By Geoff Dyer in BeijingPublished: December 29 2009 17:47 |
Last updated: December 29 2009 22:25
The latest issue of Orbis, a foreign policy journal in the US, carries an article with the alarming title: “How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015.”
In the piece, James Kraska, a former adviser to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes an imaginary future battle in which China outguns the American navy in the East China Sea.
“History shows how the maritime balance of power can shift suddenly, re-arranging [the] global order,” he writes. “The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of US dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China’s position as the Asian hegemon.”
Defence literature is full of fantasies about imminent battles, and China has always attracted this sort of attention. But for all that, the article does illustrate one of the most important and least observed points about China’s dramatic rise, as well as raising a key question about the coming decade.
During the past 10 years, China has embarked on a rapid modernisation of its armed forces – with the navy at the forefront of its expansion drive. During the next decade, Chinese leaders will start to make important decisions about the country’s navy. These will provide an insight into what sort of global power China hopes to become and whether it really intends to present a challenge to US military dominance.
“In the next three to five years, Chinese Communist party elites probably will make the decisions determining the direction of naval power projection for the next two to three decades,” says Cortez Cooper, an analyst at the US-based Rand Corporation think-tank.
A significant part of Beijing’s naval modernisation has been aimed at the traditional military priority of Taiwan, improving China’s “sea denial” operations, potentially to prevent the US from getting involved in any conflict over the island. US analysts have highlighted the anti-ship ballistic missiles that China is developing, as well as the fleet of silent diesel submarines, both of which could substantially increase the nation’s ability to deter US involvement.
However, during the past decade, Beijing has also outlined an important shift in naval strategy well beyond the Taiwan issue. In 2004, President Hu Jintao gave a speech outlining a series of “historical missions” for the armed services, which placed great emphasis on the idea of defending China’s expanding national interests. A few months earlier, he talked about the country’s “Malacca dilemma”, pointing out that as much as 70 per cent of China’s imported energy came through the narrow sea lane between Indonesia and Malaysia. The clear implication of these speeches is that China needs expanded naval power to help protect its rapidly expanding economic interests.
Plenty of signs are evident that Beijing has been expanding its naval footprint. Skirmishes this year with US vessels in the South China Sea have been taken in some quarters as a sign that China is taking a more confrontational approach to defending its perceived interests in that area. Moreover, Beijing’s investments in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Burma have raised fears – especially in India – that China is seeking to develop a series of naval bases in the Indian Ocean.
Some analysts express caution against overstating China’s naval prowess. Even sending a small group of ships to take part in anti-piracy operations off the east coast of Africa this year proved to be a large logistical challenge for the Chinese navy.
“China lacks many of the capabilities to project power abroad,” says David Shambaugh, a China specialist at George Washington University in the US.
Yet several big Chinese decisions are looming that could shift the debate – most notably over whether to invest heavily in aircraft carriers that would allow China to project naval power far beyond its territorial waters. Beijing has made no secret of its plan to build an aircraft carrier. The big question is whether it invests in one or two vessels that would expand its reach in Asia, or in a much larger fleet of carrier groups that could take on a global role and potentially rival the US navy.
How this debate will play out in Beijing remains unclear. There are voices saying that Chinese economic development will be hampered if the country does not invest heavily in naval power.
Others believe, however, that given the huge social challenges facing the country, which has vast numbers of people not far out of poverty, building a large carrier fleet is an unnecessary burden.
“The focus of our foreign policy will be in assisting development, not in signing up to expensive new commitments,” says Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at People’s University in Beijing.
Or as another Chinese academic, who asked not to be named, says of protecting seaborne trade: “Why should we spend billions of dollars paying for something that is already being paid for?” Largely paid for, he did not need to mention, by the US.
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