Why Pyongyang clings to its weapons

Apr 24, 2009
By Andrei Lankov

The recent missile test (or was it rocket launch?) once again put North Korea in the limelight - as was, no doubt, intended by Pyongyang's strategists. The launch produced an expected wave of chest-beating, vague (and meaningless) diplomatic threats and rhetoric, but nothing of substance. Even the United Nations Security Council failed to approve a resolution which would strengthen sanctions.

Finally, North Korean claimed it is leaving the six-party talks "forever". There are good reasons to doubt whether this decision is permanent - in all probability, it will be reversed for a hefty fee. Nonetheless, it is a major blow to the optimists who still believe the North Korean nuclear issue can be solved somehow, sometime.

The nuclear issue seems to be the heart of the controversy, while long-range missile launches are essentially a sideshow. It will take many years before North Korean missiles pose any credible threats to the country's neighbors (with the obvious exception of South Korea). Right now, North Korean missiles are unreliable, unwieldy, have very low accuracy and take days to be prepared for launch. On top of that, the North Koreans have not developed a nuclear device that is small and light enough to be mounted as a warhead.

Nuclear weapons seem to be an altogether different issue. Even without workable delivery systems, North Korean generals still can find a way to smuggle a crude nuclear device to, say, a Japanese or American port. The stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium is a potential threat, too. Finally, nuclear proliferation clearly constitutes a greater danger than the proliferation of missile technologies.

However, the new wave of the never-ending "North Korean crisis" also makes us wonder: what can the US and, more broadly speaking, the world really do about North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities? The honest answer is not much, or even nothing.

The rationale of the North Korean nuclear program

North Korean leaders are sometimes presented in media as madmen, as people driven by some irrational (or ideology-motivated) desire to look dangerous and create trouble. It is not the case. Their penchant for seemingly irrational and erratic behavior is illusionary: actually North Korean leaders know exactly what they are doing. They are not madmen or ideological zealots, but remarkably efficient and cold-minded, perhaps the most perfect Machiavellians of the modern world. Alas, this time their calculations seem to indicate that de-nuclearization will be a mistake.

To start with, the decision to go nuclear was not made overnight. The North Korean nuclear arms program was conceived in the late 1950s, began in earnest in the mid-1960s, and acquired military dimensions around 1980. In other words, the program has a long history, it is a result of decades of sacrifice and hard work.

From its inception, the program has served three distinct political goals. Each goal is important for Pyongyang, although their relative importance kept changing over time.

First, North Korea needs nuclear weapons as a powerful strategic deterrent. They are sincerely afraid of a foreign attack, and after Iraq and Afghanistan, such a fear can hardly be dismissed as paranoid and unfounded. The Pyongyang rulers believe - and ostensibly with good reason - that no nuclear-armed country will be invaded by any great power.

Second, the Pyongyang leaders need the nuclear weapons as a blackmail tool (well, an aid-maximization tool, if one prefers). Despite the bombastic propaganda, North Korean diplomats are painfully aware that their country is not a major international player. In terms of population size and economic significance, the closest analogue to their country is, of all places, Mozambique. Therefore, the major reason why the international community pays so much attention to North Korea is its nuclear and, to lesser extent, its missile program.

In other words, the existence of nukes means that every time North Korea has trouble getting aid, it starts making threatening noises. The North Korean strategists are afraid that without nuclear weapons, the world would become far less willing to satisfy their demands - and they are probably correct. Even if the surrender of nuclear weapons was likely to be rewarded with a large compensation payment, this lump sum money would not last forever. Meanwhile, the existence of nuclear weapons creates the opportunity for systematic and regular extortion.

Last but not least, the nuclear program has domestic importance. The nuclear test, held in a remote mountain area in October 2006, has actually been the only visible "success" of Kim Jong-il's rule. Pyongyang's propaganda now insists that the suffering and destitution of the past 15 years were a necessary sacrifice, voluntarily made by selfless North Koreans to safeguard their country and nation against enemies (above all, the "blood-thirsty Yankees" who dream about wiping out the entire Korean race). Surrender of the nuclear weapons would render this suffering and death meaningless.

These three goals are important to the regime, and it would agree to abandon these goals only under serious pressure or if seduced by sufficiently attractive incentives. Alas, no such incentive is in sight, and no pressure is likely to work either.

Why sticks are not big enough

The talk about the "red line" which should be drawn in dealing with North Korea implies that in some cases the US and the "international community" will exercise enough pressure on the country so it will have no choice but to surrender its nuclear program.

To start with, no military action against North Korea is thinkable. Air raids against nuclear installations (akin to the Israeli air raid on Iraq's nuclear-research center in 1981) will not be of much use. It is too late. Plutonium and nuclear devices are safely hidden in underground facilities. Destruction of research facilities in Yongbyon or elsewhere is not going to have a serious impact - after all, these facilities have fulfilled their mission. North Korea does not need many nuclear devices, it has produced enough to serve its political goals.

A large-scale invasion by ground forces is definitely a non-starter. If Americans and their allies chose to invade, they would likely win, but it is certain that the price of such victory would be very high.

An invasion would also encounter grave political problems, as South Koreans are unlikely to join such an undertaking. Actually, it is a rational choice: the South Korean public would prefer to live with the (very small) possibility of a North Korean nuclear strike rather than start a war in the vicinity of their major population centers. Unless faced with a clear and immediate danger, no South Korean government would (and should) be enthusiastic about joining such a hypothetical American invasion. But without South Korean support, land operations become very difficult.

One also cannot rule out that in the case of a US invasion that China and, perhaps even Russia, would cautiously support the North Korean armed forces with arms, ammunition and intelligence. Neither country is going to back a North Korean attack against the South, but in a hypothetical case of an invasion by the Americans, the North Koreans would be seen as victims of an aggression (with some justification, one should admit). It is likely that China would undertake some measures to make the situation even more difficult for their American rivals.

However, the major obstacle for an invasion is the North Korean army. It is badly trained and equipped, but it has been subjected to decades of brain-washing, has developed massive underground fortifications, and invested much in guerrilla training. The mountainous terrain of the country also favors defenders. On the final count, the US technical superiority would probably be decisive, but the political, financial and human costs of such a victory would be prohibitively high.

In this situation, sanctions appear to be the only realistic option. But their usefulness also is doubtful. First of all, sanctions are difficult to impose, since China and, to a somewhat lesser degree, Russia, would be unwilling to partake at a truly rigorous (read: efficient) sanctions regime.

However, in the improbable case of Chinese and Russian reluctance being overcome, the sanctions would still not likely influence Pyongyang's policy. Normally, sanctions work in an indirect way. Sanctions do not exercise direct influence on the lifestyle of the elite - those people still ride their Mercedes and drink their Hennessy cognac. It is the common population whose life becomes more difficult and challenging if the country is subjected to international sanctions. The strategy of economic sanctions is based on the assumption that a dissatisfied population would pressure the regime for a policy and/or regime change. This might take the shape of a popular revolution, but in the case of a more democratic and tolerant regime, it could be achieved via elections.

However, this mechanism is not likely to work in North Korea. The North Korean regime does not allow its people to have any say in matters of governance. North Koreans do not vote (well, they vote with predictable 100% approval of a single government candidate). They do not rebel either. They are terrified and isolated, have none of the rudimentary self-organization required to start a resistance and to a large extent are still unaware about any alternative to their mode of life (rumors about prosperous life outside North Korean borders are spreading, but only a minority of the North Koreans understand how backward and poor their society really is in comparison with its neighbors). Therefore, if sanctions are made successful, the only result would be the suffering and death of common people.

Why carrots are not tasty enough

The optimists who believe North Korea can be persuaded to abandon nuclear weapons usually cite three major incentives which could be put on the table: monetary payments and other aid (like, say, building light-water reactors); security guarantees and a normalization of relations with the US.

The aid and monetary payments are most welcome in Pyongyang, no doubt. Indeed, generous aid is the pre-condition of a regime's survival. However, a lump sum payment is not necessarily a solution. Once money is spent (and it would be spent quiet soon), the Pyongyang regime would have great difficulties in obtaining a sufficient amount of additional aid without an opportunity to use its nuclear potential as a way to press international donors.

At the same time, the North Korean leadership believes that it cannot initiate Chinese style-reforms, as the existence of dirty-rich and very attractive South Korea means such reform might become destabilizing and lead to collapse, East German-style. This means that they have to adhere to the old Stalinist model of a centrally planned economy (of an exceptionally rigid variety).

The promises of the security guarantee are also not attractive enough. There are two reasons why the security guarantees might be irrelevant. First, North Koreans deeply distrust Americans (and, broadly speaking, all foreigners), so they do not believe in the value of foreigners' promises, especially in a democratic system where leaders and policies are bound to change every few years. Second, they know that their major security threat is internal, not external. They are afraid of a US invasion, but they are even more afraid of a domestic crisis which might lead to their overthrow by their own population.

Needless to say, the US cannot provide them a guarantee against such an outcome, while the existence of nuclear weapons at least increases the North's ability to fend off unwanted intervention into their domestic crisis as well as their ability to extract aid which might help to prevent such a crisis.

Additionally, promises of "cooperation" are not particularly alluring to a regime which for many decades has done its best to remain as isolated as possible. The North Korean leaders suspect that all exchanges with the outside world are corrosive and ultimately destructive for their system, and they might be correct in this assumption.

Contours of possible compromise

Does this mean that compromise is completely impossible? It seems that it is not the case, even though the road to such a compromise may be long and winding. There is another problem: the only compromise solution which seems to be at least theoretically acceptable for the North Korean regime would be probably seen as unacceptable by the US side.

First of all, to achieve at least something, the US side should abandon any illusions about North Korea's willingness to completely surrender nuclear weapons. As shown above, "complete, verifiable and irreversible" de-nuclearization is an unattainable dream - at least as long as the Kim family regime stays in control in Pyongyang. Due to the reasons outlined above, North Korea needs to keep at least a part of its modest nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans might compromise on certain things (if they were paid well enough), but this is a non-negotiable bottom line.

If this is the case, what are the possible options for compromise? North Korea is likely to agree to dismantle its nuclear research facilities. After all, it does not need its old rusty reactors anymore. Yongbyon, the North Korean nuclear research center, cannot possibly produce more than Los Alamos in the US or Arzamas-16 in Russia, and it does not make much political sense to increase the North Korean nuclear arsenal further.

They already have enough nuclear devices to achieve the desirable political effect. If North Koreans use Yongbyon facilities to increase their nuclear armory from their current six to 15 devices to, say, 60 or 100 devices, their ability to deter and/or blackmail would not increase fivefold or tenfold. As a matter of fact, it would not increase much at all. So, the research and production facilities have outlived their usefulness and thus can be dismantled if the fee is sufficiently high.

Perhaps, North Koreans would agree to accept measures which would make proliferation less likely, thus addressing another major American concern. It is open to question which types of measures would become acceptable, but perhaps surprise inspections of ships and even airport facilities would be allowed (once again: North Korean diplomats would require a high price for such a major concession, actually infringing their sovereignty).

Partial surrender of nukes might be negotiable. Perhaps, North Korea could be bribed into giving up a part of its plutonium and/or a few nuclear devices.

However, this de-nuclearization, contrary to the US insistence, is not going to be either "complete" or "verifiable". North Korean leaders will need at least to maintain a high level of ambiguity about their nuclear capabilities - or, ideally, they would like to have an explicit or implicit admission that they would be allowed to keep some stockpile of plutonium and a couple of nuclear devices.

It remains doubtful whether such an outcome would be acceptable to the US, which will be expected to pay hefty fees for downsizing the threat while still living with nuclear North Korea. Perhaps, such a compromise is not even advisable, if judged from the American viewpoint - after all, it creates a dangerous precedent. It will mean that North Korea would be rewarded for its nuclear blackmail. In all probability, the total price they would extract from the US for the above-described compromise would exceed their spending on the nuclear program.

This is a very imperfect and partial solution, to be sure. It might be even seen as an unacceptable solution. Unfortunately, no other compromise seems to be in sight. So if the above-mentioned solution were rejected, we are likely to see years of negotiations, broken promises, false dawns, and still without any tangible result at the end - at least until the demise of the Kim family regime, which is perhaps an event of a rather distant future.

Andrei Lankov is an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, and adjunct research fellow at the Research School of Pacifica and Asian Studies, Australian National University. He graduated from Leningrad State University with a PhD in Far Eastern history and China, with emphasis on Korea. He has published books and articles on Korea and North Asia.