Guam Buildup :: General Conroy testimony

U.S. commander indicates change to planned force realignment in Japan
Jun 5 08:54 AM US/Eastern

WASHINGTON, June 5 (AP) - (Kyodo)—U.S. Marine Corps Commander Gen. James Conway on Thursday indicated a need to modify the plan to transfer U.S. Marines from Japan's Okinawa Prefecture to Guam by 2014.

"We have some modifications we think are worthy of consideration," he said in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, citing concerns about the concomitant relocation of facilities at the Marines' Futemma Air Station in the same prefecture.

"This Futemma replacement facility has to be indeed a fully capable replacement for what we're giving up on Okinawa," Conway said, adding, "We are concerned about training opportunities on Guam, in the nearby islands as well as the rest of the Asia-Pacific basin."

"So there are some things like that that we certainly want to see considered and negotiated as need be with the Japanese before we slap the table," he said.

The plan to move 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam is part of an agreement struck between the United States and Japan in May 2006 to realign the U.S. military presence in Japan by 2014.

Relocating the Marines to Guam is closely tied to another key element of the agreement -- transferring the U.S. Marine Corps Futemma Air Station's heliport functions from downtown Ginowan to Nago, both in Okinawa.

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D98KI70G0&show_article=1


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


Statement of
GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

before
The Senate Armed Services Committee
on
The Posture of the United States Marine Corps
4 June 2009

Realignment in the Pacific: Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI)
[Page 30]

The Defense Policy Review Initiative was established in 2002 by the United States and Japan as a means to review each nation’s security and defense issues. One of the key outcomes of this process was an agreement to move approximately 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. The movement of these forces will address encroachment issues facing Marines on Okinawa. Moreover, the relocation will afford new opportunities to engage with our partners in Asia, conduct multilateral training on American soil, and be better positioned to support a broad range of contingencies that may confront the region. Furthermore, the political agreements brokered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense provide for a long term presence of Marines on Okinawa as well as substantial financial support by the Government of Japan.

As can be expected with an effort of this scale and complexity, there are a number of challenges. Developing training areas and ranges on Guam and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands is a key pre-requisite for moving Marine forces to Guam. We also seek a contiguous base design on Guam where housing, operations, and quality of life facilities can be collocated. This will reduce the road traffic on Guam and provide for a better security posture. We have also found that collocated facilities — where Marines live and work — tend to be used more often, and serve to unify the military community.

We continue to work within the Department of Defense to align our training and installation requirements with ongoing environmental assessments and political agreements. Planned and executed properly, this relocation to Guam will result in Marine forces that are combat ready, forward postured, and value-added to U.S. interests in the Pacific for the next fifty years.

Prepared Statement: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2009/June/Conway 06-04-09.pdf


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


GENERAL JAMES T. CONWAY
The Senate Armed Services Committee
4 June 2009

Opening Remarks [excerpt]

The future posture of our Corps includes a realignment of Marine forces in the Pacific. As part of the agreement between Tokyo and Washington, we are planning the movement of 8,000 Marines off Okinawa to Guam. We support this move. However, we believe the development of training areas and ranges on Guam and the adjoining islands of the Marianas are key prerequisites to the realignment of our forces. We are actively working within the Department of Defense to align Marine Corps requirements with ongoing environmental assessments and political agreements.

42:00
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Webcasts/2009/June/06-04-09Webcast.htm


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


The Senate Armed Services Committee
4 June 2009

COMMITTEE Q&A

Senator Susan M. Collins (Maine)
[lowest ranking minority member]

Senator Susan M. Collins: General, there are press reports that the cost of moving 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam are far higher -- some five billion dollars higher -- than the Department of Defense had anticipated. In addition, the GAO has put out a report saying that it is going to cost $88 million more per year to have these Marines stationed in Guam rather than Japan. On top of the cost factors, we have the recent provocations by North Korea.

Should we be reconsidering the plan of moving some 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam?

Gen. James Conway: Ma'am, I think it is safe to say that The Quadrennial Defense Review will have that move as well as all other overseas infrastructure adjustments and costs under their consideration before they report out. I know there are special groups that are formed to discuss that .

So my recommendation would be to await the results and recommendations coming out of the QDR.

They are aware of these increased projections in cost associated with the move. They are also aware of some other problems that we have associated with the move with regard to training, with regard to quality of the Futenma replacement facility and all those things. I think they will be duly considered and there will be a recommendation coming out of the QDR on the move.

Senator Collins: Are you going to recommend a change in the plan?

General Conway: We have some modifications we think are worthy of consideration. And we have some keystone areas if you will. Again, this Futemma replacement facility has to be indeed a fully capable replacement for what we're giving up on Okinawa. We are concerned about training opportunities on Guam, in the nearby islands as well as the rest of the Asia-Pacific basin. So there are some things like that that we certainly want to see considered and negotiated as need be with the Japanese before we slap the table.

90:00
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Webcasts/2009/June/06-04-09Webcast.htm


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


Download Fact Sheet for 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20090429qdr.pdf

Quadrennial Defense Review fact sheet available
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123146950

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Fact Sheet Available
http://www.defenselink.mil/advisories/advisory.aspx?advisoryid=3105

Pentagon Begins New Quadrennial Defense Review, Nuclear Posture Review
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=54054

Wallace Gregson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

Advance Policy Questions for Wallace C. Gregson, Senate Armed Services Committee - Get more Business Documents

Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Subject: to consider the nominations of Wallace Gregson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Michael Nacht to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Ines Triay to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; Jo-Ellen Darcy to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI)
WITNESSES: THE NOMINEES TESTIFY

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building
11:15 A.M. EDT, Tuesday, April 28, 2009


Advance Policy Questions for Wallace C. Gregson
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

Perhaps more than with any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its operational contingencies?

The United States’ forward-basing strategy is critical to enable USPACOM’s execution of its operational contingencies given the importance of providing capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed, and sustained in a timely manner across a spectrum of contingencies.

What do you see as the implications of the proposed force structure changes, particularly in Korea, Japan and Guam, with respect to the Asia-Pacific region in general?

I believe U.S. posture changes in Korea and Japan contribute to strengthening our alliances and better positioning U.S. forces to ensure a more sustainable and capable regional force posture. By relocating U.S. forces, the United States will address longstanding host-nation concerns such as noise and encroachment withoutcompromising their missions. The moves also improve and enhance mutual defense infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large investment projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan. At the same time, the U.S. will make better use of Guam’s strategic advantages by arraying U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

How does the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve our security posture in the region?

This is the most comprehensive package of force posture changes in Japan and Guam in decades, and I believe that these initiatives will further several strategic goals. First, they will strengthen our alliance with Japan by addressing long-standing problems with our presence in Okinawa. Second, they will ensure the continued long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and in the Western Pacific. And third, by making better use of Guam’s strategic advantages, they will array U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in our force posture will have on the U.S. ability to defend South Korea and Japan or to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

These posture changes increase flexibility to respond when and where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen the United States’ overall capacity to deter coercive and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region. Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and strike capabilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground forces) forward in the Pacific as well as strategic mobility and command and control (C2) support from the United States—all of which are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-defense in contingencies. [Pages 14 and 15]

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States and Japan as outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document known as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and appropriate. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion’s share of the costs to develop new facilities. The GOJ also understood the strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that this move—which it explicitly sought—would not happen anytime soon without substantial investment on its part. Spending less than one percent of its gross domestic product on its national defense, yet desiring the continued regional presence of U.S. forces, Japan could also clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution to Japan’s own security and to overall alliance burdensharing. This decision was not without controversy in Japan, as it is highly unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—for a host country to pay for U.S. forces to relocate out of that country. It will be important for the Department of Defense to work closely with the GOJ on project scope, management, and other factors to minimize risks to the efforts. [Pages 28 - 29]

source: http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=3761