BY YOICHI KATOASAHI SHIMBUN SENIOR STAFF WRITER
2009/7/23
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell told The Asahi Shimbun in a recent interview that Washington embraces a proposal by Tokyo to reaffirm the significance of the bilateral security alliance to mark its 50th anniversary next year.
The proposed reaffirmation is being contemplated to keep the alliance solid at a time of an expected major political realignment and possible instability following the Lower House election to be held Aug. 30.
Campbell, who made his first regional tour after assuming his post in June, also discussed a wide range of bilateral security issues, including the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and the controversial plan to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Ginowan to Henoko in Nago, in Okinawa Prefecture.
Following are excerpts:
* * *
Question: Japan is undergoing unprecedented political realignment, and Joseph Nye said in his recent congressional testimony that it may cause friction in the alliance. Do you agree with his observation?
Answer: I agree, certainly, with the first part. I think we're heading into what could be a historic election in Japan. We are committed to begin a very serious process of sustained dialogue with Japanese interlocutors. I do think that it's important for us to have the broadest possible set of interactions, not only with the key bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry, but also with a broad range of political parties and political actors in Japan.
As to friction, are there issues that will have to be worked out? Absolutely, but the truth is that the United States stands ready to work with any government in Japan, and we have a high confidence that we're going to be able to establish a strong working relationship with whoever comes into power in Japan.
Q: But the reality may be, because of this political transition, that Japan will not have the kind of decision-making capability that the United States expects Japan to have for the next few years.
A: I've heard the argument that, in fact, it might be difficult for a new group of Japanese decision-makers to take action, but oftentimes it has turned out not to be true. So, I don't think we should believe, necessarily, that that is the case. And, no matter what, the best way to deal with a change in political complexion, on either side, is just much closer dialogue between the two countries. And that's what we're going to try to do. One of the things that I've been heartened by, very, very much, is the level and extent to which Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) friends and colleagues have been reaching out for dialogue with the United States. That suggests to me that, at a very deep and basic level, there is a belief that the alliance is central and critical.
And, what's different today than, say, during the 1990s, is that public opinion polls, on both sides, reflect a deep and abiding conviction that our relationship, as structurally constituted, provides a basis for peace and stability, and it is the best possible approach for how to conduct affairs in Asia, in both countries.
That was not the case in the 1990s. So, I'm actually much more hopeful today than I was just a decade ago.
Q: You don't think Japan will be marginalized because of this possible political stasis?
A: I don't buy the Japanese marginal talk, and I must also say, quite honestly, I sometimes hear, quietly, from Japanese friends, talk about a loss of confidence, in global politics.
Americans know what Japanese can do in global politics, at the United Nations, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, throughout Asia. Few countries make such a difference.
So, I would say one of the most important roles that the United States can play, over the course of the next several years, is to remind Japan of all that Japan has contributed, and to try to help them maintain the confidence which is essential for their role in global politics.
Q: One of the core alliance management issues is the relocation of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station. Would it be feasible or possible that Japan and the United States will find a middle ground to move forward, instead of just trying to stay with the road map that has been agreed upon?
A: There clearly is a complex and extremely detailed set of provisions associated with the move (of Marines) to Guam, and Okinawan developments, which have been painstakingly worked out through the previous administration in the United States, and are being followed, now, in the Obama administration.
Senior officials on the American side, President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have made very clear that we want to continue on with a plan that has been worked out, at enormous expense and sweat, on both sides.
On her trip here, Undersecretary of Defense Michelle Flournoy indicated that, yes, there may be some small things associated with the margins. But, in its broad-brush state, we believe that this is the best way forward.
Credibility of nuclear umbrella
Q: Some policy experts in Japan express concerns that if the United States scales back its nuclear arsenal, along with Russia, without involving China, the credibility of an American extended deterrence will be weakened and Japan will suffer the consequences. What do you think of this kind of argument?
A: It's an important argument and it's one that the United States is paying close attention to.
Let me just take a moment to underscore what I think are the several elements that go into our overall nuclear strategy, particularly as it pertains to Northeast Asia.
First and foremost, the United States could not have been more assertive and clear about the fact that we will not accept a nuclear North Korea. It is completely unacceptable. And that we will continue, in terms of our planning, to push forward on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
Second, there is a deep reflection and recognition that underscoring the importance of an extended deterrence is a clear and enduring mission of the United States, particularly in Asia. And so you're going to find that almost every senior interlocutor, in his or her meetings with the Japanese or Korean counterparts, underscores the importance of nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence, in the Asian context.
Third, at the same time, we've also tried to listen to Japanese calls to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in global politics, and that's why one of the things that was the most heartening to us was the Japanese response to the Prague speech by Obama.
It's clear that Japan seeks two things. One, a de-emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons and, two, an extended deterrent commitment on the part of the United States that will take us through this interim period.
So, if I could be so bold, I think we are following the script that Japan has asked for so many years.
I would also just underscore one larger point, as it relates to the overall level of arsenals. Even if the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) agreement (with Russia) goes through, the United States will have thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons. At this juncture, China still has a very small nuclear arsenal, and we will have overwhelming nuclear capabilities for the foreseeable future.
We believe we have everything necessary to provide reassurance, not only to Japan but any other country under the nuclear umbrella of the United States.
Q: What do you exactly plan to do to enhance the nuclear umbrella?
A: When I say "enhance," I think that means more about speaking out about it. Now, we're hearing more often from Japanese friends, across the political spectrum, that clear statements on the part of the United States will be essential. So, that's the step that we're talking, more in terms of our rhetorical position.
We don't feel that there needs to be any programmatic change in how we are deployed or the issues that we're doing vis-a-vis nuclear weapons, overall.
I think we have the appropriate deployments, the appropriate capabilities.
Q: The Op-Ed piece by Issey Miyake in The New York Times has ignited an enormous wave of expectation in Japan on nuclear disarmament. Many Japanese wish that President Obama would visit Hiroshima. In his Prague speech, Mr. Obama referred to the concept of moral responsibility of acts of the United States. How do you think the United States should and could substantiate his speech by actual action?
A: Well, let me just say, I think the president has stated, both publicly and privately, that he looks forward to an early visit to Japan. I saw the op-ed piece. I do believe that many of the sentiments that were expressed in that piece reflected the president's own thinking, and he advanced that, I think, very clearly and categorically, in Prague.
The most important things that the United States can do, going forward, however, will be not simply symbolic actions, but actually practical issues. What's going to be our strategy on the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty)? What steps can we take to prevent proliferation in Asia? What steps can we take to try to deter North Korea from its provocative path?
Q: Is it a viable option for the president to visit Hiroshima at some point?
A: I'm not in charge of the president's schedule. I'd rather not get into his schedule.
I do know that the president is looking forward to an early visit to Japan, and this set of issues will be part of a very broad set of discussions with the Japanese government.
Q: Another bilateral issue concerns the F-22 fighter jet. Do you think it's the time for Japan to give up the plan of procuring the F-22, once and for all?
A: I will say, generally speaking, that the president, the secretary of defense, and others at the most senior levels of the U.S. government have been categorical about the F-22, when it comes to the American force, and to the extent that message has been heard, it seems to me that we need a close and very careful consultation between the United States and Japan about the direction that Japan wants to go from here.
Reaffirmation of bilateral alliance
Q: Tokyo is sounding out the idea of issuing an alliance reaffirmation when President Obama visits Japan next year on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. Do you think it's a good idea?
A: Absolutely and unequivocally. I think it's a very important statement of what we've accomplished. And I think any kind of effort must have three components to it.
It must look back at all of our accomplishments, which are extraordinary. The U.S.-Japan relationship has been the most, in fact, important factor in the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. So, we need to look back.
We need to gauge our current setting at where the alliance has made contributions, and then we have to look forward at the things that we have to tackle more, as we move forward together.
I will tell you, just in the last several years, there have been new issues that have been added to the agenda that make this a much more pressing set of issues.
For instance, in 1996 (when the previous reaffirmation was drawn up), there was no mention or indication that an issue like climate change was a national security issue. Increasingly, it is so. And, the United States and Japan have to take important and critical measures to ensure that we're on the same track.
We are at the beginning stages of a process with Japanese interlocutors. I think some factors need to be worked out on the Japanese side. But, overall, we are committed, if there is a willingness, at some sort of process that affirms the U.S.-Japan security relationship and recognizes its 50-year history, yes, we're completely supportive of that.
Q: Another question is about a Japan-U.S.-China trilateral arrangement. You said in your congressional testimony on June 10 that the administration is in the initial stages of thinking what kind of diplomacy could be conducted in a trilateral context. What do you have in your mind specifically in this trilateral context?
A: In many respects, in Asia, "the meeting is the message." And so just the fact that the three countries would sit down together, I think, would send a very powerful message overall.
I also believe there are a lot of issues that need close coordination-- our respective roles in the global economic crisis, climate change and issues associated with regional stability and architecture.
And also just sort of broader political discussions about the world, about Afghanistan and Pakistan and energy. I think it would be extraordinarily valuable.
These have to be done, though, with a great deal of sensitivity.
My biggest concern right now, given heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, is that we can do nothing that in any way causes anxiety in South Korea.
Q: What is your assessment of the Kim Jong Il regime right now and how do you think we can "reboot" the six-party talks, from here.
A: Look, we are proceeding on a two-track basis right now. The first track, as senior administration officials have indicated, is that we're working through the United Nations and bilaterally, to put pressure on North Korea, vis-a-vis sanctions and other efforts. We're grateful that a country like South Korea has joined the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative).
At the same time, we want to be clear about the second track, that we keep the door open. If North Korea is prepared to return to a multilateral framework, in which the countries of Northeast Asia can express their concerns, but also their vision of a new kind of Northeast Asia, we would be prepared to do that, and, within that context, entertain bilateral discussions between the United States and North Korea.
At the same time, we recognize that any such approach has to have the full confidence and support, after extensive consultations with Japan and South Korea, and we are committed to that.(IHT/Asahi: July 23,2009)
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