Wallace Gregson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

Advance Policy Questions for Wallace C. Gregson, Senate Armed Services Committee - Get more Business Documents

Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Subject: to consider the nominations of Wallace Gregson to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Michael Nacht to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs; Ines Triay to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management; Jo-Ellen Darcy to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI)
WITNESSES: THE NOMINEES TESTIFY

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building
11:15 A.M. EDT, Tuesday, April 28, 2009


Advance Policy Questions for Wallace C. Gregson
Nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs

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Force Posture in the USPACOM AOR

Perhaps more than with any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict. Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its operational contingencies?

The United States’ forward-basing strategy is critical to enable USPACOM’s execution of its operational contingencies given the importance of providing capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed, and sustained in a timely manner across a spectrum of contingencies.

What do you see as the implications of the proposed force structure changes, particularly in Korea, Japan and Guam, with respect to the Asia-Pacific region in general?

I believe U.S. posture changes in Korea and Japan contribute to strengthening our alliances and better positioning U.S. forces to ensure a more sustainable and capable regional force posture. By relocating U.S. forces, the United States will address longstanding host-nation concerns such as noise and encroachment withoutcompromising their missions. The moves also improve and enhance mutual defense infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large investment projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan. At the same time, the U.S. will make better use of Guam’s strategic advantages by arraying U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

How does the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve our security posture in the region?

This is the most comprehensive package of force posture changes in Japan and Guam in decades, and I believe that these initiatives will further several strategic goals. First, they will strengthen our alliance with Japan by addressing long-standing problems with our presence in Okinawa. Second, they will ensure the continued long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and in the Western Pacific. And third, by making better use of Guam’s strategic advantages, they will array U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in our force posture will have on the U.S. ability to defend South Korea and Japan or to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

These posture changes increase flexibility to respond when and where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen the United States’ overall capacity to deter coercive and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region. Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and strike capabilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground forces) forward in the Pacific as well as strategic mobility and command and control (C2) support from the United States—all of which are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-defense in contingencies. [Pages 14 and 15]

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Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States and Japan as outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document known as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and appropriate. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion’s share of the costs to develop new facilities. The GOJ also understood the strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that this move—which it explicitly sought—would not happen anytime soon without substantial investment on its part. Spending less than one percent of its gross domestic product on its national defense, yet desiring the continued regional presence of U.S. forces, Japan could also clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution to Japan’s own security and to overall alliance burdensharing. This decision was not without controversy in Japan, as it is highly unusual—perhaps even unprecedented—for a host country to pay for U.S. forces to relocate out of that country. It will be important for the Department of Defense to work closely with the GOJ on project scope, management, and other factors to minimize risks to the efforts. [Pages 28 - 29]

source: http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=3761