Japan Apprehensive About State of U.S. Relations

Jason Miks | Bio | 17 Dec 2008
World Politics Review

TOKYO -- The residents of Obama, Japan, might have celebrated the election of their town's namesake as the next president of the United States, but many Japanese remain apprehensive about what the change in leadership will mean for their country's most important ally. Doubts over the state of relations with the United States were evident in a Kyodo News survey this month, which showed that a record 28 percent of Japanese view the relationship between the two countries as "not good." "Primarily this is about Iraq, North Korea and the financial crisis," says Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, in Tokyo. Despite Japan's constitution barring an offensive military force, former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi managed to get Japan's Self-Defense Forces dispatched to Iraq to offer logistical support to reconstruction efforts -- an unpopular decision with a sizeable share of the public, made worse by the subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction. "That was a disappointment for many Japanese," Nishihara says. Relations have also been strained at times during the ongoing six-party negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program. Japan has insisted that the question of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents -- a highly emotive issue here -- be tackled before Pyongyang is rewarded for its efforts at denuclearization. Many Japanese felt betrayed by the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism before any headway was made on the matter. "I think [the delisting decision] hurt Japan's confidence that the U.S. is placing Japan's priorities high up on the negotiating agenda," says James Schoff, associate director of Asia-Pacific studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. However, although Schoff believes there are challenges ahead in terms of differing security priorities between Japan and the U.S., he is more upbeat on broader issues of international cooperation. "I think an Obama administration would be a little more in synch with Japan on some of the global initiatives that Japan has been pushing," he says. "Certainly on climate change, on nonproliferation, and a variety of other issues, I think there's much more commonality on a number of issues Japan has pushed internationally on which it will find a stronger partner." But he also believes the current domestic political turmoil in Japan could hinder progress. Japan has had four prime ministers in a little more than three years, and incumbent Taro Aso is now also deeply unpopular. The divided Diet (parliament) is also paralyzing policymaking, with Japan forced briefly to recall its refueling mission in support of U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in the Indian Ocean after opposition from the Democratic Party of Japan. "The biggest challenges stem from the weak political situation in Japan in terms of being able to make decisions and act proactively, whether on the security front or on economic issues," Schoff says. Nishihara agrees that the current instability could damage relations. "This is quite embarrassing," he says of the high turnover. "And it's not very good for the continuity of Japanese policy and its policy of communication between American and Japanese leaders." But Takeshi Igarashi, a professor at Tokyo University's Graduate School of Law and Politics, believes the turnover problem is to some degree mitigated by the consistency of the powerful bureaucracy. He also believes that although there may be differences ahead, Japan will continue to be a crucial ally for the United States. "Japan continues to be very important to U.S. strategy in Asia, because how to deal with China is one of its most crucial points, and U.S. military bases in Japan are crucial to the U.S. not only strategically, but also in terms of her budget," Igarashi says. China looms large over U.S-Japanese relations and Nishihara believes uncertainty about relations is compounded by a fear that the U.S. might tilt toward China. "We really don't know what Mr. Obama thinks," he says. "There is some concern that Obama might focus more on U.S.-China relations." The issue has been further complicated by Japan's often frosty relations with China. But while these were poor under Koizumi, they have warmed noticeably under his successors. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao last year became the first Chinese leader to speak at the Diet in more than 20 years. Meanwhile, trade between the two nations has blossomed. China last year overtook the U.S. as Japan's largest trading partner, with total Japan-China trade reaching $236.6 billion, up 12 percent from a year earlier. "China still needs to strengthen relations with Japan to balance U.S. influences with which they are concerned," Igarashi says. "And if Sino-Japanese relations are strengthened, the U.S. will have to pay attention to them." Jason Miks is a Tokyo-based writer and a managing editor with the Center for International Relations.

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Japan Extends Diet Session to Debate Afghanistan Support Mission

Jason Miks | Bio | 29 Dec 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive

TOKYO, Japan -- While legislatures around the world wind down their sessions ahead of the New Year, the government in Japan announced earlier this month it was extending its parliamentary session in an effort to resolve a debate that has for the last couple of months brought the legislative process here largely to a halt.

On Dec.15, the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda announced that the Diet session would be extended for another month, the first time in 14 years that a session has been extended into the new year. The decision was made to allow time to pass an antiterrorism bill that would enable the country's Maritime Self Defense Forces to resume their refueling mission in support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party had originally hoped to secure an extension to the law before it expired on Nov. 1. But with the opposition Democratic Party of Japan seizing control of the upper house in elections in July, the LDP was unable to pass new legislation in time, and the mission was called home.

Japan is constitutionally barred from maintaining an offensive military force, but, stung by accusations of checkbook diplomacy following the Gulf War in 1991, it has tried to play an increasing, noncombatant, role in U.N. peacekeeping and other security operations, including reconstruction work in Afghanistan and Iraq.

However, DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa has insisted that the refueling mission does not count as a U.N. mandated mission and has refused in the face of pleading by both Fukuda and his predecessor Shinzo Abe, who staked his premiership on the issue, to rethink his opposition.

Many within in the LDP have accused Ozawa of risking Japan's international image by effectively using the MSDF mission as a political football, while the country's best-selling newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, has editorialized that a bill should be passed this session or Japan's international credibility will be "undermined" and its diplomatic clout "clipped."

Ozawa has also come under pressure from the United States, with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer meeting with Ozawa to ask that he reconsider, and arguing that the mission is an opportunity "for Japan to play a vital role in the international community."

The dispute comes at an important time in the ongoing debate about both Japan's place in the world as it mulls revising its U.S.-drafted constitution, and its relationship with the United States. A recent Yomiuri Shimbun/Gallup poll found the public in both countries were increasingly despondent about the relationship, with 54 percent of Japanese saying they did not trust the United States.

The findings were announced as some U.S. policymakers are said, privately at least, to be frustrated with the Japanese withdrawal, while Schieffer himself earlier this year called on Japan to shoulder a greater share of its defense burden.

"Japan has always been a reliable partner, so I think this was probably disappointing for American planners when it became clear there had been a change," said Stephen Yates, a senior associate with the American Foreign Policy Council, who served in the White House as deputy assistant for national security for Vice President Dick Cheney.

"I don't think it is this particular mission or this particular kind of contribution that is important to the United States, but instead to know we can rely on Japan to make a contribution, and that that contribution will be reliable," he said. "It is important to the international reputation of Japan and it is important to the alliance."

He also questioned Ozawa's insistence on a U.N. mandate. "I guess this emphasis on the U.N. is terribly ironic, because the United Nations is led by a permanent membership in the Security Council that is decisively against Japan. So why Japan would put its national interests and international participation subject to will of the [permanent five members] is somewhat surprising to me."

Fukuda hopes the Diet extension will allow time for a compromise to be found, though he said Thursday he was mulling a tougher approach. The antiterrorism legalization is expected to be defeated in the DPJ-dominated upper house, raising the prospect of the LDP using its two thirds majority in the lower house to ram it into law.

"Essentially, it's going to get defeated," said Steven Reed, a professor of political science at Tokyo's Chuo University. "Then the question is will the LDP try to pass it with a two thirds majority. . . . But one of the things people hated about the Abe administration was the forced vote -- the overriding." Reed says he also believes if the LDP does go down the ramming path, it will make things awkward for its coalition partner, New Komeito. "Komeito will be in a bind -- this doesn't play well with their voters."

But although the ultimate fate of the law is unclear, and with the opposition having threatened a damaging censure motion if the LDP does force the legislation through, Reed believes the current fracas is still a useful continuation of the debate on Japan's international role that has been going on since Koizumi was in office.

"For the first time in Japanese postwar history, there really is a debate going on," Reed says. "This is important because it's the first time Japan has said no to the United States, and it is forcing a debate about Japan's place in the world."

Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Pacific Forum, said he believes this debate is an important and necessary one. "The Japanese need a comfortable consensus on where they want to be, not just where a few politicians want them to be," he said. "I think Japan should step up, but it has to be commensurate with its resources and the will of the people."

Jason Miks is a Tokyo-based writer and senior editor with the Center for International Relations.

Greater Dialogue Needed to Overcome Political Obstacles to U.S.-Japan Relations

Nirav Patel | 28 Nov 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive

The quick one-day visit between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in Washington Nov. 16 was by all accounts a successful "meet and greet." However, it fell far short of the substantive policy agreements and memorable photo-ops that characterized such meetings during the era of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Bush and Fukuda had open discussions on issues ranging from North Korea to global warming to beef. However, the lack of substantive agreements that resulted highlights alarming trends in the U.S.-Japan alliance. If not properly managed, the new rifts in the alliance -- in large part attributable to domestic challenges in Tokyo -- have the ability to undermine future bilateral cooperation.

Fukuda's visit to Washington occurred during a time of enormous uncertainty in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Though the alliance remains on firm footing and the foundation of America's Asia policy, recent tensions regarding Japan's commitment to anti-terror cooperation with the U.S. military and dismay over America's perceived "soft line" policy toward North Korea are signs of unrest and instability in the alliance.

It is unlikely that the 71-year-old Fukuda will share the same rapport that Bush and Koizumi did, but both leaders should seek to revitalize the continuity and collegiality that the alliance experienced during the early years of the Bush tenure. Domestic politics constrained Koizumi's successor, Shinzo Abe, and, after its July takeover of the upper house of Japan's Diet, Fukuda faces even stronger opposition from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in pursuing his foreign policy objectives.

Fukuda clearly recognizes the difficulty he faces in combating the DPJ's stronghold and pursuing his foreign policy, including reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. He must therefore devise a more pragmatic domestic political strategy that engages -- not demonizes -- the DPJ and its leader Ichiro Ozawa. In the recent mayoral election in Osaka, in which DPJ candidate Kunio Hiramatsu defeated LDP incumbent Junichi Seki, the DPJ once again proved that it is a formidable political force. American policymakers must recognize that high-level U.S.-Japan meetings will prove unproductive if strategic assessments fail to understand the growing influence of the DPJ in the decision-making process.

If Fukuda is to survive the domestic political hurdles erected by the DPJ, he must seek greater consensus and cooperation between the DPJ and LDP leadership and encourage senior members in his party to cultivate greater flexibility and friendship across party lines. Failure to effectively deal with these domestic political problems will continue to impair Fukuda's tenure and complicate preexisting alliance activities with the United States.

Fukuda should also continue to support strategic dialogue between Japan and America. His call to increase exchange programs between U.S. and Japanese institutions, such as universities, think-tanks and research institutions, is a promising first step toward broadening linkages between Tokyo and Washington, but it's not enough. Establishing annual high-level meetings between members of Japan's Ministry of Defense and the Pentagon will provide greater clarity in Tokyo regarding America's defense posture -- including missile defense platforms.

Many tensions in the alliance are attributable to a lack of effective and open dialogue amongst senior leaders in both Japan and the United States. Some members of the DPJ may have miscalculated the effect on the bilateral relationship of blocking the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces' refueling support for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Though the alliance is relatively resilient, if the DPJ continues to force Tokyo to make unpopular decisions regarding its international role, dissonance between Washington and America's most trusted Asian friend will most likely continue to grow. If effectively managed, greater dialogue will generate more clarity amongst leaders in Tokyo and serve as a litmus test for policies perceived in Washington as dangerous to the bilateral alliance.

Moreover, a lack of continuity in Japanese leadership has eroded connections between U.S. and Japanese decision makers, which have served to advance bilateral ties in the past. This further highlights the need for a forum capable of strengthening the bond between American and Japanese leaders.

While the DPJ has changed the way decisions are made in Japan, American policymakers remain stuck in an "LDP dominated" world. Failure to understand domestic political dynamics in Japan risks endangering successful implementation of U.S. policy toward Japan. Greater strategic dialogue is the first step towards a more vibrant and robust cooperative relationship that will continue to serve U.S. and Japanese interests into the 21st century.

Growing concerns about the presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa, Japanese commitment to U.S. military operations, and America's softer approach to the Six Party negotiations with North Korea have the potential to further strain the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Communication with our most trusted Asian ally is critical to advance Washington's interests in Asia. Japan is, and will continue to be, America's most important bilateral relationship in Asia. It is incumbent that President Bush seeks to chart a new and more nuanced Japan policy capable of addressing the many challenges faced by the alliance. The time for imaginative dialogue, debate, and deliberation is now.

Nirav Patel is a research associate, specializing in Asian affairs, at the Center for a New American Security.

Photo: Bush and Fukuda at the White House Nov. 16

As Pentagon Report Warns of Chinese Military Might, Gates Emphasizes Cooperation

Richard Weitz | Bio | 13 Jun 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive

In his presentation at the June 1-3 annual Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Secretary Robert Gates appeared much more sanguine about the possibilities of establishing a constructive Sino-American military relationship than his own Defense Department. A few days earlier, DOD had released the latest version of its annual publication, "Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2007" (pdf file). The report's content is replete with warnings about China's growing military capabilities, something Gates downplayed at Singapore.

As directed by Congress, the report focused on the potential threat posed by China to Taiwan. Its authors warn that China continues to enhance its military capabilities in the region of the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese military has annually deployed 100 additional short-range ballistic missiles in the region for the past few years and now has almost 1,000 missile launchers within range of Taiwan. In addition, China keeps approximately 400,000 regular troops in Taiwan's vicinity. The report warns that the Taiwanese government has created a serious danger by allowing its defense spending to decline (on an inflation-adjusted basis) during the past decade.

The Pentagon study also describes the increasing range of sophisticated "disruptive" military technologies that Beijing could use to attempt to deny the U.S. military access to regions near China, such as Taiwan. These anti-access weapons include China's improving anti-satellite and cyberwar ("information blockade") capabilities. These "Assassin's Mace" programs aim to exploit possible adversary vulnerabilities, such as American dependence on information technologies, through asymmetric strategies.

One of the functions of the DOD report, which also underscores China's improving ability to project military power to regions beyond Taiwan, is to deter Beijing from using its new capabilities against the United States and its allies. For this reason, its authors caution readers (including presumably those in Beijing) that any attempt to launch a military invasion of Taiwan could have extremely negative repercussions for China. In such an eventuality, the DOD writers assert that Chinese leaders would have to suppress a major popular insurgency among the Taiwanese, confront possible U.S. and Japanese military intervention, manage serious economic problems due to international sanctions and the loss of Taiwanese investment, suffer severe harm to their country's reputation, including an embarrassing boycott of the 2008 Olympic Games, and deal with a prolonged downturn in China's relationship with the United States -- "a result that would not be in China's interests."

The Defense Department also urges Beijing to show greater transparency with regard to its military capabilities and intentions. After asserting that China's defense expenditures exceed those stated by the country's official budget, the report warns that, "This lack of transparency in China's military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown." U.S. representatives have long cautioned that Beijing's excessive military secrecy may alarm its neighbors and impede China's integration into regional security institutions.

In its latest white paper on defense, "China's National Defense in 2006," the Chinese government attributes its recent increases in defense spending primarily to the steady growth of the country's economy, which has allowed for expensive improvements in troop pay and living conditions. It also stresses that China's need to keep pace with other countries that are upgrading their own militaries. At the Shangri-la Dialogue, Lt. Gen. Zhang Qishering, deputy chief of the General Staff of China's People's Liberation Army, dismissed the Pentagon report as misleading. He argued that, "Given the multiple security threats, geo-political environment, the size of the territory, and the per capita expense, the Chinese defense expenditure is small by all judgments."

In his own keynote address at the Shangri-la Dialogue, Gates downplayed the military threats depicted in the DOD report and stressed that China and the United States share common interests "on issues like terrorism, counterproliferation, and energy security." Although he referred to the Pentagon report as a sign of concern about inadequate Chinese military transparency, Gates observed that "there is some difference between capacity and intent. And I believe there is reason to be optimistic about the U.S.-China relationship." Gates' presentation differed notably from that given at a previous Shangri-la Dialogue by his more combative predecessor. Two years earlier, Donald Rumsfeld told the conference that China's military buildup raised disturbing questions for its neighbors "since no nation threatens China."

One reason for Gates' relatively restrained manner may have been that Sino-American military ties have been on the upswing in recent months. The secretary recalled that in March of this year, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, concluded a very productive visit to China. Pace and his Chinese military interlocutor, Gen. Liang Guanglie, agreed to establish a crisis communications link between the two countries' defense establishments. In the question-and-answer session after his formal presentation, Gates endorsed the goal of creating a Chinese-U.S. strategic dialogue similar to that which characterized the Soviet-American military relationship during the Cold War. Through such contacts, he argued, both sides could avoid misunderstandings.

At this year's Shangri-la session, Gen. Qishering announced that he would travel to Washington in September to finalize the details regarding the planned hotline. He also insisted that the Chinese government is gradually increasing its transparency on the basis of "the principles of trust, responsibility, security and equality." Nevertheless, Zhang warned that since "some people in Taiwan are still dreaming about secession," the Chinese armed forces "must be prepared to cope with this kind of threat."

Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a WPR contributing editor.

Japan-U.S. Summit Reaffirms Bilateral Security Ties

Richard Weitz
World Politics Review Exclusive
03 May 2007

Last week's two-day summit between President George Bush and Shinzo Abe, who was making his first visit to the United States as Japanese prime minister, provided an opportunity to take stock of the profound changes occurring in the bilateral security relationship. Despite Japanese-American differences over several regional security issues, the two countries have continued to strengthen their bilateral defense ties in several dimensions.

Under the auspices of their bilateral Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the two governments have engaged in a major effort to restructure their defense alliance. For several years, the SCC has been issuing joint statements articulating the two countries' common strategic objectives, establishing new roles and missions for their defense forces, and announcing revisions in U.S. military deployments in Japan. In particular, the two governments have devoted much attention to developing and implementing plans to transfer U.S. military forces from Okinawa to Guam, integrating U.S. and Japanese military headquarters and training facilities in Japan (including at Camp Zama and Yokota Air Base), and improving bilateral cooperation in 16 specific mission areas (such as air defense, critical infrastructure protection, and human relief operations).

Photo: Abe and Bush at Camp David April 27, 2007.

The Japanese government has shown an acute interest in developing ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in cooperation with the United States. After North Korea's experimental long-range Taepo-dong 1 missile flew over Japan's mainland in August1998, the United States and Japan started a joint BMD program. Their initiative also aims to counter the hundreds of shorter-range North Korean Nodong 1 missiles capable of reaching most of Japan, including Tokyo. In 2003, the Japanese government decided to develop a multilayered defense system initially based on the Aegis BMD system and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3). The United States subsequently deployed PAC-3 at key U.S. military facilities throughout Japan. The two militaries successfully tested an advanced Standard Missile-3, a missile interceptor intended for use by ships equipped with AEGIS radars, near Hawaii in March 2006. The two governments anticipate deploying an operational joint system by 2015.

At home, the Abe administration has launched a major initiative to assess whether to revise the Japanese constitution. A newly appointed government panel will explicitly address the issue of whether to abandon the long-standing interpretation that the constitution excludes Japan's participation in "collective self-defense" arrangements. Past Japanese governments have cited this interpretation as a factor limiting their ability to provide direct military assistance to U.S. forces engaged in armed combat outside Japan. Many Japanese security experts would like to remove this barrier to increased Japanese-American defense cooperation. The current interpretation creates particular problems for plans to operate a joint BMD system, which for technical reasons would probably entail deep Japanese involvement if the system were used to defend American forces under missile attack in East Asia.

At present, the main differences between the two countries concern several regional security issues. For example, despite their shared antipathy toward the North Korean regime and common opposition to its nuclear weapons program, recent months have seen a modest divergence in the positions of the United States and Japan toward North Korea. The Bush administration now seems more willing to yield on ancillary issues in order to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. In contrast, despite criticism at home and abroad, the Japanese government adamantly refuses to normalize relations with the DPRK or provide substantial financial assistance in support of the February 2007 denuclearization accord absent meaningful progress in resolving the questions surrounding North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the current nuclear weapons issue.

At their joint press conference at Camp David, Abe and Bush reaffirmed their solidarity on this question. Nevertheless, the U.S. decision last month to consent to the release of $25 million in suspected illicit funds to Pyongyang after the financial dispute threatened to derail the denuclearization process suggests U.S. officials will grant priority to reversing the DPRK's nuclear program over other considerations.

The Japanese and U.S. governments have been more successful at managing their differences over the Iraq War. Japan's new defense minister, Fumio Kyuma, revealed the probable private opinion of many Japanese when he termed the war a mistake, leading Vice President Cheney to shun him during Cheney's February 2007 trip to Tokyo. In addition, many in Japan believe that the administration has been overly preoccupied with the Iraq question at the expense of other issues.

Given Japan's need for Washington's support regarding North Korea and China, however, the Abe government will likely continue to endorse the Bush administration's war policies. In July 2005, the Japanese government removed its ground forces from Iraq, but Air Self-Defense Forces continue to provide logistical support for coalition forces. A Japanese official accompanying Abe at the recent summit acknowledged: "The United States won't give consideration to Japan over the North Korean issues unless Japan maintains its Iraq policy."

Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

U.S. Relationship With More Assertive Japan Undergoing Evolution

Jason Miks | 01 May 2007
World Politics Review Exclusive

TOKYO -- In February 1946 the U.S. forces occupying Japan drew up a new constitution for a country that had been left shattered by the Pacific War. Many Japanese cities were left in ruins, with vast swathes of them reduced to ash by intensive American firebombing.

Fast-forward six decades to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit last week to Washington, and Japan presents a very different picture. Despite a more than decade-long slump, Japan's economy remains the second largest in the world. It is a respected member of the international community and was found in a BBC poll in March to be the most positively viewed country in the world.

Photo: President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at Camp David, April 27, 2007.

It is also one of the United States' key trading partners, and is the largest foreign market for U.S. agricultural products. The two countries also have close defensive and strategic ties, with about 50,000 U.S. troops still stationed in Okinawa, and a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that means Japan plays host to a carrier battle group, the 5th Air Force, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force, and sections of the Army's 1st Corps.

The importance the U.S. places on its partnership with Japan was reflected in a recently released report, "The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020," penned by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and Harvard University's Joseph S. Nye. In it, the authors argue that Japan should play a greater political and security role in Asia, and they envision Japan becoming something like a "Britain of the Far East."

"It's been clear since the first Bush administration, and especially with Armitage, that Japan would be viewed as a main U.S. ally, and would be expected to play a greater role in world affairs," says Dr.Yoichiro Sato, Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. "And Japan has responded rather positively to this."

Professor Arthur Alexander of Georgetown University, agrees that there has been a shift in the way Japan is viewed in the United States, and also how Japan sees itself. "American anxiety about Japan has largely disappeared," he says. "And while in the past there was a sense that Japan had to kowtow to the United States, this is no longer the case."

Alexander also points to a new generation of Japanese diplomats who since the 1990s have begun to assert Japan's independence of action more readily, and he argues that coordination and diplomatic support from Japan has become more important to the United States.

Though the Armitage report talks about Japan as an ally, however, one area where changes in the relationship have lagged dramatically is security. Under the late Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in the decade following World War II, Japan adopted the so-called Yoshida doctrine, under which it decided to concentrate its resources on its economic development while relying on the U.S. militarily for protection. This approach has informed Japanese foreign policy for decades since.

But in a forthright speech in early April, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer called on Japan to spend more on its military capabilities, noting it spends less than 1 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while in 2005 the U.S. spent over four percent.

The main bar to Japan doing so is Article 9 of its U.S.-drafted constitution, which prohibits an offensive military capability. Abe has therefore made revision of the constitution a center piece of his domestic agenda. Under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the country had already reinterpreted the constitution and passed a special law to allow the self defense forces to play a support role in Iraq.

Abe is also eyeing greater flexibility for Japanese forces to respond to contingencies and for the country to exercise the right to self defense, including coming to the assistance of an ally who is fired upon. Japanese military ambitions were illuminated in a report that the country's air force had pressed Abe to persuade Bush to sell Japan F-22 raptor stealth fighters, though the head of the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency reportedly ruled such a move out.

But while Japan has been quick to reassure its neighbors that its growing assertiveness, including greater strategic flexibility in terms of its military, is benign, some even in the United States harbor concerns over the real motivations of a prime minister who, despite his efforts to repair relations with China and South Korea, is still viewed by many observers as a hawkish nationalist. Abe stoked these fears further by dismissing the idea that the Imperial Japanese Army forcibly recruited "comfort women" in World War II.

"The nationalism associated with Abe's call for a renewal on the restraints on deployment has both a positive and negative aspect," said Dr. Tsuneo Akaha, Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "It's positive in that Japan can become a more equal partner. But it could also mean Japan could start walking down a nationalist path."

But before Japan can even begin to tread this path, it must revise its constitution, something that has not been done once in its 60-year history, though it was written by occupying forces in less than a week.

This reluctance to make changes in part reflects the Japanese attachment to the peace constitution. But Sato believes there are other reasons. "Public opinion, especially on the liberal side, is skeptical about U.S. intentions, but also about the intentions of Japan's elites," he said, pointing to a recent poll in the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper showing a sharp drop in support for revision, to below 50 percent of those polled. The same poll also showed little enthusiasm for renouncing the country's pacifist stance in international affairs.

A law covering the mechanics of a referendum is expected to be passed by the Diet this month, but Akaha believes even then political calculations could hold up changes. "I don't think there is much difference substantively between the two main parties. But I think the [main opposition] Democratic Party of Japan is trying to make sure the [ruling] Liberal Democratic Party doesn't get to succeed in its policy issues."

Akaha also believes that other unforeseeable complications could stall revision. "If the U.S. starts to be seen as pushing Abe toward revision, or if there is some unforeseen accident involving deaths among Self Defense Forces troops on duty, opponents would gather momentum."

Alexander believes that even though the United States might be content with revisions allowing Japan to shoulder more of its security burden, that doesn't mean the United States wants a militarily independent Japan.

"The United States does not want to see a fully, independently armed Japan," he says. "It wants Japan to do more, but there are concerns that if it were to have more forceful projection it would have consequences that the U.S. wouldn't like, and could upset regional balances."

Jason Miks is a Tokyo-based writer and senior editor with the Center for International Relations.

Some Question Japan's Hard Line Against N. Korea on Abductee Issue

Jason Miks | 26 Feb 2007/
World Politics Review Exclusive

TOKYO -- With his cabinet's popularity hitting new lows according to a poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took the opportunity of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney's visit last week to highlight one of his pet issues -- the abduction by North Korean agents of up to 20 Japanese citizens.

Abe's tough stance on North Korea has always been a political trump card for him, bringing him to prominence under former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. During Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002, he led negotiations on behalf of the families of those abducted, and then cemented his position as front runner in his party's leadership race last year with his tough rhetoric following North Korea's decision to test seven ballistic missiles in July.

Photo: Cheney and Abe meet at the prime minister's official residence Feb. 21.

However, some observers, both inside and outside Japan, have begun to question the country's hard line against North Korea, arguing that Japan runs the risk of isolating itself, not least in the six-party effort aimed at resolving the problem of North Korea's nuclear program.

"The abductee issue almost appears a national obsession, to the point where it is preventing the Japanese government from making a clear calculation of just what national security priorities the country should have," argues Peter Beck, director of the Northeast Asia Project for the International Crisis Group.

"Japan could -- and should -- have the most leverage over North Korea, precisely because it owes North Korea a huge development package if and when the two countries were to normalize relations," says Beck. "But by making all progress contingent on resolving the abduction issue, something that [North Korea] is either unwilling or unable to do, it has really taken Japan completely out of the game."

The issue of the abductions, believed to have taken place in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was reignited following Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002, where North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il admitted to just 13 abductions by North Korean agents -- a claim that angered many Japanese -- and announced eight had died. The Japanese media's interest has been intense ever since, with regular updates and features.

"The Japanese media has played a big role in this issue," says Yoichiro Sato of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, who adds that he is more optimistic than Beck about Japan's ability to stay relevant in the six-party talks. "This is something ordinary Japanese can understand, unlike all the details of non-proliferation that many might understand only vaguely. It's kind of a human drama."

However, though the media have undoubtedly played their part in fanning public anger, Abe has done his best to ensure the issue remains at the forefront of voters' minds. He took the opportunity during his trip to meet European leaders in January to reiterate his stance on the issue, while last year he drew sharp criticism even from some members of his own party when it emerged his administration had "encouraged" state broadcaster NHK to place greater emphasis on the issue.

"Abe can't backtrack on this issue now," says Jacob Kovalio, associate professor of Japanese and Asian studies at Carleton University. Unlike Beck, he believes Abe is right to stand firm on the issue. "I am very strongly in favor of this position. As long as China is changing its tune, including on the abductee issue, I think that the chances of Japan getting its own way are much better."

However, he also admits that there are still dangers ahead for Japan. "One element that could undermine this is South Korea. South Korea has not imposed any sanctions, and if it supplies North Korea with increased resources in a way that prevents Japan being able to pressure it, then I think there could be a problem."

Arthur Stockwin, emeritus director of Oxford University's Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, agrees that South Korea's approach differs markedly from Japan's. "The South Koreans are rather bemused by this, as they've had hundreds kidnapped over the years."

Stockwin also sees potential problems for Japan's relationship with the United States. "I think the Americans may be getting a bit fed up. There's already a fraying of relations over Iraq," he explained, in reference to recent comments by the Japanese defense minister that the Iraq war was "a mistake." "This is a fairly new development for Japan as its government has so far toed the American line on this issue."

Japanese officials reportedly are also disappointed that despite America's public support over the abductee issue, a point Cheney was clear to emphasize during his visit, it was given little attention at the six-party talks.

However, faced with upper house elections later this year and concerned about shoring up the conservative support that forms his base, Abe is unlikely to abandon the issue any time soon.

Beck says he is puzzled at this calculation, and at what he says is Japan's apparent willingness to risk marginalizing itself in nuclear talks over the issue.

"Most rational human beings would assume that having nuclear weapons and other sorts of missiles pointed at your country would be a much greater threat from a hostile and unpredictable country than the fate of a handful of people," he says.

"Everyone wanted North Korea to be the odd one out [in these talks]. Then for a while it was the United States and Japan that seemed to be the most hard-line. Now the Bush administration has compromised, it leaves Japan all by itself."

Jason Miks is a Tokyo-based writer and senior editor with the Center for International Relations.