Akitoshi Muraoka
Ensuring the security of their country is the task every national leader should place utmost importance on. For leaders of Japan, this key mission involves pursuing two largely incompatible goals: maintaining the conflict deterrence provided by the presence of U.S. forces in this country, and alleviating the burden this presence places on the people.
When Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama promised to move U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station, located in Okinawa Prefecture's densely populated Ginowan area, "out of the prefecture at the very least," he had no prospect of living up to the pledge.
Sure enough, in announcing the latest Japan-U.S. agreement on the Futenma issue on Friday, Hatoyama had to admit there was no other option than to return to an existing accord stipulating a replacement facility be built in Henoko, in Nago in the prefecture, and adjacent waters.
Given China's military buildup and a recent spate of menacing moves by North Korea, it is natural that the government put priority on pleasing the United States in deciding the relocation site.
But the government's dithering for more than eight months over the matter caused needless confusion within political circles and among the general public, making a tricky issue even more difficult to put to bed.
Hatoyama's way of doing things has also caused awkwardness in the Japan-U.S. alliance, eroded Okinawa people's confidence in the government and driven the Social Democratic Party from the Democratic Party of Japan-led ruling coalition.
His self-determined deadline for settling the Futenma issue "by the end of May" ended in failure.
The prime minister said he would "stake my job" on his ability to provide a satisfactory outcome on the Futenma issue. How is he going to take responsibility for the debacle it has become?
The plan to which Hatoyama has reverted--moving the Futenma airstrip to Henoko--was officially agreed by the Japanese and U.S. governments in 2006 after years of bilateral consultations. It is a realistic solution to the relocation problem that does everything possible to balance the conflicting goals of maintaining deterrence and lightening Okinawa's burden as a host of U.S. bases.
Even though the 2006 plan was made before the DPJ came to power in September, international politics holds as a matter of basic common sense that a new government should follow its predecessor on fundamental diplomatic and security policies.
To date, Hatoyama has failed to give any explicit explanation as to why his government continually makes a point of denying the wisdom of the previous government's diplomatic and national security policies.
The prime minister had at least two clear chances, in autumn last year and again in December, to finish the Futenma issue. At those times, both the Okinawa prefectural government and the Nago municipal government were basically in favor of the plan agreed in 2006.
So, what happened? How did things become so complicated?
Did the Hatoyama government simply not want to adopt a policy formed under the Liberal Democratic Party?
Or was Hatoyama so complacent as to presume the United States would accept his requests to move the Futenma facility outside Okinawa Prefecture, or even outside Japan?
The pet theme of the Hatoyama Cabinet has been "politician-led handling of government affairs," a policy that has repeatedly proven flawed. In this case, the Cabinet didn't listen to firsthand advice from working-level bureaucrats involved in researching candidate replacement sites under the LDP administration. Instead, the government started anew, sounding out local authorities about hosting the base, only to be flatly rejected by every one.
Because of a lack of leadership, coordination between Cabinet members involved was ramshackle. Social Democratic Party leader Mizuho Fukushima was understandably dismissed from the Cabinet for refusing to endorse the new bilateral relocation agreement.
But others, too, including DPJ Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, should be brought to task for allowing the SDP, which has only 12 seats in the lower house and House of Councillors combined, to have a disproportionately big say on the all-important issue of national security.
The DPJ, absorbed in its bid to hold onto power, has put excessive emphasis on securing the SDP's cooperation in the coming upper house election.
Hatoyama's deeply troubling admission that "the better informed I become on security affairs, the more I understand [how U.S. marines are] contributing to maintaining deterrence," shows the prime minister's knowledge about the fundamentals of national security is seriously lacking.
In addition to such ignorance, Hatoyama's political style is characterized by the idea that any political policy contrary to those adopted in the past by the LDP can be assumed to be good. He is complacent, but with no convincing reason. And he is responsible for a string of policy-management mistakes made in the name of "politician-led handling of government affairs."
Every one of these propensities points to Hatoyama's flagrant lack of the sense of responsibility required to steer a government.
It is imperative to gain Okinawa residents' consent to the Japan-U.S. accord on the Futenma transfer, so it can be put into effect without wasting more time. The question is, can such a task be undertaken by a prime minister who does not have the people's trust?
Now is the time for leaders of the DPJ and its coalition partners to give that question serious thought.
Muraoka is political news editor of The Yomiuri Shimbun.
(Jun. 1, 2010)
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