment a new Japanese national consensus on alliance transformation will come slowly. The goal of transformation will be ill served by a pace that reminds the Japanese public of its inability to make the choice on its own. Japan's citizens need the pressure, [15] but they also need to buy into the idea fully.

In 2005 and 2006, large advances were made on the political level in broadening the parameters of the alliance. With no similar advances expected for 2008 and 2009, the focus should be on military-level implementation of the earlier SCC decisions. Consolidating progress can lay the groundwork in anticipation of future breakthroughs under a more conducive political environment.

In the near term, the U.S. should strive to expand Japan's security role within existing param­eters even as it advocates longer-term expansion of the alliance. To the degree possible, changes to the alliance should be made out of view of the public eye to avoid controversy or creating anti-American sentiment.

Much can be done within the existing constitu­tional and legal framework to accomplish goals such as expanding the SDF rules of engagement for overseas operations. Tokyo should replace ad hoc overseas deployment approvals with permanent legislation to eliminate the need for recurrent Diet involvement.

While Japan Sleeps

Japan is at a strategic crossroads. It can continue its status quo thinking by citing "fiscal difficulties" to continue to fend off calls for it to fully fund its defense requirements. Though it is the more com­fortable choice in the short term, it has the effect of ceding Asia's leadership role to China. Though mil­itarily strong in absolute terms, Japan is in decline relative to Beijing.

A debate has already begun as to whether Japan has become complacent about devolving to a mid­dle-status power. Such a development would be welcomed by China which is vying with Japan for preeminence in Asia and even by South Korea, which remains conspiratorially worried about a resurgent militaristic Japan. Chinese preeminence would be a disaster, however, for U.S. national interests in Asia.

Bold leadership is needed but unlikely in Japan's consensus-driven political system. In this sense, Koizumi was an aberration the likes of which is unlikely to appear in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Fukuda shied away from expanding Japan's role through security and diplomatic initiatives, such as reinterpreting the collective self-defense theory or values-based alliance with democratic neighbors. Polls that show Japanese frustration with perceived inequities in the military relationship and the irri­tants of U.S. troop presence do not stimulate a strong national consensus to raise Japan's security role.

It is unlikely that there will be significant for­ward movement on security issues at the political level. The glacial pace of Japanese decision making has become, if possible, even slower. There will be little Japanese stimulus for highlighting security issues due to lack of interest by the electorate, few in the Diet are military experts, and the Ministry of Defense is a surprisingly minor bureaucracy— the "MoD doesn't cast a long shadow in the Diet." Alliance transformation will therefore be a gradual, incremental process that will be frustrating to U.S. officials.

Tokyo's repeated deflections to appeals for greater security contributions could lead to "Japan fatigue" in Washington. U.S. officials have expressed frustration with Japan's citing of the Ministry of Finance's opposition as justification for its failure to increase the country's defense spending beyond 1 percent of GDP.

Richard Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of defense, commented in a May 2008 Asahi Shim­bun interview that Japan's cumbersome decision-making cycle averages seven to nine years as com­pared with other countries in the region which are able to make and execute three different decisions in the same time. Military tacticians describe this repetitive decision-making process as observe-ori­ent-decide-act (OODA) with the goal to be faster than one's opponent, or "getting inside their OODA loop." A slow OODA process leads to defeat.

Lawless warned that Japan must find a way to increase the pace of its tempo of decision making, deployment, integration, and "operationalizing" the alliance with the U.S.[16] A failure to do so risks Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China.

Japanese inertia, coupled with a new conserva­tive South Korean president determined to improve Seoul's relations with Washington, could lead South Korea to supplanting Japan as the more important U.S. ally in Asia. South Korea has chafed at repeated U.S. policy references to the importance of Wash­ington's alliance with Tokyo, while neglecting Seoul's significant contributions to peace and stabil­ity, including deploying 300,000 troops to the Viet­namese War. Nor is South Korea constrained by Japan's historical legacy, constitutional provisions, or societal apathy toward security objectives.

A fundamental question for Washington, includ­ing the next U.S. President, will be how to respond to Japan's tendency for slow, incremental changes. The U.S. options will be to accept the status quo, push harder for quicker alliance transformation, look to Tokyo for contributions in other "soft secu­rity" areas,[17] or look elsewhere for more reliable allies, such as South Korea.

What the U.S. Should Do

Washington must continually urge Japan to take greater responsibility for its own defense and regional security to a degree commensurate with its economic power and global interests. Constitu­tional revision and assuming a greater security role are a means not an ends. They are part of broader strategic objectives to strengthen alliance with the U.S. while assuming greater responsibility for secu­rity in Asia. To this end, Washington should:

• Urge Tokyo to increase its spending above the historical constraint of 1 percent GDP in order to fulfill its obligations and achieve its broader strategic objectives.


• Continue efforts to broaden the responsibilities of Japanese forces and integrate the Japanese forces with U.S. military and intelligence opera­tions more closely.


• Continue joint ballistic missile defense develop­ment and urge Tokyo to modify export controls to allow indigenous component production.


• Begin laying the groundwork with the Japanese to convince their public of the need for constitu­tional revision as well as engaging in peacekeep­ing, stability-building, anti-piracy efforts, and securing lines of sea communication. Encourage Japan to continue providing support to coalition military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.


• Encourage Japan to use its economic resources, including U.S. government aid, to alleviate soci­etal problems overseas, including those that can foster seeds of terrorism. Tokyo could assume responsibility for sectoral infrastructure improve­ments in Afghanistan, such as health care or the judiciary.


• Improve congressional outreach to legislative counterparts, including the opposition DPJ, to facilitate understanding of alliance strategic objectives and gain support for enhanced Japa­nese security responsibilities. The Congressional Study Group on Japan has been relatively inac­tive and should be energized to provide stronger leadership on critical alliance transformation topics.


• Encourage Japan to implement procurement reform to gain greater fiscal efficiency, eliminate some arms export restrictions on military-related components to allow greater cooperation between the U.S. and Japan on missile defense programs, and remove constraints on Japanese defense capabilities, including restrictions on overseas deployments.

Conclusion

The U.S. has critical national interests in Asia and must remain fully and energetically engaged in the region. Washington must employ all of the instru­ments of national power—diplomatic, informa­tional, military, and economic—to attain its strategic objectives. The U.S. cannot do it alone; it relies on its indispensable allies Japan and South Korea to achieve mutually beneficial goals.

The U.S. must convince these two allies that the U.S.–South Korea and U.S.–Japan alliances are not a zero-sum equation. Both are critically important to achieving U.S. strategic objectives. Washington should make clear we stand shoulder to shoulder with both allies since we share common values.

Strong trilateral cooperation between Washing­ton, Tokyo, and Seoul is critically important. Peri­odic political or societal flare-ups that strain relations between Japan and South Korea must not be allowed to detract from steady long-term progress in strengthening the military partnership among the three countries. While the U.S.–Japanese security alliance is in a far better position to address the 21st century threat environment than it was five years ago, much work remains.

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

[1] The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are technically not military forces since Japan is precluded by its constitution from having a military. For ease of readership, however, the terms "security" and "military" will be used interchangeably.

[2] These restrictions include: no overseas deployments, no participation in collective self-defense arrangements, no nuclear weapons, no arms exports, no sharing of defense technology, no more than 1 percent of GDP devoted to defense spending, and no military use of space. As defined by Kenneth Pyle, University of Washington, on May 22, 2007, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[3] Brad Glasserman [sic] and Katsu Furukawa, "A New U.S.–Japan Agenda," Issues and Insights, Volume 8, No. 4 (March 2008), p. 5.

[4] Bruce A. Wright and Mark O. Hague, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Sustaining the Transformation," Joint Defense Quarterly, Issue 44 (First Quarter 2007), at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i44/17.pdf (October 3, 2008).

[5] Emma Chanlett-Avery, "Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March 28, 2007.

[6] Bruce A. Wright and Mark O. Hague, "Japan—Aiming for Broader, Deeper Regional Security Cooperation," East Asian Strategic Review, 2008, at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/e2008.html.

[7] John Tirpak, "Air Force Alliance for the US and Japan," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 90, No. 6 (June 2007).

[8] Wright and Hague, "Japan—Aiming for Broader, Deeper Regional Security Cooperation."

[9] David Pilling and Victor Mallet, "Japan Weighs Bigger Role as Peacekeeper," The Financial Times, February 25, 2008.

[10] David Pilling, "Japan Prepares for a More Assertive Foreign Role," The Financial Times, March 29, 2007.

[11] "No surprise: Abe Panel to Urge Right to Exercise Collective Self-Defense," Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2007.

[12] "Panel Urges Government to Allow Collective Self-Defense, Fukuda Unwilling," Kyodo News, June 24, 2008.

[13] The three fundamental tenets of the Yoshido doctrine: 1) Economic rehabilitation was Japan's prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the U.S. was necessary for this purpose; 2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. A low military posture would facilitate productive industrial development; and 3) In order to gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for U.S. military forces. Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), p. 242.

[14] Yoichi Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces ‘Priority Gap,'" Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 2008.

[15] Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 353.

[16] Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces ‘Priority Gap.'"

[17] For example, increasing Overseas Development Assistance, assuming responsibility for reconstructing sectors in Afghanistan (e.g. hospitals, judicial system), mine clearing, sea lift, or air lift are possible "soft security" areas.

Forging a New Era in the U.S.—Japan Alliance

October 9, 2008
by Bruce Klingner
Backgrounder #2196
The Heritage Foundation

The U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea are critical to maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, as well as to promoting liberty, democracy, and free-market principles. These rela­tionships are growing in importance in light of China's increasing military capabilities, economic weight, and political influence.

The bilateral U.S.–Japan security ties have expanded significantly during the past 10 years, resulting in more closely integrated military[1] operations and a broader in­ternational role for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). To accomplish this, Tokyo removed or adapted several of its self-imposed post-World War II restrictions.[2]

Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. military forces in Asia, including the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier and Marine Expeditionary Force. Ballis­tic missile defense integration is a bright spot in the relationship and joint operations are becoming more coordinated. Tokyo has been moving inexorably toward military reform during the past decade, albeit at a glacial pace and only in response to repeated prod­ding by the United States.

Adjusting to a more durable alliance structure, the U.S. and Japan have already established a blueprint for transforming their alliance. Successful implementa­tion will require sustained and energetic involvement by the senior leadership of both countries. Leadership is not always in evidence, particularly on the Japanese side, but if this is accomplished, it could provide the basis for defining a new strategic vision for the alliance in 2010 and beyond.

Yet, despite the solid bedrock of a strengthened U.S.–Japanese security relationship, uncertainties remain over the future parameters of the bilateral alliance. The degree to which Japan is willing to alter the comfortable alliance status quo is unclear. There are serious consequences to Japanese inac­tion. Long-term Japanese policy stagnation is not in the United States strategic interest and risks increas­ing U.S. frustration with its ally. Tokyo's unwilling­ness or inability to make tough decisions can lead to Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China. As a Chinese proverb cautions, "Two tigers cannot share the same mountain."

The U.S. should urge Japan to take greater responsibility for its own defense as well as an expanded regional and global security role. Much can be accomplished within existing parameters by fully implementing previous bilateral agreements. Washington should call on Tokyo to remain engaged in coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while replacing ad hoc deployment approvals with permanent enabling legislation. The U.S. should also advocate an expansion of the alliance and request that Japan increase its defense spend­ing to fulfill its obligations and achieve broader security objectives. Although newly electedPrime Minister Taro Aso will be more amenable to U.S. requests, political and societal constraints will hinder rapid progress in transforming the bilateral security relationship.

The Ever-Evolving Alliance

The bilateral U.S.-Japanese military alliance is not stagnant and has already undergone consider­able evolution. The concept of transforming the alli­ance from its initial mission of defending Japan to a broader regional and global focus also has a long history. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush and Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa affirmed the alli­ance as a "global partnership." In 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto emphasized that the mutual defense agreement constituted the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.[3]

In 2002, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), composed of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, initiated a Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to analyze the global secu­rity environment; define both nations' roles, mis­sions, capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperate in missile defense and global security challenges.[4] The 2004 Japanese Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) called on Japan to become more engaged militarily in the Indian Ocean region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, permit mil­itary exports to the U.S. to facilitate development of joint missile defense, and increase the size of rapid-reaction forces.[5]

In 2005, the SCC agreed to bold revisions to expand the parameters of the defense alliance. In Feb­ruary, the two countries produced the Common Stra­tegic Objectives which provided a common assessment of strategy and threats. In October, the SCC completed the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transforma­tion and Realignment for the Future(ATARA) which delineated bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities and defined 15 areas for defense cooperation and seven measures to improve policy and operational coordination. As a result of these decisions, bilateral military and intelligence operations have improved, becoming more coordinated and integrated.

Achievements in U.S.–Japan Alliance Transformation

Greater interoperability:

Forward deploy I Corps headquarters from Ft. Lewis to collocate with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Central Readiness Force headquarters at Camp Zama in 2012.

Establish a Bilateral Air Operations Coordination Center established at Yokota Air Force Base with integrated air and missile defense.

Realignment and consolidation of U.S. forces

Relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to a new facility at Camp Schwab.

Redeploy 8,000 U.S. Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam. Japan to pay $6.1 billion or 75 percent of the cost.

Relocate elements of Carrier Air Wing 5 from Naval Air Station Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.

Expanded role for Japan Self-Defense Force

Elevate the Japan Defense Agency to cabinet-level Ministry of Defense.

Participate in international peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations.

Enhanced cooperation on ballistic missile defense

U.S.-built X-band radar system at Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's (JASDF) Shariki air base, which shares data with the Japanese.

Expedite deployment of U.S. Patriot PAC-3 units at Kadena, Okinawa.

Provide Standard Missile (SM-3) capabilities to U.S. forward-deployed naval forces.

Accelerate modification of Japanese Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities.

Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyer intercepted a medium-range target missile near Hawaii.[6]

Japan has also been more willing during the past decade to deploy its defense forces overseas. The SDF deployed disaster relief teams to Burma and China and participated in U.N. peacekeeping oper­ations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, the Golan Heights, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Mozam­bique, Pakistan, and Rwanda. General Bruce Wright, former commander of U.S. Forces Japan, commented that Japan routinely agrees that U.S. forces in Japan should deploy elsewhere (in contrast with U.S. units in Korea which do not deploy off the peninsula).[7]

Tokyo pays $4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S. troops, equivalent to half of the total cost-sharing assistance that the U.S. receives from all NATO nations. Every year, Japan buys $1 billion worth of U.S. military equipment, with $8 billion of military sales cases currently open.[8]

Japan has expanded its role, pushing the enve­lope of acceptable practices, albeit gradually, mini­mally, and with token forces. Much more needs to be done. Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura com­mented that "compared to Japan's capabilities and strengths as a country, there is more room to make an effort in peacekeeping operations."[9] When Japan does send troops overseas, it does so with such restrictive rules of engagement that it undermines their effectiveness. The 600 Japanese troops in southern Iraq in 2005 were in an enclave that had to be protected by Dutch, and later British, troops.

Military-to-military coordination is good, though difficult due to senior political inattention. As one two-star general of the U.S. Forces Japan remarked, "Every inch of progress is an uphill bat­tle." There are no Ministry of Defense champions within Japan's Diet, nor Japanese champions within the U.S. Congress.

Riding the Waves: Japanese Leaders' Con­flicting Views on the Alliance. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. by passing the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. The legislation permitted Japan to deploy ground troops to Iraq, transport aircraft to Kuwait, and refuel supply ships heading to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations. Koizumi's motiva­tion for expanding Japan's global role was primarily grounded in strengthening the U.S. alliance, though couched in terms of common global strate­gic objectives.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006–2007) advo­cated a more assertive Japanese foreign policy that involved further strengthening of the "Japan-U.S. alliance while steadily upgrading our country's national security platform."[10] In order to allow Tokyo to assume an expanded security role, Abe pressed for a revision to Japan's constitution and an expanded role for the SDF.

Abe perceived the inherent long-term strategic benefit for Japan, but his prioritization of security policy over domestic economic issues was rejected by the electorate during the upper house election. U.S. expectations for what could be accomplished in alliance transformation under Abe were raised unrealistically. There are also questions referring to the level to which Abe could have delivered had he remained in office.

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (2007–2008) had a different foreign policy perspective from his pre­decessors. Although he wanted to maintain the alli­ance with Washington as the bedrock of Japanese security, he placed less priority on security issues. Fukuda placed greater emphasis on maintaining regional harmony by improving relations with Japan's neighbors and balancing its relationships with the U.S. and China more evenly. He com­mented privately to a Japanese journalist that he did not think Japan should always say "yes" to the United States. Fukuda had less interest than his pre­decessors in pursuing constitutional revision to attain "normal nation" status and a stronger regional security role for Japan.

The most tangible manifestation of Fukuda's softer security policy was his view on reinterpreting Japan's self-imposed restrictions on the role of its defense forces. Prime Minister Abe had established an advisory panel to review the restrictive interpre­tation of Japan's right to exercise collective self-defense. The group was to make recommendations on four scenarios:

1. Protecting U.S. naval vessels under attack in international waters;
2. Intercepting ballistic missiles that may be tar­geted at the U.S.;
3. Defending foreign troops that come under attack during a U.N. peacekeeping operation; and
4. Providing logistical support in overseas countries.

Chairman Shunji Yanai, former Japanese ambassa­dor to the U.S., commented in July 2007 that "we should bring an end to the interpretation of the [Jap­anese] Constitution that does not match reality." In light of the increasing North Korean and Chinese mil­itary threats, Yanai remarked that the panel believed in an expanded role for the SDF.[11] However, Fukuda did not accept the panel's recommendations, indicat­ing that he had no intention of altering the current interpretation, which prohibits Japan from defending an ally under attack, even though it is entitled to do so under international law.[12]

Fukuda's policy strategy reflected both per­sonal convictions as well as an assessment of the domestic political landscape. Yasuo Fukuda believed in the "Fukuda Doctrine" of his father, Takeo Fukuda, who was prime minister of Japan from 1976 to 1978. Takeo pledged in 1977 that Japan would never become a military power again and was committed to improving relations with all Southeast Asian nations. Yasuo sought to apply this pledge to Japanese foreign policy in Northeast Asia as well.

The political lesson of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) loss of the upper house in the 2007 election, as well as Abe's subsequent abrupt depar­ture from office, was that the electorate was more focused on domestic economic issues than on secu­rity reorientation. There was thus no advantage for Fukuda to spend his and the LDP's limited political capital on an issue that did not resonate strongly with the populace. This is particularly true as the LDP tries to recapture public support in the run-up to a lower-house election which must take place by September 2009.

Fukuda issued no grand strategy nor undertook any bold steps in security policy. Instead, he stalled on reinterpreting collective self-defense, creating a national security council, and revising Article 9 of the constitution. Even Fukuda's decision to use the LDP's two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the upper-house veto in order to renew refueling operations was interpreted differently in Japan and the U.S. Officials and analysts in Japan raved about the speed with which Fukuda was able to restart operations; most had expected a delay until mid-2008. Washington, however, saw Tokyo's inability to make important decisions expeditiously as reflective of a third-rate country.

Prime Minister Taro Aso's conservative foreign and security policies will be a return to those espoused by Koizumi and Abe. He will be more receptive to expanding Tokyo's role in the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and loosening restrictions on the SDF. Aso will push for a reinterpretation of the concept of collective self-defense. His policies will be more similar to Washington's than those of Fukuda. As a result, Aso's election offers the hope of closer coordination on U.S.–Japanese strategic interests. But Aso's policy focus will be primarily domestic, due to the need to recapture strong public support.

Challenges to a Stronger Security Relationship

Lack of National Consensus. Japan remains conflicted over its niche in the post-Cold War envi­ronment and the proper role of its military forces. Overcoming the pacifism of the past 50 years is clearly a factor. But beyond this is the complacency attributed to the Yoshido strategy in which Japan relied on the U.S. for its security guarantee while it devoted itself to a singular pursuit to build eco­nomic power.[13]

Abe's bold blueprint for Japan to assume a broader security role did not gain favor with an elec­torate bore-sighted on pocketbook issues. Abe's security vision was rejected, and not replaced by an alternative policy. There has not been substantial public debate on Japan's security paradigm and its international role. Concern over the intentions and implications of China's growing military capabilities has not overcome national complacency and an inherent preference for the status quo.

Tokyo has been resistant to U.S. requests to assume a larger security role. Domestic angst arising from perceived inequities in the military alliance with the U.S. conflict with a reluctance to undertake budgetary increases. There has been a greater will­ingness to deploy troops overseas in recent years but only on narrowly defined missions with no risk of being involved in combat. The task is further constrained by the lack of dynamic leaders who are willing and able to transform and direct public opinion. In that sense, the charismatic Koizumi was truly an anomaly.

Overcoming Japanese inertia will be difficult and will require a sea change in thinking by both politi­cians and public, neither of which are particularly attuned to international security affairs. Though for­midable, the task is not impossible. But it will require sustained U.S. efforts, beginning with a clear articulation of the future form of the alliance as well as Japan's roles, missions, and capabilities.

Constitutional Limits. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution specifies that Japan forever "renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis­putes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preced­ing paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recog­nized." There was declining public support during 2006-2007 for the constitutional changes that Abe was advocating.

Underfunding Defense Requirements. Japa­nese defense spending has now declined for five consecutive years. The Ministry of Defense requested an increase but was rejected by the Min­istry of Finance. Tokyo needs to increase defense spending not only to assume a greater security role but to simply remain at the same level. Following a procurement holiday, Japan now needs to purchase several systems to replace those it acquired in the 1980s, including F-15 and P-3 aircraft.

If Japan does not increase defense spending over its unofficial ceiling of 1 percent of GDP, and with missile defense consuming a larger portion of its defense budget, Japan will be forced to make addi­tional force cuts. Some cuts to ground forces are acceptable, but extensive reductions would hinder Japan's ability to engage in or transport troops for overseas peacekeeping operations.

Political Constraints. The prime minister is hampered in implementing any security policy changes due to government gridlock brought on by a "twisted parliament" in which the two legislative houses are controlled by opposing parties. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which controls the upper house, remains committed to obstructionist tactics to force an early election of the more powerful lower house of the Diet.

The DPJ refused to approve a special-measures agreement renewing host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan, marking the first refusal of an inter­national agreement by the upper house under the current constitution. The Fukuda administration was forced to use the constitutional provision which allows a two-thirds majority of the lower house to overrule the upper house.

Emboldened by Fukuda's low public approval ratings, the DPJ passed a symbolic "no confidence" censure of the prime minister. Though non-bind­ing, it reflected the extent to which the opposition will go to undermine the current government. The DPJ will continue to obstruct Japan's security mis­sions as a means to position itself for a legislative victory. Although differences between the ruling and opposition parties are smaller than often per­ceived, the DPJ's tactics are disruptive to common alliance objectives.

Transforming the Alliance: Key Concerns

Does the Political Will Exist? The U.S. sees troublesome delays in the implementation of the SCC decisions, most notably the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. These delays have a domino effect on other moves, including that of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless, a key figure in transforming the bilateral relation­ship, expressed concern over a "state of drift" in the alliance ever since Fukuda took office. He warned that if the U.S. perceives Japan as not taking the agreements seriously, the alliance will lose momen­tum and relevance, causing a degradation in mili­tary capability in the region.[14]

Is Japan Putting Strategic Objectives First? Japan has allowed strategic national objectives to take a back seat to arbitrary budget limits and in­dustrial policy. Japan's security objectives are incon­sistent with current government funding decisions. Tokyo has undertaken new missions—including missile defense, expanded overseas operations, and paying a significant portion of the cost of the re­alignment of U.S. forces without a commensurate increase in defense expenditures. Yet, the govern­ment continues to maintain a historical cap on de­fense spending of 1 percent of GDP, in essence allowing the finance ministry to determine Japan's national security strategy and objectives.

Beyond Alliance Housekeeping? Troop reloca­tion, base transformation, and burden-sharing is­sues are contentious, time-consuming, and, if handled poorly, potentially disastrous to the well-being of the alliance. Even when handled adeptly, they run the risk of sucking all the air out of the room by becoming an end in themselves rather than a means to achieving an objective. Yet, as im­portant as these issues are, they are merely alliance management issues, a national-level equivalent to rearranging the furniture.

Redeploying U.S. military forces to lessen their exposure to the Japanese populace serves the com­mendable goal of maintaining public support by reducing potential flashpoints. But, all of this does not provide clarity on the current and future roles, missions, and necessary capabilities of the U.S. and Japanese defense forces. It is critical to redefine the alliance beyond the North Korean threat, emphasiz­ing either the need for Japanese involvement in redressing global security issues or the potential threat that a rising China represents—the "dragon behind the North Korean tree," as a Japanese defense expert characterized it.

Pursuing Incremental Transformation. Wash­ington will need to manage its own expectations; in this Japanese political environment a new Japanese national consensus on alliance transformation will come slowly. The goal of transformation will be ill served by a pace that reminds the Japanese public of its inability to make the choice on its own. Japan's citizens need the pressure, [15] but they also need to buy into the idea fully.

In 2005 and 2006, large advances were made on the political level in broadening the parameters of the alliance. With no similar advances expected for 2008 and 2009, the focus should be on military-level implementation of the earlier SCC decisions. Consolidating progress can lay the groundwork in anticipation of future breakthroughs under a more conducive political environment.

In the near term, the U.S. should strive to expand Japan's security role within existing param­eters even as it advocates longer-term expansion of the alliance. To the degree possible, changes to the alliance should be made out of view of the public eye to avoid controversy or creating anti-American sentiment.

Much can be done within the existing constitu­tional and legal framework to accomplish goals such as expanding the SDF rules of engagement for overseas operations. Tokyo should replace ad hoc overseas deployment approvals with permanent legislation to eliminate the need for recurrent Diet involvement.

While Japan Sleeps

Japan is at a strategic crossroads. It can continue its status quo thinking by citing "fiscal difficulties" to continue to fend off calls for it to fully fund its defense requirements. Though it is the more com­fortable choice in the short term, it has the effect of ceding Asia's leadership role to China. Though mil­itarily strong in absolute terms, Japan is in decline relative to Beijing.

A debate has already begun as to whether Japan has become complacent about devolving to a mid­dle-status power. Such a development would be welcomed by China which is vying with Japan for preeminence in Asia and even by South Korea, which remains conspiratorially worried about a resurgent militaristic Japan. Chinese preeminence would be a disaster, however, for U.S. national interests in Asia.

Bold leadership is needed but unlikely in Japan's consensus-driven political system. In this sense, Koizumi was an aberration the likes of which is unlikely to appear in the foreseeable future. Indeed, Fukuda shied away from expanding Japan's role through security and diplomatic initiatives, such as reinterpreting the collective self-defense theory or values-based alliance with democratic neighbors. Polls that show Japanese frustration with perceived inequities in the military relationship and the irri­tants of U.S. troop presence do not stimulate a strong national consensus to raise Japan's security role.

It is unlikely that there will be significant for­ward movement on security issues at the political level. The glacial pace of Japanese decision making has become, if possible, even slower. There will be little Japanese stimulus for highlighting security issues due to lack of interest by the electorate, few in the Diet are military experts, and the Ministry of Defense is a surprisingly minor bureaucracy— the "MoD doesn't cast a long shadow in the Diet." Alliance transformation will therefore be a gradual, incremental process that will be frustrating to U.S. officials.

Tokyo's repeated deflections to appeals for greater security contributions could lead to "Japan fatigue" in Washington. U.S. officials have expressed frustration with Japan's citing of the Ministry of Finance's opposition as justification for its failure to increase the country's defense spending beyond 1 percent of GDP.

Richard Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of defense, commented in a May 2008 Asahi Shim­bun interview that Japan's cumbersome decision-making cycle averages seven to nine years as com­pared with other countries in the region which are able to make and execute three different decisions in the same time. Military tacticians describe this repetitive decision-making process as observe-ori­ent-decide-act (OODA) with the goal to be faster than one's opponent, or "getting inside their OODA loop." A slow OODA process leads to defeat.

Lawless warned that Japan must find a way to increase the pace of its tempo of decision making, deployment, integration, and "operationalizing" the alliance with the U.S.[16] A failure to do so risks Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China.

Japanese inertia, coupled with a new conserva­tive South Korean president determined to improve Seoul's relations with Washington, could lead South Korea to supplanting Japan as the more important U.S. ally in Asia. South Korea has chafed at repeated U.S. policy references to the importance of Wash­ington's alliance with Tokyo, while neglecting Seoul's significant contributions to peace and stabil­ity, including deploying 300,000 troops to the Viet­namese War. Nor is South Korea constrained by Japan's historical legacy, constitutional provisions, or societal apathy toward security objectives.

A fundamental question for Washington, includ­ing the next U.S. President, will be how to respond to Japan's tendency for slow, incremental changes. The U.S. options will be to accept the status quo, push harder for quicker alliance transformation, look to Tokyo for contributions in other "soft secu­rity" areas,[17] or look elsewhere for more reliable allies, such as South Korea.

What the U.S. Should Do

Washington must continually urge Japan to take greater responsibility for its own defense and regional security to a degree commensurate with its economic power and global interests. Constitu­tional revision and assuming a greater security role are a means not an ends. They are part of broader strategic objectives to strengthen alliance with the U.S. while assuming greater responsibility for secu­rity in Asia. To this end, Washington should:

• Urge Tokyo to increase its spending above the historical constraint of 1 percent GDP in order to fulfill its obligations and achieve its broader strategic objectives.


• Continue efforts to broaden the responsibilities of Japanese forces and integrate the Japanese forces with U.S. military and intelligence opera­tions more closely.


• Continue joint ballistic missile defense develop­ment and urge Tokyo to modify export controls to allow indigenous component production.


• Begin laying the groundwork with the Japanese to convince their public of the need for constitu­tional revision as well as engaging in peacekeep­ing, stability-building, anti-piracy efforts, and securing lines of sea communication. Encourage Japan to continue providing support to coalition military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.


• Encourage Japan to use its economic resources, including U.S. government aid, to alleviate soci­etal problems overseas, including those that can foster seeds of terrorism. Tokyo could assume responsibility for sectoral infrastructure improve­ments in Afghanistan, such as health care or the judiciary.


• Improve congressional outreach to legislative counterparts, including the opposition DPJ, to facilitate understanding of alliance strategic objectives and gain support for enhanced Japa­nese security responsibilities. The Congressional Study Group on Japan has been relatively inac­tive and should be energized to provide stronger leadership on critical alliance transformation topics.


• Encourage Japan to implement procurement reform to gain greater fiscal efficiency, eliminate some arms export restrictions on military-related components to allow greater cooperation between the U.S. and Japan on missile defense programs, and remove constraints on Japanese defense capabilities, including restrictions on overseas deployments.

Conclusion

The U.S. has critical national interests in Asia and must remain fully and energetically engaged in the region. Washington must employ all of the instru­ments of national power—diplomatic, informa­tional, military, and economic—to attain its strategic objectives. The U.S. cannot do it alone; it relies on its indispensable allies Japan and South Korea to achieve mutually beneficial goals.

The U.S. must convince these two allies that the U.S.–South Korea and U.S.–Japan alliances are not a zero-sum equation. Both are critically important to achieving U.S. strategic objectives. Washington should make clear we stand shoulder to shoulder with both allies since we share common values.

Strong trilateral cooperation between Washing­ton, Tokyo, and Seoul is critically important. Peri­odic political or societal flare-ups that strain relations between Japan and South Korea must not be allowed to detract from steady long-term progress in strengthening the military partnership among the three countries. While the U.S.–Japanese security alliance is in a far better position to address the 21st century threat environment than it was five years ago, much work remains.

Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

[1] The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are technically not military forces since Japan is precluded by its constitution from having a military. For ease of readership, however, the terms "security" and "military" will be used interchangeably.

[2] These restrictions include: no overseas deployments, no participation in collective self-defense arrangements, no nuclear weapons, no arms exports, no sharing of defense technology, no more than 1 percent of GDP devoted to defense spending, and no military use of space. As defined by Kenneth Pyle, University of Washington, on May 22, 2007, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[3] Brad Glasserman [sic] and Katsu Furukawa, "A New U.S.–Japan Agenda," Issues and Insights, Volume 8, No. 4 (March 2008), p. 5.

[4] Bruce A. Wright and Mark O. Hague, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Sustaining the Transformation," Joint Defense Quarterly, Issue 44 (First Quarter 2007), at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i44/17.pdf (October 3, 2008).

[5] Emma Chanlett-Avery, "Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March 28, 2007.

[6] Bruce A. Wright and Mark O. Hague, "Japan—Aiming for Broader, Deeper Regional Security Cooperation," East Asian Strategic Review, 2008, at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/e2008.html.

[7] John Tirpak, "Air Force Alliance for the US and Japan," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 90, No. 6 (June 2007).

[8] Wright and Hague, "Japan—Aiming for Broader, Deeper Regional Security Cooperation."

[9] David Pilling and Victor Mallet, "Japan Weighs Bigger Role as Peacekeeper," The Financial Times, February 25, 2008.

[10] David Pilling, "Japan Prepares for a More Assertive Foreign Role," The Financial Times, March 29, 2007.

[11] "No surprise: Abe Panel to Urge Right to Exercise Collective Self-Defense," Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2007.

[12] "Panel Urges Government to Allow Collective Self-Defense, Fukuda Unwilling," Kyodo News, June 24, 2008.

[13] The three fundamental tenets of the Yoshido doctrine: 1) Economic rehabilitation was Japan's prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the U.S. was necessary for this purpose; 2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. A low military posture would facilitate productive industrial development; and 3) In order to gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for U.S. military forces. Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: The Century Foundation, 2007), p. 242.

[14] Yoichi Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces ‘Priority Gap,'" Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 2008.

[15] Pyle, Japan Rising, p. 353.

[16] Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces ‘Priority Gap.'"

[17] For example, increasing Overseas Development Assistance, assuming responsibility for reconstructing sectors in Afghanistan (e.g. hospitals, judicial system), mine clearing, sea lift, or air lift are possible "soft security" areas.